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Glossary of Terms 
Glossary of Gestalt Therapy Terms 
Creative AdjustmentThis is the expression used in PHG to designate what happens 
When there is 'contact'. It is at once the act of taking up and 
giving out. For instance, ' ..... the change of attitude of a patient, 
when he turns his aggression from himself towards his introjects in 
order to assimilate them or regurgitate them, is a change of 
reality.'( PHG, p.276). 
Experiments 
Fixed Gestalt 
Parlett (2000) takes up this rich notion and enlarges it: 'Creative 
adjustment must also encompass the reciprocal nature of self and 
field process' (p.20). He develops this to show how every event 
admits of 'five dimensions of adjustment: responding, interrelating, 
self-recognising, embodying and experimenting'. His concern is 
primarily with creative adjustment in the global field. 
These are strategies which the therapist may suggest to the client in 
order to assist her in coming to awareness of particular attitudes or 
behaviours. The prototypal experiment is to ask the subject to 
make up a series of sentences beginning with the words: "Here-
and-now I am aware that ...... ". The therapist continually relates 
back to what the client is aware of (Yontef 1993, p.60). The aim of 
the experiments is not to foster a particular behaviour or attitude 
but to discover it and allow it to come into awareness. 
This is used to describe a pseudo-resolution of a problem 
For instance a child experiences difficulty in receiving loving 
attention from his mother. But he discovers that ifhe acts very 
young - baby-talk, lisping, regressed behaviour- he receives more 
VII 
attention. So, his resolution of the problem is to become a baby 
again and sacrifice his growing-up and independence for the sake 
of more attention. He gets fixed in this pattern which will take 
different forms as he grows up. It may even enter into his choice 
of marriage partner. 
Gestalt Experience Gestalt therapy views every event in human life as passing through 
Cycle phases towards completion (Clarkson 1989, p.27). When the cycle 
is 'an uninterrupted flow of experience' it leads to health. The 
healthy cycle characterised as 'action, contact, choice and 
authenticity' (loc. cit. P.41).(cfH.P.pp.16; 17;30-34;255;263 ;275) 
The unhealthy cycle is characterised as' stasis, resistance, rigidity 
and control, often with anxiety' (Clarkson, loc. cit. p.4I). 
The cycle stages can be envisaged as follows (I take this from 
Korb, Gorrell and Van de Riet (1989, p.2S): 
Rest (field undifferentiated) - need emergence, sensation or 
arousal - Scan: awareness or thought - Choice: mobilisation of 
energy - Contact: movement or action - Assimilation or Rejection: 
awareness or thought - Satisfaction: fulfilment - Withdrawal: 
energy inward - Rest. 
An example of the Gestalt Experience Cycle could be this You are 
writing an essay on a hot summer's afternoon. You hear the ice 
cream van (need emergence). You would love an ice-cream 
(sensation). You think - 'yes, the money is there' and you choose 
to buy one. So you leave your desk, take the money (mobilisation 
of energy) - (contact) buy the ice cream and start eating it 
(assimilation). You return to your desk. 'Ah, that was good l ' 
(satisfaction). Now you let go of the ice-cream delight 
(withdrawal) and settle back to work. This cycle marks immediate 
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Immediacy, 
here-and-now 
Immanent 
Interruptions to 
Contact 
and long tenn needs - such as writing a PhD. thesis. Failure to 
complete leaves the person with unfinished business, which can 
sap his or her energy. 
Gestalt therapy is more interested in process than in content. 
So the therapist is interested to note how the client carries herself, 
what her voice is like (is it open or withholding?), - the sense he 
has of her presence, the feelings that arise in him as he meets her. 
He notes what use she makes of the facilities in the therapy room; 
does she use the cushions or just accept the chair as it is and so on? 
This kind of 'observation' might easily be mistaken for intrusive 
spectatoring. The therapist will not 'note' his observations at the 
time but only later, and reflect on them. And they will concern him 
as much as his client. The criterior of how successful he is in this 
kind of immediacy will be the effect on the client. Does she feel 
scrutinized or does she feel seen and accepted? 
This means 'remaining within'. Its root is the Latin verb 'man eo', 
'I remain'. Used in this sense it especially refers to states of 
consciousness, which are not adequately articulated in dialogue 
with 'the world'. We must be careful here of dualistic thinking -
as if the world was separate from the perceiver. 
Distinguish 'immanent' from 'imminent' which means to threaten, 
e.g. disaster is imminent; and also from 'eminent' which means 
'outstanding', e.g an eminent physician. 
Gestalt therapy views a person's unhealthy life as being 
maintained in that condition at least partly by that person himself. 
Therapy helps the person to become aware of how he is 
maintaining his dysfunction. This will frequently be in terms of 
the way he maintains his favourite interruption to contact. 
IX 
Here is a brieflist of some of those interruptions. 1 take the names 
from Clarkson (1989) and the brief explanation of them from 
Parlett (unpublished ms. 1993). The examples are mine: 
Desensitization: the person tunes out unacceptable input 'I 
can't be bothered'. 
Confluence: 
Deflection: 
Introjection: 
Projection: 
Retroflection: 
Egotism: 
avoidance of facing up to disagreements and 
differences. 'The more we are together the 
happier we will be' (provided I submerge my 
identity!). 
reframing. 'Do you love me? It depends on 
what you mean by "love"'. 
taking on board wholesale and unaware. 
Swallowing down without discernment. 'The 
Bible clearly states ..... '. 
creating constructions of external reality and 
acting as if they were 'true' - not my 
constructions. 'You're angry at mel' 
Holding in, holding back. 'What's wrong? 
You've been silent the whole evening?' 
'Nothing!' 
Examining navel, self-spectatoring 
Woody Allen: 'My girl and I are making great 
progress in our sexual relationship last night 
we only twice had to consult the manual'. 
All of these have their polarities - which also interrupt contact 
For instance confluence interrupts contact by blotting out one's 
personal identity; but the polarity is inability to go along with 
anything - extreme individualism. 
x 
I-Thou One of the signal developments in Gestalt therapy since its 
inception in the 1950' s has been the development of a clear 
teaching relating to Martin Buber's philosophy of I-Thou as the 
goal of Gestalt therapy. A great impetus was given in this 
direction by the pioneering work ofLynn Jacobs whose doctoral 
dissertation was entitled I-Thou Relation in Gestalt Therapy 
(1978). Yontefin 1981, in an unpublished but widely circulated 
paper which he subsequently published in 1983 (in Germany) and 
then again in English 1993, makes extensive use of Jacobs' 
dissertation. This article ofYontef places the I-Thou relationship 
right at the centre of Gestalt therapy. He expressly identifies 1-
Thou dialogue with the older nomenclature' existential encounter'. 
Jacobs (1995) says: 'The I-Thou relation or dialogue can be seen as 
a specific form of the contacting process between two people, 
through which each person realises most fully his or her distinct 
humanity' ( p.53). Notice her allusion to the text of Martin Buber 
(1923/1996, pp.Sl-S2). Vontef, Hycner (1995) and Jacobs all 
make the point that whereas the I-Thou moment, so beautifully 
described in Buber's work, may not feature as an on-going event in 
the therapy, it is essential to Gestalt therapy that openness to the 
development of such 'between' moments features as an on-going 
atmosphere. 
Jacobs distinguishes I-Thou and I-It relationships. The first has no 
correlation of use; the second has. To make the achievement of an 
I-Thou moment a goal is self-defeating. I-Thou is 'given'. The I-It 
on the other hand is easily achieved: 'We only need to fill each 
moment with experiencing and using, and it ceases to bum' (Buber 
loco cit. p.Sl). 
XI 
Organismic 
Self-regulation 
Splitting 
Jacobs' allusion to Buber in the quote from her 1993 chapter, is to 
that memorable utterance at the end of Part I when Buber says: 
'And in all seriousness of truth, hear this: without It man cannot 
live. But he who lives with It alone is not a man' (loc. cit. supra). 
(Jacobs using the Kaufman translation, says 'human' instead of 
'man'.) 
A person in his life can be driven by a collection of 'oughts' that 
have buried themselves in his thinking and supply him with a 
series of automatic responses to situations: 'You should not be 
happily enjoying yourself playing with the cat and the children; 
you ought to be mowing the grass for your mother, now that your 
Dad is dead' . 
The opposite of this 'shouldism' is what PHG calls 'organismic 
self-regulation'. The principle here is that: 'If things are let be, 
they will spontaneously regulate themselves; and if they have been 
deranged, they will tend to right themselves' (pHG, 294-5). 
Yontef(l993, p.214-6) develops this notion: 'Organismic self-
regulation is based on acknowledging the complete array of 
sensory, mental and emotional data concerning both one's internal 
needs and the needs of the environment, and also, the internal and 
environmental resources'. This notion is basic to Gestalt therapy 
as a process that continually adjusts itself to the reality of the client 
as contrasted with the imposition of some programme of self-
improvement. 
When we speak of personality disorders we are speaking of people 
whose process of splitting has taken them to an extreme. If the 
way in which a person organizes the basic components of his 
experience becomes so fixed and inflexible that his social and 
XII 
Zeigarnik Effect 
professional functioning is affected and high levels of distress are 
experienced, then that person is said to have developed, over time, 
a personality disorder. So it can happen that someone can swing 
from telling you that they owe their life to you and that they will 
hold you in gratitude for the rest of their days, to denouncing you 
as trying to destroy them. So, you have become demonized 
overnight. Such a person cannot hold the good and bad in one 
person together; they split themselves. 
Yontef: 'In Gestalt therapy dichotomizing is considered a basic 
aspect of all psychopathology ..... ' (1993, p.462). 
The basis of splitting is a denial or disavowal of the body -
because it is through our senses that the world, good or bad, 
pleasant and unpleasant, gentle and rough, that we are 'in contact' 
with the world - and that the world is in contact with us. Kepner 
devotes the whole of his Body Process (1987) to this problem of 
the denial of embodiment. He says: 'The self and contact 
functions are one and the same to the Gestalt (therapy) view' (loc. 
cit. p.11). 
(Clarkson, P. 1989, p.6). Zeigarnik (1900-1988) was one of Kurt 
Lewin's students in the Berlin Institute of Psychology in the 
1920's (Mazure, 1996, p.1S). She did a famous study on the effect 
of the 'unfinished' on a person's life. While there is 
incompleteness in my life I remain uneasy - always trying to 
complete. For instance, unless the divorced couple have properly 
processed their parting they may spend many years trying to 
complete it under different guises, - through lawyers, messages 
through the children- ostensibly trying to right an injustice. The 
incompleteness is in the person's body who cannot bring himself to 
say Good-Bye - and mean it. This can become totally devouring of 
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their lives (Alvarez, A.1981, pp.2Sf). Without the language of 
Good-bye and all that means, there can be no end to mourning, 
because I can never take possession of my being-in-the-world. 
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PART TWO 
A Glossary of Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy 
Acquired world(s) An example of an acquired world would be that of a person who 
knows how to play the church-organ. The body of such a person 
has introjected, or made its own the world of organ-playing. She 
can go to any church-organ anywhere and after a few minutes of 
adjustment she feels at home with that world. 
Anonymity 
'An acquired world confers upon my experience its secondary 
meaning' (phP.p. 130;FI51). 
So when I chat with a friend, whom I know well, each of his 
remarks and each of mine contains a host of references to his 
character and mine, without our needing to recall previous 
conversations with each other. 
This is a recurring theme in Merleau-Ponty around the experience 
of perception: 'Every perception takes place in an atmosphere of 
generality and is presented to us anonymously' (PhP. p.2IS; F249). 
Merleau-Ponty explains this by placing perception as an act of the 
lived body: 'In perception ..... we are given over to the object and 
we merge into this body which is better informed than we are 
about the world .... ' (PhP p.238; F275). 
The anonymity in perception marks the ever-present 'object side' 
of the act. We find, sometimes, that things are more difficult and 
complicated than we thought; like DIY. In our every perception we 
are given 'an inexhaustible object and we are sucked into it ... ' 
(loc cit). 
xv 
Autochtonous 
Being 
'So if I wanted to render precisely the perceptual experience, I 
ought to say that one perceives in me, and not that I perceive' (PhP 
p.215; F249). 
This is a principle which states that the Gestalt or phenomenon 
organizes itself and generates its own internal coherence; the 
perceptual meaning, the configuration of parts with the Gestalt 
contexture is intrinsic to the sensuous content. Just as my body can 
be said to have an autochtonous significance, in that all its parts 
cohere in a unity, so the things 'in the world' have such a 
significance. Think of a poem and how each word, line, stanza, 
their position, sound and selection creates that internal coherence. 
A corollary of this is the irreducibility of the Gestalt or 
phenomenon. If you start to explain how it is only an appearance-
under-written by a deeper or even inaccessible reality, then the 
phenomenon disintegrates. The principle of autochtonous 
organisation is basic to holism. 
I follow Mallin by using 'Being' when I speak of Being itself, 
apart from its specification. A specification of Being is an instance 
of it -like a person; 'being' is when I speak of it as realized in 
this or that - again like a person or an animal. So, I say a tree is a 
'being'. It is just there: 'That which appears to us and 
consciousness as universal fact' (PhP p.397; F455). 
At the same time being is that which 'runs through me without my 
being the author of it' (PhP. p.216;F2S0). Here it is specified. 
Merleau-Ponty sometimes uses 'being-in-truth' for that experience 
of belonging-in-the-world which we call 'primordial contact' and 
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Cogito 
which specifies itself in our every act. For instance, if! am seeing 
something, then, whereas my certainty about what I see may be 
open to question, the fact of my seeing it is not. 'Being-in-the-truth 
is not different from being-in-the-world' (phP p.395; F452). 
For Merleau-Ponty 'the Being of every being is to be found in its 
articulations rather than in its substance or matter' (Mallin 1979 
p.65). This is the manifestation and totally necessary character of 
Being - that it moves to uttering itself So speech is not just an 
added capacity to our human nature, it is constitutive of it. 
This is Latin for 'I think'. It has been made famous by Descartes 
utterance 'Cogito, ergo sum '. In his search for what he could be 
absolutely certain about, his meditations brought him to this point, 
the only thing he could be quite sure about. He was mistaken: it 
was not the most primitive 'experience' but is and was, in fact, 
content-laden and presupposes a prior or primordial contact with 
the world. 
If Descartes' 'Cogito' stands as the originating source for all 
perception, then we are each possessed of a constituting 
consciousness, which occupies some god-like position with regard 
to the world - this source must possess previously all the structures 
in itself and there is no real place for the body in the act of 
perception. 
'Critical Problem' This is the term applied to the question: Is the world that I perceive 
real? And then it is possible to ring the changes on this formulation 
by distinguishing 'real' e.g. Real-like, I am real? Real -like an 
idea is real? Real- like a dream? And so forth. 
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Dasein 
The 'critical problem' does not feature as part of Existential 
Phenomenology because it can only be formulated with a 
philosophical system which does not take its notion of perception 
from the way perception actually happens. For existential 
phenomenology, knowledge happens as intentionality; that is, as 
my movement towards the world, which is already given to me; 
but there can be no intentionality without a real world. So 
existential phenomenology cannot raise the' critical problem' -
except as 'someone else's problem' (cfLuijpen 1972, p.1D2). 
This term is taken from Heidegger's Being and Time (192711973) 
and is the subject of the analysis he makes in that work. It means 
'there-being'and describes the human condition. We find ourselves 
'there'. (Which is an implied reference to the body.) The 
characteristic ofDasein (every man) is the permanent relationship 
of instability which continually meets him with regard to himself 
His existence is always 'in the making'. 'He is fundamentally a 
power-to-be' (de Waelhens 1946, p.26). According to Mallin, 
Merleau-Ponty was very profoundly influenced by Heidegger. 
Determined World This is an example ofa 'natural attitude' which thinks of the world 
as already set and fixed in its identity before it falls under my gaze. 
In this view the world and its things are all displayed before me 
like goods in a supermarket. It is challenged by such a simple 
thing as a child entering a room and seeing an armchair as a toy. 
The world is neither entirely just my interpretation nor entirely 
alien to me. Merleau-Ponty sees the world as awaiting our 
designation, it is 'an incomplete work'. 
Existential Regions These 'regions' I take from Mallin's comprehensive sketch of how 
XVIn 
Facticity 
Merleau-Ponty conceives of Existence. It is a way of thinking 
aaout the complex act that we call perception. Not everything we 
do or get caught-up-in is primarily perceptual; but it only comes to 
light as part of our world when it enters 'the perceptual region' . 
These regions are not separate nor distinct in reality; they flow into 
one another and overlap; they are ways in which we think of our 
engagement with the world. Each of these four regions has its own 
'primordial contact with Being' (PhP. p 221;F255). 
They are the (1) cognitive/linguistic; (2) motile (3) intersubjective 
and (4) perceptual regions. He calls these the 'thrown regions'; one 
can take this, as some Gestalt therapy writers do, in the sense of the 
cruelty or the fecklessness of fate; or one can take it in the sense 
that Mallin does - following Merleau-Ponty - that a particular 
world is given to me and is almost awaiting my coming. Mallin 
says: 'The core idea ofthrownness is that there is meaning in the 
world before I initiate it, but at the same time this meaning 
discloses my "connaturality'" (1979, p.42). 
To say that I have a visual field is to say: 
'That I have access to and an opening upon a system of beings, 
visible beings .... In virtue of a kind of primordial contact and 
through a gift of nature, with no effort on my part .... That I am 
able, being connatural with the world to discover a sense in certain 
aspects of being without myself having endowed them with it 
through any constituting operation' (PhP. p.214-7;F248). 
This term is used a lot by Heidegger (1927/73, p.82). It indicates a 
condition of a person that has actually taken place in which he/she 
is 'given' a situation so that they have to respond in some way. I 
have been brought up speaking English; it just happened that way 
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Fundierung or 
'founding term' 
Given 
- we can imagine that it need not have happened that way - but 
once it happens, it cannot unhappen - it becomes necessary. It 
almost corresponds to our expression: 'The fact of the matter is 
.... ' (and we state an irreconciable, undeniable event). 
Where does our knowledge get its validity from? What is the 
bottom line for all our theoretical constructs? 
Merleau-Ponty makes use of this concept ofjundierung or 
founding term. He calls it 'a meeting of the human and non-
human' (PhP p.403; F462). 
What is it that actually roots our dialogue in reality? 
'It is consciousness at the level of perception ... " 'the silence that 
is prior to expression and categorical (using concepts) thought' 
(Dillon 1992, p.195). Note that this silence is not emptiness but 
fullness; it is an opening upon the world which is given me in my 
body (how else?). The silence is my presence to myself 
simultaneous with my presence to the world and the world's 
presence to me. Dillon describes this as a relationship of 
'asymmetrical reciprocity' (loc. cit.). It is similar to father and son. 
The father 'founds' the son; so the son is founded; but the father 
could not be a father without the son. Similarly, our knowledge 
gets its validity from the world; but the world would not be a world 
without us. Such is the closeness of our union with the world, 
which is given us in our bodies. 
Merleau-Ponty very frequently uses this term in conjunction with 
the 'anonymity', 'opaqueness' of perception. It really amounts to 
'thrownness'. It always involves a situation which implies a 
response to otherness. This expression articulates Merleau-Ponty' S 
teaching that even our most developed knowledge ultimately 
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Hermeneutics 
Intentionality 
derives from our senses-in-contact-with-the-world (Mallin 1978, 
p.41). 
Hermes was the messenger of the gods in Greek mythology. He 
not only repeated their message verbatim, but took it on himself to 
interpret the message. This describes the twofold task of 
hermeneutics: accuracy of text and discovery of meaning (cf 
Bleicher 1980, p.11). This science of textual reading and 
interpretation grew up first of all, as a result of the Reformation in 
the 16th Century; thereafter it was very much focused on the 
reading of sacred texts, particularly the Bible. It has a bearing on 
Gestalt therapy through its importance in existential 
phenomenology (cfBrooke 1993, p.8). Every metaphor, every 
image, every poem, every phenomenon reveals and conceals at the 
same time. The tension between revelation and concealment is the 
business of existential phenomenology. So it is we get 'the 
hermeneutic circle'; this is a method of carefully describing the 
phenomenon by returning repeatedly 'to the phenomenon so that it 
may show itself in ever deeper, richer and more subtle ways' 
(Brooke 1993, p.31). This involves constantly bracketing one's 
own prejudices and theories, and allowing oneself to be constantly 
corrected and taught by the phenomenon. 
In phenomenology this word designates knowledge itself-it 
signifies 'reach-out-to-and-receiving-from' the world. Knowledge 
in phenomenology is not viewed as a storing up of images, 'but the 
immediate presence of the subject as a kind of "light" to a present 
reality'. The world resides in me through my movement towards it. 
You buy yourself a new toothbrush and a tube of toothpaste; you 
unwrap them and bring them to the bathroom. As you mount the 
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Intersensory 
stairs you picture the old toothbrush and the old squeezed-out tube 
of toothpaste and an intention forms itself in you: 'I'll put them 
both in the bin'. That intention informs your body as you go to the 
bathroom. Your body prepares itself for the action ofbining the 
old toothbrush and tube. Intentionality makes this action possible. 
So here is a way of conceiving of the lived body, a potentiality for 
a host of possible projects. This is why Merleau-Ponty says that I 
am given to myself as an 'I can' rather than as an 'I am' 
(PhP.p.137;FI60). 
Intentionality is almost indistinguishable from the existential 
region of motility: 
'My body is a movement towards the world and the world my 
body's point of support ' (PhP p.350; F402). As soon as I tum 
myself in a particular direction, for example, to speak to someone, 
then every cell in my body begins to make ready for that project. 
A speech therapist working with someone who experiences 
swallowing difficulties, will coach the person how to form an 
intention of swallowing. The preparation of the swallowing 
mechanism takes time, and to surprise it could result in the person 
suffering a severe episode of choking. 
This term we apply to the continual flow of information that goes 
on between the sense functions. Empirical studies have shown that 
there is continuous communication between the cells of our body. 
This is well documented in Rossi (1993). 
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Lived Body 
Natural Attitude 
This is the human body, carrying as it does all the adornments and 
limitations that characterize our bodies. The lived body carries the 
whole of our history and the inherited history of our family and 
friends and relations. It is not the mechanical body of the institute 
of physiology, nor the idealized body of Greek sculpture. Such 
conceptions of the body do not carry the intentions of a person 
around his projects. The institute body and the ideal sculpture body 
do not inhere in the world. 
The lived body is at once reflection on its situations and 
spontaneously responsive. It is impossible to comprehend so long 
as 'mind' is in anyway distanced from flesh and 'so long as 
immanence and transcendence are regarded as mutually exclusive' 
(Dillon 1997, p.13l ft nt.). In other words the lived body is the 
resolution of the problem of dualism which has plagued 
psychotherapy since its beginning; one could say that to experience 
myself as a lived body is itself psychotherapy. 
This is Merleau-Ponty's expression - taken from HusserI, to 
describe that collection of beliefs about the world which a person 
has before they engage with phenomenology. He references these 
at length (PhP p.70-7l; F84-85). The natural attitude is expressed 
as "'I and my surrounding world"': 
'My recent awareness of my gaze as a means of knowledge, I now 
repress, and treat my eyes as bits of matter. They then take their 
place in the same objective space in which I am trying to situate 
the external object. ..... My duration (becomes) an abstract aspect 
of universal time, as my body is a mode of objective 
space' . (loc. cit. supra) 
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'Noumena' 
Ontology 
Opaqueness 
' .... Although it is presented to me from my own subjective first 
person singular point of view, I am myself a member of this world. 
The physical objects and other conscious beings within it exist 
whether I am conscious of them or not .... ' (Priest, 1998, p.l8) 
This is Kant's term for the realities that are totally inaccessible to 
our experience. He contrasts them with the 'phenomena' that we 
do experience. This view of perception is not congenial to Gestalt 
therapy because it means our sense of immediacy around clients is 
an illusion. 
This is the study of entities under the aspect of their being or 
existing. This contrasts with the study of things under the aspect of 
their utility. An example of the first is Heidegger's Being and 
Time in which the human being features as 'Dasein'; an example of 
the second is the study of agriculture. 
I go along with Mallin's distinction (p40 ft. note 21) in that 
METAPHYSICS includes ontology 'but ties this study to further 
investigation of being itself' . 
If you look at an orchid and hold your gaze and wonder at the 
flower then you may experience, after some time, that it is going 
away from you; that there is so much of it there, that you cannot 
take it in. This is an experience of the opaqueness that 
characterizes 'otherness'. What happens when we perceive 
anything is that we are seeing in it an aspect of the world as a 
whole. The structures of your senses, your vision, smell, feel, are 
held enthralled by the structures in the orchid. They are both the 
self-same, and have obtained throughout the world and were laid 
down in you during your history. 
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Phenomenal Field/ 
World 
Primordial 
This is a concept central to the thought ofMerleau-Ponty. It is the 
world or field of real things and people - in contrast to the 
objective world, which is the object of scientific investigation. 
The phenomenal world is that in which 'the light of a candle 
changes its appearance for a child when, after a burn, it stops 
attracting the child's hand and becomes literally repulsive' (PhP 
p.52; F64). This is in contrast to that world in which the light of 
the candle is explained in terms of chemical interaction at a high 
temperature; and in which the child's response is explained in 
terms of psychological response. 
In the phenomenal world: 'Vision is already inhabited by a 
meaning (sense) which gives it a function in the spectacle of the 
world and in our existence' (loc. cit). A mark of the phenomenal 
world is that the body features centrally in every event as the 
foundation, source and reference point of all meaning. The world 
is constantly viewed from the point of view of the lived body. A 
landscape, a body, a face is seen as 'gay', 'lively', 'sad', 'dreary', 
'coarse' or 'elegant'. In the phenomenal world, anger and pain is 
read in the face of the person, the essence of 'religion' is seized in 
some hesitation or reticence; the temper of a city is picked up and 
recognised 'in the attitude of a policeman or the style of a public 
building' (phP p.23-24; F32-33). 
Merleau-Ponty attaches this adjective to 'space', 'world' and 
'contact'. It describes a state before the first act of perception. He 
says 'we are already at work in a world' and a sense of space has 
been 'already acquired' (PhP. p.254;F293). 'It is necessary that my 
first perception and my first hold on the world appears to me as the 
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Reductionism 
Self 
execution of a most ancient pact between X and the world in 
general' (loc.cit.). 
This primordial contact is 'pure presence and contact with Being' 
(Mallin, 1979, p.57). 'I am here now' - how do 1 justify that or 
find something more sure or basic than that: I cannot. This is one 
of those certainties so simple that I cannot analyse it further to 
justify it. By saying this I am declaring my inherence in Being, my 
belonging in the world. I can neither doubt nor justify my 'given' 
facticity. 
In an effort to simplify extremely complex material a person may 
seek to explain it all 'in terms of ..... '. So, in an effort to explain 
the extremely complex condition known as 'schizophrenia' 
someone may wish to 'simplify' matters by explaining it in terms 
of 'chemical imbalance'. Another example of reductionism was the 
project of John Dewey, (who heavily influenced Paul Goodman), 
to explain perception in terms of biology (Dewey, 1920/1991, 
ch.4). 
This is the traditional name for an awareness of a world structure. 
It is that which Descartes 'contacted' in his famous meditation. It 
is what Goodman reaches in those opening words of Book 2 of 
Gestalt Therapy. This is the language of consciousness, of 
immanence. The tendency is to omit the body or leave it 'outside'. 
When Merleau-Ponty says: 'The acts of the J are of such a nature 
that they outstrip themselves leaving no interiority of 
consciousness' (PhP 376;F431), he is at once denying and positing 
that immanence (Dillon, 1997, p.102). In the Phenomenology of 
Perception, Merleau-Ponty was still struggling with the problem of 
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Tacit Cogito 
Thetic 
how to talk: about 'consciousness'/awareness without slipping back 
into dualism. He acknowledges this in a later work: The Visible 
and the Invisible (1968, p.200). It was only gradually that he came 
to see that consciousness, the soul, the psyche, the thinking self, 
are abstract words describing modalities of the lived body (cf 
Dillon, 1997, p.l02ft). 
Dillon (1997, p.104) calls this: '(The) reflexivity intrinsic to 
perception.' It is the 'founding term' in the Phenomenology- that 
which gives rootedness to our perception and to our speech. It can 
be seen as the 'connecting point' with the world. And it is not a 
point at all. Dillon calls it: 'the silence that is prior to expression 
and categorial thought. This silence receives the name "tacit 
cogito" '(loc.cit. p.195). 
In order that I perceive something there has to be a 'not-me'. I do 
not coincide with the chair I am sitting on; it is at once resisting me 
and incorporated by me. Now, I notice that while I am perceiving 
the resistance of the chair I cannot be aware of myself; while I am 
feeling that resistance I cannot be aware of myself as the subject of 
that resistance. So there is here a hidden self-awareness -
otherwise there could not be a me/not me experience which 
constitutes the resistance. This is what Merleau-Ponty is talking 
about when he says 'every perception takes place in an atmosphere 
of generality and is presented to us anonymously ...... ' 
'Tacit cogito' is therefore the silent presence of the me in every 
perception (phP p.215; F249). 
This is the adjective of 'thesis'. A 'thetic utterance' will mean: 
an utterance carrying a proposition or constituting the start of a 
position. 
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Transcendence 
The Worldrrhe 
Earth 
In the Phenomenology of Perception, transcendence designates 
both the openness of the subject to the world - this is active 
transcendence; and the opaqueness of the world - which is 
inseparable from its reality (Dupond, 2001, p.59 ; PhP p.376; 
F431). 
I go out into the garden and all the flowers and trees show 
themselves to me and I wonder. And I think of all the mysterious 
activity that is going on in that oak tree, that I know nothing about. 
This active transcendence means that it belongs to my very 
existence to enter situations and transform them. This happens, for 
instance, when lovers transform one another. 
Merleau-Ponty conceives the world as the ever-present horizon of 
all our perceptual acts. It is like a vast individual, who stands there 
as a guarantor of our personal acts, the' ground' of our existence. 
He also sees it as 'an open and indefinite multiplicity of 
relationships which are of reciprocal implication' (PhP p.71;F85) 
In this awkward expression he is endeavouring to avoid making 
you the spectator, and the world the spectated. This is because he 
is concerned to emphasize our belongingness, our attachment to 
the world, as the only home we have. In one of his celebrated 
Pensees, Pascal shows that in one way I understand the world, and 
in another the world understands me. We must add that it is in the 
same way: ' ...... and this finally is because I am situated in the 
world and it understands me' (PhP p.408; F467). 
Dillon's translation of , com prendre' as 'comprehend' appeals to 
me more than Smith's 'understand' because when I say the world 
'comprehends me' it can have the nuance of' shared flesh', the 
world shares its stuff with me. Fifteen years after the publication 
of Phenomenology of Perception (i.e. 1969), Merleau-Ponty returns 
XXVIII 
to the theme of grounding. He says that one of the effects of the 
opening up of the universe of Copernicus is to have made people 
forgetful of the earth. 'Through meditation we must again learn a 
mode of being whose conception (Copernicus man) has lost, the 
being of the' ground' (Boden), and that of the Earth first of all -
the earth where we live, that which is this side of rest and 
movement, being the ground from which all rest and movement are 
separated, which is not made out of Korper, being the' source' 
from which they are drawn through division, which has no 'place', 
being that which surrounds all places, which lifts particular beings 
out of nothingness, as Noah's Ark preserved living creatures from 
the flood' (in Madison, 1981, p.213) 
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Preface 
The study that follows is my own work. The central idea of the study - the application of 
the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty to the theoretical structures of Gestalt therapy - was 
conceived by me in 1996 and apart from one year 'out' I have worked at it steadily since 
that time_ It is not a solo work, in that I was very ably assisted by my supervisors, and 
others; but the central idea, the structure, material and elaboration of the study is entirely 
mine_ What I submit here has not been submitted previously by me for any award nor 
has any part of it been so submitted. 
It is an unusual study in that it straddles two quite separate and specialized disciplines: 
psychotherapy (Gestalt) and the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. So, to meet the difficulty 
of someone reading this who lacks a knowledge of either discipline, I have made two 
arrangements. 
At the start of the thesis, the section immediately preceding this Preface, I have inserted a 
Glossary in two parts. This is of Terms covering approaches of Merleau-Ponty's 
philosophy and Gestalt therapy. This is also intended to prevent too much fragmentation 
of the text by my having to break off to explain terms. The reader can use it as little or as 
much as he/she likes. It does not form part of the text of the Thesis. 
The second arrangement is to insert a brief account of Gestalt Therapy and of Merleau-
Ponty. This forms Appendix B. Or if one prefers it, there is an extended account of 
Gestalt therapy in the Chapter 'Foundations' (p.134fl). 
Two texts feature a great deal in the Thesis and I have taken the liberty of referencing 
them by abbreviations. 
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'Gestalt Therapy' is commonly taken as the founding text of Gestalt therapy. It was first 
published in 1951 and authored by Fritz Perls, Ralph Heffertine and Paul Goodman. For 
this text I use the abbreviation PHG and a page number referencing to the 1973 edition. 
I have confined my study of Merleau-Ponty almost exclusively to his major work 
'Phenomenology of Perception' (194511979). I abbreviate this (PhP.p ..... ;F .... ). 'F' 
gives the page in the French version by Gallimand: Phenomenologie de la Perception 
which has retained the same pagination since 1945. Whenever I write 'mt' outside a 
bracket; this indicates that I have preferred my own translation to that of Colin Smith, 
which I ordinarily use. The same holds for other texts available only in French. 
Usually I shall write references by citing the author's surname, the year of publication 
and a page number. If the reference is to the theme of a book with recurrent references 
thoughout the book, then I shall usually omit to specify a particular page, e.g. (Sartre, 
1992). 
Generally I shall give initials only when I need to distinguish between authors of the 
same name, e.g. Richardson, J.P. and Richardson, W.J. 
Cross references within the study itself will generally take this form: (cfR.P. p ... ) 
Further references to the same will be indicated in the usual way "et passim". 
Wherever in the text I refer with detail to clients, this is not a breach of confidentiality. I 
have received written permission to do this from the clients involved who have seen and 
possess a copy of the text relevant to them. Their permission is expressly limited to this 
study. 
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Thesis Abstract 
The Application of the Philosophy ofMerleau-Ponty to the Theoretical Structures of 
Gestalt Psychotherapy. 
This is the first time such an extensive application has been attempted. The thesis argues 
that Gestalt therapy as a modality of perception, can best come to a recognition of itself 
in the Phenomenology oj Perception. That Gestalt therapy requires such a support is 
apparent right from its flawed foundation in the writings of Paul Goodman. Its weak 
philosophical foundation has diverted its development away from the lived body, 
impoverished its view of phenomenology, constrained its language so that the articulation 
of its theoretical structures lacks depth, left it vulnerable to the distortions of post-modem 
constructivism, rendered unclear the domain proper to it as a psychotherapy, and 
bequeathed to those who would work to construct a consistent, organic and cohesive 
theoretical structure, an impossible task. 
The epistemological foundation of the theoretical structures of Gestalt therapy is to be 
found in what Merleau-Ponty calls 'primordial contact' or belief. This is that timeless 
pre-conceptual 'moment', when, without theme or image, a world begins to form itself 
about me. In this 'moment' I experience myself as 'given' to me in my body. This 
primordial experience of givenness is henceforth the ever-present anchorage of all 
subsequent experience. It is this which authenticates the therapist's immediacy to his/her 
client which constitutes the dialogue between them as healing. 
The argument in the thesis hinges upon the congeniality between Gestalt therapy and 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy: they are both experiential, radically holistic and centred 
upon the lived body. They both claim to transcend the subject/object, mind/body dualism 
and view the human being in his/her embodiment as the Gestalt, actualizing being-in-the-
world. The thesis demonstrates how, with the application of four key concepts from 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy to the theoretical structures of Gestalt therapy-
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intentionality, anonymity, transcendence and intersubjectivity - there emerge new 
horizons of understanding for such Gestalt therapy concepts as field theory, immediacy, 
holism, personal relationship and the body as a carrier of our history. Such an application 
also reveals to us the 'phenomenal field' as the domain of operation proper to a therapy 
of bodily presence, awareness and exploration. 
The thesis concludes that the development of Gestalt therapy theory lies in a more 
profound development of its phenomenology along the lines of the analysis made by 
Merleau-Ponty in the Phenomenology of Perception. Such a direction will at once correct 
its list towards scientism, and the penchant for involvement in distracting philosophical 
debates. The thesis also points up the need for development at the training level of skills 
in reflection upon the experiential learning of the Gestalt therapy concepts, the paramount 
importance of relationship between trainers and trainees based upon an exacting personal 
authenticity and transparency. 
Key words: anonymity, authenticity, awareness, field perspective, Gestalt, givenness, 
holism, intentionality, lived body, phenomenal field, phenomenology, presence, 
reductionism, subjectivity, transcendence, truth, 
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Section One: What this Study is about 
The Originality and Scope of the Thesis 
The originality of the thesis consists in this: that it is a beginning and first attempt to 
support the theory of Gestalt therapy practice with an adequate and congenial philosophy. 
F or this purpose I have chosen the phenomenological analysis of perception by a leading 
European philosopher: Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
I make no claim to be promoting standards of clinical practice. Nor do I think that my 
way is the only way to found Gestalt therapy in a philosophy. What I offer is a way to a 
more profound understanding of the theoretical structures which underlie the clinical 
practice of Gestalt therapy. I do this by elaborating the meaning of these constructs in the 
light of those elaborations made by Merleau-Ponty in his phenomenological analysis of 
perception (1945/1979). 'A more profound understanding' arises when we lead the 
theoretical structures of Gestalt therapy back to derivation from that primordial belief in 
the world, where Merleau-Ponty places the ultimate rootedness or foundation of all 
meaning and rationality. The locus of this is the lived body. It is in such an analysis that 
we 'thicken' and substantiate the theoretical structures of Gestalt therapy. (l'epaisseur: 
PhP.p.238;F275). Whereas, there have been many attempts to unpack the meaning 
carried by the Gestalt theoretical structures (and I shall refer to and acknowledge these 
works), there has not been - so far as I have been able to ascertain - any sustained 
application of the reflective philosophy ofMerleau-Ponty to Gestalt therapy theory, 
especially at the level of pre-personal existence. 
I say it is a 'beginning' because I am aware of how incomplete my study must be. I know, 
for instance, that in his later and posthumously published works Merleau-Ponty becomes 
critical of his earlier work and carries forward the insights of the Phenomenologie de la 
Perception in ways that are ever-so-promising for the Gestalt therapy theorist. 
2 
Merleau-Ponty - A Congenial Philosopher 
My choice ofMerleau-Ponty is something I have come to gradually, over the years. It 
arises from my practice as a Gestalt therapist, my study of Gestalt therapy literature and 
my ever-growing interest in Merleau-Ponty. As I came to discern a gap in the Gestalt 
therapy literature, I began to realize that this could be adequately met by the philosophy 
of Merleau-Ponty. This gap is the absence in the literature of any connection with that 
realm of pre conceptual experience, which Merleau-Ponty demonstrates as the basis of all 
perception. That realm is present to me at every moment in my body and undergirds my 
whole perceptual life. As soon as I began to think of the Gestalt theoretical structures as 
deriving from and informed by my body in this way, I found that my appreciation of the 
meaning of what I was doing as a Gestalt therapist was substantially enriched. I would 
describe it as adding a dimension of depth to my understanding. 
I found between the therapy and the philosophy a hugely promising congeniality: Gestalt 
therapy is a body-centred therapy and the philosophy ofMerleau-Ponty is a body-centred 
philosophy. A salient characteristic of Gestalt therapy is its consistent refusal to go along 
with the traditional dualism of subject and object, to split the person into body and mind, 
to make a sharp division between client and therapist, to speak as if there was an interior 
and an exterior person. The Gestalt therapist invokes phenomenology as the agent of this 
holism. Merleau-Ponty, as is apparent even in the very lay-out of his Phenomen%gie, 
never wavered in making the lived-body the centre of his work; his unrelenting polemic 
against Empiricism and especially against Idealism, from which emerges much of his 
own positive teaching, is, primarily, showing the inability of these systems to account for 
the body's role in perception. We shall see in the course of this study, that none of the 
main concepts of Gestalt therapy can be made meaningful except as operative in a living 
person. Part of my project in this study is to take those concepts and, by informing them 
with the thinking ofMerleau-Ponty, unpack the rich layers of meaning that they carry. 
The primary insight, emerging over the years from the anguished process of my study, is 
the over-riding centrality o/the lived body as the focus not only of the philosophy of 
Merleau-Ponty but of the theoretical foundations of Gestalt therapy. My demonstration of 
this is, I believe, an original contribution. 
3 
The Thesis Title Explained 
When commentators like Dillon (1997, p.51) say that the whole ofMerieau-Ponty's 
philosophy is built around the ontological principle of the primacy of the phenomenon 
and its epistemological correlate the primacy of perception, this means for Gestalt therapy 
theory that the phenomenon is the lived bodies of the client and of the therapist in their 
meeting; and the epistemological correlate of this primary phenomenon is what we call 
'therapy', the dialogic world that constitutes 'the between' of these two people. To state 
this in another way: the reality for me, a Gestalt therapist, is this person before me. The 
correlate or response to this is not primarily my learning and knowledge, but my 
embodied presence with, to and for that person. Together we co-create an event. It is in 
the certainty, in the authentiCity, in the truth oj this meeting that the healing happens. It is 
this dialogic contact in their shared world, an embodied meeting, that heals not only the 
client but the therapist also. This meeting is primarily in the perceptual realm of our 
being. And this is why I title my thesis 'Healing Perception'. 
The Ontological Dimension of Gestalt Therapy Theory 
Some people are inclined to switch-off when they hear the word 'ontology'. But, in my 
study it is a very important word, because it is the ontological aspect that thickens and 
enriches our understanding ofthe theory. I take 'ontology' in the sense of a 'meaning-
making' process; that is to sayan explanation oj the living person/event in terms that 
transcend the singularity oj that particular person/event. I That which transcends the 
singularity of every event and person is Being, the act of existence itself, which 'runs 
through' us (phP.p.216;F250), and maintains each of us as a cohesive entity yet 
inextricably binds us up with all the rest. Such a general aspect we call 'ontological'. The 
1 Here I speak of 'ontology' because I wish to draw attention to the Being that 'runs through' us. For 
Heidegger, as for Merleau-Ponty, 'Ontology is possible only as phenomenology' ( in Richardson,W.J .. 
1963, p.46-7) 
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benefit of an ontological view is that it gathers everything into a Gestalt and enables us to 
see the astonishing connectedness of our world, where we belong and how we fit together 
in ourselves and with everything else. It is somewhat like viewing a tree in a field against 
the background of the bright blue sky of a Summer's morning and a clear horizon. In 
such a view, nothing of that tree is dismissed or 'factored out'; truly, there are many 
aspects of that tree that we do not focus on - its smell, the feel of its bark, the beautiful 
texture of the leaves and so on; but yet we carry these forward as part of the tree in its 
world-setting; we see its figure as it stands out against the horizon, how it reaches for the 
light and how it fits in with all the rest round about it and belongs in the world. An 
ontology of Gestalt therapy theory allows us to view it under the aspect of Being, the 
foundations in which it is rooted, the trajectory of its dynamic, its context in the world, its 
built-in contradictions and anomalies. Such an ontology is available in the analysis of 
Merleau-Ponty. He views the realization - the becoming real of these abstractions - as 
constituting the lived body of the person before me. It isfrom such a 'clotting' of Being 
that all our thought derives, and to it that all our thought returns for validation. And that 
becoming real applies every bit as much to me as it does to the person before me. My 
reality is invoked by him, just as his is invoked by me. And this bodily phenomenon is 
primary because everything else derives from this phenomenon which is given to me as 
my only access to reality. 
Section Two: Overview 
An Overview of the Three Parts 
Part I: consists of an Introduction and four chapters. My concern here is twofold: I want 
to introduce the reader to the conjunction of these two different realms of discourse -
Gestalt therapy and the philosophy ofMerleau-Ponty. For readers who are unfamiliar 
with one or other of these two realms, it will be a little like learning a new language; so, I 
try to explain the terms, I use illustrations and repetitions. Secondly, I want in this 
section to enter the problem areas of Gestalt therapy so that the reader gets a sense of 
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purpose behind my study. I endeavour all the time to maintain focus on the centrality of 
the body in Gestalt therapy and in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. 
Part II: deals with the foundational literature of Gestalt therapy and the foundational 
concept ofField Theory. I do this in three chapters. I devote a long chapter to discussing 
the 'originating text' as Robine calls it. In this chapter, I draw attention to the strengths 
and weaknesses of the supporting philosophy in the classic text. Following this is a two-
section chapter (7): In section one we look at the actual practice of body-centred work in 
Gestalt therapy. In section two I detail some recent good theoretial work by outstanding 
Gestalt writers; I allow the reader herself to judge how much the 'lived body' actually 
features in the work and then I take up some of what the writers have said and take it 
forward in the light ofMerleau-Ponty's analysis. The last chapter in this Part is 
particularly important; it deals with the meaning and importation ofField Theory into 
Gestalt therapy. At present, I notice that development and growth in Gestalt therapy 
theory, is centred upon this area. Field Perspective is the growing edge of Gestalt therapy 
at present. 
Part ill: The earlier material places us in a better position to explore those views of 
Merleau-Ponty which directly affect the theoretical structures underpinning Gestalt 
therapy. This Section is a formal application ofMerleau-Ponty's philosophy to Gestalt 
therapy theory. I do this in two chapters: Ch.9: The Body Situated and Ch.l 0 Action and 
Presence. 
The ftrst of these is a closer phenomenological view of the body as the vehicle of our 
being-in-the-world and the locus of operation of Gestalt therapy. It is here that I deal with 
'situatedness' the special ontological status of every one and everything in the world. 
This leads us to the Phenomenal Field, which yields everything (and more) that the 
Gestalt therapists want to borrow from Lewin. 
In the second of these chapters we return again to the flaw at the basis of Gestalt therapy 
philosophy: a failure to experience the givenness of the body. Such a lapse has got in the 
way of Gestalt therapy theory availing itself of a group of phenomenological ideas. There 
are four cardinal concepts from Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the perceptual region of 
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existence, and I explain each at greater length than previously, as applied to Gestalt 
therapy theory: Intentionality, Anonymity, Transcendence and Intersubjectivity (feeling). 
I call them 'cardinal' because they are the hinges upon which hangs the door to a richer 
understanding of Gestalt therapy theory. (I will already have given definitions! 
descriptions of these so they will not come completely new to the reader). 
Connected with these Chapters is Appendix A. There I propose an analysis and 
resolution of the problem of why sexual intrusion may wreak such unbounded havoc in a 
person's life. 
This Appendix profoundly challenges the 'objective' view of trauma and endeavours to 
demonstrate how the injury happens at the preconceptuallevel, a primordial body-level, 
and therefore calls for therapy to operate at such a level"":' the level of the lived body. 
An Ontological Study 
It is my experience as I read much of the standard writing on Gestalt therapy that they 
have very little to do with what I am about in this study. As I read Mackewn (1997) and 
notice the acuity of her observations, the practicality of her theorizing - how real and 
immediate she makes the process of psychotherapy - it seems to me as if I am, in my 
study, moving in a different universe of discourse. And then she will say something like : 
, A person is at all times a whole person, whose body, emotions, thoughts and perceptions 
function interrelatedly as one complex relation' (loc.cit.p.43). Then I know that this is 
precisely related to what I am addressing in this study. In this opening sentence of her 
section on Holism, she is proposing a view of the world and of our relationship with the 
world, in fact, a 'phenomenology of perception' , which calls for ontological validation-
i. e. that what she says makes meaning, is of a piece with our general experience and 
enables us to make sense of our lives. People are speaking psychologically, when they 
speak of events in terms of events of similar kind, like explaining sight in terms of the 
retina and images imprinted thereon. They are speaking ontologically when they relate 
events to our being-in-the-world; this is the level of my study. 
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The Use of Illustrations and Metaphors 
The very nature of this study, which is aimed at a quite limited and specialized audience 
in the Gestalt therapy world, dictates that I speak very abstractly at times making use of 
terms unfamiliar to people unacquainted with the philosophy ofMerieau-Ponty. These 
terms are important because they allow us entry to the domain of phenomenology and 
ontology. There are also other terms, which may seem to be familiar but which call for 
expanded exploration in the context of this study. In both of these situations I need to 
come from a place well-understood by my Gestalt therapy hearers; and therefore, I draw 
upon my experience as a practising Gestalt therapist to illustrate the enlargement of 
understanding. This may seem simple but, in fact, it can bring difficulties with it. 
Every example I cite, every metaphor I depict, will, of necessity, be an interpretation and 
every application afurther interpretation of an event which admits of an indefinite 
number of interpretations. This is because we are here dealing with the indeterminate 
nature of the existence that is given to us. Like Adam and the animals, the world waits 
upon our word to become what we call it. 
I am very aware that the philosophies of 'deconstruction' which critique the meaning of 
meaning, would leave very little of this thesis - so packed with interpretations, so 
presumptive of the possibility of what James Joyce in his Catholic way calls 'the 
epiphany of being' - undemolished. I am very aware that to approach this study with a 
too critical attitude will make the understanding of it even more difficult than it need be. 
There is no example that does not limp and every event admits of an indefinite number of 
interpretations. 
It is time now for me to let the reader have a clear and brief formulation of the core of 
this thesis. 
A Concise Formulation of the Problem I am Addressing 
Gestalt therapy is a body-centred existentialist psychotherapy. It breaks new ground in 
that it is also radically holistic. That is to say, it treats a person not as a 'problem-case' 
but as totality, a Gestalt in herself and also as organically related to the world and other 
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people. As an existentialist therapy it shares with the other therapies those concepts and 
values well-rooted in the Existentialist philosophy tradition (cfYalom, 1980, pp.18-19). 
As a holistic therapy, which in no way accepts the mind/body dualism and is based upon 
a vision or belief in the unity of people with one another and with the environment, its 
foundations are flawed. It is in the context of establishing the epistemological basis of 
Gestalt therapy in Ch.3 that I begin to explain this flaw in the analysis. 
This flaw is to be seen in the formulation of its point de depart, its first principle, so often 
cited by Gestalt therapy writers and taken from the writings of Paul Goodman. This 
formulation is an observer's pOint of view, which omits a primordial, unspecified, 
preconceptual experience of the body as given. I shall elaborate more upon this in Ch.6: 
Foundations. 
The consequences of this flaw show themselves directly or indirectly in five ways: 
1. A forgetfulness of the centrality of the body. This I treat of in Ch. 7 Section Two: 
The Body Eclipsed. A limited use of phenomenology as an instrument of 
investigation. This is featured in Ch. 4. Phenomenology and also in Ch. 8 The Field 
2. A tendency on the part of Gestalt writers to be blown about by philosophical trends 
and fashions. Some of these trends -like Constructivism, carry an important message 
but, as promulagated and promoted, Constructivism does not seem to me, congenial 
to the support of the Gestalt therapy project. This I deal with in Ch.3 Epistemology for 
Gestalt Therapists. 
3. A lack of serious engagement with the problems and possibilities of language in 
therapy; and here again a tendency to be pulled into unhelpful philosophical debate. 
(By 'unhelpful' I mean what is not conducive to that 'between' which I spoke of 
earlier.) I treat of this in Ch. 5. Language. 
4. Gestalt therapists sometimes experience difficulty in discerning their historical 
foundations - what they must keep and what they must discard of those principles and 
practices taught by the founders of Gestalt. This leads to difficulties between different 
'schools' of Gestalt therapists. (Wheeler (1998App.v-xxi; Yontef, 1993, pp.343ff). I 
treat of this question in Ch. 6 Foundations. 
5. Its flawed philosophical foundations gets in the way of the organic development of 
Gestalt therapy theory. In its own understanding of phenomenology it does not find 
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the wherewithal to develop and enlarge the rich notion of field. Therefore, its 
theoreticians have gone and borrowed notions from other disciplines whose approach 
may not be congruent with Gestalt therapy. An example of this is its borrowing the 
elaboration of the notion of intersubjectivity from Martin Buber. It seems to me, 
however, that Buber's philosophy is congruent with Gestalt therapy theory. However, 
the same cannot be said for the approach of Kurt Lewin. From Lewin, the founder of 
Social Psychology, Gestalt therapy theory has taken the notion ofField Theory. I 
have not dealt with the Buber borrowing - which I think, has enormously enriched 
Gestalt therapy. With regard to the borrowing of the notion ofField from Lewin, I 
explain at length how Field perspective - once we see it as centered in the lived body 
- is implicit in the holistic phenomenology of Gestalt therapy. This I deal with in Ch. 
8: Field Perspective. 
Why Merleau-Ponty? 
The above schema may sound as if I am about to be very negative about Gestalt therapy 
theorists and what they say. The reader will not find it so at all. I have stated it in this 
negative way, in order to give point and direction to my study. What the reader will find 
is that I state what the theoreticians have said, and then, appreciating it, 1 take it forward 
in the light of the deeper analysis. This application is not with a view to showing up the 
weaknesses of Gestalt therapy theory but to showing how its great richness can be taken 
forward2 to new hinterlands of insight and understanding. 
This study proposes to address these difficulties by the application of the philosophy of 
Merleau-Ponty to the Gestalt therapy theory structures. Merleau-Ponty's philosophy 
brings to Gestalt therapy a thoroughly Existentialist background, which, unlike that of 
J.P. Sartre, is supportive of the Gestalt (cfLanger, 1989, p.152)' These two philosophers, 
for obvious reasons, are sometimes bracketed together (eg Wheeler, 2002) whereas, from 
a Gestalt therapy point of view, they are poles apart (Stewart (ed.) 1998, passim). 
2 The reader will understand that whenever I use the expression 'taking forward' - which I do frequently -
I am talking about the application of the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty to the theoretical structures of 
Gestalt therapy. 
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One of the things, which could most highly recommend Merleau-Ponty to Gestalt 
therapist, is the fact that the pivotal centre of his philosophy is the lived body. To open 
Phenomenology of Perception at random and read it, one finds almost inevitably that one 
is reading about the lived body. Even more impressive for a beginner, would be a cursory 
read through the Table des Matieres at the back of the French edition, alas, not 
reproduced for English readers, even in the millennium edition of the translation. 3 
Merleau-Ponty has faced-up-to and resolved, in a way congenial to Gestalt therapy 
theory, the haunting problem of dualism, the split between mind and body. 'The missing 
tenn that resolves the contradiction, for Merleau-Ponty at least, is the lived body. '(Dillon, 
1997, p.l 05). This problem is most important for resolution in some way by all 
psychotherapists; if a psychotherapist treats a patient/client from a philosophy which 
accepts this split then he will (unwittingly, I'm sure,) be reinforcing the very world-view 
that undergirds the patient's psychopathology. 
Merleau-Ponty's epistemology is body-based and supportive of Gestalt therapy. It arises 
out of his on-going controversy with the Empiricists and the Idealists. Each of these he 
faults on the grounds that they cannot account for the body's role in perception. His 
support for Gestalt therapy here is most striking in his emphasis upon the immediacy of 
perception, while allowing for interpretation. 
Trust and Authenticity 
The question of the foundation of trust and authenticity recurs throughout the study as it 
does throughout the work ofMerleau-Ponty. It arises during the course of my exploring 
the perceptual aspects of Gestalt therapy as body-centred. When viewed 
phenomenologically, these body-centred concepts imply the kind of actuality/immediacy 
3 An English version is available as an Appendix in Mallin (1979), together with a most helpful 
Integration into the English Text. 
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which we spoke of above. Immediacy is called for by these concepts and the language of 
Gestalt therapy assumes such immediacy. 
Conclusion 
Even in such an introduction as this, I do not expect everything to be clear. Were I to give 
the impression that my study is clear and straightforward, I would not be faithful to my 
own experience. My thesis does not progress in a straight line like a good syllogism. It is 
much more like a spiral that turns so that sometimes the edge is in the middle and the 
middle at the edge. I have tried, however, to make clear the central thrust of my thesis: 
the bringing together of the theoretical structures of Gestalt therapy and the body-centred 
philosophy ofMerleau-Ponty. 
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Section One: Foreword 
Situating the Study 
One day a speculative philosopher challenged Diogenes the Cynic with the proposition 
that local motion was impossible. Diogenes, without saying a word, stood up and walked 
away. In this simple but powerful gesture, he was not merely launching a story that 
would run and run down the centuries, but was marking out a particular approach to 
philosophy. He was connecting philosophy with experience in such a way that 
experience, not philosophy, became the criterion of the real. He was equivalently saying: 
however subtle your system or impressive the reach of your thought, if it makes everyday 
life impossible then your system needs looking at again. 
He was also saying that the kind of knowledge you have of walking from actually doing 
it, is quite different from that which you have from talking about walking. It is in this 
tradition that I want to situate my study. (I take the story from Hadot, 2001A, p.97). 
My Point of Departure 
My interest is not in constructing a system of philosophy or in showing that others are 
wrong, but like the people in those schools of ancient Greece, in promoting a life choice. 
It is a search for meaning: What is happening to me? To us? It is an exploration of the 
question that I am to myself (Rahner ,1984, p.189). This is the tradition of Blaise Pascal, 
Edith Stein, Etty Hillesum, Nicolai Berdyaev, and Michael Polanyi. 4 My interest is 
primarily in what works, in what enables therapists in their work of transformation. The 
works of these writers are marked by the intimate connection that they make between 
philosophy and life-style. They address the concerns of their hearts. I would count 
several of the writers publishing in the British Gestalt Journal as belonging in this 
tradition. This is the tradition also ofMerleau-Ponty as is attested by people who actually 
knew him. I think of Professor Peter Figueroa or Jean-Toussaint Desanti: here is the way 
the latter speaks of his teaching: 
4 cfKennedy, D . .1. on Nicolai Berdyaev (1994) and Etty Hillesum (1998). 
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Merleau-Ponty's philosophical utterance did not float about in a condition of 
dis embodiment, ... Nor did it dwell in a mass of texts, abandoning the solitary 
reader at a distance. His word was born of someone who addressed himself to 
me after the manner of his presence: it became my familiar (voisine) (Desanti, J-
T. in Sechere, 1982, p.8). 
Merleau-Ponty himself lived his philosophy intensely, with its heavy political 
consequences, and embraced the demands it imposed upon him: 
We must not only adopt a reflective attitude, (secure) ourselves in an impregnable 
Cogito, but moreover, reflect upon this very reflection, in order to embrace the 
natural situation, which it is aware of succeeding and which therefore belongs to 
its definition, not only to practice the philosophy, but also to acknowledge to 
ourselves the transformation, which it brings in our way of viewing the world, and 
in our existence (phP.p.62;F75) mt. 
One needs very little contact with the tradition of Gestalt therapy to recognise that 
personal commitment is now, and was from the beginning, a characteristic of the 
movement: Fritz and Laura Perls, Paul Goodman, Joel Latner, Jim Simkin, Joseph Zinker 
were all people primarily interested in how to be with others, rather than in making their 
mark. In these days when the sacred word in the therapy world is 'professionalism' and 
when professionalism in the media is strongly linked to the medical 'profession', some of 
the implications of what I argue may not be welcomed. As I see it, to be a Gestalt 
therapist is to take on a life-style that requires considerable self-discipline, a lot of 
knowledge humbly carried, and an openness of heart and mind that welcomes growth and 
is for ever asking searching questions. It is more of a 'vocation' - in the old sense of this 
term - one summoned to assume a special mission (like Socrates), than it is a way of 
paying the mortgage. 
Gestalt therapy practice has come a long way since the 1950's. It has become far more 
reflective and developed in its theory and practice. Yet the tradition of searching for truth, 
the connection between philosophy and life-style has continued. I see this in the works 
especially ofLynn Jacobs and Richard Hycner (1995), of Malcolm Parlett (2000) and 
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Gordon Wheeler (1998B), of Lolita Sapriel (1998) and Arthur Roberts (1999), of Ken 
Evans (2000) and John Wheway (1999). All of these are writing from their hearts yet 
thinking hard and seriously connecting what they say with how they live. Their tradition 
is not just of thinking but of life-choice. 
Another consequence of my standing in this tradition is this: I am not aiming to prove any 
philosopher right or any philosopher wrong; Merleau-Ponty does not need me to 
vindicate him. I do not have to show that he is right. He has made the analysis, I do not 
have to traverse that territory again. That is not my project. I take up what he has done 
and use it to elaborate the theory of Gestalt therapy. My interest is not primarily in 
philosophical debate; I am far more interested in what actually connects a person to 
his/her life. Therefore, when I take issue about the importation of Lewin ian Field theory 
into Gestalt therapy theory, my interest is not primarily in the questionable methodology 
of this - although I point it out at length - but in the practical implications of it for the 
writers and practitioners of Gestalt therapy. 
Like the early Gestalt therapists I am primarily interested in doing, in a life-style that 
works for people. 'In Gestalt therapy, we are working for something else (from the 
hedonism of American culture). We are here to promote growth process and develop 
human potential. We do not talk of instant joy, instant sensory awareness, instant cure. 
The growth process takes time' (perls, F., 1971, 16). 
My Explicit Anthropology 
Before going on to speak of those personal influences upon me, which have shaped my 
world, I need to speak of what Giorgi calls 'my approach'. This is (my) 'fundamental 
view point towards man and the world' (Giorgi, 1975). It is something, prior even to those 
twin engines of enquiry: existential phenomenology and hermeneutics. Indeed it is out of 
this most primitive experience that existential phenomenology and hermeneutics arise. 
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My most basic experience is the givenness of Being and the summons, not of my making 
to respond. It is similar to Heidegger's analysis ofDasein which 'as being-in-the-world 
is the illuminating occurrence of Being' (Brooke, 1993, p.104). 
A thorough phenomenological analysis ofthis is made by Heidegger (192711973) in his 
chapter: Dasein's Attestation ofan Authentic Potentiality for Being (p.312). 
'Conscience summons Dasein's self from its lostness in the 'they' (loc.cit. p.319). 
'Conscience' here is not moral conscience but renders a moral conscience possible. For 
Heidegger 'the existential conscience is that which gives there-being (Dasein) to 
"understand" what it is (his status as being) and thus calls it to authenticity' (Richardson 
W. J., 1963, p.81). It will be noticed that whereas Heidegger says 'In conscience Dasein 
calls itself (loc. cit. P.320), J say, the summons arises out of the 'givenness of Being' . 
There is really no discrepancy here - as is shown by what Heidegger says, further on, 
about the characteristics of this call: 
Indeed the call is precisely something, which we ourselves have neither planned 
nor prepared for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so. 'It' calls 
against our expectations and even against our will. On the other hand, the call 
undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The 
call comesfrom me and yet from beyondme (Heidegger, 192711973, p.320). 
Ifwe are to accept that the only being we have is our being-in-the-world, then it must be 
that every movement of being, so far as we are concerned, must involve that relatedness 
to the world. This is Merleau-Ponty's view, which he returns to repeatedly: 
The central phenomenon at the root, both of my subjectivity and my 
transcendence towards others, consists in my being given to myself. I am given, 
that is, I find myself already situated and involved in a physical and social world -
I am given to myself, which means that this situation is never hidden from me ... 
(phP.p.360;F413)5. 
5 The phrase 'I am given to myself' is one that will recur again and again throughout this study. It is, after 
all at the heart of my thesis. ( CfH.P.pp175,204,223,227,229 et passim. ) 
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We shall see further on (Chapter 7) the pivotal importance I attach to Heidegger's and 
Merleau-Ponty's analysis as yielding givenness as the root of all our experience(, 
Section Two: Methodology Explained 
The subj ect of this study is the theoretical structures of Gestalt therapy; the particular 
aspect under which I consider them is in the application to them of the existential 
phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
Not all of this study, by any means, is phenomenological reduction. A great deal of it is 
discursive and all of it is reflective. But the phenomenological aspects of it are the 
foundation upon which I build the discursive areas. 
Application of Merleau-Panty's Philosophy to Theoretical Structures 
What is Gestalt therapy theory? It is a body of knowledge, comprising a series of general 
coherent statements concerning what it is to be a human being in the world, with the 
specific difference of being concerned with what we call 'mental' health and personal 
development. This body of knowledge finds expression in a special terminology, which 
carries, in a coherent and connected way, this body of explanatory theory. For instance, 
Gestalt therapists may use the phrase 'an incomplete Gestalt' or 'unfinished business'. 
Such an expression of theory will then be expressed like this: 'What we really want and 
what we are looking for in our lives are complete experiences.' (Korb, et al. 1989, p.9). It 
is to such expressions of theoretical structure that I intend to apply the philosophy of 
Merleau-Ponty. 
I need to explain further what I mean by the expression "Application to the Theoretical 
Structures" . 
6 Here I am anticipating what I shall return to several times during this study: the giverutess of being is 
precisely what Goodman missed out on in the analysis which has become the basis of Gestalt therapy 
theory. 
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The theoretical structures of Gestalt therapy are expressed in concepts that occur 
frequently in the Gestalt literature some of these concepts feature in the Glossary at the 
beginning of this study. A sample list might go like this: authenticity, awareness, 
boundary, contact, creative adjustment, dialogue, embodiment, fixed Gestalt, field 
perspective, holism, immediacy, intersubjectivity, interruptions to contact, organismic 
self-regulation, polarities, responsibility, spontaneity, support. There are also special 
technical meanings attaching to such expressions as 'interruption to contact', 'theory of 
change', 'therapeutic alliance', 'experiment', 'embodiment' and 'health'. Interruption can 
be broken down into: deflection, introjection and confluence and several others. (cf 
Clarkson, 1989, p.50). 
To apply the philosophy ofMerleau-Ponty to these, I first of all need to experience for 
myself the area of discourse in which these structures operate. This is my experience 
during eleven years as a practising Gestalt therapist. I also need to have experienced in 
my own body what that concept means for me. This leads to reflection. I need to see how 
my experience squares or does not square with what the manual/trainer says. In Section 
F our of this chapter, I illustrate such reflection in great detail for the concept of' health' 
in Gestalt therapy. 
Because these concepts are all derived from experience of the embodied person, they 
support, balance, unify and explain one another in a cohesive system. They all describe 
modalities of the whole person, not just of thoughts. Together they form a Gestalt, just as 
the person from whom they derive is a Gestalt. Thus, if through a philosophic reflection, 
my understanding of awareness undergoes alteration, then my understanding of each of 
those other structures will undergo alteration, because awareness is implied in every one 
of them. Similarly if my understanding of holism changes, a corresponding alteration 
happens in all the others. 
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A Short Sample Application 
So that a person can permit this kind of change - organic and dynamic - there are two 
pre-requisites: (i) a congenial experience, (ii) an ability to name that experience (we shall 
see in our Chapter on Language and Speech that, literally, I do not really know what I 
think until I speak it. Speech is thought. And thought/reflection is the integration of 
experience.) By 'congenial' here I mean an experience of a similar nature or in the same 
existential region as the one I am talking about. If, for instance I am talking about 
'unfinished business', then it needs to be something like a too-hasty good-bye. 
Let us take an example. Holism. 
Mackewn (1997) says: (Gestalt therapy nowhere) 'A person is at all times a whole 
person, whose body, emotions, thoughts and perceptions function interrelatedly as one 
complex relational whole' (p.43). This is the way the therapist views himself, his family, 
his friends and everyone he meets; it is not just a special act for the therapy session. He 
will be able to view himself like that only if he has experienced others treating him 
similarly. His training and his reading will have taught him the vocabulary in which to 
articulate this experience or its absence. If he lacks the words how can he recognise the 
experience? 
Reflection 
Suppose the therapist reflects upon his experience of holism and begins to see it as 
applying not only to persons in his world, but to his every act of perception. He notices 
how his senses combine around food - he not only tastes but smells, sees, feels the 
texture. He notices how, although he has two eyes, he does not see double, and how 
disconcerted he is until both eyes give him a monocular vision, and this unifying drive in 
his body does not proceed from a thought. Now, if he acquires the existential 
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phenomenological word 'transcendence' he will be able to articulate more how his senses 
surpass themselves. He will experience that not only does he carry with him everywhere 
a power which he does not give himself, of unifying and integrating the world of his 
experience, but that he is that power. He will come to realize that 'holism' is the very 
direction of his existence. 
Now it is not possible to maintain that consciousness has this power, it is this 
power itself (PhP.p.121;F141). 
He comes to see holism as an event which affects him in his entire relationship with the 
world; it is no longer a thought or doctrine but the very existential of his own lived body, 
a facet of his sociality. When we relate Gestalt structures to terms such as 
'intentionality', 'anonymity', 'transcendence', 'intersubj ectivity', as they occur in 
Merleau-Ponty, we at once give the Gestalt therapists a vocabulary which allows them to 
have a broader experience of the world, and opens the way to their actually experiencing 
the structures in their own bodies. 
Merleau-Ponty's Three-Step Application 
Merleau-Ponty in his Preface to the Phenomenology oj Perception has very well sketched 
out the application of his analysis, in three movements. 
(1) Facticity: 
This 'Gestalt therapy' is present in its facticity, is there as an 'inalienable presence' in the 
world. I set out to connect Gestalt therapy theory in its structures, with a direct and 
'primitive contact with the world and endow that primitive contact with philosophical 
status' (loc. cit viii). So it is that I endeavour to link 'awareness' with that most primitive 
pre-conceptual experience of ourselves as embodied subjectivities in 'givenness'. To 
ensure that I am allowing the phenomenon to be and 'speak from itself, I return 
'repeatedly to the phenomenon itself so that it may show itself, in ever deeper, richer and 
more subtle ways' (Brooke, 1993, p.31). 
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I want to connect Gestalt therapy theory organically with Merleau-Ponty's twofold 
teaching of the ontological principle of the primacy of phenomena and its epistemological 
correlate - the primacy of perception (Dillon, M., 1997, p.52 et passim). By 
'phenomenon' I mean 'that wherein something can become manifest, visible in itself 
(Heidegger, 192711973, p.51). By 'the primacy of phenomena' I mean the view in which 
being or reality is 'conceived as phenomena' (Dillon, 1997, p.156). By 'the primacy of 
perception' I mean that' the perceived world is the always presupposed foundation oj all 
rationality, all value and all existence' (Merleau-Ponty, 194711964 p.13, my italics) In 
other words, that our only path to reality is the phenomenon; and my senses are the gates 
of meeting for the phenomena. The phenomenon in reference to which all other 
phenomena become meaningful is my lived body. So, it is my intention to re-instate the 
body unequivocally at the centre of all Gestalt therapy theory, as it is at the centre of 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. 
(2) Description: 
This application is descriptive. I do all I can to set aside my theoretical and philosophical 
beliefs. Phenomenological reduction is a difficult process. Indeed it is quite contrary to 
'common sense'. One can find the value and effectiveness of it only by doing it and by 
experiencing it in oneself (e.g. having a therapist who practices it.) 
'We shall find in ourselves and nowhere else the unity and true meaning of 
phenomenology' (PhP.p.viii;Fii). 
So it is, for instance, that I describe how our bodies hold time. The Gestalt therapy' here-
and-now' is a layered accumulation of history and culture being realized. 
Practice 
To put aside my beliefs, my theories, my prejudices, is what I have to do every time I 
meet a client. If I do not do that, then I will not only impose my own beliefs on the 
client, but stop listening to my client and hear instead the voices from my own history 
speaking to me from the client. This is called counter-transference - the aggregate of the 
projections which the therapist has about the client. The long training, my years of 
supervision and personal therapy have educated me in this regard. It is precisely because 
I am so trained that clients come to me and pay for my services. 
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There is no question here of there being a hidden reality beneath the appearances - the 
'noumenon' of Kant. The phenomenon, in Gestalt therapy, is the reality. 
(3) An Always Incomplete Reduction: 
This study is a search, not for an ideal Gestalt therapy, but for that in the practice of 
Gestalt therapy, which unifies and realizes all the theory: the lived body. This takes the 
place of the search for essences. The theoretical structures that I explained earlier are 
unreal until they are embodied in the therapist and client. So, the question for the 
therapist is this: How can I be, in my feelings, sensations, understanding and articulation 
so that I most facilitate "the between" with this client? (Hycner and Jacobs, 1995, p.90). 
All the theories become real only in my lived body and that lived body is, in its most 
profound intentionality, reaching out towards the other. 
In so far as this is a phenomenological study, it requires constant faithfulness to that 
demanding mistress which is my experience. I shall endeavour not to use quotations as 
arguments: I will not use quotes from Merleau-Ponty merely to 'prove' my point. If! 
quote him, or any other philosopher, it will be because they have articulated my thinking 
in a way better than I can. Furthermore, it may be useful to invoke the nuances of their 
teaching by citing their words. Phenomenology also means that the first person singular is 
going to appear a good deal in a strong autobiographical emphasis. This is also an effort 
to bring into awareness and bracket as much as possible, the prejudices that I carry from 
various other realms of discourse. As I am both a student ofMerleau-Ponty and a 
practising Gestalt therapist, I am really asking what it is like for me to 'face' the 
philosophy ofMerleau-Ponty. 
Biographical Background 
I return to the point made earlier, that my study is a lived dialectic between me - a 
practising Gestalt therapist, - and the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. I should also say that 
I spent many years studying a philosophy (neo-Thomism) as a student in the Jesuit order. 
I took this as it was given me - a buttress and support for theological positions. The 
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legacy of my years with Scholasticism was three-fold. Firstly, it imbued me with a great 
respect for learning; secondly, learning became for me more a question of 'counting up 
quotations' (PhP.p.viii;Fvii) - of knowing what the 'masters' had said, rather than 
'determining and expressing in concrete form this phenomenology for (myself). '(ibid.) A 
corollary of this was that authority rather than the phenomenon - res se manifestans. (the 
thing showing itself) - became my criterion of truth. A third and rather surprising legacy 
of these years passed so much in the study and practice of spirituality, is an abiding awe 
and wonder at human existence. We find the same attitude in Merieau-Ponty's Preface: 
'The best formulation of the reduction is probably that given by Eugen Fink, 
Husserl's assistant, when he spoke of 'wonder' in the face of the world' 
(phP.Preface xiii;Fvii ). 
The Scholastic world of solid certainties was thoroughly subverted by my exposure to 
Existentialism during a sabbatical year '68-'69. I took a course with the late Professor 
Donald Nicholl: Jewish and Existentialist Influences on European Thinking 7, This 
'conversion' was reinforced in me by the works of Karl Rahner. However, my departure 
from the Jesuits in 1972 had to do not so much with intellectual disenchantment but more 
with personal change in me. Philosophy had become less a system of knowledge and 
more of a life-choice. 
Then for eighteen years I had charge of the teaching of Religious Education in a 
Grammar School in the Wirral. During those years I deepened my acquaintance with 
Existentialism by teaching a course in philosophy in the Lower and Upper Sixth Forms. 
It was when I retired early from teaching through illness and was training as a Gestalt 
psychotherapist, that I became acquainted with Merleau-Ponty. This acquaintance 
transformed me and my understanding and appreciation of Gestalt therapy. His 
7This was the title of a course by the late Professor Donald Nicholl, which I attended as a student at Corpus 
Christi College in London in 1968-69. This college which trained teachers of Religious Education. was 
subsequently shut down by Cardinal Heenan in 1972 because it was widely alleged to be subverting the 
obedience of clergy. 
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resolution of subject/object split was out of tune with what I had lived by for thirty-five 
years. Yet, I had the impression, which slowly became a conviction and then a passion, 
that here was something I had been working towards and waiting for all my life. 
Paradoxically, far from its undermining my Christian faith I found it enormously 
supportive of that theological spirituality which emerged from the Second Vatican 
Council and which I found in the works ofRahner and in the Jesuit journal, Theological 
Studies. I discerned a passion and freshness in Merleau-Ponty which reminded me of 
another great philosopher from whom Merleau-Ponty expressly distanced himself in the 
very first pages of his Phenomenology, yet who bestraddled western thinking for fifteen 
centuries and whose beautiful cadences, ever ancient ever new, still echo in the prayers 
and sequences of the Roman liturgy: St Augustine of Hippo. As a young student of 
philosophy I had learned much from this great mystical thinker. Augustine, despite his 
fearsome reputation as a fanatic, carried much compassion and respect for those Platonist 
philosophers who had rescued him from Manichaeism. 8 
The legacy of Augustine was, to some extent, the enthronement of dualism as the ruling 
philosophy in western theology/philosophy. It was this same split between body and soul 
that Merleau-Ponty so untiringly wrestled with. It seemed to me, that what Merleau-
Ponty was writing about was being put into practice in Gestalt therapy. They were both 
dealing with a world that had been ruptured, so that people were educated to be at a 
distance from their experience. This rupture is profoundly explored in R.D. 
Romanyshyn's remarkable work (1994): ' ...... in the space of linear perspective vision, 
the body is progressively abandoned. Indeed ... as we approach the vanishing point, the 
body increasingly becomes a matter of the head ... in other words the human body is taken 
up into the heady eye of mind' (pAS). 
81 think of that wistful outburst of compassion for his teachers: ' ... hoc il/ae litterae non habent ........ et aliud 
est de silvestri cacumine videre patriam pacis, et iter ad eam non invenire, etfrustra conari per invia ... ' 
(Confessiones VII. 2 1.)' .. this (the teaching of Jesus), those books do not possess, .. .it is a different 
experience to view the peaceful homeland from a wooded hill and not find the way to it and to attempt 
vainly to find it along paths that lead nowhere. ' 
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Audience 
I have already declared in general the aim of this study and my on-going relationship with 
Gestalt therapy theory and practice. Now I need to explain what audience I am writing 
for; the peculiar style I am adopting. 
I envisage my audience as a group of sophisticated and well-read Gestalt 
teachers/trainers, practitioners - very much the kind of people I had the honour of 
meeting at the International Conference for European Gestalt Writers in Syracuse (Sicily) 
in April 2001. They will be as familiar as I am with Gestalt therapy theory but most of 
them will be almost totally innocent of the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. I say this 
because very few works reference him and those that do, mention him only en passant. I 
find him most referenced in Hycner and Jacobs (1995). 
A Note about the Style of my Study 
The style of my composition is analogous to my meeting with a client and a paradigm of 
all phenomenological perception. I allow certain aspects of my subject to become figure 
and then to fade into the background, bowing out in favour of further aspects. 9 The image 
that most suits my work is that used by Merleau-Ponty himself in his introductory piece 
to Part I of the Phenomenology of Perception (1979, p.67, F8I). There he speaks about 
regarding a house from different viewpoints. Each perspective offers its own special view 
and each new aspect is carried forward into the following one, all enriching the 'final' 
view of the house. All the different perspectives overlap; they all imply one another. And 
that is the way with the concepts ofMerleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology; for 
instance, it is impossible to speak of intentionality without implicating transcendence. 
The disadvantage of this style is that it may appear to be repetitious. That, I think, is 
Ths is an application of the figure-horizon structw'e accepted in Gestalt psychology and which Merleau-
Ponty says is an essential condition for the possibility of perception. (eg.Ph.P.p.68fI; F 81 ) 
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unavoidable when my whole research is one long unfolding of the dialectic between aim, 
method and object of study. I must beg the indulgence of the reader who will find me 
returning to the same themes again and again. On the other hand some of the concepts are 
difficult and the reader may actually welcome the repetition; or the reader may quickly 
recognise repetition and just skip. I notice that repetition is a common trait amongst 
writers on Merleau-Ponty, ego Mallin (1979). 
To return to the house metaphor, we realise, that however many perspectives we take 
upon the house, there are still more remaining, so that we depend on ever-emerging 
perspectives to know the house and we can never know it in its 'objective' reality which 
is really an ideality. We know it only in its phenomenology, that IS, in its 'advent to being 
in our awareness instead of presuming its possibility as given in advance' 
(phP.p.61;F74).1O Our perception of the other is always and essentially partial and, 
therefore, inexhaustible. Phenomenologically, in the thrust of our transcendence we 
experience the other, as ultimately inaccessible. 11 This generates a humility, which 
inspires that empowering respect for the client so characteristic of the Gestalt approach. 
Similar Studies 
I can find no exactly similar studies. Wheeler in his Gestalt Reconsidered (199111998A) 
has endeavoured to re-direct Gestalt therapy away from the individual focus of Fritz Perls 
and more towards the field focus of Goodman and Lewin; he moves forward in this 
project with the publication of his Beyond Individualism (2000). This is a very serious 
and well-structured attempt to unhook Gestalt therapy from any model where the 
individual and therapist are isolated from the community and working to a goal where 
self reliance/self-support equals maturity. In Wheeler's view, therapy should enable a 
person to find his growth and maturity in accepting and giving support in the community. 
Wheeler's work is an extension of the Field Theory aspect of Gestalt therapy. This is a 
10, ... the absolute positing of a single object is the death of consciousness, since it congeals the whole of 
existence, as a crystal placed in solution suddenly crystallises it' (ph.P.p.71;F86). 
IIWe have to be careful here not to posit 'an objective being' (cf.Ph.P.p.333;F384). 
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philosophical work but it is not similar to my project; Wheeler is working things out from 
within the GoodmanlLewin framework, flawed as it is. 
Another notable philosophical study is the work of Malcolm Parlett (1997 and 2000) 
He confirms for me that the growing edge of Gestalt therapy theory seems centred in 
Field Theory. He finds that the old dualisms, which have plagued psychotherapy, are 
most effectively met by elaborating the basic concepts of the field: 'Lives and collective 
systems intertwine and need to be considered together as a unifiedfield' (1997 p.16) The 
great merit of Parlett's work is that he demonstrates how Field Theory is eminently 
practical and promotes a movement away from isolated individualist talk and thinking 
such as "the family", "the person" to linking and stating the connectedness of things: 
"family-in-society", "person-in-situatio". He does not reference Merleau-Ponty, yet his 
thinking is very congenial to that philosopher's way. It will be apparent, I hope, 
especially in my Chapter, The Body Situated, how much foundation and development are 
on offer in the philosophy ofMerleau-Ponty for these kinds of developments. 
Recently (2001) three remarkable philosophical articles appeared in the (American) 
Gestalt Review 5(3). The leading article is by Vernon van de Riet: Gestalt and the 
Phenomenological Method This is a comment on an article written three years earlier by 
Lolita Sapriel published in the British Gestalt Journal (1998,7 pp.133 -144). She 
challenges the process of bracketing - which she attributes to Husserl- and says it 
negates the holistic nature of Gestalt therapy. I deal with this comprehensively in Ch 3 
while discussing Epistemology. Kenneth Mayer's article is a commentary on the same 
and seems to agree with Sapriel. Mark McConville (2001) on the other hand takes issue 
with the interpretation they are placing on 'bracketing'. In this article, McConville, for 
the first time ever that I have come upon, calls into question the value for Gestalt therapy 
of drawing its central theoretical component (Field Theory) from Kurt Lewin - an 
empirical scientist. I shall discuss this further in Chapter 6. Furthermore, it is significant, 
that when McConville wishes to make the point that the observer is part of 'the field' he 
gives (a very difficult) quote from Merleau-Ponty's chapter on the Phenomenal Field 
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(PhP.p.59;F72).12 All of these articles underline the difficulty that Gestalt therapy faces 
though the weakness of its underlying philosophy. 
A Note about the Various Meanings of 'Phenomenology' 
Here I wish to state briefly how I deal with the problem of the many meanings of 
'phenomenology' How do I apply phenomenology - itself a term of many disputed 
meanings - to Gestalt therapy theory - itself inseparable from a whole spectrum of 
varying practices. (cf Y ontef , 1993, p.48) I proceed by allowing myself to carry the 
many meanings of phenomenology evident in the literature PhP.(p.vii -ix); Spiegelberg 
(1972); Richardson, W. J. (1979 pp 1-3); Blankenburg (1980, p.50fl). I shall enter into the 
question of the meanings attaching to 'Phenomenology' in Ch 4 Pt. I. 
For the purposes of this study I favour one ofMerleau-Ponty's own definitions: 
, ... phenomenology is a study of the advent of being to consciousness, 
instead of presuming its possibility as given in advance.' (phP. p. 61 ;F7) 13 
The challenge to me then is to study the advent of Gestalt therapy theory to my awareness 
- 'manifesting itself from itself precisely in the way it does that when it speaks from 
itself (Richardson, J. P., 1986, p.56) without allowing my intent to bias what shows 
itself 
Section Three: Methodology Dlustrated 
In this Section I wish to describe an example of a phenomenological reduction applied to 
one of the theoretical structures of Gestalt therapy. In the procedure I am influenced by 
the general outline of the research described by Giorgi (1975): An Application of 
Phenomenological Method in Psychology. 
12 I notice with interest that Mark McConville is scheduled to address an international Gestalt Conference 
in Paris in March 2003: Phenomenological Foundations of Gestalt Psychology: The Relevance ofMerleau-
Ponty. 
13 The reader, I'm afraid, is going to grow weary of this expression:cfH.P.pp.55, 75, 146,209,et passim. 
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I shall first of all briefly list the 'steps', then I shall take the concept of 'psychological 
health' as it is described in the literature and use that to illustrate the application. Two 
preliminary notes are required: 
In his article Giorgi says:' .... phenomenology is the study of the structure, and of the 
variations of structure, of the consciousness to which anything, event or person appears' 
(p.S3). I am suggesting that we take 'this study of structures' to embrace, more 
explicitly, the bodily sensations, feelings, inclinations and hesitations that develop in the 
subject involved in the event. This is Merleau-Ponty's own style in the Phenomenology in 
his chapter on sexuality. Also, I wish to follow him in his aversion to any view that seems 
to centre perception apart from the body. 
In the course of this study I shall not repeat such an analysis for every Gestalt therapy 
concept I mention. The phenomenological analysis of the theoretical structures of Gestalt 
therapy formed part of the training I underwent for many years. The concept of 
'confluence' for instance, which means a movement to merge with the environment -
like a trainee wanting to please his trainer and therefore not daring to challenge the trainer 
on anything he says or does - was the subject of a 'workshop' lasting five days during 
which we explored this concept through experiential work and discussions. The analysis I 
describe below, is only a summary account of what could be a far more elaborate 
analysis. This procedure does not happen in linear mode. The 'steps' constantly over-
lap. Because I cannot be experiencing while I am describing, every 'step' is happening 
with every other step, back and forth. 
An Application of Merleau-Ponty's Analysis to 'Psychological Health' 
Firstly I formulate the concept as we find it in Gestalt therapy literature; I put it in context 
and explain it. 
Secondly, I use a manner of meditation technique, a gaze on that concept and note the 
changes it brings about in me and allow these changes to 'lead' me. I do not assume that 
what I am coming to in the 'meditation' will be identical with what the literature says. 
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Thirdly, I bracket prejudicial/distracting material that this concept brings in its train. 
Fourthly, I continually check that what I am noting is, in fact, present in the phenomenon. 
This is called the hermeneutic circle; I have to be careful not to compose the experience -
as much as possible, anyway. 
Fifthly, I generalize the 'enriched' concept so that it loses its definitive edges and 
connects more deeply with that power of reflection, which took it up in the first place. 
Now I can hold it in its ontological connection as a modality of the perceptual region. 
Let us take the theoretical structure of psychological health as it is enunciated in Gestalt 
literature and see it as a phenomenon of actuality. Let us look at two places in the classic 
literature: 
I am excerpting the description of psychological health from that part of Gestalt Therapy 
(pHG), which is dealing with the Structure of Growth. I take it from Section 11: The Self 
and its Identifications which, is the final section in this part. It has just been preceded by a 
section 9.: Excitement is Evidence of Reality and section 10: Contact is 'Finding and 
Making' the Coming Solution. 
The description of psychological health and disease is a simple one. It is a matter 
of the identification and alienation of the self: If a man identifies with his forming 
self, does not inhibit his own creative excitement and reaching towards the 
coming solution; and conversely, if he alienates what is not organically his own 
and therefore cannot be vitally interesting, but rather disrupts the 
figure/background, then he is psychologically healthy, ....... (pHG p.282) 
I note here the emphasis on wholeness, on differentiation, on excitement, novelty, and 
creativity. Also it emphasises the vigour necessary to reject what does not belong. 
This is in accord with what has been said at the beginning of the book, in that part 
where they are preparing the readers for the experiential work which forms the 
body of Book I. 
To the extent that your feeling of actuality has been split offjrom your workaday 
personality, the effort to experience actuality will rouse anxiety (masked, perhaps, 
as fatigue, boredom, impatience, annoyance) - and what specifically rouses your 
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anxiety will be the particular resistance by which you throttle and pre vent full 
experience (PHG p. 67; emphasis in text.). 
Let us take an example: 
A child of four visits the seaside for the first time. He shrieks and runs and dances and 
rolls in uncontrollable delight and his Grandma joins in the fun. Another child in the 
same situation is told to 'control himself and not to upset people by his screaming, so he 
goes quiet and behaves like a 'good little boy'. The first is identifying with this forming 
self; the second is alienating what is organically his own, turning instead to what is not 
vitally interesting for him. The first is on the road to health, the second to ill-health. 
As I contemplate these examples the first thing that arises for me is a difficulty in 
separating 'psychological health' from the rest of me. That is not how I experience 
myself. This happens when I imagine myself in a state of health. I enter into this as much 
as I can, using all my faculties and allowing what comes to me to affect my body. 
So, in this exercise I can put my body in a posture of health - by, for instance, standing 
up facing my garden, opening the patio door and breathing deeply. Feeling the coolness 
of the air, becoming more and more aware of my embodied self. I notice how I am 
associating health with contact with the 'raw' earth. This has a sense of familiarity for 
me. I recognize also that health is by no means a 'new' idea. I can sense the energy in my 
body, the appetite for living, I want to do things. Images come tumbling in .To some 
extent it is 'talk about talk' that I have previously engaged in. It lacks the stuff of poetry; 
but I notice I become more alive when I breathe and move my body in the open air -
uninhibited movement. I notice the cascade of stored memories of my own experience of 
health and illness. I am encouraged by the richness of the memories. I bring on my 
knowledge and experience with my clients over eleven years, my years of hospital work., 
my memory of work with that osteopath who helped me recover the use of my back from 
a painful illness. I am emotionally moved by some of these memories. I allow my body as 
it is affected by these memories and stored experience to 'speak'. These accumulated 
experiences mayor may not emotionally affect me; but they serve to enrich the image 
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and the concept that are building in me. The important thing, so far as Gestalt therapy is 
concerned, is the process. I allow the massive accumulation of data to speak to me 
through my experience. I allow myself to feel an embodied connection with the totality 
that is myself in the world. I notice how fixed I am on the movement of my body as 
signifying my health. The more I focus on the changes that takes place in me, the more 
the phenomenon discloses itself. The important thing is the process of disclosure. Health 
is presence to my totality; not driving any part of me away, or dismissing anything about 
me. At the same time I am as careful as I can be, to bracket off those considerations, 
those experiences which I see are not coming from my body's experience but deriving 
from some other source. For instance, moral considerations around 'health' deriving from 
the prejudice I built up a long time ago at my father's poor health and his preoccupation 
with it. (The moral component intrudes in my saying to my father: 'It is your duty to be 
healthy'!) 
The exercise is never complete, and the best we can hope for is an approximation to an 
unprejudiced experience. The whole procedure is called a 'phenomenological reduction'. 
It is an effort to allow the phenomenon to manifest itself to meJrom itself - as distinct 
from manifesting itselfJrom my interpretation. We shall, in a little while, discuss the 
epistemological validity of this procedure. How does it get past the universal capacity for 
projection and interpretation? Does it bring us to 'the real' aspects of health? 
Now I connect this reflection with a more primitive situation in which I have not yet 
reflected, in which, without the never-ceasing chatter of reflection, I am simply be-
coming. My previous attentive gaze at 'health' at my healthy living body, the practised 
and risky openness, the carefulness I exercise around my allowing the experience to 
impact me, have prepared me for this step into philosophy. As I go to that place of silence 
and return from it and go there again and return again, I enable myself to appreciate the 
process that we call perception in all its complexity, and I can see how 'health' emerges 
from this process of perception laden with all manner of connections, how straight-away 
the perceptive process loses itself in this plethora of 'objects' that it brings into being. In 
this back and forth exercise I am coming to appreciate perception as unifying presence: it 
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is that which holds all things together by keeping them apart. In entering the ontological 
dimension of 'health' I am not leaving it behind but allowing it to manifest itself to me in 
all its complexity, I am now seeing it as a human phenomenon, a modality of human 
being-in-the-world. I am no longer seeing it disconnected as an entity in itself in 
isolation; I am seeing it now as surrounded by the world that confers meaning upon it as a 
way of being human In this last move, I am 'touching base' connecting myself to the 
foundations of my being. 
How does such a 'reduction' facilitate the application ofMerieau-Ponty's philosophy? 
It does so by allowing reality to manifest itself to me from itself and not just from my 
interpretation. The more I gaze at a thing, the more complexity I see in it. All orchids 
look more or less the same at a distance. Indeed you can easily mistake them for some 
other flower. It is only when viewed at 'an optimal distance' that the astonishing 
individuality of the orchid impacts you. It is only at an optimal distance 
(PhP.p.302;F348), when my gaze has opened up the inner horizon of it, that I can 
appreciate the inter-connectedness of its parts and its belonging with everything else. 
That way I allow the reality of a healthy person to manifest itself to me without 
composing it beforehand on the assumption that I know what health is 'a priori'. As it 
unfolds itself in all its complexity, I see clearly how I cannot know all there is to know 
about the healthy person, without knowing all there is to know about the whole of the 
world. I am left with the image of health as that bracing energized feeling of facing the 
southwest wind blowing strongly along the promenade early on a Summer's morning. 
In the analysis I have just made we see health as a modality of each of the four existential 
regIOns. 
Section Four: Gestalt Therapy as a Modality of Perception 
The word 'perception' is not a key word in the classic text PHG. It does not feature in the 
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index and it very little features in the text of that very long bookl4. We can only speculate 
on this omission because the book makes no mention of this anomaly. The authors were 
certainly familiar with the word, which was common parlance in the world of 
psychology. In fact, Gestalttheorie with its figurelhorizon view of awareness was 
incorporated as the theory of perception in Gestalt therapy (Y ontef 1979, p.182, 196 et 
passim); it was their admiration for the breakthrough of the Berlin psychologists who, 
contrary to the theories of the atomists, demonstrated that the Gestalt is the minimal 
percept (Kohler, W., 1930 Ch 6) which inspired the authors to call the therapy 'Gestalt' 
(Stoehr, 1994, p.1 04-5). There is no discussion in PHG of connection between contact-
actuality-awareness and perception. 
We think that they avoided the word15 for the very reason that it had already acquired a 
'psychologistic' or 'psychophysiological' connotation and the pioneering early Gestalt 
therapists felt it needed to be superseded by some other words, more indicative of the 
engagement of the therapist with the situation. Their vision was holistic and what we 
would call 'the phenomenon' was for them a whole-field configuration. In order to 
express this they employed words like 'awareness', 'contact', creative adjustment' .16 
If I am to apply the phenomenology of perception to the theoretical structures of Gestalt 
therapy then it is necessary to demonstrate that Gestalt therapy is a perceptual activity. 
Let us consider whether the term 'perception' has a place in describing the operation that 
is Gestalt therapy. It is important to note, that seeing it through such a lens by no means 
diminishes its belonging also to the three other existential regions. It is simultaneously a 
cognitive/linguistic, a motor and an intersubjective activity. Like cognition, like 
language, like movement, like relating, perception is realized only in the lived body. My 
procedure here will be as follows: 
141t is of course mentioned here and there: ego pp.320, 321, 426, 428 
15This omission has continued in Gestalt therapy writing: ego In Y ontef (1993) 1 count 172 references to 
'Contact' and 154 to 'Awareness' but none to perception. 
16 I am indebted to Professor Malcolm Parlett for sharing his ideas on this matter with me. 
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Firstly we shall see what Merleau-Ponty means by 'perception' and find ifhis use of this 
term is congenial to what happens in Gestalt therapy. 
Secondly, I shall take six terms prominent in the literature of Gestalt therapy to describe 
its activity. We shall see if these terms meet the meaning of' perception' as Merleau-
Ponty uses the term and if such perception is rooted in the body. 
Merleau-Ponty's Use of the Term 'Perception' 
Merieau-Ponty sees 'the world' as delivering itself to us, without theme or structure, so 
that it comes to us in the most general of ways 'something and not nothing'. This 
'revelation' is the foundation upon which the edifice of all subsequent knowledge will be 
built. 
. ... we are trying to describe the phenomenon of the world, that is its birth for us 
in that field into which each perception sets us back where we are as yet still 
alone, where other people will appear only at a later stage, in which knowledge 
and particularly science have not so far ironed out and levelled down the 
individual perspective. It is through this birth that we are destined to graduate to a 
world and we must therefore describe it (PhP.p.256~F296). 
In this way he sees it as a coming to birth, like a wakening-up-to and discovery of the 
world. He returns to this theme as he speaks of the task of phenomenology. 
Our task will be, moreover, to rediscover phenomena, the layer of experience 
through which other people and things are first given to us, the system' self-
others-things' as it comes into being (PhP.p.57;F69). 
When we ask about the locus of this 'birth', it is not 'some transcendental subjectivity, to 
be found everywhere and nowhere;'(PhP.p62;F75) but 'the body as a grouping oflived-
through meanings (moving) towards its equilibrium. '(in Mallin 1979 p.153)Italics mine. 
My act of perception, in its unsophisticated form does not bring about this 
synthesis (of the multiple data of experience); it takes advantage of work already 
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done, of a general synthesis constituted once and for all, and this is what I mean 
when I say that I perceive with my body ..... (PhP.p.238;F275). 
That Merleau-Ponty sees perception as inseparable from the body, as a life-long activity 
of the person ranging from pre-objective experience through intersubjectivity and 
motility right up to the cognitive/linguistic level, will become more and more abundantly 
obvious as the study progresses. 
How the Modality Manifests itself in Eight Key Terms 
Let us tum now to the terms in which Gestalt therapists describe their work. I have 
already listed the terms one finds very frequently in the literature: authenticity, 
awareness, boundary, dialogue, embodied, field perspective, holism, and so on. When we 
look to the meaning of these terms we see how each one finds its meaning adequately in 
the body as the locus of perception. 
Term 1: Authenticity 
Gestalt therapy is a work of authenticity. I pointed out earlier how the transformative 
power of Gestalt therapy is centred in the genuineness, the truth of the between of 
therapist and client (H.P p.4). Then the client feels supported and is empowered to enter 
the alienated parts of her personality. This presence of client to therapist, and therapist to 
client, has to be a bodily thing. How else can they be present to one another if not through 
their bodies? This meeting can happen only if each perceives in the other an extension of 
his own system. That is the basis of recognition. If someone is totally other than me then 
there is no basis for re-cognition. They see one another, they hear one another, they feel 
the presence ( or absence) of one another. This is not a matter of inference or reasoning -
but of bodil y immediacy. 
Term 2: Awareness 
Awareness plainly belongs with perception. However, it might seem at first that 
awareness is a matter of 'the mind' an act that is apart from the body. For reasons of 
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clarity, I take awareness in Gestalt therapy to be the same as consciousness. I? Frequently 
it is taken in the sense of self-consciousness (Yontef, 1979, pp183-4,196). Yontef 
describes it as 'a state of being in full and vigilant contact with what is the main figure in 
the field' (1979 p.183). A woman on a date is aware that her partner does not look at her. 
This is not an inference but an immediate bodily experience - she feels disregarded 
perhaps, angry maybe, and emotions of various kinds are stirred up in her. This lack 
overshadows her meeting with her date. It is one step further when she notices that she 
notices it and it becomes self-awareness or self-consciousness. 
Merleau-Ponty sees awareness as a kind of light that draws no attention to itself but 
points to the "things" it displays. It is that in me which 'enables "things" to be 
constituted'; awareness 'forgets its own phenomena in favour of things' a bit like a 
mother forgets herself in favour of her children, 'because (awareness) is the cradle of 
things' (phP.p.58;F71) and can recall its own phenomena. Merleau-Ponty does not 
separate awareness from the existence of the person: 'Consciousness is being-towards-the 
thing' (PhP.p.138;F161). 
He identifies perception and awareness as the act of contact. Perception is the realization 
of my access to the world. No further proof is possible. It is its own guarantor. 
Perception is inseparable from the consciousness it has or rather is of 
reaching the thing itself (phP. p.3 74;F429) Italics mine. 
1 iIn order to contradistinguish the work of Gestalt therapy from that of the psychoanalysts, Goodman 
expressly avoids the use of the word 'conscious' or expressions such as . the heightening of consciousness' . 
As he sees it 'consciousness' for the Freudians is 'the passive receiver of impressions, or the rationalizer. or 
the verbalizer. It is what is swayed, reflects and does nothing.' (pHG.p.286-7). He seems to me to be 
inconsistent in his use of the term 'consciousness'. He connects 'increased complexity' with 'heightened 
consciousness' (ibid.p.307-8). It seems to me he is here talking about 'self-consciousness' because he 
associates it with an interruption of contact; as soon as I become SELF-conscious, I withdraw myself from 
involvement with you. 
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In this view it is misleading to break up awareness into separate acts; just as it is 
misleading to think of the world as comprising separate things. The human person 
is one, lived unity; not a body and soul joined together, not the result of some over-
arching rational act which draws all the multiplicity into one, but an on-going 
embodied expression of existence 'like a word expresses thought' (PhP.p.S8;F71). 
Awareness is the abiding source of cohesion in a person's life, indeed it is the life 
of the person: 
I am not myself a succession of "psychic" acts, nor for that matter, a nuclear "I" 
who brings them together into a synthetic unity, but one single experience 
inseparable from itself, one single "living cohesion", one single temporality which 
is engaged, from birth in making itself progressively explicit, and 1 confirm that 
cohesion in each successive present. (PhP.pA07;F466 ) 
Term 3: Dialogue 
This is one of that trinity of characteristics (dialogue, phenomenology and field theory) 
which Yonteflays down as the hallmark of Gestalt therapy practice. It embraces 'I-Thou' 
and depends upon immediacy. Dialogue means two people talking with one another, so 
that each is responding to the other and engaging with the new perceptions generated by 
the conversation; primarily, this belongs in the intersubjective and cognitive/linguistic 
regions of existence. And because it involves a search for meaning it belongs in the 
perceptual region. Furthermore, as we shall see, it is a transcendent activity of the body. 
So it can happen that I begin to discuss with a colleague how a 'forgetfulness' of the 
events can get in the way ofa person's coming to terms with a horrific event. As we talk I 
notice that things I had not considered - such as, a much increased frequency of therapy 
sessions by way of giving the client the support which may allow the banished memories 
to surface - begin to take shape in me and I find myself in a new place. 
The meaning of the word is not contained in the word as a sound. But the human 
body is defined in terms of its property of appropriating in an indefinite series of 
discontinuous acts, significant cores that transcend and transfigure its natural 
powers (PhP.p.193;F226). 
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Here we see 'dialogue' as meaning-making - which is always a perceptual exercise -
through the medium of the body. 
Term 4: Embodied 
We have in the literature of Gestalt therapy a strong tradition of the body as the centre of 
therapy. I go over this question in greater detail in Chapter 7, Section One. 
In his work (1987) Body Process, Kepner gives a very convincing account of the 
effectiveness of therapy centering on the body. He makes it clear at the same time that 
this must go hand in hand with dialogue. One without the other will not be sufficient. (I 
deal with this more fully further along.(cfH.P.pp.66; 170-176). Sufficient here to notice 
that 'embodiment' in order to be understood as a therapeutic movement must be seen as 
an activity of the perceptual region. 
Terms 5 and 6: Field Perspective and Holism 
I take these two terms together because they are very closely related in their meaning: 
they each of them stress the belongingness of things with one another and in the totality. 
They mark the departure in Gestalt therapy, from the model of the world as it was handed 
down in the Cartesian tradition: 'Here, I am the thinking mind and over there are the 
things; to study them I isolate them and treat them as things in themselves'. Holism and 
field perspective are essentially epistemological terms - they express the way in which 
we know the world; these terms also express an ontological belief - that the being of 
'things' is in their interconnectedness. Later we shall explore this belief and its origins 
under the heading of situatedness (Ch.9). It seems apparent to me that the adequate 
meaning of these terms is to be found in 'perception'. I shall, however, make an 
important point about their being body-based: if one reflects upon it, one sees that it is 
only from the experienced unity of my own body that I can constitute the object. In my 
perception of any object or person all my senses are employed and this inundation of 
disparate data is brought together only in the Gestalt of my own body. This enables me to 
hold the object in my perception as a unity, vis-a-vis my own unity and also as belonging 
in the world of things. 
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Terms 7 and 8: ResponselResponsibility 
Both of these related terms find their adequate explanation only in terms of perception by 
the embodied subject. They belong most properly in the region of intersubjectivity. 
They also embrace the region of motility and perception equally. I cannot respond to 
what has no meaning for me; for such I have literally no response-ability. Gestalt therapy 
helps people to appropriate their lives; in every act of awareness there is present an 
element of ownership of my life - I become responsible. 18 Response involves bodily 
action - turning my body, looking, speaking, feeling, and moving. So, here again Gestalt 
therapy manifests itself as a function of perception in the sense in which Merleau-Ponty 
uses the term. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have done four things: 
Firstly, I have situated my study in a particular genre of writing. It belongs with those 
thinkers who relate their thinking to the actual quality of life for people. I dissociated the 
study from partisanship in academic philosophic debate. Life choice is, for me, of 
primary importance. This means for me to re-Iocate Gestalt therapy as a therapy of the 
lived body. 
Secondly, I demonstrate the use I make of existential phenomenology in my study -
somewhat after the manner of Roger Brooke (1993) in his work on Carl Gustave Jung. 
Merleau-Ponty's analysis offers a new vocabulary to Gestalt therapy, which will enable it 
to develop and articulate itself in a whole new way and at a more profound level. My 
study will be of little value and lose all its originality unless my investigation moves at 
the ontoiogicailevel; that is to say, it must pass through the 'natural attitudes', and go for 
that which is at once concealed and revealed by the phenomenon: Being. Phenomenology 
18 lP Sartre, in his Truth and Existence (1992B) makes this point most powerfully showing how knowledge 
brings in its train responsibility and opens the way to our inauthenticity by our hiding from it. 
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reveals the lived body as the confirmation of the theoretical - a realization of Being. 
Thirdly, I demonstrate how the phenomenological method can operate with regard to the 
concept of' health', much spoken about in Gestalt therapy literature. 
Fourthly, I demonstrate the validity of my applying a phenomenology of perception to 
Gestalt therapy because the therapy is essentially a perceptual activity. In this chapter we 
began to glimpse something of the wealth of deeper understanding which the philosophy 
ofMerleau-Ponty offers to Gestalt therapy theory. 
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Introduction: Stating the Problem 
The problem I am addressing in this chapter is this: What is the epistemological basis of 
Gestalt therapy theory? In other words: What does Gestalt therapy theory state as its basic 
certainty: What is the 'bottom line' for judging the validity of a theory in Gestalt therapy? 
From where does Gestalt therapy derive its reality? How does Gestalt therapy stand with 
regard to truth and certainty? We can formulate the problem in three interdependent 
propositions. 
Proposition 1. If the world as I know it is a construction of my mind and if it is the only 
world I know, then how can I be sure that I am in contact with the actuan Rather, it 
would seem, am I in contact with an idea of the actuan In other words, aliI have is an 
interpreted world 
Proposition 2. The realm of experience is limited to the realm of language. 'Being is 
forever imprisoned within the house oflanguage. There is no access to either Being or 
beings that is not mediated by language' (Dillon 1997, p.178). I deal with this in Chapter 
3 on Language. 
Proposition 3. There is my truth and there is your truth. We each of us are separate 
people; we each of us take a different view of the same reality. We each of us can be 
right. So talk about 'truth' becomes problematic. 
The 'critical question' for Gestalt theory and practice is this: 
Am I, in fact, deluded in thinking that I am in contact with actuality? This person that sits 
here in front of me, how sure can I be that I am really meeting that person and not just my 
idea of that person? It seems to me extremely important that there be no chink of 
equivocation about the possibility of our immediate contact with reality. A question-mark 
against the reality of my world is a question-mark against my own reality, because it is 
only in terms of the world that I know myself. 
In this chapter I shall deal at length with the position stated in proposition 1 above; less so 
about proposition 3; and I shall deal with the question of language in a separate chapter. 
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I attach such importance to proposition 1 precisely because it is - to my mind - a position 
being taken up by some very influential Gestalt writers of our time. Here are some 
examples: 
Sapriel, L. (1998) says: 'everything is interpreted and this interpretative process does not 
get us closer to 'truth'. She approvingly cites Spinelli, E (1989) 'whatever be the meaning 
arrived at, it cannot be concluded that it is a true or "correct" reflection of reality'. She 
does not modify or qualify this first statement (cf H.P.pp. 28,99,110,114,124,127.) 
Wheeler. G. (2000) says: ' ... the world we are aware of seems to come to us already 
packaged' (p.80) . .... the world as it is (Kant) is ultimately unknowable to us ... all we have 
are our interpretative pictures .... All we have to work with are constructions of our 
bodymind' (pp86-87) (italics in text). 19 
Robine. A.: ' .... with this (post-modem view) comes the conclusion that there is no other 
reality than that which we construct .... ' 
I am not here citing the context of those quotations because I shall do so later. However, I 
need to make two very important points very briefly: 
(i) They are quite right to say that we shape everything we perceive according to our 
needs, desires, losses, hopes, ambitions etc. 
(ii) There is no question of our knowing the 'thing as it is in itself; to accord 
actuality to such a notion is to deny the primacy of phenomena; it is to assume 
some god-like stance upon the world so that I know something through and 
through - in its ipseity; because to know one thing is to know its relationships 
and its origins through all time and this must involve knowing the same about all 
connected with it. 
19 cfMy challenge to Wheeler on this view of perception in the British Gestalt Journal (2001). For his reply 
to me cf (Wheeler, 2002). 
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Section One: The Relevance of This Concern to Gestalt therapy Theory 
Truth, Certainty and Belief 
Firstly, I need to make some clarifications and distinctions. The point of these will 
become apparent later in the chapter - and, indeed, throughout the study. 
Firstly, I must address the difficult question of truth: In Gestalt therapy truth is not to be 
found in a proposition. Rather is it a process of dawning awareness of the reality that is 
here present with me, that summons me and engages my awareness. Though they are 
very closely connected I am not wishing to make 'reality' and 'truth' interchangeable. 
Reality may not engage my judgement or make a demand upon my awareness the way 
truth does. It is more than just a 'point-of-view'. A client said to me: 'For years, I 
engaged my father in polite conversation just to be able to be comfortable with myself. I 
knew I was avoiding him but chose not to face up to it. I patronised him- and somewhere 
I knew it.'. To say to such a person: 'That is just your viewpoint on what happened', is to 
collapse his experience into a proposition. This is more than just a point of view: he is 
passing judgement on himself and coming from a place of illumination in his 
awareness.
20 It is part of embracing the truth to embrace also the opacity of the world. We 
are never fully sure; our weightiest decisions are made in semi-darkness. 
I go along with Dillon's distinction between the search for truth and the search for 
certainty: 
The search for truth is an attempt to pierce the opacity of the world, an effort to 
make our conjectures about the world as accurate as possible. The quest for 
certainty, on the other hand, is an attempt to eliminate the opacity ofthe world 
altogether and make it entirely transparent; an essay to expel all conjecture or 
supposition from our knowledge (Dillon, 1997, p.lO). 
In searchingfor the truth one can be content that the opaqueness of the world remain; in 
questing certainty one is wanting to do away with that opaqueness. In Gestalt therapy 
20 In my views here I am very influenced by Michael 1. Buckley (1978). 
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theory each of these positions is seen as a movement towards the world; each of these 
searches is charged with an emotional attitude they will affect the atmosphere of 'the 
field'. Furthermore, the therapist who has given up on 'truth' as a quest at all is moving 
towards the world in his own way and this will also manifest itself in his body-presence 
with his client. This will have relevance in our discussion of some aspects of post-modern 
de-constructivism. 
Present as Operational Intentionality 
And then there is 'belief which is the way we cope with the great sea of our ignorance: 
, ... believing (or cognitive "knowing") is the sublimation (translation or expression) of 
our noncognitive situations into the thematic and linguistic structures of our cognitive 
region. '(Mallin, S.B, 1979, p.221). People cope with the surd that is mortality by belie/in 
a life after death. All these - the search for truth and certainty, acts of belief - are 
activities of our existential regions - cognitive/linguistic, motor, intersubjective and 
perceptual (Mallin loc.cit.p.41). As such, these activities are present to us in the 
operational intentionality of our bodies - our senses, our muscles, our brain, our skin and 
bones. And this operational intentionality is not available to me until I actually jump into 
the situation. How do I know I can see? By seeing! And how do I know I can walk? By 
walking! This is because I do not actually coincide with myself; there is a tension 
between what I am and what I can be or what I can aim at: 
.... action is, by definition, the violent transition from what I have to what I aim to 
have, from what 1 am to what I intend to be. 1 can accomplish the cOgito and have 
assurance of genuinely willing, loving or believing, provided that in the first place 
1 actually do will, love or believe, and thus accomplish my own existence 
(PhP.p.282;F438). 
When Merleau-Ponty here says: 'I can accomplish the cogito ... ' he is referring to my 
allowing and articulating awareness of that stream of life through me, which is given to 
me, is not deriving from me but which I acknowledge when I utter 'Cogito' 'I think.' It 
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is an acknowledgement of that 'upsurge of existence', of what already IS, independently 
of me and which 'runs through me' without my being its origin. 
I experience the sensation as a modality of a general existence, one already 
destined for a physical world and which runs through me without my being the 
cause of it. (PhP.p.216~F250)(italics are mine) 
Merleau-Ponty is speaking here about sensation. However, because for Merleau-Ponty 
being is univocal, that is to say there are not 'kinds of being' like 'sensation and 
'intellection' or 'spiritual' and 'corporeal' being, but only one Being with different 
articulations, what he says of sensation will apply to cognition and all its modalities. 
Let us now return to re-consider Proposition I. 
If the world as I know it is a construction of my mind and ifit is the only world I know, 
then how can I be sure that I am in contact with the actuan Rather, it would seem, am I 
in contact with an idea of the actuaf? In other words, aliI have is an interpreted world 
Procedure 
First of all I wish to illustrate the strengths of this position and to make clear that I am in 
no way disputing the fact that we construct our world. (I am aware how in that last 
sentence I am falling into presupposing that there is 'a-world-in-itseIr which beckons to 
be 'constructed' by us!). 
Secondly I shall dwell upon the limitations of this position: how it omits that dimension 
of perception which I have discussed above and which is the body dimension of 
perception. It is my contention that the bottom line for Gestalt therapy theory must be the 
givenness of the lived body. 
Thirdly I shall elaborate further upon this bodily dimension by explaining the concept of 
'primordial faith' or 'contact' as Merleau-Ponty calls it. 
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We Construct our World 
The strength of this position is twofold. (i) The manifest truth which we all experience is 
that we shape or construct our world; everything that comes within the ambit of our 
perception. (ii) It is supported by the same unquestioned presupposition allowed by 
Descartes when he originally uttered his famous 'Cogito, ergo sum '. It is following 
Descartes. 
Gestalt therapy theory does not deny that we shape and construe our perceptions after the 
manner of our own familiar world. It is precisely our acknowledgement of this that leads 
us to bracket and to apply rigorously the hermeneutic circle. Technically it is explained as 
projection (pHG pp.254 -262). Projection is a matter of common observation and there 
is nothing particularly new about it. The medieval Scholastics recognised this and had a 
phrase for it: Quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur (,Whatever is received 
is received in accordance with the disposition of the receiver. ') However, this notion 
which, long after the Scholastics, became known in psychology as 'projection', came into 
its own mainly in the 19th century under the pen of Ludwig Fuerbach who applied it to 
explain (away) religious belief (Buckley, M.J, 1979, p.682fl). The notion that we 
constantly project ourselves into the world and find there what really belongs to us, 
became a mainstay of Freud's work particularly in its application to the interpretation of 
dreams and the phenomena of transference and counter-transference. The concept of 
'projection' was philosophically enthroned by Heidegger in his Being and Time (1927). 
Dasein stands in the world in a familiar setting precisely because he sees his own destiny 
in what lies around him. (cf Richardson, J.P. 1986, p.21fl). 
To construct our world is to project ourselves and the world we know ahead of us and 
'find' it in new situations. Such construction of our world goes on all the time in our in 
every-day life. The meaning we give to events varies with our loves, hates, desires, etc. 
So, if someone I love 'borrows' my stereo player I will say: 'That's alright, she'll give it 
back when she's finished with it': whereas, if someone else does the same thing, his label 
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is 'thief. This construction of reality is acknowledged generally in Gestalt therapy 
writing. Yontef(l993, p.286ff) deals with it in connection with Field Therapy. 
In the practice of therapy we do our best with phenomenological reduction to counteract 
projection to some extent by filtering out the grosser distortions. Everything we touch, 
imagine, perceive, talk about, use, and associate with is imbued with humanity. 
Merleau-Ponty acknowledges the truth in this position when he speaks of the way in 
which the person and the thing are joined 
The thing is inseparable from the person perceiving and can never be actually in 
itself because its articulations are those of our very existence, and because it 
stands at the other end of our gaze or at the terminus of a sensory exploration 
which invests it with humanity (phP.p.320;F370). 
Support from Descartes 
The second strength of this position is the support it gets from Rene Descartes. 
Descartes' position: the only meaning we can really claim to know is what is beyond the 
vicissitudes of the body and time. Meaning, if it is to be really meaning must be eternal, 
it cannot be the plaything of moods and weather and wear and tear. So, this underlies 
'the adoption of a methodology of reduction which further separates essence from fact 
and meaning from existence'. (Dillon 1997, p. 77) 
As Descartes struggled to know something with certainty, he bracketed off all his 
everyday certainties - like that he was a mathematician etc. - even to the extent of 
'doubting' his actual being in the world - his existence. This meant he 'factored-out' his 
bodily existence. This is also what Paul Goodman did in formulating the basis of his 
philosophy for Gestalt therapy. He may not have 'missed out' on the body; I'm sure he 
had it in mind; but in missing out on the givenness of the body as the primordial 
'experience', he missed out on our most basic contact with the world. Thus Goodman, 
like Descartes, falls into that ancient reversal where thought about the world replaces 
experience of the world. 
so 
Proposition 1: It's Limitations 
Challenging Proposition 1. 
To directly challenge the position stated in Proposition 1, would involve demonstrating 
that there is a world apart from my thinking and I do not think that is possible - from this 
position: as soon as I take the first step I am, in that step, back where I started out from -
my thinking. 
Propostion 1: Needs to be Challenged 
If this Proposition 1 stands as it is, then, in my view, the whole basis of the practice of 
Gestalt therapy is undermined. Gestalt therapy theory and practice depend on a naive 
belief in the immediacy of our contact/presence with people and things. So it is necessary 
for us to know what is missing from this formulation of perception. Dillon (1997, p.88) 
calls this formulation the 'Thesis of subjectivity'. ' This,' he says, 'is the thesis on which 
all forms of intellectualism rest, and it states that the only world we can ever 
perceive/conceive is a world constituted on the basis of the subjective structures of 
perception and conception; the only reality to which we have access is an immanent 
reality' (loc.cit supra). From within the stance of this subjectivist formulation there is no 
way out and the only reality to which I have access is an ideality. 
Because the consequences of accepting this position as it stands, can be so dire for 
Gestalt therapy we need to look carefully at its limitations: It may be helpful if! repeat 
here the text of Proposition 1: 
Proposition 1. If the world as I know it is a construction of my mind and ifit is the only 
world I know, then how can I be sure that I am in contact with the actuaf? Rather, it 
would seem, am I in contact with an idea of the actuaf? In other words, all I have is an 
interpreted world 
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What Propostion 1 Misses 
What is missing here is what was missing in Descartes 'Cogito'. (Let us take 'Cogito' as 
representing the act whereby I know the world). What he was not taking into account was 
the fact that his 'Cogito' was not as primitive as he thought. He was leaving out all that 
coursing of Existence through him, which we spoke about earlier under the heading of 
'belief' . 
If you take time to do the Descartes meditation for yourself, you will find that it is 
'preceded' by a thrust for self-articulation; this thrust which is present in every movement 
at all levels, defies further reduction, and is my existence itself (cf Mallin, p.65). I have 
placed 'preceded' in inverted commas to indicate that this is just a manner of speaking: 
the 'thrust' is not separate from the utterance; it is built into it as part of it, and its priority 
is not temporal but logical - not with the logic of reason but with the logic or inevitability 
of situation. 21(We need to be on our guard not to predicate of perception what we 'know' 
to be in the thing.) 
My Given Existence Precedes My Thinking 
I do not call myself into existence by my 'I think', my existence in all its richness and 
promise precedes my 'I think'. Rather is my , I think' gathered up in the current of my 
existence and made part of my history. 
"It is being that speaks within us and not we who speak of being" (Merleau-Ponty 
V1.194) 
It is not the "I am" which is pre-eminently contained in the "I think", not 
my existence which is brought down to consciousness which I have of it, but 
conversely the "I think" which is re-integrated into the transcending process of the 
'I am', and consciousness into existence ( PhP.p.383;F439) (cfMallin, p.178). 
~l An exampJe of the logic of situation: if you are sitting on the branch of a tree and saw that branch at a 
pJace between your body and the trunk, you will fall to the ground when you have sawed the branch 
through. 
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People who hold Proposition 1 as it stands, follow Descartes in collapsing perception into 
cognition; this is similar to those who collapse Existence into sexuality. 
The Obtuseness of the Other 
Proposition 1 speaks as if my thinking, my understanding, was the only factor in my 
perception. It makes no mention of the life going on in my body - in no way separate 
from that self-same thinking but intimately related to it and substantially affecting my 
perception. All the time in my every perception I am having to wrestle with the 
obtuseness of that 'other' which, if! disregard it, is as unforgiving as a road accident. 
Disregarding that 'other' which is my body and its needs can lead to pain and illness. 
Similarly, if! put off contacting a friend, the time passes, the opportunity drifts away and 
my relationship comes to a pass I would never have wished. I am aware of noticing only 
a tiny segment of the great mass of experience that is pouring over me from my senses. 
Merleau-Ponty never tires of reminding us of the gratuity of our existence. 
Such is the lot of a being who is born, that is, who once and for all has been given 
to himself as something to be understood ..... . 
He returns to this enterprise of the world in which each of us 'finds' ourselves caught up. 
Because I am born into present existence by a time I do not constitute, all my 
perceptions stand out against a background of nature. While I perceive, and even 
without having any knowledge of the organic conditions·ofmy perception, I am 
aware of drawing together somewhat absentminded and dispersed 
"consciousness"; sight, hearing and touch, with their fields, which are anterior and 
remain alien to my personal life (phP.p.347;F399). 
The Body Given in Primordial Contact 
In order that I may say 'I know the world' I must be already constituted in existence. I 
am already 'recognising' a world, I already possess a language, I am already thinking and 
familiar with process. The question then arises - "How did I come to this pass?" Just as I 
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sit at this table and write I have come to the place from an earlier position, I can write 
because of a previous education; one thing leads to another. Now, in order to torestall an 
infinite regress Merleau-Ponty offers us the idea of Primordial Contact: this is a basic, 
totally general, altogether non-specific, 'meeting with the world'. He calls it variously 
'primordial comprehension of the world' (PhP.p.327;F377 -cette comprehension 
originaire du monde) the 'tacit cogito' (ibid.), 'the original perception' (PhP.p.241;F278 
- valeur originaire), faith or opinion (ibid.foi originaire). All four major regions of 
existence - cognitive/linguistic, motor, intersubjective and perceptual - are articulations 
of this primordial contact with being. He would say that the very move to such 
articulation is my Existence itself. 
The 'Cogito' is a 'specification' of this primordial contact with being. 
This contact is my body - precisely these structures which are my senses; these senses 
have a 'pre-personal status' (Mallin 1979, p.4I). 
By means of sensation I am able to grasp, on the fringe of my own personal life 
and acts, a life of given consciousness from which these latter emerge, the life of 
my eyes, hands and ears, which are so many natural selves. Between my 
sensation and myself there stands always the thickness of some primal acquisition 
which prevents my experience from being clear to itself(phP.p.216;F250). 
This 'primal acquisition' is that 'marriage' of myself (my body) with the world, my 
thrownness which disclosed to me, albeit without self-awareness, my connaturality with 
the world. My experience is not clear to itself because this connaturality is the great 
reservoir from which all subsequent contacts with the world draw their foundation. 
This is why we discern an ineluctable 'givenness' about my experience - it does not 
originate with me. 
Another self which has already sided with the world, which is already open to 
certain of its aspects and synchronised with them ..... I experience the sensation 
as a modality of a general existence, one already destined for a physical world and 
which runs through me without my being the author of it (PhP.p.216;F256). 
54 
'1 am given to myself as something to be understood'. This givenness of myself to myself 
is my contact with the world because it is only in terms of the world that 1 can experience 
myself. This givenness is pre-personal and is the foundation of every 'realisation' by me 
of my selfhood - such as Descartes' 'Cogito'. Primordial contact constitutes the 
foundation for all subsequent specifications of perception - even for Proposition 1 above 
which is a view of perception in terms of the subjective structures of perception. It is the 
epistemological basis of Gestalt therapy theory and this cannot be different from that 
which centres Gestalt therapy in the body. In the Chapter on Foundations we shall come 
to discuss the formulation by Paul Goodman that has come to be taken as a basic 
philosophic stance in Gestalt therapy, we shall see then how he missed out on this 
givenness as foundational to all perception. 
Ifwe speak about primordial contact as 'an experience' we have inserted some kind of 
'content' or 'intentionality' into it. It has no content, no intention but is that timeless 
'moment' when my belonging in the world discloses itself; the world is my home and is 
the ever-present horizon of every perception and therefore the ultimate validation of 
whatever 1 hold to be true. The world is the source of such certainty as I must have to 
carry on my life, because the world in general is the only absolute certainty I possess 
(PhP.p.297;F244). It is this most general presence of being in primordial contact, which 
will, for the rest of my life, adhere to every single movement of my perceptual region of 
existence. 
My first perception, along with the horizons that surrounded it, is an every-present 
event, an unforgettable tradition; even as a thinking subject, I still am that first 
perception, the continuation of that same life inaugurated by it (PhP.p.407;F466). 
Primordial faith therefore undergirds the 'Cogito' as it undergirds every perceptual act: 
We could well call it the' Kiss of the World' .22 
22 Primordial Contact is similar to what the Existentialists call "thrownness". This is realized especially, 
though not exclusively, in what Jaspers calls 'limit situations' such as bereavement (Macquarie 1973, 
p.194). 
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In summary we can say about Primordial FaithlPrimordial Contact 
(i) It founds the certainty that I belong in the world; I am of the same stuff as the 
world. 
(ii) It informs every subsequent perception and generates the affirmation in us that all 
our experiences are compatible and deliver to us a unified' world'. 
(iii) It makes possible the experience of self as a single' cohesion oflife', a single 
temporality that progressively explicates itself from birth and confirms it in each 
present (PhP.pA07;F466). 
For Merleau-Ponty, 'primordial faith' is the beginning place for philosophical reflection. 
Just as Descartes discovered his 'Cogito' in the upsurge of Existence from primordial 
contact which he missed and so inaugurated his 'method' (1637) so, it is in the upsurge of 
Existence that we find phenomenology: we 
..... re-discover phenomena, the layer of living experience through which other 
people and things are first given to us, the system "self-others-things" as it comes 
into being for us (PhP.p.57;F69). 
The Phenomenon and the Thing-in-itself 
The practitioners of Gestalt therapy act on the assumption that 'contact' is with the real 
world as distinct from an ideal world. This is apparent from reading almost any part of 
PHG or indeed of any text commonly in use at present. 
I count twenty-seven direct references to 'contact' in PHG and all of them are based upon 
the assumption of the validity of our sense of immediacy. The same holds for the one-
hundred-and- twenty-seven references to 'contact' in Yontef(l993). Indeed, trainees are 
taught to assess the suitability of a person presenting himself for therapy from the way he 
uses his senses to 'contact the environment' (Delisle, 1991, p44). 
'Truth' does not mean in Gestalt therapy theory, contact with the thing-in-itself or its 
'ipseity'. By ipseity I mean the sum total of all its possible manifestations. That, as 
Merleau-Ponty has shown is an ideality. an ens rationis and is not reached by us in 
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perception23 (PhP.p.67;F81 and p.233;F269). What we immediately 'touch' is the 
phenomenon - the partial epiphany of the 'thing'. Yet this is not separate from the thing, 
as I have explained already. It is the only way the thing can be in the world as it is. Of 
course it is only one aspect of the thing - and it is important to remember that 'aspect' 
does not belong to the thing-in-itself as such but to the thing-in-relation-to-the-world. The 
thing in isolation from the world is as meaningless as a private language. We can imagine 
the thing in isolation - like spinning interminably through deep-space-nine, but in order to 
do that, we have to 'forget' about all those relationships, which make it intelligible to us 
in such an imagination. So closely is every thing bound up with every other thing, that to 
comprehend one thing absolutely would mean knowing everything absolutely. In other 
words, to grasp the ipseity of the thing here and now would mean an end to perception. 
And yet the absolute positing of a single object is the death of consciousness, 
since it congeals the whole of existence, as a crystal placed in a solution suddenly 
crystalizes it (PhP.p.71;F85). 
Section Two: Problems for Gestalt Therapy in Meeting Post-Modernism 
Epistemology and the Post-Modern Influences in Gestalt Therapy Theory 
How then can it happen that the very foundations of the therapy are called into question? 
Jean-Marie Robine, in a brilliant lecture, which he delivered at a conference in Paris in 
1997 and subsequently published in Cahiers de Gestalt Therapie (5.1999), answers this 
question That was not the purpose of his paper. Yet, ironically, it is the title of his paper 
that directs us in the way of an answer. His paper is entitled: Will Gestalt Therapy Dare 
travel the Road of Post-Modernism. 24 
23 Note how difficult it is to talk of the problem without falling back into a dualist conception. Our thinking 
sepamtes what in actuality is ONE. 
24La Gestalt-therapie va t 'elle oser s 'engager dans /a voie post-moderne? 
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The burden of the paper is to bring to our attention how Gestalt therapy, as we have 
'inherited' it from the founders and early writers, is not quite adequate to the demands of 
the post-modem era. He points out how the post-modem paradigm embraces chaos and 
doubt; how it brings into many areas of human life a movement of' deconstruction, 
decomposition, decentralisation, deregulation, desacralisation,' how it questions the value 
of information, and challenges people to let go of their cherished illusions (of progress, of 
science, of truth, of world mastery, of cultural dominance). He delineates areas where 
Gestalt therapy is especially challenged. The notion of 'self - more dynamic, and 
embracing a temporal dimension; language - must become the measure of our ontological 
reach; the relation between client and therapist -more equal; the paradigm of the field 
must replace the paradigm of the individual. It is noteworthy that he makes no suggestion 
of the central role of the body in perception 
So, as I see it, Gestalt therapy is under great pressure to 'post-modernise' itself With its 
philosophical foundation none too robust, as I have earlier demonstrated, Gestalt therapy 
writers are at a loss where to tum for a framework within which to up-date. So, they tum 
to that version of post-modernism which most affects psychology and which is presently 
a la mode, and this called 'constructivism'. This is a view which says that what we 
perceive is, in fact, an interpretation or construing of the data that is given to us. What 
that 'data' is, remains totally hidden from us. So, we are back again to something 
resembling Kant's numenon. The conviction I carry that I am immediately in touch with 
the cat as I stroke him is, according to the constructivists, an illusion. Robine (loc.cit.) 
gives a useful summary contrasting the paradigms of modernism and post-modernism: 
Whereas 'modernism supported itself on the premise which can be found in the saying: "I 
believe only in what I can see", constructivism would rather say, "I only see what I 
believe'" . 
So, the question arises, what is it about constructivism that I find so threatening? The 
issue here is the ontological status of the phenomenon. If the phenomenon is generated 
purely by my perceptual powers and is not in itself actuality, the underlying foundation of 
immediacy and reality is gone. If the phenomenon is simply a product of the mind, then 
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the process of bracketing and the hermeneutic circle as we employ them in Gestalt 
therapy become meaningless. Both those processes have to do with letting the thing show 
itself to us precisely as it shows itself, when it does so from itself-in contrast to the way 
it shows itself when it does so through my interpretation. 
It is not the notion of projection that threatens Gestalt therapy theory but the sweeping 
away afthe underlyingfoundatian afimmediacy against which we can say: 'Yes, such 
and such is a projection, the reality is different. ' 
In Gestalt therapy theory today, the epistemological problem takes the form of a move 
away from the body as the most basic factor in our perception. (Even such writing as that 
last sentence carries shades of dualism). Once we waver at all in seeing experience as 
that 'reciprocal relationship of expression which presents the human body as the 
manifestation ofa certain manner of being-in-the-world ..... ' (PhP.p.5;F67) then Gestalt 
therapy theory is in epistemological trouble. Such hesitation results in some by-passing 
of the 'lived body' as the only access we have to being and we are back again to the old 
dualism of body and soul in some way. 
The Importation of Constructivism 
This by-passing of the lived body is, as I see it, the difficulty about the excessive 
importation of constructivism into Gestalt therapy theory. 
Robine's paper comes to us in the context ofa discussion ofField Theory in Gestalt 
therapy, although he begins by announcing that he is going to explore 'the rather 
mysterious theme of post-mode mist possibilities for Gestalt therapy'. He also warns that 
he is exposing himself to the Perlsian charge of 'mind-fucking' by speaking about 
epistemology. (This is an allusion to Fritz Perls during that phase of his life when he was 
in reaction against academia.) In my remarks below I shall confine myself closely to our 
question: Is it an illusion that I am in immediate and real touch with the world as 
specified in this person or that thing? 
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He states his position - without qualification - three-quarters way through the paper in 
associating himself completely with the 'thesis' of Wheeler on the deplorable 
consequences of individualism, and calling for a new paradigm of field connectedness. 
except on one point: 
'Wheeler co-ranks the paradigm of the field with the advance of constructivism. 
F or sure, it is the use of the logic put forward by constructivism, which allows us 
or has allowed us easy entry into this (Wheeler's) new paradigm. This has 
happened with very much more clarity than phenomenology or Gestalt therapy 
could offer up to now. Despite this, in my view, at least, constructivism remains 
locked into the individualist paradigm there by saying: "There is no other reality 
besides that which each subject constitutes"(it) remains a solipsist affirmation. 
Drawing on social constructivism we can modify this into: "There is no other 
reality besides that which each subject constructs in relationship". This, in my 
view, truly marks a change of paradigm. (Robine, 1999,p.74) 
In order to contextualize what Robine is saying we need to understand something of the 
kind of constructivism he is speaking about. He sees constructivism as that branch of the 
post-modem movement which applies to psychology and brackets it with 'Gestalt theory, 
the work of Pia get and the work ofL'ecole de Palo Alto', it also includes the dialogue 
work inaugurated by Martin Buber and these movements which give primacy to 
•... 
relationship 'in the definition of the human'. I also note that he takes up and applies to 
post-modem philosophy that 'bon mot' of Max Weber: 'The desire to re-enchant the 
world' (Le desire de re-enchantment du monde' )(loc.cit.p.67). This brings to mind what 
Merleau-Ponty says about perception: 
Expression is everywhere creative .... we have the same miracle of an 
immediately apprehended clarity, which vanishes as soon as we try to break it 
down to what we believe to be its component elements' (PhP.p.391;F449) 
So here we have the phenomenon of a somewhat different application of post-modem 
thinking than we meet with in the work of Professor Heath (2000)(cf H.P.p.67) 
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Let us remind ourselves that I am confining myself to the epistemological aspects of 
Robine's long paper. We get a key to his thinking when we notice that the first third of 
this paper is taken up with a very moving and interesting narrative of his ownjoumey in 
the world of Gestalt therapy theory and practice. He is saying everything develops, 
changes and takes time. He narrates how he changed, during fifteen years, from being a 
convinced 'Perlsian' therapist to discovering the field as taught by Goodman and Isador 
From. His own personal journey led him to the conviction that every theory is a fiction 
amongst other fictions; but that it is thanks to theory and by means of it that we 
endeavour to construct the meaning of our experience. (And no mention of the body at all 
as a source of knowledge). 
He says theories derive from our thinking and lead back to thinking and it is upon these 
that the meaning we give to our lives depends. In this viewpoint everything is relative; 
there is no reliable foundation. It is all in the mind. At this point I ask: but where do the 
theories come from? From reason presumably; and in what is reason founded? In 
reflection upon experience, and what is thefoundation of this experience if not the lived 
body? And this brings us back to primordial contact 25and the role of the body in 
perception. Is there any point of reference here? Is there any 'founding' term which has 
a priority over the founded term (the theory)? Otherwise we are not in any position to say 
whether one theory is any better than any other; and then it would follow that the Perlsian 
theory that human growth as a function of self-reliance is just as 'good' as the theory that 
human growth is a function of relationship to others. 
Every theory, however long-lasting and prestigious, 'retains its coefficient offacticity' 
(phP.p.394;F451). Therefore, it will eventually be superseded by another theory, just as 
Euclidean geometry has been overtaken by other geometries as an account of space. 
However, the relationship of a theory to reason from which it derives is reciprocal but not 
25 We have already met this concept. It is very important for understanding Merleau-Ponty. 
cfH.P. Gloss. p. JCV;pp52-55;60;66;87;97;1 06; 116; 161 ;220;225;237;262;Appendix AIX; 
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symmetrical; it is like the relationship of father and son. Similarly reflection is related to 
the unreflective in a reciprocal but not symmetrical way. That is to say, their place in the 
process of experience is not neatly balanced equality. They are in the relationship of 
originator and originated. The originated is a specified instance of the originator and 
therefore distinct and different in function, though utterly dependent upon one another 
and meaningless apart. 
'The relation of reason to fact, or eternity to time like that of reflection to the 
unreflective, of thought to language or of thought to perception is this two-way 
relationship, that phenomenology has called Fundierung'(PhP.p.394;F45 1). 
Meaning and Personal Acts 
If Robine is saying that the meaning of my personal acts depends upon a theory then that 
reduces them to the status of specifications of general principle. The 'meaning' that I 
attach to my own life or to my personal acts is not the same as theory. To say that I abide 
by my word not because of fear of punishment, nor because of some parental introject, 
but because that is what I chose to do, is not a theory. If it is just a theory then there is 
the presumption in all cases that there is an unconscious life determining me, about which 
I know nothing but which takes away the possibility of free choice and therefore of my 
capacity for responsibility and love (which by definition requires freedom - lack of 
determination - to be what they say they are). Again we return as always to the lived 
body; the meaning of my personal acts is in a different relationship to my lived body than 
is 'the paradoxical theory of change'. My personal acts have to do with a chosen focus of 
my perception articulated in a positive posture of my body and a chosen closing up of a 
general view and the allowing of a specific view to become figure in my perception. In 
order to assign meaning with seriousness to my personal acts - such as interventions in 
therapy - I draw close to my immediate experience repeatedly, as the validation source of 
that meaning. 
For theory on the other hand, I draw back and yield. Theory is a hypothesis awaiting 
validation on the basis of evidence, especially the accuracy of prediction. The hypothesis 
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is a construction of my thought, and while our pre-reflective body-experience ultimately 
founds all theories, the link with my lived body is less close than it is with the meaning of 
my personal acts. And of course, theory and personal acts overlap - as in this study, for 
instance. 
The Attack on Meaning 
At the same time that Robine hails post-modem thought as bringing enchantment back to 
the world, he says it 'signals the death of illusions (of progress, of science, of truth, of 
supremacy and cultural dominance)' (loc. cit. p.67). Deconstruction is the process of 
dismantling such myths and illusions so that their meaning drains away. He does this by 
'holding up for demolition the epistemological assumptions, implicit or explicit, in 
judgements of aesthetic value and in interpretations of sense' (Steiner G. 1989, p.116). 
Deconstruction searches out and destroys delusions. 'The ultimate basis of such 
delusion', says Steiner, 'innocence or cunning, its final validation is theological. Where 
it is consequent, deconstruction rules that the very concept of meaningfulness, of a 
consequence, even problematic, between the signifier and the signified, is theological or 
onto-theological (loc.cit. p.119). 
Talk about truth is one of the casualties of this movement against meaningfulness. 
Meaningfulness is another name for real. If we agree that the therapeutic component in 
Gestalt therapy essentially consists in the genuineness, the authenticity of the relationship 
between client and therapist, then Gestalt therapy will be a casualty. 26 The real, the 
actual, the true is of great importance to Gestalt therapy. Such genuineness has as its 
characteristic immediacy, bodily presence one to the other. Is this illusion? It is one thing 
to question the genuineness of my relationship with a client; I may be pretending to feel 
what I don't, or withholding, or covering up in some way; it is quite another thing to 
question whether a real and immediate contact or presence is possible at all. Such a 
26 'authenticity' is a key idea in Gestalt therapy and this is reflected in this study: cfH.P. 
pp4;11;37;62;99;107; 122;192;195;305. 
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question wipes out the possibility of genuineness, which was concerning me in the first 
question - it is sawing off the branch I sit on. Such a position is equivalent to calling into 
question the reality of the world; and such a position is supported only by a total 
misconception of the world. I would apply what Merleau-Ponty says about the truth of 
the world to the truth of the relationship between client and therapist: 
To ask oneself whether the world is real is to fail to understand what one is 
asking, since the world is not a sum of things which might always be called in 
question, but the inexhaustible reservoir from which things are drawn 
(PhP.p.344;F396). 
The world as a connected integral totality is the horizon from which things and events 
emerge and find meaning. If, however, I view the world as a collection of disconnected 
items, and time as a series of discontinuous events, then I have taken away that agent 
which holds things and events together. 
Concerns arising: From Gestalt Therapy Theory Writers 
In regard to Gestalt therapy theory, when it comes to projection we must make a 
distinction. Projection as a psychological phenomenon is widely spoken of from the start 
in Gestalt literature (e.g. PHG p.53 1ft). For the most part projection is regarded as 
constituting an obstacle to contact. Ifwhen I meet you I 'see' my Uncle Henry who used 
bully me, then my projection of him on to you will stop me contacting you. Projection as 
'constructivism' is where reality is 'basically nothing but what each individual perceives 
as the representation and interpretation of his own feeling about existence'. 27 
Constructivism raises serious epistemological questions for the Gestalt therapy theorist. 
Y ontef does not use the word 'constructivism' but speaks about the importance of 
knowing the implicit presuppositions in our 'individual functioning'. He invokes a 
thoroughgoing field perspective, taking into account the manifold influences seen and 
27 Rahner, K. (1984, p.344) uses this description in a related but different context. 
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unseen, which cluster round the simplest situations (1 993,p.86tl). In no way does he call 
into doubt the validity of our conviction of immediacy. 
Sapriel (1998, p.38) raises the issue in this form: she invites us to accept that 'ultimate 
reality' is unknowable to us, and all we have anyway is an interpreted world. This 
position seems to me to assume that there is a thing called 'ultimate reality' - as if 
underneath the phenomenon there is a hidden, unknowable 'res'. I go along with 
Merleau-Ponty who says that such a notion is an ideality necessary for the sciences but 
which has its foundation in the phenomenon. 
'The house seen from everywhere is really the house seen from nowhere' . 
(Because 'everywhere' is not a vantage point at all). (PhP.p.69;F83) 
Sapriel is correct in saying we project and interpret all the time. I disagree if she says we 
cannot do that more or less. Phenomenologically, bracketing is an effort to do it less. 
That way we allow the thing (phenomenon) to speak from itself through our bodies 
conjoined with it (cfH.P.p.80-81). Ifwe once attribute our knowledge of the world to 
some immanent structures of the human mind this makes for considerable difficulties in 
regard to the role of experience in perception. 
When the organisation of perceptual experience is attributed entirely to the 
activity of some supervenient immanent agency, experience can no longer be 
regarded as the origin of knowledge (Dillon, 1997, p.65). 
If one argues that there is no need for 'primacy' if there is convergence, then we are still 
at a loss to know what the founding term is: I have got to where I am now by being 
somewhere else previously. Where I was then is the 'founding term' of where I am just 
now. Without ontological primacy there remains the problem of how the 'mind and body' 
can be united. And the way out of this old, old problem is to accept that our only access 
to reality is the phenomenon which is given us through our senses. That given is the 
founding term. 
My body has a massive knowledge of the world. The knowledge, which my eyes have of 
protecting themselves from tiny flying objects by shutting the eyelid even before I know 
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anything about it, is not interpreted knowledge. If we do not learn from the world 
(through our bodies) then how do we recognise things? Is it perhaps that we are endowed 
with a primordial knowledge of ail things, a power of knowing that is co-extensive with 
the world, which is 'triggered' by my meeting a thing? (PhP.p.370;F424). The body is the 
problem. If you once grant - as even the medieval Scholastics did - that all knowledge 
ultimately comes to us through our body, then we are back to the ontological primacy of 
the phenomenon and its epistemological correlate the primacy of the perception. You 
cannot have one without the other. 
In my challenge to Wheeler (2001), I asked him six questions about his generalization 
that 'perception is an interpretative, constructive act ..... The world as it is (Kant) is 
ultimately unknowable to us ... all we have are our interpretative pictures. All we have 
to work with are constructions of our bodymind' (loc. cit. pp. 86-87, italics mine). I 
pointed out how his position seems to collapse perception into thought; leave no place for 
body in perception, makes no account of preconceptual awareness. 
In his reply to me he attributes my questions as a reaction to the 'deeply unsettling' 
predicament that we 'no longer have any god-given direct apprehension of the "real" 
world or even some final picture of our own "authentic" experience'. He attributes this 
unsettling position to phenomenology; it (follows) directly from the premise and 
implications of phenomenology (Wheeler 2002, p.46). 
In this reply he says ofMerleau-Ponty that he 'made enormous contributions to our 
understanding of self-process and the embodiment of the world'( ibid.loc.cit.), which he 
concedes 'is experience in a very real sense'. (I'm not sure what he means by this - is 
our experience in any sense an experience of otherness or just an experience of a 
construction of our minds?) 
He cites Merleau-Ponty's definition of phenomenology 'the study of the advent of being 
to perception' but omits the second part of this quote: 'instead of presuming its possibility 
as given in advance' (phP.p.61;F71). He says that 'Merleau-Ponty reduces and 
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effectively obscures much of what is interesting and crucial (and central to Gestalt 
therapy) behind that tiny word 'to'. And what is hidden there is the whole world of social 
process, the presence of other beings' (loc. cit. p.46). 
I do not think that Merleau-Ponty's analysis misses out on the social dimension. In his 
notion of primordial contact - the preconceptual gift of the world - all the rest is given. 
Wheeler is stuck with the epistemological problem of the body's contribution to 
perception, or rather, one could say, of explaining how my body perceives the world. 
In a later part of the reply - where he is dealing with my question to him about 'truth' -
that if there is no such thing as 'truth' then the theory that therapeutic change is 
dependent upon the constellation of the heavens, is as equally valid as any other theory. 
Here he does admit of' some direct experience', like sense experience. He does not go on 
to deal with the question of how this concession undermines his general embrace of an 
exclusively interpreted world. 
I notice that in his discourse on the social dimension of our experience he is inclined to 
see it as apart from our experience of the world. I would agree with him that 'truth' 
expressed in a proposition is highly problematic. 
Roberts (1999) wrote an article in which he dares to blame the application of 
constructiveness to Gestalt therapy for the standstill in its theoretical development. His 
daring earned him a long excoriating review article from Professor Heath: A 
Constructivist Attempts to Talk to the Field (2000). The burden of this ferocious review is 
that Roberts is attributing a reality to the notion of 'field', which Heath thinks 
unwarranted. 
That the inroads of 'constructivism' are not confined to Gestalt therapy but are also 
taking root in the wider community of psychotherapists is shown by the editor's Note at 
the end of this twenty-three-page review by Professor Heath. The Note praises Professor 
Heath's review and condemns Roberts article as 'representative of certain kinds of 
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objectivising, concretistic, and fideistic stances in psychotherapy.' This is trom the editor 
of the International Journal of Psychotherapy. 
Truth becomes a problem 
So the question arises: Is the only world that I know, one that is formed by the 
programmes and prejudices that inhabit me') Is the world as I know it purely a product of 
my construction. If so, then truth becomes a problem. (cfDillon, 1997, p.178). By 'truth' 
I mean here 'actuality, or state of being the case, precisely as it illumines recognition' 
(Buckley, 1978 p.647), and makes a demand on me. If the world as I know it is only an 
idea, then 'what is' for me is only an idea of what is. So, it becomes problematic whether 
we can ever know the real and know that we know it. 
If the only world I know is the world-as-I-understand-it and if this is the product of my 
immanent programs and prejudices then I may not claim to be in touch with the real 
showing itself, with what is, but only with a viewpoint upon the world. The mistake in 
their argument is to separate the phenomenon from the thing. When I look out the 
window and see a bird I am seeing the thing itself. Truly, no one manifestation expresses 
the whole bird. And I may be mistaken; if I view the lamp at the end of a high stanchion 
on the motorway from a distance against a grey background, I can easily mistake it for a 
seagull - but I shall know that, only when I come to an optimal distance for seeing it. The 
problem is to find the foundation upon which the validity of this perception rests. This, 
Merleau-Ponty finds in the notion of Fundierung or 'foundation' .28 For our purposes here 
we can say that the thrust inherent in expression is towards intersubjectivity and this 
intersubjective communication is achieved in the bodily experience of the people. There 
is always a bodily exchange in intersubjective communication. 
28-yrus notion he himself later criticises as 'flawed by its dependence on consciousness' (Dillon, 1997, 
p.194). In his later work The Visible and the InviSible Merleau-Ponty returns to the problem and elaborates 
a more refined resolution of the problem. 
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There is an autochthonous significance of the world, which is constituted 
in the dealings which our incarnate existence has with it, and which provides the 
ground of every deliberate Sinngebung (PhP.p.441;F503) (cf Dillon 1997, p.96). 
Such autochtonous significance is constituted at every level of perception. It is 
constituted in the hermeneutic circle where we constantly look to the phenomena to 
purify our listening. At the sensible level; 
The sensible gives back to me what I lent to it, but this is only what I took 
from it in the first place. (PhP.p.441;F503) 
Gestalt therapy writers will find that the problems of truth, of certainty and ambiguity, of 
belonging and personal uniqueness have been addressed by the phenomenologists, 
particularly by Merleau-Ponty, whom very few reference. While we make use of and 
admire the work of the Berlin school of psychologists, we keep in mind, that despite their 
insight about the Gestalt as the minimal unit of perception, they adhered to the myth of 
the detennined world. 
My Position with regard to what is called 'the Critical Problem' 
By 'critical problem' I mean: Am I in immediate contact with reality as I experience 
myself to be, or is this an illusion so that ' because I have no direct, unmediated access to 
things as they are, I have to create beliefs about them. '(prof G. Heath in private 
correspondence). Yes, I believe I am in immediate contact with the world of things and 
people. I do not think all my contact is by any means immediate - a great deal of it is 
mediated to me by my own projections and by the mores of the society I carry around 
with me and which informs a great deal of what I do. That being said,J am convinced 
that the acquired worlds and habits out of which I act are all founded upon the immediacy 
of my contact with the world. To have a body is to have a world, and the only way I can 
have a world is through my body, which is in union with the world. This position is 
elaborated upon by Luijpen (1960/1972, p.102) and W.I.Richardson (1963 ,pp102-3). 
Luijpen and Richardson both reference Heidegger when they say (in very similar ways): 
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, The "scandal of philosophy" is not, as Kant still thought, the fact that no one has ever 
managed to offer a valid proof for the reality of the world, but the fact, as Heidegger has 
shown, people continue to look for such a proof.' (Luijpen, loc.cit. p 103). 
This summarises my position, which I take because it makes sense of my experience. It 
seems to me also that the very formulation of the problem requires two presuppositions, 
which contradict my experience and make Gestalt therapy impossible. 
Presuppositions which generate the 'Critical Problem' 
Presupposition 1: In order to formulate the critical problem I must presuppose that the 
perceiving subject is isolatedfrom the world 'out there' and must find a way of 
'contacting' it. To place an ontological disjunction between me and my world is to enter 
the realm of the 'determined world' where the function of the perceiving subject is 
problematic. To have body is to have a world. And neither makes any sense without the 
other. 
Presupposition 2: That the experienced movement of my body in attunement to its world 
is mistaken. In other words, in order to have the problem we have got to disregard the 
experience o/knowledge as we have it. I feel the warmth of the sunshine. There is no way 
I can proceed to verify this perception. If I try, I can only do so by first of all verifying a 
similar perception like that I am sitting here in the first place and before that another 
similar perception; and so on in an infinite series. How do I know that I feel the warmth 
of the sunshine? By /eeling the warmth of the sunshine. This is the argument of Diogenes 
the Cynic (Hadot. 2001. p.170). 
Any definition of perception, which locks the perceiving subject into an immanent world, 
must dispense with our description of human being as being-in-the-world. It cannot 
accommodate such a human phenomenon as reflexes; cannot explain how the reflex 
opens itself to the meaning of a situation - like when a fly is about to enter my eye. The 
fly is not in the immanent world nor is there any reason to think that my eye shuts down 
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to protect itself because of some all-knowing immanent centre of synthesis. The eye shuts 
down because of my body's intimate belonging in the world. 
Nor can a locked-in immanent world accommodate any intention of our whole being -
such as a thirsty person reaching for a glass of water. Each of these examples, the reflex 
and the thirst, is a 'modality of a pre-objective view which is being-in-the-world' 
(PhP.p.79;F95). The Gestalt therapy view of perception needs me to be able to say that 
my body incorporates the space of this keyboard I am using into my bodily space and so 
enables me to find my way round it without thinking where my fingers should touch. 
Otherwise, I think, Gestalt therapy, as we know it, becomes impossible. This is because 
it is a therapy/way oflife;joundedupon the beliejthat health is to be found in living out 
the intimacy of our life with the world. 
Merleau-Ponty's View 
Ifwe take up Merleau-Ponty's description of awareness as he treats of it in the chapter on 
The Spatiality oj one's Own body and Motility (ph.P.p.98; Fl14) we get a view of 
perception congenial to Gestalt therapy. He describes awareness as 'being-towards the 
thing through the intermediary of the body. '(loc.cit.pl38). This straightaway places the 
body to the forefront of perception. He sees the body, the movement, the sensation and 
perception as of one piece. 'Movement and background are, in fact, only artificially 
separated stages of a unique totality' (p.138). He places perception in the order of 
existence, a constituent oj our being, -not as a state people get into or not. Therefore, we 
can consider awareness as primarily 'presence of oneself to oneself' which makes all 
perception oj the world possible - without such self-presence there could be no object -
nothing that is 'not-me', just pure subjectivity - which is meaningless. The phenomenon 
is the primary and only source of reality and it is through my body that I am in touch with 
the phenomenon. It follows that the only way in which the world can be immediately 
present to me is through my body. And this presence is, primarily, oj a different order to 
the presence of the world to me as a result of my reasoning and symbolic representation. 
If I wave my hand to greet a friend on the other side of the street, that very gesture 
contains a reference to my friend 'not as an object represented, but as that highly specific 
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thing towards which I project myself and near which I am in anticipation' 
(PhP.p.138;F161). 
For Wheeler to explain the role of the body in perception by saying that 'all we have 
to work with are constructions of our bodymind', does not resolve the difficulties. His 
point of departure is to state that the world comes to us 'already organised'. 
'My Truth 'and 'Your Truth': A Crypto-Constructivism 
The question of truth carries with it considerable ethical implication (Buckley, M.J.1978). 
Gestalt therapy writers take truth for granted as the sine qua non of the therapeutic 
alliance with the client. It is simply not discussed in the manuals. In practice the tendency 
to tell lies is regarded as a serious 'interruption to contact'. 'Transparency' is expressly 
prescribed in the code of ethics and practice of trainers and it is at the heart of the 
'therapeutic alliance' between therapist and client - without which it is neither safe nor 
wise to proceed with therapy. Even to work with such a client as Bollas (1987, p.173fl) 
describes, the minimum necessary must be his acknowledgement that his lying 
constitutes a life problem. 
Often main Gestalt therapy books that I consulted only two indexed 'truth,29.Even 
Yontef, who uses exhaustive referencing, carries not a single mention of 'truth'. The 
absence of discussion indicates to me that 'truth' is not considered as a 'problem' in 
Gestalt therapy. It is not raised at all as a question meriting serious consideration. To 
avoid the question altogether tells us that the writers either do not see 'truth' as relevant, 
or are unsure about its importance. 
29 These are Kepner, 1. (1995) and Zinker, 1. (1994/98). The fact that each of these books is especially 
concerned with issues of intersubjectivity serves to demonstrate how critical the question of truth can be at 
the cutting-edge of psychotherapy. 
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However, an attitude that I have found amongst Gestalt therapists is to take refuge in a 
kind of solipsistic personal truth: 'My truth is my truth and your truth is your truth; I 
don't impose my truth on you and I will not have you imposing your truth on me. ,)0 
If by such utterance the person means that no one can deprive him of his viewpoint, his 
own special, unique experience, of the' ipseitas' of his experience, of that inalienable and 
irreducible sense of 'me' with which every person is gifted, (deWaelhens 194211946, 
p 131), then, of course, such an utterance is unexceptionable. This sense of self is present 
in every perception and it is invoked rather than perceived (PhP.pA06;F465). Ifhowever, 
they intend that there is something incommunicable and even infallible about their view, 
which at the same time compels their assent, then we are into a different realm of 
discourse. 
Such a realm of discourse believes that truth is a purely personal thing and since truth can 
only be experienced in language it makes language a private thing. It is a kind of crypto-
constructivism. Two things I would like to say about this position: 
1. It is naive in that it fails to reflect upon the way in which I have arrived at my view of 
any event. My view is always intentional: something that is not-me is specifying the 
movement in my body that is perception; the world is having a large say in what I think. 
It is derivative: my view is built around what has been given to me. My view is 
dialectical; ifllook at what I perceive then I shall immediately see that as well as my 
subjective contribution there is an inexhaustible otherness about it. I will see that 
perception resides in neither pole, but between the poles of subjectivity and otherness. So 
it is simply to mistake the situation, to wrap it round with my personal ownership and 
immure myself in some impregnable 'cogito'.(cfSchner, 1992). 
2.Dialogue, a central component of Gestalt therapy, becomes impossible. Perception 
finds its . telos', its ordained goal in language and speech. ( PhP. P .177 ;F206). Whoever 
holds the 'my truth' view is burdened with the task of showing that perception and 
language are not bound together in that way. 
30Schner, G.P. (1992) Deals with this in the context of the appeal to (personal) experience as an argument 
favoured by the devotees of some religious sects. 
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Dialogue means exactly the opposite of the locked-in, isolated, individual viewpoint. 
Dialogue means that we utter a logos articulating the same world; that, independent of 
each of us, is created a new being that was not there previously, a shared world in which 
each of us discovers that we are not alone but that the other is a continuation of my 
world. If dialogue does not yield such communion then it is difficult to understand how it 
differs from monologue. In speaking oflanguage Merleau-Ponty puts it this way: 
In the experience of dialogue there is constituted between the other person and 
myself a common ground; my thought and his are interwoven into a single fabric, 
my words and those of my interlocuter are called forth by the state of the 
discussion. and they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is 
the creator. We have here a dual being, where the other is for me no longer a mere 
bit of behaviour in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we are collaborators in 
consummate reciprocity. 
Our perspectives merge into each other and we co-exist through a common world. 
(Ph.P. p.354; F406) 
One more argument in the face of 'private' truth is this: anyone who either comes to 
Gestalt therapy for help or comes to be trained in Gestalt therapy, is, in that very act 
making an act of faith in the process. He believes that this is somehow worth while. So, 
he associates himself with others who share this insight - he chooses to belong. In this 
very act he is not only accepting something on the word of others but is letting go of his 
'private truth'. This is the existential choice. Such a choice is impossible if one remains 
locked into the immanence of one's own world. Just as there is no such thing as a private 
language, so neither is there such a thing as a 'private Gestalt therapist' . 
Conclusion 
It has been my aim in this Chapter to found the authenticity of Gestalt therapy and its 
basic beliefs, in the lived body. 
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I have sketched out the difficulties that arise as therapy theorists are drawn into 
contemporary philosophical debates, which call into question the validity of those 
meanings, which are esssential to Gestalt therapy practice. Here I refer especially to the 
conviction of the immediacy of our contact with the world and with people. I found this 
conviction in the immediacy of our bodily presence in the world. 
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Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to clarify the place and function of phenomenology in the 
theory and practice of Gestalt therapy. It has three sections: 
1. Merleau-Ponty's working definition and the world-view that accommodates it. I use 
the work ofL. Sapriel to illustrate the difficulties that follow in regard to bracketing 
for therapists who carry 'the prejudice of the objective world'. I bring forward an 
example of bracketing from my clinical experience. 
2. Gestalt therapy literature: unanimity about phenomenology and bracketing being 
essential to Gestalt therapy. I note the lack of a reflection in the literature about the 
bodily nature of bracketing. 
3. The philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Why Husserl's reduction is 
not a helpful model for Gestalt therapy theory. I focus on the body-centred nature of 
the approach ofMerleau-Ponty. 
Section One: A Working Definition and Its Explanation 
Introduction 
Phenomenology is an instrument of investigation. It is the patient and painstaking process 
of reflection upon the way in which the world gives itself to us and we give ourselves to 
the world. This is our dialogue with the world. Merleau-Ponty, in the context of 
explaining the Phenomenal Field, offers what I have found to be a very useful definition 
of phenomenology: 
A study of the advent (l'apparition) of being to consciousness, instead of 
presuming its possibility in advance. (phP.p.61;F74)(Italics in text.) 
We are 'presuming its possibility' if we compose the reality instead of describing it. 
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We compose or shape the reality when we do not permit it to speak/rom itselfbut speak 
for it from our projection or prejudice. 'Bracketing' is the process of tiltering out those 
prejudices that distort the emergence of being in our awareness. Bracketing - the 
epoche3] in phenomenology - is an essential process in Gestalt therapy; otherwise, I 
interrupt my contact with the other by the fog of my preconceptions and assumptions. 
For instance, if a clergyman comes to me and I immediately place upon him the popular 
stereotype of 'the parson', then we never genuinely meet, and dialogue becomes 
impossible. We shall see later that there are Gestalt therapy theorists who do not agree 
with bracketing as part of the process. 
A more precise context for the definition above is Merleau-Ponty's criticism of the 
introspective psychologists and his approbation for the phenomenological psychologists. 
The former have made the mistake of 'trying to describe the givens of consciousness 
without putting into question the absolute existence of the world surrounding it' 
(PhP.p.59;F72). Pronouns are important here. The 'it' in this quote about the mistake of 
the introspective psychologists refers to 'consciousness' .So, these psychologists have 
made a split between consciousness and 'the world surrounding it.' 
Merleau-Ponty and the Hidden Subject 
Let us turn now to Merleau-Ponty's definition: Notice that the possessive pronoun, 'its' 
in the definition refers to 'being' that is, to the being of the world and the things 'in' the 
world. So, here we have a problem for the Gestalt therapy theorist: As well as engaging 
in careful bracketing of the usual prejudices of our education, we need to call into 
question the 'absolute existence (I 'existence absolue) of the world.' By this he does not 
mean adopting an attitude of universal scepticism but avoiding the 'determinate world 
view' or 'the prejudice of the objective world' of the scientist. He gives the same 
31, epoche' is a Greek word introduced by Husserl and it means a 'suspension of belief'. 
(in Priest. S.1998. p.19) 
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warning elsewhere speaking dramatically of the 'death of consciousness' and using the 
same adjective 'absolue' 
The whole life of consciousness is characterised by the tendency to posit objects 
since it is consciousness, (puisqu 'e//e n 'est conscience, ..... qu 'en tant qu 'efle ... ) 
that is to say self-knowledge, only in so far as it takes hold of itself and draws 
itself together in an identifiable object. And yet the absolute positing (la position 
absolue) of a single object is the death of consciousness, since it congeals the 
whole of existence, as a crystal placed in a solution suddenly crystallizes it. 
(PhP.p.71;F86) 
The "prejudice of the determinate world" arises, says Mallin, 'because the ideal of a 
determinate world is taken to be actual, and this is done by understanding the world, 
strictly from a cognitive point of view, as implicitly containing a subject at every possible 
spatial and temporal point within the world '(Mallin, 1979, p.258). 
Let me explain this a little. 
Weare encouraged every day by scientific reports about space travel, gene investigation 
and the like, to conceive of the world as already constructed and waiting out there to be 
'discovered' by us. What is not said is that 'a million years' or 'a micro-organism forty-
times smaller than your average full stop' becomes meaningful for us (i.e. becomes real) 
only if we include some subject observing the passage of those years or engaging with the 
micro-organism. There has to be some embodied subjectivity around against whose age 
and size such things make sense. The drawback in accepting a determinate view of the 
world, is that thereby I detach myself from my bodily involvement with the world and 
fail 'to return to the things themselves' and 
... to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks 
and in relationship to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and 
derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in which 
we have learned beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is (phP.p.ix;Fiii) 
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As I assume some god-like spectator position towards the world, I re-introduce all the old 
dualisms again. If I am just a spectator, then I am doing the spectating by my 
consciousness. Descartes recognised a long time ago that in this process my body is very 
likely to lead me astray (Descartes, 163711949, p.l11; Med.IV). So, in order to be a good 
spectator I must leave my body aside with its feelings and imagination and capacity for 
error. The prejudice of the objective world is very widespread. Merleau-Ponty recognised 
such a view as most useful for scientific investigation but irreconcilable with 
phenomenological an analysis as he conceived it. 
Difficulties with Bracketing: 
L. Sapriel' s Critique 
Presently there are some very influential writers and trainers in Gestalt therapy who call 
into question the process of bracketing as part of the therapeutic process. Lolita Sapriel is 
a writer and trainer from California. She is a past president of the Gestalt therapy Institute 
of Los Angeles and currently trains in the US, Canada and the UK, being a faculty 
member at Metanoia Institute in West London. In a remarkable and long article in the 
British Gestalt Journal (1998,7. 1.) she makes the case that' "bracketing" contradicts 
some basic tenets of Gestalt therapy's field theory' (p.38). We shall see later that 'Field 
theory' is one of the three essentials for Gestalt therapy; so, if Sapriel is right then the 
whole of Gestalt therapy theory becomes very questionable. The context in which she is 
writing is to meet the question: Can Gestalt Therapy, Self-Psychology and 
Intersubjectivity Theory be Integrated? Her resolution of the question is that whereas 
Gestalt theory and Intersubjectivity theory can come together, there is a difficulty with 
the theory of Self-Psychology because of the way it reifies the self 'as if it were an 
"objective" 'thing". (p.33) On the way, she favours Intersubjectivity theory over Gestalt 
therapy theory - on account of her difficulties with bracketing. 
Sapriel attributes the Gestalt practice of bracketing to a borrowing from Husserl: 
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The origins of Gestalt therapy's phenomenological method derive from the 
writings of Edmund HusserI (1859-1938) ... PerIs wanted to provide an 
alternative to previously hierarchical attitude prevalent in psychoanalysis where 
the therapist was privy to a 'truer' version of reality than his or her client's. In 
trying to avoid the pitfalls of prior psychoanalytic reliance on 'objective 
interpretation', Gestalt therapy adopted Hussed' s notion of 'transcendental 
perception' and thereby paradoxically fell into the very same objectifying trap. It 
was thought that interpretations just brought into awareness are something 
already within the patient. Gestalt therapy has believed that 'pure observation' 
will allow the client to arrive at his/her own experience. 'Bracketing' one's 
biases in order to see 'pure' or 'virgin' experience leads to what Stolorow refers 
to as the 'myth of immaculate perception' ..... To think that we can ever leave 
the field and return to a version of 'scientific objectivity' ... (pp38-39) 
I view her critique of bracketing as a great service to Gestalt theorists because it causes us 
to pause and ask ourselves: What is our point of departure in the process of bracketing: 
from what view of the world am I working? These questions bring into relief two 
presuppositions about my act of perception: 
(i) That my act of perception is far more than just a noting of different projections. 
(ii) That my act of perception presupposes my capacity to get to a different reality 
than that which my projection offers. 
The consciousness I have of seeing or feeling is no passive noting of some 
psychic event hermetrically sealed upon itself, an event leaving me in doubt 
(uncertain) as to the reality of the thing seen or felt ..... it is the actual effecting of 
vision (PhP.p.376;F431). 
Reflections and further Critique 
(For reasons that will appear later in this chapter I do not think that in practice - as 
distinct from what is written - Gestalt therapy derives from the model set down by 
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Husserl. Even if unwittingly, Gestalt therapy is far more indebted to Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty ) 
Her use of the expression 'virgin experience', taken from the work of Robert Resnick 
(1995), and her talk of' pure observation', make me think, not of a Gestalt therapist but of 
a scientist working in the old traditional way. Sapriel's reservations about the validity of 
bracketing seem to me to have validity in certain circumstances i) If the practitioners are 
imagining they can prescind from the very structures of their perceptual process. If I am 
doing mathematics, there is no way I can suspend belief in the axioms that support my 
procedures. ii) If they are thinking that there is some 'in-itself out there which will 
disclose its 'ipseity'. That would be to deny the partiality of our perception. iii) If they 
come from a view of the world as already' determined', where consciousness is also a 
'psychic fact' meriting investigation like anything else in the world and where my 
thoughts - 'cogitationes '- can be viewed as 'the contents' of that consciousness. In such a 
view if I try to bracket or empty my consciousness of its 'prejudices', then there is not 
much left to work with. In these three circumstances I do not recognise the theory of 
bracketing as I understand it in Gestalt therapy. In other words I think she is right to back 
away from bracketing of the kind she implicitly describes. 
Let us hear some more of her difficulty: 
Bracketing (even embedded in dialogue) contradicts some basic tenets of Gestalt 
therapy's field theory. Thinking that we can, in any way, observe behaviour with 
'presuppositionless' eyes assumes we can actually transcend our own organising 
principles and unique life experience (which filter and colour every perception) 
and objectively observe behaviour without an inherent bias being attached to our 
observation (loc.cit.). 
'Bracketing' represents an attempt to neutralise the therapist's biases. Ifwe 
adhere to field theory, where the observer and the observed are understood to be 
inextricably intertwined in a field of mutual co-regulation, then we cannot 
subscribe to the premise that one can ever leave one's position for a mythical 
Martian one. We cannot neutralise our biases. Resnick's assertion that one "is not 
assuming, interpreting or ascribing background meanings to what is figural to the 
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client" implies a one-person psychology view of experience, which holds that 
intrapsychic meaning arises solely out of experiences 'figural to the client'. This 
fails to recognise that the therapist's very presence, as well as any subtle or overt 
signs from him/her are influencing what is figural to the client, as well as what is 
figural to the client influencing how the therapist organises meaning (p.39). 
Bracketing is never complete and is always selective; the nature of perception implies 
projection; but this is not the whole of perception; phenomenologically 'perception is 
inseparable from the consciousness it has or rather is of reaching the thing itself 
(PhP.p.374;F429). Both Sapriel and Resnick are reaching for too much certainty. There 
is a lurking "causality" in the way they talk about 'influencing one another'. 
In order to deal with Sapriel's difficulties we need to ask ourselves: Why does a Gestalt 
therapist need to use the epoche? What is he after? What does he want to happen which 
prejudices will block? He wants to meet the client: that means he must remove those 
things which stop that happening. To meet a person is to allow myself to perceive them 
just like they present themselves to me. What will stop me is a mind-set which is fixed-up 
with theories of what is 'wrong with them', of how 'they should be' of what is going to 
be a 'good outcome'. These are the things I need to bracket. If I think of myself as an 
investigator I ' .... should bracket out presuppositions ..... based on theories or earlier 
research findings, those drawn from the investigator's personal knowledge and belief, and 
those which dictate specific research methods' (Ashworth, 1996, p.3). 
Here we need to distinguish three 'worlds': a) our every-day common-sense world b): 
our lived-world. c) the world of 'Field Theory'. This last comprises both a) and b) worlds 
and is realised in my body. 
The everyday world is the world of our culture and our news media and our scientific 
investigations. It is peopled by all manner of distorting prejudices. The lived world is the 
pre-objective world. It is world without 'knowledge'; it is the world on which the 
common-sense world is based, as a map is based on the actual landscape . 
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Philosophical access to the pre-reflective world is by reflection only, and this can be 
quite difficult even after long and arduous preparation. (What else are all our years of 
training for, if not for that') Bracketing has to do with the common-sense world, not with 
the pre-reflective world. If you remove the pre-reflective world then we disappear 
altogether as body-subjects and end up in an impregnable fortress of immanence where 
'the world becomes a correlative of thought about the world' (PhP.p.208;F241). 
Merleau-Ponty uses the tenn 'lived world '(Ie monde vecu) to designate that world which 
is 'ontologically and epistemologically prior to the worlds of subjectivity and objectivity 
which dualist thought posits as primary reality.' (Dillon 1997, p88). He also calls it 'the 
phenomenal world'. This is the world of the body. 
Bracketing has the function of 'opening up a reality' (Ashworth, 10c.cit.p.4) 
The reality that it opens up is the world of the body; because to have a body is to have a 
world. The categories of cause and effect have no place in the world of the body or the 
'phenomenal field', as Merleau-Ponty sometimes calls it. 
The Epoche In Gestalt Therapy Practice 
Let us look at an example of bracketing" 
Suppose a woman client comes to me who is married with a young family of three 
children and a husband who is 'devoted' but 'very busy'. She tells me she is having an 
affair with a man who is married and has a grown-up family. She can't ever imagine how 
life could be happy without her lover and wants to abandon her family and run away with 
this man, if he is willing to do that. Suppose I listen to her story with compassion and 
respect and without interrupting; I enter the world of her fascination, allow myself to feel 
in my body the dread she feels, to respond to the sparkle in her eyes as she speaks of her 
lover, allow tears to brim in my own eyes as she reads the poems she has written about 
him, while all the time another side of me wants to warn her and protect her from this 
man who has already betrayed her previously; but I say none of those things to her 
because they are not of the phenomenon. I would call this an exercise in bracketing. I am 
not denying any reality, I am not imagining that I can achieve contact with any 'pure' and 
'virgin' reality. Of course she is influenced by my posture oflistening and by the way I 
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look at her. And I am allowing myself to be influenced by her. I am facilitating the 
opening up of a clearing between us and allowing the reality of this-woman-in-Iove to 
emerge in that clearing. Our time together 'discloses subject and object as two abstract 
"moments" of a unique structure which is presence' (PhP. p.430;F492). In this presence of 
one to the other something new is co-created. The alternative - to allow my fears and my 
moral and religious convictions to enter the field, to assume that I am possessed of a 
superior view of reality than she has access to - would be to allow my cultural learnings 
to come between me and her. I am neither encouraging nor discouraging her from 
abandoning her family; I am simply allowing her to show herself as she shows herself 
when she is speaking from herself Of course those prejudices are part of my Field but 
that does not mean that I am unable to bracket them. 
Bracketing is a bodily thing. I tum my body, move my body in such a way as will most 
help our meeting. (I recall how this meant, with a different client, my suggesting that we 
experiment with sittingforther away from one another - in our search for optimal 
distance.) Such movement will be in my face, eyes, mouth, head, shoulders, breathing 
and so on. This is a meeting of bodies. A totally impassive 'blank' face will be as 
eloquent as one that is fixed in a perpetual smile. The operative intention expressed in my 
body is not the attainment of some knowledge or the achievement of some favourable 
outcome, but the meeting with this woman. 
Stepping Down from the Professional Pedestal into the' Between' 
There are some other considerations in relation to bracketing. In Gestalt therapy this does 
not mean becoming an Empty Head or adopting an impassive stance. It does mean that 
the therapist ' .... steps forth out of his protected professional superiority into this 
elementary situation between one who asks and one who is asked ... ' (Jacobs,L. 1989, 
p.44). I do not know what to expect; but I do know that, 
In the phenomenological approach therapist and patients bracket off or put aside, 
their preconceptions about what experiences are relevant, and allow their sensory 
processes to discover whatever is revealed by the self and the situation. 
(Jacobs,L.loc. cit. p.37) 
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I can formulate the process as my respectfully witnessing the phenomenon of this woman 
and of her respectfully witnessing my phenomenon. The NOW is the only access to this 
person, allowing myself to be moved by my participation, doing my best not distort this 
epiphany by my analysis and reflections, but staying as open as I can dare to be to our co-
creation. 
I am aware that my perception is inevitably partial and time-limited. So, I am seeing only 
part of the person and I respond to that part that I am seeing in the NOW. I am aware that 
I can never reach this woman in her uniqueness, in her' aseity '; that what I see now will 
be gathered up into that opaqueness in which every 'other' permanently resides. It is of 
my very nature that I do not know even my own 'aseity' but know myself only in terms 
of what I am not. So, however hard I try, I can never know this woman any other way 
than in her phenomenology. I am operating in what Merleau-Ponty calls 'the Phenomenal 
Field'. This is not aplace but a level of perception where 
Vision is already inhabited by a meaning (sens) which gives it a function in the 
spectacle of the world and in our existence. (PhP.p.52;F64) 
Not only is my vision inhabited by a meaning but all my other senses are also, and my 
body is in touch with the world at first hand without the interposition of 'thinking about'. 
In this I move into 
that layer of living experience through which other people and things are first 
given to us, and the system 'self-others-things' as it comes into being. 
(PhP.p.57;F69) 
Here it is not a question of feeling with my body and then thinking. My lived world is all 
around me. At this level, the woman is no longer an object in the world nor am I an 
object in her world, but together we live in 'the between'. I do not think this is possible 
unless we put aside the myth of the determined world. 
It would seem then that in the process of phenomenology, at the very front of this process 
- so far as Gestalt therapy is concerned - is that question which Merleau-Ponty says was 
86 
never posed in Kantian philosophy: Who is thinking? (PhP.p.62;F75). Unless I see 
myself, an embodied subjectivity, as part of the process then it is not hard to create two 
kinds of being: my consciousness and my body. From the start Gestalt therapy theory has 
inserted the subject into the process (PHG p.32) and called into question our inclination 
to stand apart from the process of therapy and become 'an outside spectator' (Merleau-
Ponty, 1983, p162; and 194211990 p175).32 If! want to participate in what is going on for 
my client then I must be aware of what is going on for myself. As Giorgi says:' The 
minimum requirement for the study of anything is that I am aware of it. '( 1975. p. 84) The 
problem is not just in the thing that is coming into our awareness, but in the very process 
of reflection by which we are making the investigation. There is general agreement 
amongst Gestalt theorists that phenomenology is the method of investigation especially 
suited to Gestalt therapy; there is less agreement about the way in which it operates in the 
process of therapy. 
Heidegger chooses to depart from HusserI' s approach because he did not see how it could 
avoid imprisoning the subject in a solipsistic mode. We shall see more ofHeidegger's 
approach further on in this chapter. 
Section Two: Gestalt Therapy Literature 
Introduction 
I shall outline briefly how the term 'phenomenology' is used in Gestalt therapy literature. 
This outline does not claim to be exhaustive or to include all the possible exceptions. In 
my selection of literature I am guided by two factors: (a) What I know to be the state of 
teaching in the Gestalt institutes at the time of my writing. (b) By trends I notice in 
Gestalt therapy writing. Gestalt therapy claims not only to be phenomenological but 
existential. I shall discuss, briefly again, how HusserI, Heidegger understand the term. I 
32 'This was the position taken by Merleau-Ponty in his earlier study La structure du comportment 1942, cf. 
Geraets (1971, p.38). 
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choose these philosophers because they were leading phenomenologists and are cited 
(and at the same time disregarded) in some of the Gestalt therapy literature and seem to 
me to speak to Gestalt therapy. I shall summarise Merleau-Ponty's own position on 
phenomenology and thereby come to formulate some viable definition of my use of the 
term. 
The Gestalt therapist emphasises the importance of carefully observing the client - not in 
the way a scientist, as a detached spectator would observe - but in a way that most 
facilitates the person's becoming in his presence. Phenomenology is universally accepted 
in the I iterature of Gestalt therapy as one of the essentials of that therapy. Y ontef 1993, 
for instance, makes it one of the three essentials of Gestalt therapy and has sixty-four 
references to it in his text; the term is used frequently in all the standard authors. Most 
often it is used in the descriptive sense - applied to the way the client presents - in such 
expressions as 'the Phenomenology of Shame', 'the client's phenomenology'. Implicit in 
this is the need for bracketing and the belief that by returning repeatedly to the 
phenomenon the therapist can be more profoundly present with the client. 
We are trying to be clear about the kind of phenomenology which best serves the nature 
and purpose of Gestalt therapy. 
Gestalt Therapy Writers 
PHG (1973 p.432) describes phenomenology as 'a classification, description and analysis 
of possible structures of the self and identifies it with phenomenological psychology. 
This work contains many descriptions (e.g. p.273 and p.377) which are commonly 
pointed out as examples of his 'phenomenological approach'. Description is a very 
important aspect of phenomenology (cf Stoehr, 1994, p. 93). In PHG we notice the 
emphasis on the individual which is something of an inheritance from psychoanalysis. It 
is also important to note that Goodman makes the point strongly that awareness of the 
self - the 'I' - is a social construct. It is important because in phenomenological 
reduction as I have described in Section One above, the 'I' is not the ego of Freud and is 
a social construct only in the sense that I know myself in terms of the world; the world 
tells me who I am. 'A social construct' is not the equivalent of what I say in invoking 'I'. 
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PHG misses out on my transcendence in regard to the world. When I invoke'!', my 
invocation brings along far more than people will predicate of me. 
Zinker, J. (1978, p.77) marks phenomenology as 'that process which one experiences as 
uniquely one's own.' The context of his definition is his exploration of the phenomenon 
of insight into one's personal responsibility for one's life. Phenomenology sites a person 
in his own 'here and now' which he cannot deny without leaving himself He also 
stresses it as a process of description and bracketing. 
Mackewn J. (1997) follows Yontefs phrase about phenomenology 'concentrating on 
describing the obvious' (p.215) and puts the emphasis on phenomenology as subjectivity 
as the way towards a bringing to awareness of one's uniqueness. She also invokes it to 
show the partiality of all perception. 
'Gestalt therapy is a form of phenomenological field theory. Gestalt (therapy) 
shares the concerns of phenomenology, which are to study the multiple 
possibilities of a given situation as it is experienced subjectively by the people co-
creating it at any moment in time ...... there is no objective truth - only a multitude 
of subjective perceptions.' '(p.58-9). 
She also speaks of' setting aside your own limited perspective and opening to a wide 
range of possibilities' which we can take as her placing those possibilities in what we 
have called 'bodily intentionality'. She places much emphasis on embodied subjectivity 
throughout the whole of her book (e.g. p 177). 
Bycner and Jacobs (1995) who, amongst all the Gestalt therapy writers most reference 
Merleau -Ponty, work to a comprehensive view of phenomenology. 
It is a rigorous investigation of what is. . .. that can include not only the 
individual subjective experience of the patient and that of therapist, but also the 
experience of the between, which 'transcends individual' experiences. In effect, 
they (phenomenologists) are discussing the psychological world preceding or 
89 
underlying the meeting of person with person, though not yet the actual meeting. 
(p.209). 
We here see the authors touching on the big themes, which go along with 
phenomenology: transcendence, pre-objective perception and primordial contact. 
Hycner and Jacobs focus almost exclusively on intersubjectivity and do not explore what 
it means to contact the world of things. Truly, our being is given to us as relational and 
many Gestalt therapy theorists by-pass an exploration of the I-It world and move straight 
on to that of 1-Thou. This jump has its inconveniences: engagement with another person 
is integral with engagement with the world of things. The parallel of the scientific stance 
of isolating things from the world is that of isolating a person from things. In engaging 
with a person we engage with his world which is a world of things. We are wedded to the 
things in our world because 'the thing is inseparable from the person perceiving it'. 
'Being-in-the-world' means that. 'all perceptions stand out against a background of 
nature' (PhP.p.347;F399). 
Resnick R. (1995 p.4) clearly states essential elements of phenomenology - bracketing 
of 'personal beliefs so as to be touched anew by the numena (sic), the virgin experience, 
so as to be able to describe rather than explain.' Here we have, interestingly, an implicit 
reference to that preconceptual experience of the world which is the basis of all 
subsequent experience of reality and whichfounds- all our interpretations. (It is to Resnick 
that Sapriel mainly speaks in her critique described in Section One above.) 
Yontef(1993). Lastly, I shall speak ofYontef, whom I find to be one of the clearest and 
most insightful of Gestalt therapy theoreticians. He has written extensively about many 
aspects of Gestalt therapy and always with erudition and insight. 
Yontef so heavily emphasises the role of phenomenology in Gestalt therapy that he calls 
Gestalt therapy 'clinical phenomenology' (1993, p.186). In his essay under that title he 
sets himself to define phenomenology as it is used in Gestalt. 
A search for understanding based on what is obvious or revealed by the situation 
rather than the interpretation of the observer. Phenomenologists refer to this as 
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'given'. Phenomenology works by entering into the situation experientially and 
allowing sensory Awareness to discover what is obvious, given. This 
necessitates discipline, especially sensing what is present, what IS, excluding no 
data in advance (Yontef 1993, p.86). 
He links phenomenology with the quality of contact. Contact - and therefore relationship 
- is encumbered until it can be purified by the phenomenological process. The purpose of 
description - which he emphasises a lot - is, for him, this process of purifying perception 
so as to be able to move towards relationship. 
His use of the word 'obvious' I find puzzling and somewhat misleading in that it makes 
the process sound too easy. Therapists may come to think they are making a 
phenomenological reduction when they are not. Merleau-Ponty's saying that 'Nothing is 
more difficult than to know precisely what we see' (PhP.p.58;F71), comes to mind here. 
In practice it is fatally easy to mistake what is 'obvious' for what is thoroughly informed 
by a host of unconscious natural attitudes. 
My Comment 
Whereas the Gestalt writers view of Phenomenology is in line with the Merleau-Ponty 
definition with which I opened the Chapter none of them explains or emphasizes the 
correlation of phenomenology and the body_ 
Section Three: The Philosophers 
Husserl and the Phenomenological reduction in Gestalt Therapy 
Husser! is frequently referred to in the Gestalt therapy texts, and was the only 
phenomenologist whom Paul Goodman acknowledges as having influenced him in the 
writing of Part II of the classic Gestalt Therapy (1951). Merleau-Ponty was always very 
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respectful ofHusserl and hated to challenge him - which he did, covertly at first, and 
later openly. (Dillon, 1997, p.87) 
In the light of the fact that any phenomenological reduction in Gestalt therapy needs to 
involve the lived body as an integral part of the process, I think we need to exercise 
caution in invoking Husserl's reduction as the model for Gestalt therapy. Crudely stated, 
the difficulty is this: Husserl, it would seem, thought he could separate consciousness 
from the body. In his wish to find true knowledge, Husser! engaged in what is called 
'transcendental reduction'. That is to say, he bracketed every knowledge he possessed 
including his own personal existence, and the existence of the everyday world. It is called 
'transcendental' because this process surpasses the individual subject with all his human 
characteristics. The subject of transcendental reduction is no longer a participant in the 
world. (cfDillon 1997 p.29) 
'Husserl's transcendental reduction is essentially a "universal depriving of acceptance" of 
"all existential positions". "What is" , says Mallin, 'has been reduced to "what is meant". 
The meditating philosopher by the rule of epoche brackets everything and considers all 
the objects of his experience as his thoughts or 'cogitationes'. This means that the every-
day wor!d exists for him only in the tension between his thoughts and possible actions. 
We call this 'intentional presence'. So the palpable world within which our actions take 
place has been bracketed out, and the world now exists for us only in our thinking. For 
Gestalt therapy, the kind of presence that Husser! describes, allows no place for the body 
in perception; such a view rules out that tension I experience in my body as the presence 
of the 'other', beckoning me to a new possibility of existence for him and for myself. 
Such a presence is not adequately met in the intentionality of Husser I where the world is 
locked into immanence. We need now to look closer. 
Intentional Presence 
Let us take an example: Suppose I am sitting in my armchair reading and someone 
knocks on my door. As soon as I make to stand up and open the door every moment of 
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that action is already 'known' in my body ever before 1 move intending to open the door. 
As 1 move to open the door all the movements are available to me in virtue of their 
common meaning conferred on them by the task. This dynamic presence of the end 
throughout the movement is called 'intentionality'. (PhP.p.149;173-4). The pertinent 
question is this: how can we explain this intentional presence? It is explained if we take 
it that my existence is given me not as an 'I am' but as an' 1 can' (PhP.p.136;FI60).The 
logic of this means that I am actually constituted in being by the world present to me as 
possibility of action. This possibility is present to me and experienced by me in my body. 
It does not come from my thoughts, from my 'cogitationes '. This is different from 
Husserl's transcendental intentionality. 
What counts for the orientation of the spectacle is not my body as it in fact is a 
thing in objective space, but as a system of possible actions, a body of power 
whose place is defined through its task and through its situation. My body is there 
where there is something to be done (phP p.2S0; F289) mt. 
In this study I am in agreement with Dillon who says that Husserl' s intentionality 
remains locked into an imminent world, a transcendental idealism, which constitutes the 
interpretative horizon (Dillon 1997 pp27-34 and p.87). Richardson ,W.J.(l979, p.2) 
makes the same point. Others -like Luijpen (op.cit. p.101) see Husserl as not isolating the 
subject from the world and view his intentionality as 'openness-to-the-world'. Brooke 
(1993 p.36-37) draws attention to the dispute but remarks that it 'need not concern us'. It 
is, however, of importance in this study. Two foremost Gestalt theorists, (McConville, M. 
2001 and Van De Riet, 2001) both look to Husserl's reduction as the lead model of 
phenomenology for Gestalt therapy. McConville goes further and finds in it a foundation 
for the Gestalt theory ofField Perspective (McConville, M. 2001). 
Husser! centred phenomenology in the intentionality of consciousness, that is to say, in 
his transcendental reduction, the world for Husser! was the world of the interaction of 
thoughts rather than the world of our lived experience. 
The world is for me absolutely nothing else but the world existing for and 
accepted by me in such a conscious cogito (quoted in Dillon 1997 p.28). 
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Dillon adds that Husserl never abandoned this viewpoint even in works as late as the 
Crisis. Priest (1998 p.22) offers a useful distinction here. He classifies two kinds of 
phenomenologists. He would label Husserl an 'intemalist' phenomenologist and Sartre, 
Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger as 'extemalist'. This last means that there is no way you 
can predicate events until the events happen. So, any assumption that my consciousness 
contains my relation to the world is problematic. 
Priest says it more accurately: 
The subject's relations with the world are not wholly intrinsic to the subject or the 
world, and it is not possible to specify what the subject is in abstraction from the 
world and it is not possible to specify what the world is in abstraction from the 
subject. (Priest, 1998, p.24) 
The important point for us to note here is that the intemalist phenomenologists must 
consider the human being isolated, the human being apart from his lived-world, as 
making sense. To the extemalists such a concept is nonsense and empties of its essential 
meaning the expression 'being-in-the-world'. This is why I said above that 
phenomenology in Gestalt looks more to Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger than to Husserl. I 
note this as important because it features in Sapriel' s difficulties with bracketing; I note 
that it is the Husserlian view that is propounded in Spinelli's 'Interpreted World' (1989, 
p.16fl) where he is explaining 'The Phenomenological Method'; also when he is talking 
about the 'I' in experience (loc.cit.p.25), and shrinking its importance, he does not ask 
that question which Merleau-Ponty put to the Kantians: 'Who is doing the thinking'l' 
Spinelli's book is commonly used in teaching Gestalt trainees. 33 
Heidegger 
Heidegger saw phenomenology 'as expressing nothing else than the maxim 
formulated above; "To the things themselves". '(Heidegger 1927/1973 p.58) 
33Husserl was the only phenomenologist named by Goodman as having influenced him (Stoehr. 1994, pp. 
111-112). 
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Although he shows great respect for HusserI, and quotes his famous maxim, 
Heidegger departed radically from his former teacher. Heidegger never departs 
from the historical order in his approach to phenomenology. 
So, for Heidegger, 
phenomenology formally means a branch of research, which seeks to let that 
which shows itself, be seen from itself, in the very way in which it shows itself, 
from itself(1927/1973, p.S8). 
This is very important for Gestalt therapy theory so I shall take space to explain it. 
When a client presents herself to me for therapy I am faced with a series of choices: I can 
regard her as someone who needs to be talked at, spoken down to, needing my 'helping 
hands' or my gems of wisdom; that way she becomes for me in Buber's language an 'It', 
an object. By this I place her in a different order of reality to me who am myself a 
subject. On the other hand I can decide before she speaks that I know what is 'wrong' 
with her and construe her answers to my questions so that they confirm me in my 
'diagnosis'. I can also proceed to ask her leading questions, which lead the way I want 
her to go. In none of the above eventualities is the woman identified as a carrier of her 
own meaning. Instead, I am doing the speaking and I am the source of meaning. It will be 
altogether different if I decide to allow her to become with me, in the way that she be-
comes and accommodates my be-coming to hers. Because I am with her and alive in my 
senses towards her, I am in a position to constantly check what is happening in me about 
her, and whether or not I am permitting my bodily presence to be impacted by her or not. 
That way she shows herself, 'in the way in which she shows herself, from herself.' 
Brooke explains this very clearly: 
Subjects are identified as carriers of meaning which can therefore answer 
questions. As soon as the other is perceived as an object, a determined product of 
physical contingencies, ontologically different from the perceiver-subject, then 
the other can no longer 'speak for himself. Meaning is then 'spoken' only in 
terms pre-determined by the perceiver-subject. Historically fixed and denotatively 
circumscribed, meaning is not really meaning at all; dialogue and the hermeneutic 
circle of question and answer breaks down. (Brooke, 1993, p.29) 
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Let us look again at Heidegger's definition of phenomenology 
Phenomenology formally means a branch of research, which seeks to let that 
which shows itself, be seen from itself, in the very way in which it shows itself, 
from itself(192711973, p.S8). 
For the purposes of Gestalt therapy, there are five things to notice about this definition. 
I. It goes without saying - but it needs to be said - that this method is possible only for 
an incarnate subjectivity. The body is given its 'place' in perception. 
2. It assumes the possibility of dialogue - so that as party to such a dialogue I listen as 
well as speak. And my speech is a response to the other self-manifesting. 
3. This self-manifestation is unique to each individual. 
4. In such a dialogue it is necessary to check constantly that it is the other who speaks, 
and not some projection of the subject. 
'That which does not show itself at all' 
One more remaining point of great importance is this: Heidegger uses the word 
phenomenon to designate not only what easily 'shows itself but for that also which 
'proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all. '(Richardson, 1.1986, p.57) 
But this hidden belongs to that which shows itself 'and it belongs to it so essentially as to 
constitute its meaning and its ground.' (Heidegger 192711973, p.59). Heidegger identified 
this as the Being of entities. (Richardson, IP .1986, loco cit.) So, for Heidegger, a 
phenomenology is in fact also an ontology - it allows space for the manifestation of 
Being. This means that in the very process of bracketing my prejudices, of allowing the 
other to become, Being discloses itself Here is a point relevant to Gestalt therapy, which 
so emphasises the importance of allowing' a clearing' - a space of silence - to emerge in 
the therapy in which what needs to show itself comes to pass - even in a hidden way. 
Being authenticates the meeting. 
This science of phenomena does not designate any object 'but the how with which what is 
to be handled'. Phenomenology, therefore, is not the study of appearances as such, but 
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the articulation of what manifests itself - to supply a logos for the phenomena where 
logos means an utterance that makes present what it utters. At this point we need to take 
up this last expression' Appearances as such'. It has relevance to the phenomenology of 
Gestalt therapy. 
Merleau-Ponty and Phenomenology 
Why his phenomenology is so congenial to Gestalt therapy? 
For three reasons: (i) body-based (ii) it emphasizes phenomenological reduction (iii) it 
promises 'access to the truth', I have already developed this last point quite a bit in this 
Chapter so we can be brief 
(i) Body-based 
Merleau-Ponty carries forward all the points I made earlier in regard to Heidegger and 
Phenomenology - and develops the historical rootedness by making his whole theory of 
perception also a theory of the body (PhP.p.203;F235). For Merleau-Ponty, to speak of 
perception is to speak of the body. 
External perception and the perception of one's own body varies in 
conjunction because they are two facets of one and the same act 
(PhP.p.205;F237). 
It is the intentionality, which resides in our body that achieves the unity of our 
perception: 
perceptual life - is subtended by an 'intentional arc' which projects round about 
us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological and moral 
situation, or rather which results in our being situated in these respects. It is this 
intentional arc which brings about the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of 
sensibility and motility. And this it is which goes limp in illness 
(phP.p.136;F158). 
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The relations between things or aspects of things having always our body as 
their vehicle, the whole of nature is the setting of our own life, or our 
interlocutor in a sort of dialogue (PhP.p.320;F369,370). 
For the purpose of this study, this rootedness in the body and therefore in history, is of 
great importance. It is what distinguishes Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. It is what lies 
behind his departure from Husserl's intemalist form of phenomenology. It was the basis 
of his criticism of the Berlin Gestaittheorie psychologists who were under the spell of 
Husserl and who were not following the logic of their own position. 34 
(ii) Emphasizes Phenomenological Reduction 
The second characteristic which recommends Merleau-Ponty to Gestalt therapy is that his 
phenomenology is concerned with 'phenomenological reduction'. This is a process of 
by-passing the certainties of common sense and the learned natural attitudes which go 
unnoticed and undergird our everyday involvement with the world (cf Priest, 1998, p. 18). 
Merleau-Ponty's aim is to bring into relief that primordial experience of reality, which he 
calls 'primordial contact'. This is 'the birth of the world for us where each perception 
puts us back' (phP.p296;F296. cfMallin 1979 p.57). This process Merleau-Ponty calls 
'reflection'. It does not withdraw us from the world into a self-sufficient realm of 
immanent consciousness. Rather does it 'slacken the intentional threads which attach us 
to the world and thus brings them to our notice. '(PhP.p.xiii;Fvii) This reveals to us the 
world as 'strange and paradoxical', and ourselves as 'filled with wonder' 
(PhP.p.xiv;Fviii). The focus of this reflection is my body which is given me as 'a certain 
hold upon the world' (PhP.p.354;F406). This 'hold' which is our relationship with the 
world is so intimate that Merleau-Ponty uses the metaphor of sexual union to describe it.: 
34In an unusual 'aside' - a long footnote at the end ch 3 of the Introduction to the Phenomenology of 
Perception - Merleau-Ponty talks about the cosy relationship which Gestalt Psychology endeavoured to 
establish with phenomenology. (cf PhP. p. SO-51 ;F62-63) 
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To this extent, every perception is a communication or a communion, the taking 
up or completion by us of some extraneous intention or, on the other hand, the 
complete expression outside ourselves of our perceptual powers and a coition, so 
to speak of our body with things (PhP.p.320;F370). 
In order to proceed with the phenomenological reduction we need to describe what we 
see, feel, hear, etc. and he gives us many examples of this throughout The 
Phenomenology e.g. (p.324;F375) where he details such an exercise in regard to a die. 
His description comprises several elements: It details what he actually sees, it retails a 
dialogue between him and some 'natural attitudes' which are intruding; it details what 
happens when he 'experiments' by moving as he looks at the die. 
The die is there, lying in the world. When the subject moves round it, there 
appear, not signs, but sides of the die. He does not perceive projections or even 
profiles of the die but he sees the die itself at one time from this side, at another 
from that, and those appearances which are not yet firmly fixed 
intercommunicate, run into each other, and all radiate from a central 
Wurfelhaftigkeit which is the mystical link between them. (p.324;F375) 
Let us ask ourselves: How is it that all this can 'hang together', what is the integrating 
dynamic in this array offacticities? We come up with the reply that such a dynamic is a 
modality of a preobjective view of the world and we call it 'being-in-the-world' 
(phP.p.78;F93). This dictates that Merleau-Ponty take up a here-and-now situation not 
some cogitatio for his analysis. 'The world is not what I think but what I live through' 
(phP.p.xvii;Fxii). He does not question how sure he is of the truth of the situation. His 
undertaking makes no sense if such a question can arise. 'To seek the essence of 
perception is to declare that perception is, not presumed true, but defined as access to the 
truth.' (xvi) 
(iii) Promises' Access to the Truth' 
The third characteristic which recommends Merleau-Ponty to Gestalt therapy is that his 
phenomenology promises access to the truth. This access to the truth that informs the 
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thrust of each and every act of perception is not just an idea but a constituent of our 
existence and it is only in the living of it that we can realise it. This is most important in 
Gestalt therapy, which places such emphasis on immediacy. This is behind Merleau-
Ponty's insistence that there is no way any of us can understand phenomenology unless 
we do it for ourselves, in one way or another. It is as vital an activity as eating which no 
one else, however high their standing, can do for us. If we cannot/will not do it then we 
cannot proceed with the study. 
We shall find in ourselves and nowhere else, the unity and true meaning of 
phenomenology. It is less a question of counting up quotations than of 
determining and expressing in concrete form this phenomenology for ourselves 
....... (phP. p. viii;Fii) 
If it is such an inalienable activity then why does Merleau-Ponty here speak in the third 
person singular? People could object: 'But how do you know that the subject sees those 
things?' He knows this and proceeds with his description on the basis of the reality of his 
description because he is the SUbject. And, like every perception it carries the burden of 
some ambiguity. This is the way it is whenever we speak about our clients' perception .. 
So closely bound up with us is what we perceive that it 
can never be actually in itself because its articulations are those of our very 
existence, (phP.p.320;F370). 
If its articulations were not enmeshed with the articulations of my own existence then 
there would be no possibility of our meeting. The dog, the flower, the other would be 
what the scholastics used to say of God - totaliter aliter - 'totally other' and therefore 
unknowable. 
Phenomenology and Phenomenalism 
Phenomena - not Mere Appearances 
For Merleau-Ponty the foundation of all perception is the phenomenon, it is our only 
access to reality and the perceived world is 'the foundation of all claims to truth and 
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validity' (Dillon 1997, p. 51). This is the polar opposite of phenomenalism. To stop at 
appearances and separate them from the being manifesting itself is called 
Phenomenalism. People who cling to the idea of a ready-made world and who reflect on 
their experience, can quite easily begin to imagine that underneath 'the phenomenology' 
there resides some core of reality which is really what therapy is about?5 
'Phenomenalism' is characterised by instituting a separation between the appearances 
and the thing (Mallin, 1979, p.118). It has its most famous elaboration in the philosophy 
of Plato who made a clear distinction between the shadows of the puppets which the 
slaves mistook for reality and Reality itself to which only the chosen few (people like 
Plato) had access (Republic, Bk7). Merleau-Ponty is quite clear that there is a categorical 
difference, but not a separation, between appearances and objects with their constant 
properties. Appearance is the object manifesting itself. Appearances are the contingent 
36 
presentation of the constant. The colour manifests the object - I go through it 
(PhP.p.26l;F302) and arrive at the object. Mallin (1979, p.118) remarks how heavily 
Merleau-Ponty relies on this 'through'( a travers). It means: 'I pass by without stopping 
to perform a possible act of attention'. In Merleau-Ponty's thinking there is no such thing 
as a sensation in its own right; its being is to refer beyond itself to the object. Like light. 
So, phenomenology will not stop at appearances but follows the intentionality of the body 
manifested in those appearances and manifesting the thing. 
The idea that we have of a 'core object' is just that - an idea. The only way the thing can 
be for me is as phenomenon. Merleau-Ponty applies this to viewing the next-door house 
35 It is this notion which, it seems to me, lies behind the Stephen Tobin article in the Gestalt Journal in 
1983 and which was so ably responded to by GaIy Yontef. (1993 pp. 326-342). Indeed, the idea ofa 'core 
self' of a profound reality behind appearances can arise in the thinking of therapists who work in a 
psychoanalytic way. 
36 A difficulty arises here in that the possible profiles of the thing are infinite and, whereas we touch the 
profiles, we never touch the thing in its ipseity (phP. p.233;F269). Luijpen (1972 p.128) says that Merleau-
Ponty never managed to deal adequately with this difficulty. He is content in The Phenomenology to say 
that the thing in its ipseity is an ideality. 
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at the very start of his chapter: Experience and Objective thought. The Problem of the 
Body. 
Conclusion 
Clearly the definition of phenomenology which best suits Gestalt therapy implies a bodily 
mode of handling what manifests itself to us. It is not phenomenalist i.e. does not separate 
appearances from the thing. It regards phenomena as our only path to being or reality. 
The phenomenon unites us so closely to the world that we can be said to live what we 
perceive. Whatever the manifestation, it happens in the historical context of the world of 
our lived experience. This lived experience is the foundation from which any 'internal' 
event derives its ontological validity. 
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Introduction 
In a work first published in 1960 and translated in 1964, Merleau-Ponty says of 
language - that it is 'our element as water is the element offishes'(1987B). To change 
the metaphor somewhat, we can say that the oxygen of psychotherapy is Language and 
Speech. 'Language' embraces the whole area of communication while 'speech' indicates 
the verbal, auditory, coherent specification of language. I shall throughout this chapter -
for reasons of space - refer all the time to speech - expressive speech. 
It not infrequently happens that people think of speech as an activity of 'the mind' in 
contradistinction to 'feeling', which is regarded as 'more earthy', more 'real'. There was 
even attributed to Gestalt, in its early days, a slogan 'lose your head (speech) and return 
to your senses'; the situation was not helped by Fritz Perls himself who, in his last (and 
rather sad) years, divided speech into very derogatory categories (Perls, F. 1969/71, ch. 7). 
Aware that this derogation is still lurking about in some pockets of Gestalt therapy 
practice, I have made point in each section of this chapter of showing speech as 'the 
surplus of our existence over natural being' (PhP.p.197;F229). This means, that far from 
speech being apart from our bodily existence, it takes up our bodily existence, our 
breathing, our feeling, our muscular movements, and brings them to a wonderful 
completion in speech as communication. 
Section One: Experience in Search of Articulation 
The Tension Between Perception and Cognition 
What we perceive is far and away bigger than what we know (Stem, 1985 p. 170ft). In 
fact, to identify cognition with perception is to isolate the objects of knowledge from the 
world that gives them meaning. It is like mistaking the painting for the actual countryside 
which the painting depicts. Similarly to identify someone as a 'a depressive' is to forget 
that there is far more to any human being than their depressed condition. Yet, if my 
104 
perception were shorn of its abilities to articulate the details, my global perception would 
be of no use to me in my life. We carry the structures of our cognition in our bodies -
especially in 'the linguistic motor capacities' (Mallin S.B. 1979 p.184), that enable us to 
speak. It is precisely the precision of our language abilities that enable us to grasp definite 
things. Through speech I can know your name and where you live and what your work is. 
This is cognition and a basis for communicating with you. Yet this does not coincide with 
my perception of you. But what good is my perception of you unless I can speak to you in 
the detail carried in my cognitive structures. We see here an interdependence. The thrust 
of my perception is towards speaking with you; yet this can be done only in details which 
no way coincide with you and whose meaning resides only in the fuller perception of 
you. That fuller perception of you is only in the context of your belonging in the world; 
and you are and remain as mysterious to me - however many details I may know about 
you - as that world in which we both meet. It is as if our meeting is taken over into a 
mysterious and incomprehensible setting, because that whole world that is you, is given 
to me through my senses in such a way that it would be more true to say that' one 
perceives in me' rather than that 'I perceive' (PhP.p.240;F277). This world that evades 
articulation is the pre-reflective world of perception and remains always rooted in this 
area for its operation. 
Language and Speech: The High Point of Gestalt Therapy 
The 'healing of the soul' happens when that 'soul' or person finds the desires of his heart 
addressed by another, 'who knows also the darkness of his heart, but with a knowledge 
h . al I·' 37 t at IS so a ovmg . 
Psychotherapy of every school seems to me to depend intimately upon language and 
speech. Each of us 'is living out a deep story' (Moore 1994, p.224) and it is the desire of 
our hearts to utter that story, hear it understood and loved and bask in the sunshine of 
37 I take this thought from John S.Dunne, (1985, p.130): Professor of Theology in the University of Notre 
Dame, Indiana. 
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belonging. We seem destined to act out those things in our stories that we dare not utter; 
the" nefanda" of our lives become the demons that drive us. In therapy we permit those 
things which we do not know, dare not to know about ourselves to come into our 
awareness in the presence of a loving other who is skilled and knowledgeable; that 
coming into awareness means that they 'take flesh' in us which is their finding words, 
and we speak. 
We present our thoughts to ourselves through internal or external speech .... but 
then we are left to lay hands on it, and it is through expression that we make it 
our own (PhP.p.177;F207). 
Vanden Berg tells of a man patient of his, an assistant manager in a big business, who in 
travelling from Leiden to the Hague, kept driving off motorway journeys on the wrong 
slip road; 'he found himself "just like that" and much to his own surprise, in a village, 
some ten miles off the road ...... ' He returned to the motorway and 'to his even greater 
amazement the same thing happened to him all over again' (Van den Berg, 1980 p.35). 
As it emerged in therapy with Van den Berg, this man did not even want to go to work. 
He had attained his present position by marrying the Managing Director's daughter, so 
that he held a post, which was too much for him, and worked everyday in the shadow of a 
man (his boss) who knew that. When he was enabled to tell his story in therapy his 
panics and depression left him and he was able to leave his post in the firm and work at a 
job he actually liked (ibid.). 
It may seem that in making Language and Speech the' high point' of therapy I am 
abandoning my project of reinstating the body as central in Gestalt therapy. Not so. I 
intend to show how speech is an action of the body. 
Speech as a Bodily Act 
Speech is a special way in which a person uses her body to go beyond the limitations that 
hedge about everything else in the whole world. In speech the body transcends itself 
'Thought tends towards expression as towards its completion' (PhP.p.177;F206). This 
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way the subject appreciates his world and establishes communication with the 'other'. 
Once I speak a situation, then that situation is transformed for me; whereas, before I 
addressed the situation, it was confusing and I was unsure what I thought - having put 
words on it, I now stand in a transformed relationship to it. 
We witness this in almost every therapy session. For example, a couple came to me in 
great distress. The man whom we can call Peter had become angry all the time. From 
being pleasant, affable and funny, he seemed to have become silent, grumpy and sulky. It 
emerged that for the past seven years Peter had stayed at home and looked after the 
children while his wife Fiona went out to work. Now she wanted him to take up a job 
opportunity that had come his way and allow her to stay with the children. In the course 
of the sessions he was able to talk to his wife about his pain at 'leaving' the children, his 
fear of the exposed life of business; and she was enabled to listen to him, and speak her 
own misgivings and fears to him. Over time this free flow of feeling and communication 
transfonned their life together. During one of the sessions Peter said; 'I never realized 
how afraid I was of taking my chance in the world of business'. 
'We present our thoughts to ourselves through internal or external speech. It does 
indeed move forward with the instant and, as it were in flashes, but we are then 
left to lay hands on it, and it is through expression that we make it our own' 
(PhP.p.177;F206). 
That 'laying hands on it' can be very difficult. There is nothing inevitable about the 
process. That couple could have come to therapy, talked, rowed, but never engaged with 
their situation; instead, because of their love, fortitude, and beliefin their future they laid 
hold of their situation and transfonned it. 
Speech is not just a process of matching a thing with a word. It must be more than just a 
cognitive operation because of the thirst to find words to express our condition. Until I 
can name a thing it seems altogether distant from me and in an anonymous relationship 
with me. When I began this study so many years ago, I did not know what I was going to 
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put into it. Until I actually set down my thoughts about the bearing ofMerleau-Ponty's 
philosophy upon Gestalt therapy theory, I had only a set of vague notions, and then the 
more I set them down the more I had to revise and change my earlier thoughts. It was in 
the process of explaining my thinking to myself and to colleagues that I came to realize 
how little I understood of what I was about. 
..... the thinking subject himself is in a kind of ignorance of his thoughts so long 
as he has not formulated them from himself, or even spoken and written them as 
is shown by the example of so many writers who begin a book without knowing 
exactly what they are going to say (PhP.p.177;F207). 
Every word I utter is 'one of the possible uses of my body' (PhP.p.lSO;F210). These 
words - this language is present to me like any of my limbs are. I do not have to wony 
that I may reach for it and find it gone or that I will not know how to organize the words 
into sentences that cany meaning. My language - in the form of my expressive speech, 
is as close to me as my skin. It works hand-in-hand with my memory but they are not the 
same; because people struck down by a stroke can lose their memory but not their speech 
and vice versa. A woman deprived of all speech by a stroke was able to find her way 
home and go straight to where she kept the account books which she had been 
accustomed to keep most carefully, and handed them over to her husband for him to take 
over.
38 
When Descartes shut himself up in his room and wrestled to find what was most basic to 
him of which he could have no doubt he found his 'Cogito', that is, he found speech. 
Even speech which is often treated as being essentially an operation of thought 
and spirit, must be viewed in the context of the power the lived body has of 
reflecting on and expressing itself (that is, of turning back on itself, doubling up, 
and taking itself for an object) (Madison 1981, p.49). 
This power that the body is of expressing itself, is shown in the way the urge to speak and 
38 I have this from a personal communication with a very experienced speech thempist. 
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be understood can take possession of the whole body. Take stammering for instance: in 
the huge effort to produce fluent speech the stammerer may develop involuntary 
movements in the larynx and mouth, these can be extended into foot tapping, head 
movements and hand clenching, which all become part of the effort to produce speech 
(which the stammerer experiences as being 'stuck' or 'locked') (Stewart and 
Rowley, 1996, p.3). 
A further example of this power of the body to transcend itself through speech is the 
amazing inventiveness of very young children who have had a tracheostomy to find ways 
of getting air to their speech organs so as to be able to make verbal gestures.(Sell and 
MacCurtain, 1984, p.37) 
The operational intentionality to communicate which possesses the lived body of the 
person and which shows itself in speech will go on being operational even when that 
person has been rendered incapable of speech. Children with a cleft of the palate or 
adults with acquired damage - for instance, a head injury or removal of palate in an 
operation for cancer - will quickly develop movements of muscles in the throat to 
compensate for the palatal dysfunction. Palate dysfunction makes clear articulation of 
speech sounds in the mouth very difficult and also leads to,the articulation being 
transferred from the mouth and throat to other muscular structures, so that the person can 
produce equivalent sounds. 
When voice becomes impossible - as, for instance, in the case of a baby of 2 years old 
who has had a tracheostomy so that the larynx muscle makes no sound, the baby then 
develops an amazing variety of gestures to communicate his needs (Sell and MacCurtain, 
1987), (cfGrumwell and Russell,1987). 
So my emphasizing language and speech is in no wayan abandonment of my project of 
centering Gestalt therapy in the body, it serves to emphasize how speech in its every 
phase is ultimately rooted in the body. This also means that primordial contact, which 
makes all subsequent dialogue with the world possible, is the foundation and guarantor of 
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my speech as uttering what is authentic. 
Authentic Speech - Healing Speech 
You may recall how I said in the Introduction that the healing component in Gestalt 
therapy is the quality of the dialogue between client and therapist. The quality of this 
dialogue requires, amongst other things, authenticity. This means that each party is 
speaking from the heart. Each of them is engaged in the utterance; their experience in 
the NOW between them. This requires that what I say involves the whole of me, not just 
my very well-educated 'mind' and my practised tongue. Just as an organ becomes an 
extension of the organists body, so that all he has to do is sit down, adjust his seat and 
allow his hands to play the keys and his feet the pedals and music fills the church; so also 
a skilled therapist will have embodied his life and its bank of experiences and be so 
connected with it that her words will carry her love and experience to her client; this, of 
course, may be blocked off from the client by the intensity of transference - his 
projections upon the therapist, or the therapist's projections upon him or counter-
transference, the therapists projections upon the client. 
In order that the therapist be connected with her experience she must be connected with 
her body. Only that way can she be an integrated person. It is only if she is alive in her 
own body that she will be able to respond to the body of the client and thereby co-create 
an environment in which the client can tell his story. Speech of itself is not the therapy, 
but speech as embodying experience. PHG has a tenn for empty speech - 'verbalizing'. 
Speaking, Speech and Spoken Speech 
Merleau-Ponty acknowledged a distinction between 'conventional speech' and 
'originating' or 'transcendental' speech. The first is what Heidegger calls 'idle chatter' 
(Gerede) and this comprises a great deal of our everyday talk (Dillon 1993, p.190). The 
second he calls 'speaking speech' (la parole par/ante) and this .... 
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· .... is the one in which the significant intention is at the stage of coming into 
being. Here existence is polarised into a certain 'significance' which cannot be 
defined in terms of any natural object ... " the spoken word, which enjoys available 
significance as one might enjoy an acquired fortune. From these acquisitions 
other acts of authentic expression - the writers, artists or philosophers are made 
possible (PhP.p.197;F229). 
Merleau-Ponty, who was brought up by the sea, uses a marine metaphor to describe this 
speech: it comes to birth from where, no one knows, it rises in tension, it allows to fall 
back into being whatever cannot keep up with it (if fait retomber a J 'etre ce qui tendait au 
deja). 
Such is the function which one discerns throughout language; it retakes itself, 
makes itself its own foundation, and then like a wave gathers and poises itself to 
slam itself in beyond its limits (PhP.p.197;F229-230) mt. 
The important point about 'speaking speech' is that the speech is charged with its 
meaning and conveys this in a (sometimes) totally compelling way. I'm thinking of the 
ritual I have followed with a woman who twenty years previously, had a hasty abortion 
and now comes to regret her loss and mourn her baby. It was a very healing and moving 
'experiment' when she asked the baby's forgiveness?9 Such 'speech' I would think of as 
'originating' . 
This we can call 'authentic speech' so important in Gestalt therapy. At the same time 
Merleau-Ponty is 'close to the distinction between authentic and inauthentic speech'. 
Merleau-Ponty readily acknowledges that our discourse is not always 'singing the world' 
(PhP. p.187;F218) but predominantly inauthentic and is conducted within the parameters 
of convention where the ritualized exchange of familiar cliches involves neither creative 
effort of expression nor the struggle to understand a novel thought. 
39 Isolated from the context of the whole course of therapy sessions, the procedure I talk about here may be 
judged macabre. This is an ever-present risk. which we all take when we report on our experience out of 
context. 
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Phenomenology Reconnects Speech to its Roots 
The theory of psychotherapy that I have put forward above is not original - except in so 
far as I radicate it expressly in the lived body. Van den Berg ends his article (1980) with 
a definition of psychotherapy: 
In a world of an all but omnipotent convergent 40 thinking, phenomenology is 
cosmotherapy. Or else if we strip the word psyche of its one-sided Cartesian 
meaning, there is this last, more modest, but equally daring and shortest possible 
definition, Phenomenology is psychotherapy (loc. cit. p.48). 
I like the suggestion that we strip away the dualism implicit in the word 'psychotherapy'. 
The healing takes place in the whole person (client and therapist), through their' allowing 
that to show itself which shows itself, precisely in the way it does so from itself. By 
'from itself we mean from the totality of the other - not from some fayade or 'wanting-
to-please' or conceit or 'persona'. 
Brooke R (1993 p.41) makes the same point very powerfully, I think. The context is his 
discussing the language ofC.G. lung and its 'congeniality with the primordial structures 
of psychological lives; it does not tear the experience in two'. lung's language is the 
opposite of what is called 'psychobabble'. For instance, 'To speak of a "complex" 
instead of a god is of doubtful accuracy, not in a positive, nominated sense, but in the 
sense that the experience is taken from its vital roots'. He means by this, I think, that a 
person's worship, or sense of awe in his rituals, is rooted and experienced in the lived 
body; whereas 'complex' is much more distant from the flesh in its derivation and 
atmosphere. lung, he says, uses a language that speaks out of and to that primordial world 
(ibid). 
40 The terms 'convergent' and 'divergent' are used by Schwnacher R. (1975 p.79) to distinguish problems. 
which can be solved by logic and those which cannot. The world of Descartes is ruled by convergent 
thinking. 
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'Such a language perpetuates our modem alienation. . ... .if experience is ruptured, 
cut off from its own foundations, then a phenomenology of experience is 
intrinsically a psychotherapy' (ibid). 
In the paper which invites Gestalt therapy to engage itself with post-modem philosophy 
as it comes in constructivism, Jean-Marie Robine points to a development in the same 
direction; narrative therapy. He refers to Polster, E., who has already led the way with 
his 'Every Person's Life is Worth a Novel' (1987). He further looks to Goodman (pHG, 
1951, Ch.5): Maturing, and the Recollection of Childhood. Goodman draws attention to 
narratives from which the narration is absent and leaves the person 'empty and 
exhausted'. Robine says that a 'chronicle' rather than a 'topical' narrative suits Gestalt 
therapy in that such an 'unfolding' is more suited to a SELF which is so variously 
experienced. 
When I decided to entitle this study 'Healing Perception' my thinking was in the same 
direction as Robine. Healing, I thought, is essentially a reciprocal activity in which a 
person opens her heart to the gaze of another without any feeling of shame, but of 
affirmation and acceptance in one's full humanity. To allow oneself to be perceived in 
one's totality is already a healing act. 
Recognising Disconnected Speech 
In this section I propose to explore what it is we mean when we say that not all narratives 
are therapeutic. I'm taking up and bringing forward what Goodman said about empty and 
lifeless speech; and what Robine urged when he said there was a promising place in 
Gestalt therapy for narrative as a life chronicle (Robine, 1999, p.74). 
It was my experience on an occasion that a client who had been sexually abused by her 
father as a little girl during some ten years of her life, spoke very openly with me about 
her sexual experiences. This surprised me and I asked her how it felt for her that I was a 
man and she, who had such great difficulties, could speak like that with me. As it 
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emerged she said she felt absent from me during her narrative and from herself. It was as 
if she was speaking about a third party, for whom she felt very little; as if her words and 
her stOry were distant from her. Certainlv, there was a level at which she knew what she 
- -
was doing, at which she experienced herself speaking, at which she even knew I was 
there but there was a lack of connection. Stem (1985, p.226) discusses this phenomenon 
in his section on Clinical Implications under Verbal Relatedness. 
Paradoxically while language vastly extends our grasp on reality, it can also 
provide the mechanism for the distortion of reality as experienced. As we have 
seen, language can force apart interpersonal self-experience as lived and as 
verbally represented ...... It is for this reason that so much of what is clinically 
important when language emerges is invisible and silent. 
He cites Basch (1983) as offering us a useful distinction about this process. 
In repression the path from the lived experience to its articulation in language is simply 
blocked off. In disavowal the path from language representation to the feelings associated 
with these is blocked. In denial there is a distortion in the perception itself - 'I was never 
abused'. 
My client's disavowal was a learned and well-practised strategy deriving, 1 would say 
(with Stem), from her powerful existential desire to be with her father all those years ago. 
By splitting herself in this way she was able to drain of meaning the words she was using 
so that there was no affect or sensation accompanying them. In other words she had 
abandoned her body. 
When Merleau-Ponty says: 'The word has a meaning' he is connecting words, our 
expressive speech with the body which is sustained and made meaningful by the word. 
He is rooting the meaning of words in the world. His saying, 'The word has meaning' is 
similar to his saying that in the phenomenal world: 
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Vision is already inhabited by a meaning (sens) which gives it a function in the 
spectacle of the world and in our existence (PhP.p.52;F69). 
He goes on to explain how the meaning is never just a quality (,quale') but that what we 
see (colour for instance) is 'invested with vital value, grasping it first in its meaning for 
us, for that heavy mass which is our body, whence it comes about that it always involves 
a reference to the body'. (ibid) 
What he says here of our perceptual region of existence, applies equally to our 
cognitive/linguistic region because none of these regions function in isolation from the 
others and Existence for Merleau-Ponty is univocal - it is the one Existence in every area, 
just manifesting itself in different modalities. 
The key to the word having meaning then, is its lived connection with the body. 
Therapeutic narrative then as Robine, Polster or Goodman would have it in Gestalt 
therapy will move towards a poetry where the body of the person is behind every word 
and informs the grammar and syntax and style of the utterance. 
A Cautionary Note: Be Careful about Questioning Meaning-making 
Robine safely advises us to be on the alert around the question of meaning-making (sens). 
In the same place that Robine suggests narrative as genuine dialogue, he calls meaning-
making into question (1999, p.74). He has been influenced by the saying of the 
intellectual Paul Ricoeur that 'the hermeneutic field itself has been broken', blown apart 
by contradiction and different strategies (Ricoeur, 1992). This is one of those questions 
between philosophers that I think we had best not get into, unless we know how to get out 
without damage. Sometimes the Diogenes strategy is best. I think we need to be very 
careful about questioning the possibility of meaning. After all it is what Robine himself 
and Ricoeur are about when they write for us. Not only that, but they must also carry the 
intention of being 'believed' by us and therefore that they are in the business of truth. 
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Section Two: Speech and Language in Gestalt Therapy Literature and Practice 
Early Writings 
Early on, Gestalt therapy recognised the importance of language. It features in Perls early 
work, in Gestalt Therapy (pHG) and in the verbatim accounts ofPerls' work with clients. 
In the context of discussing the basic Gestalt therapy principle that each person is 
responsible for his/her own life, PerIs sees the use a/impersonal language as a flight 
from owning their experience: 
I'd like to point out one of the most difficult problems to handle in therapy, and 
this problem is characterised by the word it, or the noun. " My memory is bad." 
"The thought slipped out" "the matches are needed for lighting cigarettes." .... I 
mentioned before, the death layer, ....... this petrification does often occur in the 
way of becoming something dead: a living organism becoming a thing, a process 
becoming a noun, a freezing of a high potential, a predictability, an easy use of 
words rather than experiencing living processes. This is one way that we are dead 
without knowing it. (perIs, 1971, pI 06) 
So, instead of someone saying 'My back is hurting to-day', he would urge the client to 
experiment with: 'I am hurting in my back to-day.'{cfClarkson and Mackewn, 1996 
p.109). I see this as an invitation to clients to be immediate to their world. It is the 
opposite of spectatoring the world through a window. (Romanyshyn, 1994, Ch 2, p.32 fl) 
Similarly Perls asked clients to make statements instead of asking questions; to ask 'how' 
instead of 'why': 'why I assumes that the trouble was 'caused' by something in the past -
and leads us into the world of science. But, in the phenomenal field which is the realm of 
Gestalt therapy, cause-and-effect categories are not helpful. Implicit here is Perls view 
that a person is not in the world as a thing is in the world. This is a point made powerfully 
by Merleau-Ponty. (PhP.p.98ff;Fl14 fl) 
One could say that the main part - the whole of Part One - of the Phenomenology of 
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Merleau-Ponty is devoted to the way the body is in the world. The human body is not a 
thing amongst things and the rule of cause and effect runs only in a world where there is 
extension - partes extra partes - because only in such a world does it make sense to talk 
about 'efficient causality' where the contiguity of entities is the event. And then there is 
the ambiguity that the body is subject to all the laws that operate for other material things. 
Nothing is ever clear-cut. This ambiguity is constantly reflected in our speech. Even 
when we speak about 'the phenomenology of the client' we are, to some extent, lapsing 
back into dualism. 
Early writings stress that a requirement for Gestalt therapists is to use language in such a 
way that it articulates their experience of being-in-the-world. 
We don't look to the world any more in terms of cause and effect. We look upon 
the world as continuous on-going process ...... If you ask how, you look at the 
structure, you see what is going on now, a deeper understanding of the process . 
.... Why and because are dirty words in Gestalt Therapy. They lead only to 
rationalisation.... (perls, 1971, p.4 7) 
The attitudes in this writing about speech express well the basic theory of speech and 
language, which obtain in Gestalt therapy. Speech is meant to bring people into 
relationship but it can be used to keep them apart. A person can seem to be expressing 
himself while he is simply making sounds that are close to meaningless. Peds' view of 
the close correlation between awareness, speech and language is here apparent. He is 
pragmatic in his interest: the thrust of his admonition is to help the person to own her life 
through her speech and language. 
His use of the metaphor 'petrification' is interesting. His view of language is that it is 
meant to give life. Uttering a person's name summons that person to life. This is the 
opposite of cursing a person - uttering a death wish towards her. The videotapes ofPerls 
with client Gloria have attracted great criticism of him. They also show however, how 
powerfully present they were with one another - which enabled him to be very robust in 
his exchanges with her. There is nothing boring or lifeless about the meeting. The same is 
apparent in the videotapes of Lynne Jacobs - who very beautifully uses the client's name 
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(Jacobs, Video 1998). 
The authors of Gestalt Therapy devote two sections of the book to the question of speech 
and language (PHG.pp 138ff and 372ft). Implicitly they recognise the 'situatedness' of the 
person and the interdependency of thought and expression. (They tend to polarize 
cognition and feeling). I find these chapters amongst the best written in the book. 
Goodman, who was also a poet, would have written most of it. (Stoehr, 1994 and 
Goodman, 1973). Beginning from the premise that' social relations ... are original in any 
human field; long prior to recognising oneself as an idiosyncratic person' they point out 
that 'personality,41 is a 'structure of speech habits, a creative act of the 2nd and 3rd 
years' oflife (PHG p. 372). So, the child begins off happy and free but then society takes 
him over. Here we see that difficulty which still persists in Gestalt writing about 
acknowledging the ambiguity that accompanies all 'spontaneous' and 'personal' 
articulations. Gestalt therapy heralded itself as liberating the individual from the chains of 
customised, deadening society. And it did indeed do that; yet, as we shall see, it had 
difficulty acknowledging the ambiguity that is ever present in human existence. 
The authors take it that all beliefs and evaluations come from speech - unless they spring 
from 'organic appetites'. People mirror society in their speech and they lose their 
spontaneous selves. They contrast verba/ising with poetry. "Verbalising" is speech that 
has lost its soul. It is monotonous, insensitive, affectless and stereotyped. It becomes a 
ready-made means by which an introjected alien personality, with its beliefs and 
attitudes, can live instead of oneself.' (pHG. p.376) 
Poetry on the other hand is expression just for itself. It is ' an organic problem-solving 
activity.' By this they mean that the whole of the person is involved in contact with the 
41 It seems to me that Goodman is using 'personality' here in the sense of 'persona' - an assumed role as in 
a play. This is quite different from the meaning given it in some Existentialist writings; Berdyaev E, for 
example, who uses it in the sense of the unique epiphany ofa hwnan being. (1944, p.23) Goodman is 
contrasting 'personality' with the 'tmderlying powers', the innate, unspoiled purity of the individual. 
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environment without the interference of 'manipulating,42 factors. 'Poetry is not 
instrumental in a further social situation as to persuade the listener...' (PHG p.375) 
This works, it helps people to health. 
There is no attempt in PHG to 'found' language, to see it as articulating that primordial 
'givenness' of which Merleau Ponty speaks; the question is not even raised. When we 
look at what they contrast with genuine speech i.e. 'verbalizing' - it comes not from the 
lived body of the person but from some 'alien' presence, which has invaded and 
plundered that pristine world. It is difficult not to discern a belief amongst some Gestalt 
therapists in a kind of primitive condition of spontaneity and health that has been taken 
away by 'society'. People would be healthy if they were not 'meddled-with' by 'society'. 
So, the thrust of therapy is to reconnect a person with her organismic self, let her become 
aware of the 'shoulds' that drive her and by means of 'self-regulation' she will be 
restored to health and become contactful. The experiments in PHG have all to do with 
this restoration of a lost integrity. 
I'm sure that the view of 'primordial innocence' would qualify as a 'metanarrative' about 
which we have been thoroughly warned by Jean-Franyois Lyotard (1984. p.xxiii). It 
seems to me that such a paradisal picture is as valid as any other to express in metaphor 
our relationship to Being. It is not so distant from Heidegger's notion of' fallen' . 
Later Writings 
Yontef(1993 passim) and Korb et aI. (1989). make the same points as Perls and PHG. 
Y ontef readily recognises that experience is moulded by language and, in tum, has the 
effect of determining what experiences a person may allow herself to become aware of 
'Semantic clarification can be used as a vehicle for improving observation and for 
conveying new outlooks or attitudes.' (Y ontef, 1993, p.76). He draws attention to the fact 
42Perls uses this term to describe the indirect and pseudo-resolution of a difficult situation in which a person 
is afraid to 'self-regulate' (1969/1971 pp.17-18). 
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that people need to be taught the difference between 'feel' as affective and 'feel' as 
cognitive. It may be useful also to experiment with substituting 'I won't' for 'I can't', 
and so drawing the client's attention to how inaccurate language leads to distorted view 
of oneself The authors have a sense that speech is most effective when it comes from the 
heart - when it articulates the full experience of the person. We can remark that here 
again we see the phenomenal field as the realm of discourse proper to Gestalt therapy. 
Such speech is characterised by epaissure or 'thickness' (PhP.p.238;F275) - that 
'substantiality', which marks the grounding in primordial contact, that profound 
belonging to the world, that unreflected-upon presence of the world which recedes from 
awareness in every act of knowledge and yet which gives foundation and meaning to 
what we know. Such articulation is especially important with clients who have been 
profoundly shamed (Yontefloc.cit. p.501ft). 
Implicit in this is acknowledging the essential element as the ever present 'primordial 
contact' enlightening our every act of perception. This is the level of operation proper to 
Gestalt therapy. Underwriting their position is the presupposition that the client and the 
therapist are in dialogue with one another and are in immediate contact with reality. The 
ideal for Yontef(loc. cit p.76ft) is a cultivation ofBuber's I-Thou language in therapy. 
The attitude to speech and language in Gestalt therapy theory is, as ever, pragmatic. 
Section Three: Awareness, Expression and Poetry 
Firstly, I shall discuss the relationship of awareness and expression. I choose this because 
Gestalt therapy is a therapy of awareness. It is also fundamental to the thinking of 
Merleau-Ponty: he maintains an indissolveable bond between language, expression and 
thought. 'It is through expression that we make it (our thoughts) our own. ' 
(PhP.p.177;F207). 
Secondly, I shall explore further the function of poetic utterance in therapy. I do not mean 
that a therapist needs to be a poet - but almost! It is a question of how he is present in his 
own expression. 
Thirdly, there is the question of the 'inner life', which Merleau-Ponty dismisses. 
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The Body a Power of Natural Expression 
Awareness in Gestalt therapy is not a silent condition. It is never separate from 
expression. Nor is awareness always healing: a traumatised client may drift off into a 
regressive condition. It seems to me that at that point therapy stops until the two are 
present in the room again. 'Awareness is the process of being in vigilant contact with the 
most important event in the individual environmental field ........ Awareness is always 
accompanied by Gestalt formation ... (it) is in itself an integration of a problem.' (Y ontef 
G. 1993, p.183 italics mine) , ... the work unifies sensing and thinking into a continuum 
of awareness in the NOW' (loc.cit. p.189). Yontef stresses the transcendental element in 
awareness: 'Awareness is always Here and Now and always changing, evolving and 
transcending itself (Yontef loco cit. p.185). Yontef does not explicitly connect awareness 
with articulation, but he does so implicitly when he says 'awareness - real awareness is 
always an appropriation of a problem'. However, I am not sure that is sufficient to 
forestall a lapse back into a split between speech and awareness. According to Merleau-
Ponty, articulation is always an integral part of awareness. Otherwise we are back to a 
separation between awareness and speech. A disconnection between awareness and 
speech makes it very difficult to view thinking as a bodily activity and we are faced with 
awareness as an immanent process. 
In this view speech becomes 'the envelope and clothing of thought' . This is to introduce 
again the split between mind and body, so that thought is somehow independent of the 
body, and grief, anger, sadness, joy tend to be regarded as 'inner states'. Such a view 
discounts the fact that not only has my body a gigantic power of expression but that it is, 
in its ontological constitution, such a power of expression. 
Let us consider this. When I reflect upon it, if the grief I feel for a lost loved one, happens 
to me in my body it can only be because the world of the beloved-and-me still persists 
around me. It is important for the holism of Gestalt therapy that this concept of total 
unity should not be compromised when it comes to speech. I can conjure up a pseudo-
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presence of the lost one. This is just one possibility of my being-in-the-world, one of the 
many possible modalities of my cognitive/linguistic region. These possibilities remain 
only possibilities unless and until I allow them to become actual in my body. 
"To say I imagine Peter is to say that I bring about the pseudo-presence of Peter. 
Just as Peter in imagination is only one of the modalities of my being-in-the-
world, so the verbal image is only one of the modalities of my phonetic 
gesticulations, presented with many others in the all-embracing consciousness of 
my body' (PhP. p.18l ;F21O-2ll). 
The world that so pains me is painful precisely because it carries the bodily presence 
(now become an absence) of the loved one. Such a process is possible because of my 
body's relationship with the past. My body carries my past, as my scars and my wrinkles 
testify. And just as I can, by my body, walk to the other side of the road and see my house 
from there, so also, by my body, can I bring the past into the present and allow it to glow 
with a transforming light. My body has this reach in space and time because it is 'a power 
of natural expression' (PhP.p.l8l~F211). The response I make to every event is 
essentially a bodily response. There is no 'cause and effect' here, no before and after. It is 
all of one piece. 
'The body converts a certain motor essence into vocal form, spreads out the 
articulatory style of a word into audible phenomena, and arrays the former 
attitude, which is resumed, into actual movement, because the body is a power of 
natural expression'. (ibid) 
Expression Brings Meaning into Existence 
This power of natural expression enshrined itself in the thinking of Wilhelm Reich, a 
disciple of Freud and one time analyst to Fritz Perls, and the pioneer of what has come to 
be called Bioenergetic therapy. It is reported of him that he said he never bothered to 
listen to what people were saying - because it was all lies anyway! All that interested him 
was the body profile of the client which told his expertise how this client supported his 
psychopathology by inhibiting body movement. Gestalt therapy has learned a lot from 
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Reich but would not take up his deafness to what people say.43 What Gestalt Therapy 
owes to Reich is its emphasis on the body and its focus on process of speech rather than 
on content of speech. The tone, the style, the cadence, the juxta position of the words, the 
brevity or profusion of the speech and the flow, are of interest to the Gestalt therapist. 
What interests the Gestalt therapist is the meaning in all these modalities of 
speech/articulation. Merleau-Ponty sees a parallel with an artistic performance. 
The process of expression, when it is successful, does not merely leave for the 
reader and the writer himself a kind of reminder, it brings the meaning into 
existence as a thing at the very heart of the text, it brings it to life in an organism 
of words, .... opening a new field on a new dimension to our experience ...... The 
meaning swallows up the signs .... (phP.p.182;F212). 
The meaning for the therapist must come from his own body; from his images, 
sensations, feelings, inclinations; and these move towards speech as towards their 
completion. This constitutes dialogue. (Of course he will be careful to use the 
hermeneutic circle in his discernment). 
Recently, Yontef(1991, p.8) and Hellinger (1998, p.224) have both written pieces, which 
call into question the meaning-making power and genuineness of the more dramatic 
forms of expression such as shouting, screaming and loud mourning as part of therapy. 
Y ontef contrasts the 'theatrical, cathartic approach in which technique is accentuated 
more than person to person involvement' with 'the hard working person-to-person 
approach' and he memorably calls the first the 'boom-boom-boom therapy'. I agree 
broadly with Yontef. Gestalt therapy is not a therapy of catharsis. It relies on slow 
reparative work between therapist and client with the holding situation called a 'working 
alliance'. 
43 Fritz Perls was profoundly influenced by Reich. Following upon his hugely demoralizing experience 
with HarDick who 'broke' the analysis because Fritz wanted to many, he turned to Karen Homey (Perls, 
1977, p.48). She referred him to Reich with whom he was in therapy from 1931-1933. This therapy came 
to an end by Reich's having to flee from the Nazis. Perls later told a friend that Reich was the only man he 
had ever been able to trust (Clarkson and Mackewn 1996 p.12). 
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Kovel's criticism of Gestalt therapy comes from a misunderstanding. It was primarily 
aimed at Perls himself and some practitioners who were imitating Perls' style without the 
background of his knowledge and experience. There is a very good account of his 
criticism in Clarkson and Mackewn (1996, p.128ff). 
The question of non-verbal therapy with the emphasis on spontaneity is a tricky one. 
Ylodem Gestalt practice moves towards dialogue, but there must be a place for preverbal 
material also. To endeavour to regulate spontaneity can be a mistake, and it is a mistake 
to think that the spontaneous expression of all emotions is always therapeutic. Emotions 
that emerge 'according to the book' and at 'an acceptable level' of disturbance may very 
easily fail to be the person showing himself phenomenologically. 'Composure' is not a 
Gestalt therapy word if only because Merleau-Ponty said that, in phenomenology, events 
must be described rather than composed. We need to acknowledge that upsetting human 
expressions can be part of the phenomenology of terror and pain, which many of our 
clients have suffered. This is amply documented in the chronicles of those who have been 
tortured (Lomax, 1995, pp.94, 95). 
In these times when emotional sophistication is so highly prized, it is also worth 
reminding ourselves that Gestalt therapy owes a great deal in its genesis and development 
to the annealing fires of war and the trauma of the Nazi prison camps (ZinkerJ.1998, 
pxxvfl). Despite what some Gestalt writers may imply (Harris,C.O. 1992, p.239) it is 
precisely because the level of operation proper to Gestalt therapy is the phenomenal field, 
there is no emotion or human disturbance that it cannot meet in a human way. It is not 
just a therapy for the well-adjusted middle-classes. 
Such primitive weeping and crying as we find in that inscription set to music by Henryk 
Gorecki is by no means foreign to Gestalt therapy. This is an example of what Merleau-
Ponty would call 'originating speech'. 44 It comes right out of the deeply felt body-
44It is part of his 'Symphony of Sorrowful Songs': 'No, Mother, do not weep, / Most chaste Queen of 
Heaven / Support me always. "Zdrowas Mario". Prayer inscribed on the wall of cell number 3 in the 
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awareness of the subject. 'Spoken' or 'secondary speech' is already formed, templated 
speech applied by custom to various situations. Every 'sedimented' world 
(PhP.p.130;FlS2) that we acquire endows us with a new possibility of speech. This 
enables us to move with ease and elegance in a particular realm of discourse. The speech 
of the acquired world can carry in its train the authenticity that adheres to its origins. The 
inauthenticity derives from this: that whereas such speech purports to be transparent in its 
meaning it may not be so. Its meaning is concealed from us in such a way that unless we 
are content to go along with its inauthenticity it says nothing to us. An example of this 
would be the loudspeaker apology at the station for the cancellation of a train service . 
. The difference between such a message and the wall-poem of the girl in the prison cell is 
a difference of awareness of meaning. Like an atmosphere, which wraps us about like a 
cloak, each carries a different world along with it. The girl prisoner is present to us in the 
atmosphere of words informed by feeling and maintaining a whole world of shame and 
suffering. Looking a little closer we see that in the first case there is a built-in link 
between the words; they acquire their place in the piece from one another. (Field theory is 
as operative here as in the 'larger' field.) As we hear it we enter a particular realm of 
feeling and thought where the utterance makes sense. Just as in a painting, the colours 
depend on one another for the atmosphere of the picture, so in this expression the words 
do not stand alone but are 'leaning' on one another in their connection with the person. 
We find here beneath the conceptual meaning of the words, an existential 
meaning which is not only rendered by them, but also which inhabits them and is 
inseparable from them. (PhP.p.182;F212) 
Merleau-Ponty says it is like the notes in a piece of music. The individual notes become 
dead sounds except in the context of the piece. At the same time, the poem, the music, the 
painting, are almost nothing without that 'otherness' which is the 'intentional tissue' 
of my body in its connection with the world (PhP.235;F271). This is precisely what is 
lacking in the railway apology - it is without connection and foundation in my body and 
basement of the Gestapo's headquarters' in Zakopane, southern Poland. Beneath is a woman's signature 
and the words' 18 years old, imprisoned since 26 September 1944'. 
125 
therefore is almost totally meaningless; it barely merits classification as communication 
at all. We experience this lack of connection in our bodies when we listen to a souless 
narrative. 
Gestalt therapy is very sensitive to such meaningless talk, what Heideggger calls 
'Gerede . Perls was merciless in his castigation of it in psychoanalysis, In dismissing the 
process of psychoanalysis that he underwent with an analyst called Harnick, he describes 
how it reduced him to 'a state of stupidity and moral cowardice' (Perls 1977, p.48). If as 
Polster says, every human life contains a novel, certainly every human meeting is 
potentially a poem. Once uttered from the heart it becomes an illuminated human event. 
The illumination is the awareness, which is always a meaningful expression. The 
meaning is inseparable from its expression. 
Language and Sounds in Therapy Practice 
Gestalt therapists believe that there is an intrinsic correlation between the retroflected 
trauma in the musculature of the person's body and the movements of that person. The 
therapy moves in the direction of bringing into awareness the presence of that 
retroflection. Before I narrate an example I need to say this: the example I am bringing 
forward, I am assured, is very rare in Gestalt therapy practice. Before I do work of this 
kind with clients I make an agreement with them that while we work in this way they will 
keep their eyes open and remain in contact with me; and, if ever I say during the 
experiment, 'Stop now', they agree beforehand to stop. What I describe and what 
seemingly helped my client might be censured by colleagues, whom I greatly respect. 
The reason why I bring it forward at all is to return therapy to the body. I wish to make 
the point that Gestalt therapy has room for all human emotions (not 'acting-out'), 
however harrowing. We could say of Gestalt therapy what the poet Terence said of 
himself a long time ago 
Nihil humanum a me aliermm esse, puto. 
(Nothing that is human is foreign to me, I think.) 
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Let me narrate the example. It is important to note that in such a narration I shall attribute 
or connect phenomena (sensations in the body with events). I am quite aware that this is 
an interpretation which is open to question~ The point I am making is not dependent upon 
moral, never mind apodictic certainty of the connection, which, of course is an 
interpretation. 
A woman, who for many years carried, unuttered, an uncertainty about her mother's love 
for her was able to experience something of that retroflected secret in her body. 45 She felt 
it (as she thought) as a pain in her lower abdomen that moves down her right leg. With 
support she was able to connect some sound to that pain. From being totally silent she 
moved into loud screaming. Following this session - which of course took place in a 
context of a long course of psychotherapy - the client felt changed. She was able to 
abandon that hope which had dogged her for years of finally winning her mother's 
approval. She herself interprets it - in terms of her experience of being 'heard'. Such 
screaming is not conventional communication between people. 
But conventions are a late form of relationship between men; they presuppose 
an earlier means of communication, and language must be put back into this 
current of intercourse. (PhP.p.187;F218) 
Is this part of a healing dialogue? Many Gestalt therapists would dispute it fiercely! This 
'conversation' is not entirely a 'cognitive operation'; yet the therapist may experience the 
energy of the client or the intensity of her pain in his own body. The client may feel: 'I 
am no longer alone'; 'There is someone who knows'. And the therapist may feel very 
moved and apprehensive and joyful and strong. Here we have what Merleau-Ponty calls 
'reciprocity of intentions' . 
The communication or comprehension of gestures comes about through the 
reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others; of my gestures and the 
intentions discernible in the conduct of other people. It is as if the other person's 
45 This is, of course, an interpretation, which is made according to the 'meta-narratives' of Gestalt therapy. 
Some therapists would require a greater degree of certainty in order to avoid the danger of disrespecting the 
client A Gestalt therapist. such as I am, will be content to go along with what seems to empower and help 
the client in her life-choice. 
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intention inhabited my body and mine his (PhP.p.183;F213). 
This is not language but 'linguistic gesture'· it is the sound of the body as it moves in the 
area of its trauma. Here we are not in the objective world· where the application of the 
dimensions of the thing to the surroundings define what we call 'space'; we are in the 
phenomenal field, a realm where the body's movement in its presence to itself creates its 
own space· which it inhabits· as the heart inhabits the body (PhP.p.203;F235). 
There is another aspect to the articulation of retrotlected trauma by the client. As you will 
see if you opt to read the Appendix on the phenomenology of sexual violation, one of the 
effects of trauma· especially violent trauma· is to rob the person of her sense of identity; 
that of her capacity to be present to herself in terms of the world. 46 So the victim emerges 
split· not able to recognise or own herself in her body. This can lead to a sense of not 
being present· 'not being oneself. Now, when that woman screams from the place of her 
pain and in communication with her therapist it means that she is allowing herself to 
enter that forbidden zone of herself, allowing herself to become aware of herself there 
and . as Y ontef well points out - she appropriates that part of her world. (I would say 
ore-appropriates' because it was taken from her at the time of the trauma). 
This is an integration that happens in the phenomenal field (PhP.p.232-3;F269). When 
my perception, in the modality of my gaze, is allowed to take in a particular person/event, 
it delivers itself to me in such a way that my own wholeness becomes bound up in the 
wholeness of the event or person. They become for me an extension of my own life. It 
comes to me through the prism of my personal history; by 'it' I do not mean the person or 
event on its own, but the experience of the person or event. This delivery of the person or 
event to me does not mean that my being and the being of the event or person coincide, 
otherwise they could never again assume their own separate history without my ceasing 
to exist. 'In order to perceive things we need to live them' (PhP.p.325;F375). Merleau-
Ponty explains this in the context of talking about sense experience. He is discussing the 
nature of the dialogue between myself and the 'sensible' thing: 
4~S is thoroughly documented as one of the symptoms in post-trawnatic stress disorder. Herman. 1. 
(1998) p.12!; Horowitz. M. et aI. (1999, p.22ff). 
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'As I contemplate the blue sky I am not set over against it as an acosmic subject; I 
do not possess it in thought, or spread out towards it some idea of blue such as 
might reveal the secret of it, I abandon myself to it and plunge into this mystery, it 
thinks itself within me' (PhP.p.214;F248). 
The identity of the thing through perceptual experience is only another aspect of 
the identity of one's own body throughout exploratory movements; thus they are 
in the same kind as each other. (PhP.p.185;F216) (emphasis added). 
Unless it is articulated by the subject the event is not complete - and therefore cannot be 
perceived as a Gestalt. In that articulation the movement of the subject's body in the act 
of screaming is at once a movement towards integration and appropriation. And this is all 
one movement - irreducible to anything else without loss of itself 
Section Four: The Debate about Language 
I shall now outline the controversy amongst philosophers at present over the nature of 
language and its reach. The relevance of this to Gestalt therapy theory is twofold: a) It 
can constitute a distraction and b) Some theorists become drawn into it and unwittingly 
take a position that undermines the very therapy they are practising. 
A Distraction for Gestalt Therapy Theorists 
The Language Debate can constitute a substantial distraction from the most urgent task 
that faces Gestalt therapy at the present, which is to reinstate the centrality of the body 
and found itself philosophically. It is not necessary to still the voices of those who say: 
'You must first deal with the difficulties arising from Sassure's writings before you can 
have confidence in your foundation.' The test of a philosophical foundation for Gestalt 
therapy is to be found in the way it facilitates and deepens work with clients, not in the 
imprimatur of some post-modem philosophers. This distraction for Gestalt therapy 
theorists can arise from the sometimes indecent rush amongst them to become 
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'academically respectable' by linking into the curricula and awards of the University 
system. The rush to 'respectability' is most likely to happen if people view Gestalt 
therapy as a . profession' where money and status mark success rather than as a life 
choice, an invitation to take on a particular lifestyle, with its own set of values and goals. 
The seduction is dangerous when the therapist feels the urge to 'take on' or 'join-up-with' 
the 'professional' philosophers and run with whatever is 'a la mode '. Very respectfully, I 
have a different take on language and speech in Gestalt therapy. 
The Two Related Positions 
What follows I take mainly from two works by Professor M.C.Dillon a person very 
familiar with the work ofMerleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty's Ontology (1997) and 
Semiological Reductionism (1995). This last is a book devoted to 'a Critique of the 
Deconstructionist Movement in Post-modern Thought'. 
The debate is over the foundation of language. Dillon agrees with Merleau-Ponty that: 
The perceived world is the always presupposed foundation of all rationality, all 
value and all existence. This thesis does not destroy either rationality or the 
absolute. It only tries to bring them down to earth. (Merieau-Ponty,19461 1964, 
p.13) 
Dillon uses two terms to describe the positions of the philosophers who want to have 
nothing to do with 'foundations': Semiological Reductionism and Post Hermeneutic 
Scepticism. 
Post Hermeneutic Scepticism 
For this group the truth is always and only my interpretation~ there can be no question of 
what I call 'true' having any validity apart from the constructions with which I inform 
every thing, because, they say, that is the very law of perception itself. In this view there 
is no point in the hermeneutic circle because there is no escape for me from the immanent 
world of my own thought. Thought is made possible by language. So the reach of 
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language is the reach of thought. Therefore, it is correct to say that' language is the 
temple of Being' (Heidegger,1971,p .132). Thought is grounded in language, but 
language itself has no ground. This position is based upon an interpretation ofHeidegger. 
It says he viewed perception as necessarily throwing ahead of itself a projective 
understanding which washes over everything we meet, so that we contact nothing but 
only our own projections. Merleau-Ponty takes a similar view of cognition: this 
projection is our movement towards being - which he calls ecart - ultimately ends in a 
Gestalt, which is a figure against a horizon. It delivers to us our lived world: 
Let us therefore say rather, ....... that the life of consciousness - cognitive life, the 
life of desire or perceptual life - is subtended by an 'intentional arc' which 
projects round about us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, 
ideological and moral situation, or rather which results in our being situated in all 
these respects. (PhP.p.136;FI58) 
Semiological Reductionism 
The second position - semiological reductionism, says again that our cognition is 
necessarily confined to the immanence of language. Semiology is the knowledge of signs. 
The premise that transforms semiology into semiological reductionism is that signs refer 
exclusively to other signs, that signs cannot refer to extra linguistic realities (Dillon, 1995, 
p.13; 1997,p.181). This position argues, on the basis of Sassure's teaching, that words get 
their meaning from other words and not from things. Words he says, are pure signifiers. 
They point to other words and cannot point elsewhere. The 'reductionism' enters with the 
claim that 'there is no egress from the chain of signifiers, no access to transcendent 
reality.' If the linguistic sign unites not a thing and a name but a concept and a sound 
image (de Sassure 1959, p.16), then language becomes a catena of signifiers without 
foundation in reality (cfR.P. p.20 definition of Primacy of Perception). 
The attraction of this theory oflanguage/ perception is that it brings together Sassure's 
thinking and Husserl' s transcendental idealism. In this combination language assumes all 
the functions accorded to the transcendental Ego by Russerl (cf Dillon 1997, p.183). 
131 
Difficulties Arising for Gestalt Therapy Theory 
It would follow from this that the Gestalt therapy principle that we are healed by the 
immediacy of our relationship with the other is based on illusion. Furthermore, meaning 
making is not derived from our contact with reality but from an immanent activity. Here 
again the role of the body in perception becomes problematic. It would follow from this 
that the stress in Gestalt theory on 'bodywork' which embraces also linguistic articulation 
is withollt foundation. 
An Embarrassment to Gestalt Therapy 
Acceptance of either of these views will constitute an embarrassment for Gestalt therapy. 
Both of these views clash with the Gerstalt therapy view that 'perception is inseparable 
from the consciousness it has of reaching the thing itself (PhP.p.374;F429). Furthermore, 
they do not accommodate the presupposition in Gestalt therapy theory of bodily 
intentionality. My bodily intentionality is towards being, towards the expression of 
meaning (Madison, 1981, pIlI). The intentionality of the body is the way in which the 
world (the horizon of horizons) is present to me. This intentionality obtains in all the 
cognitive structures not just in the linguistic structures. If I move to open a window there 
is a sense in which that act -opening the window -already is present to me in my body, 
even before I actually perform the operation. Similarly speech is my-presence-to-you and 
your-presence-to-me in a shared logos or meaning. This is intersubjectivity, which means 
sharing a world with the other person. It is a basic belief of Gestalt therapists that our 
existence is about sharing a world, and every sentence in Gestalt Therapy presupposes 
that. I shall say a lot more about the implications of intentionality in Chapter 10. 
Conclusion 
It has been the theme of this chapter that language is the highpoint of human being-in-
the-world. I have been careful to emphasise that language itself does not found or ground 
our being but is itself founded upon the reality of the world of which each of us is a part. 
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Yet in this belonging in the world there is the same ambiguity which marks all else about 
us. Our speech does not adequately express our experience. We are not entirely just 
another thing in the world, but through our transcendence transform the world into 
utterance. 
I have been careful not to involve Gestalt theory in the debate amongst the philosophers 
about the limitation upon our perception imposed by language. I have, in this debate, 
taken the line that Gestalt therapy theory requires a supporting philosophy that promotes 
the rationale of its work rather than says it is impossible. In this attitude I am supported 
by Merleau-Ponty, Dillon, M. (1997), Mallin, S.B. (1979) and Madison, G.B. (1981). 
This position is summed up by Merleau-Ponty as he speaks about what phenomenologists 
call the 'Fundierung". 
Thus every truth of fact is a truth of reason, and 'vice versa '. The relation of 
reason to fact, or eternity to time, like that of reflection to the unreflective, of 
thought to language or of thought to perception is this two-way relationship that 
phenomenology has called Fundierung: the founding term, or originator - time, 
the unreflective, the fact, language, perception - is primary in the sense that the 
originated is not simply derived from it, since it is through the originated that the 
originator is made manifest. (phP.p.394;F451) 
We have expressed here what is at once the strength and the weakness of Gestalt therapy 
theory; nothing is black or white, or plain and simple about our human existence; the 
beginning is in the end and the end is in the beginning; language is the high point of 
human perception; this is so only because it is inextricably tied to the limitations of our 
body; and although it is the high point, it falls short of and loses out on the full richness 
that is perception. 
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An Introduction to the Chapter 
The point of this chapter is to look hard at Gestalt therapy in its beginnings and see if, in 
its classic text and early practice, it is the kind of enterprise which invites the application 
to it of the philosophy ofMerleau-Ponty. 
First of all I show it as a holistic therapy from the start, which theoretically places the 
body as the focus of application. I demonstrate the difficulty arising from Goodman's 
foundational formulation in Gestalt Therapy. 
In sketching out the difference between 'body' as intended by Goodman and body as 
intended by Perls we see that Goodman's 'body' - as interpreted especially by Gordon 
Wheeler is close to Merleau-Ponty's 'phenomenal body'. 
We then review points of theoretical agreement amongst Gestalt practitioners. We look 
at the widely used text Gestalt Therapy in its content and I write an account of 'best 
practice' as we find it in the literature and as I myself experienced it in the early days 
(70's). 
Returning to theory, we see that whereas the authors were not expressly 
phenomenological, they were implicitly so, and I bring forward four arguments. 
However, they did not follow through on their insight, they failed to view therapy in 
terms of perception and they yoked the therapy to a constraining paradigm. 
135 
As an example of this constraint I take the analysis of sexual touch from Gestalt therapy. 
I demonstrate what difference the summary application - under four concepts - can make 
to the analysis. I conclude then with a Formulation of Gestalt therapy from the point of 
view of the Phenomenology of Perception. 
Section One: Gestalt - A Holistic Therapy 
The Defective Foundation of Holism in Gestalt Therapy 
The theoretical foundation of the Gestalt therapy that I am writing about in this study was 
laid down by Paul Goodman in the opening section of Book Two, Part I of Gestalt 
Therapy: 
Experience occurs at the boundary between the organism and its environment .... 
What is real are the 'whole' configurations of this functioning .... We speak of the 
organism contacting the environment, but it is the contact that is the simplest and 
first reality (pHG, 1951173, p.273). 
This is the statement - maybe not all that clear - of the holism that is the cohesive 
foundation of Gestalt therapy theory. It is also, in my view, a deficient foundation. 
Firstly, I shall talk about it as a deficient foundation for the holistic approach and then I 
shall say why it is sufficient, in its own way. 
Why Goodman's Formulation is Deficient 
First of all I need to say what I mean by the 'holistic approach'. By the holistic approach I 
understand: ' ... treating a person at all times as a whole person, whose body, emotions 
and perceptions function interrelatedly as one complex relational whole' (Mackewn, 
1997, p.45). In other words doing away with the mind/body dichotomy. In my view, it is 
not possible to limit holism to the unity of the person themselves; the very structures of 
our sense functions are mirrored in the structures of the world and the same cohesion that 
holds me together as a person, binds me to the world so that I am in the world as the heart 
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is in my body (PhP.p.203;F235). Whereas PHG intuitively extends holism in the way 
that I understand it, I think that Goodman's foundation is unequal to such an extension. 
But they do it anyway! 
The defect in his formulation is that he omits a more primary experience:' I am given to 
myself: (or 'One is given to oneself' to avoid the dispute about 'I' as a cultural 
construction). His oversight is to assume he is stating the total primary experience. His 
statement is that of a detached observer reflecting upon a primary experience. 
Let us look at this a little more closely. It will become very important in the latter part of 
this chapter because this omission will block the way to the human body as transcendent, 
as opening up a whole future of creative possibilities. 
When I reflect upon my experience, the unity of myself with the environment is certainly 
present and, concomitant with that, is the experience that I am given to myself. This is 
what Goodman missed. It is in this givenness of me to myself that 'the upsurge of the 
world' which constitutes my experience is also given. This 'upsurge of the world' 
(PhP.p.53;F65) happens as a polarity of my subjectivity. Subjectivity is my presence to 
myself. It is only in the light of my presence to myself that I can have any sense of 
'other'. I experience myself only in terms of the world - of that which is 'not-me'; but it 
is in the luminosity of my subjectivity that I experience the 'not-me'. So, what Goodman 
has done is by-pass the subjectivity and point to the 'not-me'. So the subjecitivity is 
omitted, over-looked. 
At no point in PHG does he or any of the others raise the question of this more basic 
constituting element of experience. and this lack has consequences for his insight as an 
undergirding philosophy of Gestalt therapy. 
Yet it Founds the Holism of Gestalt Therapy 
It is a basis for holism because he is placing experience neither in the organism or outside 
the organism but in the totality, organism-and-environment. This means that my unity is 
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not centred in myself but in my connection with the world. It would be illogical to 
postulate unity with the environment without previously postulating an organic coherence 
of the organism within itself, which is to say that the person is a Gestalt. The statement 
above is Goodman's version of 'being-in-the-world'. It may become clearer with an 
example. A woman presents herself in my office for therapy. As far as possible I 
approach her with an open mind and open heart. (I don't ordinarily read any notes, for 
instance, that might come with her referral). So I have not turned her into a 'case for 
treatment'! I have prepared myself and my office for her and I sit in such a way that I am 
facing her and able to give her my full attention. So I am, in the situation, already being 
impacted by her as she is by me. The reality of our meeting is not in me nor in her but 
between us, as a totality, involving both. Our bodies carry our worlds. The description I 
give is of a modality of a pre-objective view, which is what we call being-in-the-world 
(PhP.p.79;F95). 
My grasp of this totality (my degree of presence) is a function of my degree of presence 
to myself. The situation as a Gestalt, that is a meaningful whole, will be a correlate of 
myself as a Gestalt. This means that if I am not a meaningful whole to myself then I will 
not be present in the situation. If, for instance, my wife has just told me she is leaving 
me, or if my young son has gone missing or if I have sexual designs on this woman, then 
I will be split and so will the meeting be split. 47 
Gestalt Therapy - Body-Centred 
I place importance upon this statement of Goodman's because it is widely taken to 
establish the holism of Gestalt therapy. Despite its incompleteness, I think it does that 
effectively and thereby establishes Gestalt therapy as body-centred. I have explained 
earlier why I think it a defective foundation and the consequences of that. 
(cf H.P. p.136; p.177). 
47 In Chapter 13 under the heading Creative Adjustment where he is talking about fullness of contact, 
Goodman lays down 'conditions' which allow 'The Self' to be 'figure'. 'The figure embodies all the 
concern of the self, and the figure is nothing but its present concern, so the self ~ figure' 
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It is not my intention in this place to explore whether or not Goodman carries through the 
promise of this early section - in fact he does not - but to explain how Gestalt therapy 
was, from its start, a body-centred therapy. The opposite of holism is dualism - the 
division between body and soul, consciousness and body, subject and object; holism in 
Gestalt therapy, on the other hand, will admit no such division. 'Once beyond a certain 
stage, one recognises that 'subjective - objective' is a false dichotomy' (PHG, p.46). 'The 
definition of an animal involves its environment' (ibid p.307). To make the point that he 
is departing from (the early) Freud in rejecting the dualisms in the person, Goodman 
brings in Aristotle's dictum that 'the vegetative functions, sensation and motivity ---- are 
"identical in act" with the nature of food, the objects of sensation etc.' (pHG, Bk Two, 
Part 2, p.303). Therefore Goodman's view of human being is as a unity, a Gestalt. This 
means that a Gestaltist can say with Merleau-Ponty: '1 am my body'. 
But 1 am not in front of my body, I am in it or rather I am it . 
.... we do not merely behold as spectators the relations between the parts of the 
body and the correlations between the visual and the tactile body: we are 
ourselves the unifier of these arms and legs, the person who both sees and touches 
them (PhP. p.150;F176). 
Goodman also quotes Koehler 'the whole process is detennined by intrinsic properties of 
a whole situation'. And Wertheimer: 'Imagine a dance full of grace and joy .... Do we 
have a summation of physical limb movement and psychic consciousness? No'. (pHG 
p.304). 
Goodman, in my view, goes further than the Gestalttherorie psychologists. They retained 
the myth of the objective world - of a world already composed of things - out there, 
despite their firm establishment of the human being as a Gestalt. In this they did not 
follow the logic of their own discoveries. Maybe, Lewin did take this step and Goldstein 
too, as Wheeler asserts (1998A, pp.44-45). 
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Introducing Gestalt Therapy 
There are some preliminaries we need to discuss before entering upon a discussion of the 
origin and format of the foundational text. One of these is some doubts that have arisen 
around the meaning of 'body' as it is used in the text. 
Perls and Dualism 
It is a matter of dispute amongst Gestalt writers, particularly in regard to Part I of Gestalt 
Therapy, what to attribute to Perls, what to Goodman. Be that as it may, the stated 
philosophy undergirding both parts of the book is in rejection of dualism. Wheeler 
(1991/98, p.44) places a question against the way Perls was understanding 'body' and 
'organismic': Was Perls still regarding the body as a thing separate from the environment 
and unwittingly holding a dualistic outlook? Those eighteen 'experiments' which form 
the' corpus' of Book One of Gestalt Therapy under the title Mobilizing the Self and which 
are especially attributed to Perls (Stoehr, 1994, p.84) are not, I think, the work of a 
someone who regards the body as a 'thing'. There is also his claim in this part of the 
book to be including 'the experimenter in the experiment' (pHG p.32); and his emphasis 
upon the therapist as 'catalyst' (loc. cit. p.40); furthermore we must take him seriously 
when he says the following - or allows it to go into a book under his name: 
'It will be strongly stated later on, that we deny independent status to 'mind', 
'body' and external world. What these words apply to are artifacts of a dualistic 
tradition which has sought to build them right into the functioning of man's 
organism .... Those who cherish their 'minds' and intend to cling to them to the 
end will, at the very least, decline our suggested procedures if we show so little 
understanding of how they genuinely experience themselves - that is as non-
physical 'mind' operating a physical 'body' in an 'external world'. This way of 
experiencing oneself is the fiuit of the socialisation process, which we all undergo 
as children'. (pHG p.42-43). 
Here as in other places Perls rejects the dualism of mind and body. 
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Wheeler (l998B, pAOfl) makes the case that Perls, in his earlier work (1947/1969), is 
strongly dualist. He argues this in the context of showing how the declared intention of 
Perls in his earlier work 'To replace the psychological by an organismic concept' comes 
to nothing. 'When Perls speaks of "holism" and the "holistic approach", he generally 
does not mean, as the Gestaltists did, the organismic and environment field (Arnheim 
1959), nor does he use the term as Lewin and Goldstein in particular used them, meaning 
the organism in its "life space", including environment, overall goals, and the dynamic 
interaction of all these things (Goldstein 1939; Marrow 1969), but rather again, the 
organism as body' (Wheeler, loc.cit. pA4). 
Wheeler says that Perls inherited his notion of body and body-work from his much 
admired therapist Wilhelm Reich who derived his theory from the earlier instinct-based 
psychoanalysis of Freud. As we shall see in a later chapter, there are some substantial 
doubts about this lineage. Peds, says Wheeler, is limiting himself to the psychosomatic 
whole. 
'Nor does Peds seem at all aware, here or later (pHG, 1973), of the crucial work 
of Lewin in understanding motivation in terms of the "whole field" - including 
Lewin's emphasis on the "here and now" (1936) and the "demand quality" of 
unfinished situations' (Wheeler, loco cit. pAS). 
Whereas I may not agree with Wheeler in his judgement ofPerls, I want to acknowledge 
that Wheeler is making a very valid and important point. The importance of this is to 
demonstrate that the body that is central to Gestalt therapy, is not the psychosomatic 
body, the body is not the isolated individual body of the medical school or the 
gymnasium. Merleau-Ponty calls it 'the phenomenal body' (phP, p.232; F269) which is 
the body about which a world is ever forming and changing, wherever one goes. 
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Points of General Agreement 
Another preliminary is to give the reader some idea of points of agreement amongst 
Gestalt therapists. Even though Gestalt Therapy is held in high esteem, there is no way 
the practitioners accept it all as if it were holy writ. Let us look at points of general 
agreement amongst Gestalt therapy practitioners. I say general because I find that as soon 
as they begin to discuss any of these points, divergent views begin to emerge. 
Firstly there is general agreement that Gestalt is essentially about awareness and that its 
focus is immediate -that is, it is concerned with the holistic bodily presence of the 
therapist-and-client; secondly, that Gestalt therapy embraces basic Existentialist teachings 
in regard to the human person: that the human being is social, responsible, self-
determining, rational, affective, unique and inevitably intersubjective. Gestalt therapy is 
an Existentialist therapy and subscribes to those characteristics drawn up by the 
American Association of Humanistic Psychology and known as the Bugental Postulates 
(Yalom, 1980, p.18). In addition to these basic postulates there is general acceptance of 
the phenomenological nature of Gestalt therapy. Agreement about this last is less general, 
as we shall see - different schools of Gestalt therapy understand this differently. All are 
agreed that the therapeutic element in Gestalt therapy is mainly in the relationship 
between therapist and client; a relationship of healing dialogue. The client feels 
supported enough to become aware of his/her condition and appropriates it in a creative 
way. Gestalt therapy generally claims to avoid interpretation as an instrument of therapy; 
but, of course, interpretation takes place and is not always owned - especially as it is 
acknowledged as counteractive to phenomenology. It is significant that despite the 
universal embrace of Gestalt theory there is general avoidance48 of the term 'perception' 
and frequent use instead of words such as 'contact' and 'awareness'. The text Gestalt 
Therapy is generally held in esteem rather than actually used. In my experience I could 
find no trainees who had read it all; most were acquainted with Book 1 and a little of 
Book 2. Yet it is widely and respectfully quoted by the writers e.g. Wheeler, Philippson, 
48lt is significant that in Wheeler's most recent book (2000) he uses the word frequently and freely. The 
significance is that Gestalt therapy theory is in a state of change. 
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Y ontef, Parlett, Robine, Spagnuolo-Lobb, and many others. 
Section Two: The Book: Gestalt Therapy 
The Arrival of Gestalt Therapy 
Gestalt therapy arrived on the scene in the early 1950's. This was in the format of the 
collaborative work Gestalt Therapy - Excitement and Growth in Human Personality by 
Frederick PerIs, Ralph F. Hefferline and Paul Goodman published by Art Ceppos of the 
Julian Press (Stoehr 1994, p.85). One of the main influences behind this new therapy was 
Laura PerIs, Fritz's wife, but her name appears nowhere in the book. Perls was a 
practising psychoanalytic therapist; Hefferline was a university teacher of psychology, 
Goodman also taught philosophy in the university. The original arrangement was that 
Goodman would edit the work ofPerIs; but as it turned out, Goodman became the main 
writer and Perls took the role of the consultant expert (Stoehr loco cit. p.88; Clarkson 
&Mackewen, 1996, p.21). It consists of two books: Book I contains exercises designed to 
increase the person's awareness. Book II is an abstract statement of Gestalt therapy 
theory with an on-going polemic against Freudian analysis. It is not a scholarly or precise 
work and the writing is sometimes confused and obscure.49 The slim manuscript given 
him by Perls containing a number of 'concentration exercises' grew hugely under 
Goodman's pen and became the formidable volume that is now known as 'PHG'. 
Hefferline was the only certain Ph.D. amongst the three of them. The emergence of the 
book is thoroughly and sympathetically treated by Stoehr. It appears to have begun in a 
casual way but gained momentum as the book emerged. 
Perls was undecided what to call the therapy but they settled for 'Gestalt' out of 
deference to the influence which the Berlin school had had on them - mainly through the 
491 am not alone in this view: Mackmin, M (1995 p.56) excoriates Goodman for pseudo-scholarship and 
unclear writing. Also Simkin - a leading Gestalt therapist - said publicly that he could not understand 
Goodman. (in Yontef, G. 1993 ) 
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work of Goldstein (Stoehr loc.cit. p.90).50 
The Context of Gestalt Therapy 
To put it in context and see Gestalt therapy as part of a wider, perhaps political, 
movement we need to remember that the authors lived in very exceptional times. These 
were dangerous days in the USA world. It was a time when America was driven with fear 
of infiltration by Communist radicals. Under the respectable guise of wanting to purify 
the states from traitors, Senator John McCarthy had inaugurated his 1950's version of the 
witch-hunt of Salem .51 The thrust of Gestalt therapy was out of step with this popular 
movement. PerIs, HefferIine and Goodman showed courage in launching this new 
liberating therapy. Two of them were, in their own ways particularly vulnerable people: 
Perls was a Jewish refugee and Goodman was openly bisexual. All through the text of 
Gestalt Therapy but especially in Book Two there is manifest disenchantment with 
psycho-analysis, anger and resentment at the curtailment of freedom, which was 
especially personal to Paul Goodman (Stoehr, T. 1994.p.2). 
The Shift to Experience 
It is important to note how Gestalt therapy exemplifies that epistemological transition 
away from authority as a source of knowledge and towards experience as the main object 
of philosophic investigations2(Buckley, M.l, 1989, pp.443f). Philosophically it rode the 
tide of the paradigm shift away from the nature oj thought processes, which was so 
50Speigelberg, H. (1972, pp. 30 1-318) notes that Goldstein never professed himself a Gestalt theorist. Peds 
had worked with Goldstein as a laboratory assistant in the Frankfurt clinic and very much admired his 
work. Medeau-Ponty also was heavily influenced by the work of Goldstein. In 1934 Kurt Goldstein fled 
from the Nazis to the US and came to Columbia University. Paul Goodman earned some sorely needed 
cash by teaching him English (Stoehr 1994, p.99). This was only one year before Peds fled from Germany 
to Holland (perls, P, 1977, p.40). 
SlThis is well documented in such works as Chambers, W.(l952) and Miller, Arthur (1953/82). 
52cf Buckley,M.J.(1978, p.633). cfKemp-Smith, N.(l963, pl9f) in Preface to Second Edition of Kant's 
:Critique of Pure Reason. 
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investigated in the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, and towards human experience and its 
expression as the foundation of all knowledge. Language and action bound together, in 
the ellipse of human experience, became the primordial source for 20th century 
philosophy. This movement was taken up by the Gestalt therapists and enabled them to 
break with that view of human being which confined experience to something happening 
in the head. Therapy now becomes essentially relational - an event unfolding in the field 
of the between. It seems to me that the founders only vaguely knew the implications of 
what they were saying. And that is why, I think that they were part of the movement that 
is phenomenology, to which Merleau-Ponty refers . 
... phenomenology can be practised and identified as a manner or style of 
thinking, that it existed as a movement before arriving at complete awareness of 
itself as a philosophy. (PhP p.viii; FIT) emphasis in text. 
Their ability to move therapy away from some immanent event so that it becomes instead 
afield event was the gift of the Gestalt psychologists 53. The Berlin researchers 
demonstrated that the organisation of experience derives neither all from my mind nor all 
from the thing but is intrinsic to the field, that is, to the situation of perception. As Dillon, 
M. (1997) says: 
The principle of autochthonous organisation maintains that there are intrinsic 
relations obtaining among the parts of the perceptual whole, that these relations 
are grounded in phenomena and that they constitute the perceptual significance 
or fundamental meaning of phenomenal experience (op.cit.p. 65-66).(cfDillon 
loc.cit. p. 63; PhP.p.7;FI4). 
In other words, the perceptual world carries meaning in itself. My world arises out of a 
dialogue between my Self and the world. Therefore, I am not confined in a world purely 
of my own construction; if I were, there would be no point in a therapy that accords the 
body the central role. The Gestalt psychologists demonstrated that the phenomenon 
530n this most important subject of the Gestalttheorie cfWbeeler,G.(l991/1998 p23ff;) and Yontef (1993 
ch.7) 
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unveils to me a meaning-full world and therefore I am presented with a range of 
relationships bearing unlimited possibilities of change and growth and becoming, which 
find their articulation in my body. Gestalt therapy is built upon these insights and calls 
this intimate co-creative commerce or contact with the world, 'dialogue'. 
The Return to the Things Themselves 
Gestalt therapy no longer made the 'unconscious' the familiar focus of attention nor 
interpretation the main vehicle of cure. It was the genius of Freud to 'discover' the roots 
of 'mental illness' in the forgotten secrets of that dark crypt of the human mind called the 
unconscious, what Merleau-Ponty called Freud's 'protean idea' - 'the unconscious 
conceived as a system' (Richardson W.J. 1979, p.2). Freud held that the reality of the 
person was encrypted in that system in a code, which only the analyst could read. So, the 
reality o/the person showed itselfnotfrom itself but through the analyst. The Gestalt 
therapists however, go to the totality of the person's bodily presence and, through raising 
her awareness, allow her to speak from herself about herself. Although they did not 
recognise it formally as such, the Gestalt therapists were following Husserl's crusading 
maxim in his phenomenological revolution and 'returning to the things themselves' 
(Dillon, M.e. 1997 p23ff. and Luijpen W. 1960/1972, p.lOO) (cfH.P.pp.254-5;264). The 
question of bracketing 'facticity' did not even occur to them. Just as Gustave Fechner 
(van den Berg, 1980) opted for the beauty and brightness of the park as the 'true' reality, 
as against the darkness and silence of the 'scientific' view of that park, so now the first 
Gestalt therapists implicitly by-pass the interpretation of the unconscious and opt for what 
is before their faces. 
This new therapy breaks the sacred seal on that immanent sanctuary of the unconscious, 
in that it finds those secrets not so secret after all; because they intrude upon and proclaim 
themselves from the rooftops in manifold ways in the everyday life of the person, even 
and especially in the therapy room with the therapist (pHG p.164). Instead of 'probing 
the unconscious' the Gestalt therapist sets herself to engage with the person in the 'here-
and-now' event of their meeting. Because they work in the context of the field everything 
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that is required is in the room (PHG pp 59 & 287 et passim). They allow experience 
itself to utter itself from itself. 
In this book (we) take the dynamic structure of experience not as a clue to some 
'unconscious' unknown or a symptom, but as the important thing itself. This is 
to psychologize without pre-judgement of normal or abnormal, and from this 
point of view psychotherapy is a method not of correction but of growth. (pHG 
p.284) 
A Summary of 'Best Practice' 
I speak now of the best practice of Gestalt therapy contemporary with the early days of 
the book and well documented in several publications: Perls.F. (1969/1971): Gestalt 
Therapy Verbatim; (1971): Gestalt Approach and EyeWitness to Therapy; Polster, E and 
M. (1974) Gestalt Therapy Integrated. In Gestalt therapy54 a person is seen as a unity not 
as a duality - not as someone living at two levels - the level of the conscious and the 
level of the unconscious. If I can allow my awareness of the now to grow and elaborate 
then I am in contact with the real. That is the source of all nourishment. (This is in 
contrast with thoughts, surmises, memories, other people's thoughts, surmises, memories 
etc., and the whole paraphernalia of 'cogitationes'). This is the thinking behind the 
series of exercises, which make up part I ofPHG. It is also the thinking that underlies 
Awareness by John O.Stevens'(1971) widely used in the training of Gestalt therapists and 
containing whole sets of exercises to enable people to become aware of the difference 
between surmises, thoughts, hopes memories and the here-and-now observations and 
feelings. 
Perls and his colleagues were effectively denying the split between 'the inner life' of the 
mind and the movements of the body in the 'external world'. My thoughts and 
S4Here 1 write about best practice -as 1 experienced it myself in workshops with Boin 0 'LeaIy, Helen Davis 
and David Boadella in the 1970's -and as documented in Gestalt Therapy Verbatim (1969/1971), Eye 
Witness to Gestalt Therapy (1976), Awareness (1971). (I am also aware of Masson's savage indictment of 
Perls (1992 pp.54f) 
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imaginations are a different mode of contact with one and the same world or 
environment. The consequence of this is that everything going on in the room between 
therapist and client is, potentially, informed by the meeting of their embodied 
subjectivities and therefore affords material for therapy. For instance, the fact that the 
client does not sit back in the chair and accept its full support for his body is a statement 
of his existence vis-a-vis the therapist (cfPeris, F. 1976; p.76). It is not that he should sit 
back and relax. There is nothing wrong with the way he is sitting. It is the client's style of 
being in the world and he has a right to have it respected by the therapist. His posture 
carries the whole of his history. It may be that the whole of the session is taken up with 
the discussion of this in 'experiments' with posture and distance. A conversation between 
bodies. The therapist must be careful - as much as he can - not to focus on the 
interpretation of such things - he picks up the signal in his own body and checks and re-
checks again with the way in which the client is coming to be with him. It seems to me 
that diagnosis/interpretation is intrinsic to what we do. The dynamic of our rationality is 
to make sense of what is unfolding around us, i.e. to interpret it. What he is after is not to 
diagnose the malady of the client, but to be present and as aware as fully as he can be, of 
what is going on between himself and the client55 . The method of working is no longer 
interpretation but relation. This is important to note. 
Peds not Always the Best Model 
It has to be said that Fritz Peds did not always model the therapy he taught. As we read 
some of the considerable body of 'examples' of his work, which he has left us, some of it 
reads rather like heavy-handedness. Take the interview with Marek (perls F. 1976, 
p.128). It reads more like a robust confrontation than a person-centred therapy session. 
For sure, Peds brings out what is happening between them; but he does not sound really 
concerned for the client. I would like to know what Marek brought away from the 
S5y ontef, (1993) Part iv Ch, 13 discusses the question of Diagnosis in Gestalt very thoroughly. 'When I 
have not been clear about diagnostic issues with a patient, my understanding of the patient and of the 
patient's self-experience has been reduced' (p.389) cf. Delisle,G. in British Gestalt Journal I, 1.1991 pp42 
-50) 
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session. I think I would have felt exposed and shamed; but then I only read an account of 
it; I don't hear the voices, I don't see the faces, I have no notion of what kind of history 
Perls and Marek have with one another. I am also acquainted with the reputation Perls 
acquired for being a show-man (Clarkson and Mackewn, 1996, p.137ff). I say 'not 
always' above because there is an abundance of very impressive and truly 'Gestalt' 
therapy by him. (loc.cit. p.94ff) 
For Perls the goal of the therapy is awareness of the Here and Now. The context of 
personal relationship, of dialogic movement leading to Martin Buber's 'I-Thou' moment, 
took a long time to establish itself in Gestalt therapy. It was not until the 1980's under the 
influence of powerful writers like Gary Yontef and Lynne Jacobs that this development 
finally established itself with the therapists. I deliberately place the emphasis in that last 
sentence to remind ourselves that Gestalt therapy was revolutionary right from the start. 
Contrary to the usual medical procedure of those times, Gestalt therapy intimately 
involved the client precisely as a human person in the therapeutic process. I am not sure 
if Kuhn (1970, p.43) would agree with my use of the expression, but it seems to me that 
Gestalt therapy marked a paradigmatic change in the approach to and treatment of 
'mentally' sick people. 
Why I think the Authors were phenomenological 
I shall bring forward four arguments to show why I am persuaded of the 
phenomenological basis in the thought of the authors. In order to do this I shall draw on 
the analysis ofMerleau-Ponty to articulate what I see as an implicit and limited 
phenomenology in the text of the authors. Later, I shall demonstrate that they did not 
follow through on their primary insights. 
A Summary of the Arguments 
Each of these makes the same point in a different way; they mutually reinforce one 
another: Gestalt therapy is an exercise in purification and liberation: purification from 
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those things that cloud perception and liberation to live through the inviting possibilities 
of the real. 
• Stress on actuality 
• The Experiments as Phenomenological Enquiry 
• Holism: Beyond the Subject/Object Dichotomy 
• A Phenomenological View of What Constitutes Health 
Stress on Actuality 
Here I need to refer the reader back to my chapter on the term 'Phenomenology' (cf 
HP.p 76) and the meaning I am attaching to it in this study. I follow Merleau-Ponty's 
understanding of phenomenology as 'the study of the advent of being to awareness 
instead of presuming its possibility, as given in advance' (phP. p.61; F71). Very close to 
this is Heidegger's definition which I have cited several times in the study so far: 'to let 
that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itselfwhen 
it shows itself from itself (in Richardson, J.P. 1986, p.56). This allows for 
phenomenology not only in the descriptive sense, but also of becoming aware of pre-
objective being i.e. 'the constituting process out of which self and world actually 
develop' (phP p.53;F65). That pre-objective being is my body. In this sense I think the 
founders were phenomenological in their approach. It was axiomatic in their view that 
only in the immediacy of actuality does a person grow. Immediacy for them is the locus 
of creativity, which, in turn, is the mark of life and growth. Their quest therefore, was for 
'the advent of being to awareness'. Indeed the very first experiment in the book focuses 
on the way in which the subject comes to awareness ofhislher actuality. 
Try for a few minutes to make up sentences stating what you at this moment are 
aware of Begin each sentence with the words 'now' or 'at this moment' or 
'here and now'. (pHG, p.59) 
To make explicit the phenomenology implicit in each of these quotations we can invoke 
some reflections ofMerleau-Ponty. The above exercise is one in immediacy. Being 
'immediate' with something means being 'joined-up-with' it so that my existence and the 
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existence of the thing 'stand together' and, through my body, form one system. The 
structures of the thing and the structures of my perception form one system. 
'The thing is inseparable from a person perceiving it and can never be actually in 
itself because its articulations are those of our very existence, and because it 
stands at the other end of our gaze or at the terminus of a sensory exploration 
which invests it with humanity. '(PhP. p.320;F370) 
To elicit the phenomenology latent in the following passage we would need to ask the 
writers: But how does the novelty nourish? In order to do so the 'novelty' must 'be lived' 
by the subject. 
We must then conclude that all contact is creative and dynamic. It cannot be 
routine, stereotyped or merely conservative because it must cope with the novel, 
for only the novel is nourishing. (pHG p.276. Pt. II) 
Merleau-Ponty in his chapter on The Thing and the Natural World helps us: 
If one tried, according to the realistic approach, to make perception some kind of 
coincidence with the thing, it would no longer be possible to understand what 
the perceptual event was, how the subject managed to assimilate the thing, how 
after coinciding with the thing he was able to consign it to his own history, since 
ex hypothesis, he would have nothing of it in his possession. In order to perceive 
things, we need to live them. (ph.P.p.32S; F376) (emphasis mine.) 
Such also is the prescription for the good life advocated by the authors of Gestalt 
Therapy: 
' ... the authors believe that the Gestalt outlook is the original, undistorted, 
natural approach to life; that is to man's thinking, acting and feeling. The 
average person, having been raised in an atmosphere full of splits, has lost his 
Wholeness, his Integrity. To come together again he has to heal the dualism of 
his person, of his thinking and of his language ...... The unitary outlook which 
can dissolve such a dualistic approach is buried but not destroyed and, as we 
intend to show, can be regained with wholesome advantage (pHG p.14). 
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The regret in this passage is about dualism in perception. Things have got in the way and 
blocked immediacy and the unfolding of 'natural approach to life'. What else can it be 
but a distortion of perception? The presupposition is that there is possible through 
Gestalt therapy, a more healing mode of perception, one more in harmony with one's 
belonging in the world. The authors presuppose such an outlook in the Gestalt therapist. 
It is the systematising and organising and indeed, the 'education' of folk that gives rise to 
problems. 56 The enemy is 'shouldism' which schools people in self-inhibition 
(Retroflection in PHG p.183ft). If! am pretending to be calm when, in fact, I am feeling 
very agitated because this is what is expected of me, then I am not in immediate touch 
with my world but accepting a version of it from someone else. I am showing myself but 
notfrom myself. The authors prescribe for the therapist that he give up control and allow 
the client to get on with his process without getting in the way. In this context Goodman 
quotes the Tao: 'Stand out of the way'. (p.295). 
The Experiments as Phenomenological Enquiry 
The professed aim of these is to raise the person's sensory awareness, to promote the 
emergence of 'meaning' in the person's life. Anyone who has done these experiments 
will know how powerful they are. They raise not only sensory awareness but heighten the 
over-all awareness of the person. There is, in the book, no effort to give these 
experiments any ontological basis. There is a repeated invitation to live more fully. That 
is the closest they get to establishing an ontology. 
We have in store for you no 'easy steps to mastery', no moral uplift 
programme, no guaranteed rules for breaking bad habits which you are actually 
determined to keep. We undertake to do nothing to you. Instead, we state some 
instructions by means of which, if you so desire, you may launch yourself on a 
progressive personal adventure wherein, by your own active efforts, you may do 
5~van lllich was profoundly influenced by Goodman and this attitude appears in Illich's writings on 
education 
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something for yourself - namely, discover it, organise it and put it to 
constructive use in the living of your life. (pHG p.28) (italics mine) 
The 'something for yourself' is to bring the person close to her own experience, which is 
the aim of all the experiments and first condition of psychological support. These 
experiments feature, especially in Book One. They are the technology of awareness, 
which brings the ability to appropriate one's own experience as one's own. This enlarges 
the range of one's choice. Some of the experiments are very elaborate. Under the heading 
Self-Awareness in Experimental Safe Emergencies (pHG pp.336-7) they propose a set of 
eight steps to excite such a safe emergency for the patient in the consulting room. The 
goal of the exercise is once again the acceptance by the patient of a new figure as his 
own. Such a goal is implicitly phenomenological. This way I co-create my own world. A 
phenomenologist like Luijpen (1972 p.104) would say that through these experiments the 
'concealed' becomes the 'unconcealed'; being discloses itself - which disclosure 
phenomenologists call 'meaning'. The Gestalt therapy way of speaking about such a 
disclosure of 'the concealed' is to say that Gestalt therapy is primarily interested in 
'process'. Process does not stop at 'contents' but contemplates the way in which being 
comes to awareness. 
Holism: Beyond the Subject/Object Dichotomy 
Originally, when first they brought the book to the publishers, what is now Book Two 
and the highly theoretical part of the book, was Book I. So, the original intention was to 
straightaway plunge the reader into a view of the world that was quite oblique to the 
commonly accepted view but one familiar to phenomenologists. 
You and your environment are not independent entities but together you 
constitute a functioning, mutually influencing total system ..... . your sense of the 
unitary interjuntioning of you and your environment is contact 
(pHG.p.l04) Emphasis in text. 
When we say 'boundary' we think ofa 'boundary between'; but the contact-
boundary, where the experience occurs, does not separate the organism and its 
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environment. (PHG p.27S) 
Here right at the beginning of Gestalt Therapy, but not fonnally articulated by the 
authors, is the rejection of 'the prejudice of the detennined world' (Ph.P.p.S8-9) which is 
'the presupposition that things are, in themselves, completely and unambiguously 
detennined.' (Dillon, 1997, p.62). Once past that, then the meaning of 'immediate' is 
transfonned. It can no longer be the 'impression' or 'impact' of the thing on my senses 
but 'the meaning, the structure, the spontaneous arrangement of parts' (PhP.p.S8;F70). 
Intersubjectivity is impossible if the other is to me only an object, over, opposite, against 
me. It becomes possible if the other is inhabited with such meaning, because then, in my 
gaze we can form one system, one Gestalt. This is what a phenomenological reduction of 
our perception discloses to us. (phP.Part Two ch.4) 
A Phenomenological View of What Constitutes Health 
The conviction that the authors of Gestalt Therapy were basically phenomenological in 
their orientation is reinforced by their view of what constitutes health - by their view of 
what is truly human in regard to behaviour: 
The description of psychological health and disease is a simple one. It is a matter 
of the identifications and alienations of the self: if a man identifies with his 
forming self: does not inhibit his own creative excitement and reaching towards 
the coming solution; and conversely, if he alienates what is not organically his 
own and therefore cannot be vitally interesting, but rather disrupts the 
figurelbackground, then he is psychologically healthy, ....... (PHG p.282) 
To the extent that your feeling of actuality has been split off from your 
workaday personality, the effort to experience actuality will rouse anxiety 
(masked, perhaps, asfatigue, boredom, impatience, annoyance) - and what 
specifically rouses your anxiety will be the particular resistance by which you 
throttle and preventfull experience. (pHG p. 67 their emphasis) 
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To 'identify with one's forming self is to allow oneself to become aware of the structures 
and meaning of reality forming itself in my awareness. This is a creative act of 
integration; the kind of unity envisaged here is only possible within a phenomenological 
view of the world. How can a person identify with her 'forming self (aware of the 
environment and appropriating nourishment that is both other than and the same as the 
perceiver) unless they belong in the same system? 
That the authors were phenomenological is reinforced by what they say about: 
'Actuality'. This is the lived through unity of the self-and-environment. This is the key to 
health. The way to regain wholeness, they say, is to allow oneself to experience 
'actuality'. Such a one lives his life in the 'here and now', risks being spontaneous, finds 
the basis of his action in the experience of himself rather than in any body of rules, and he 
eschews the dead hand of stereotyping, convention, routine and control. 
Creativity and adjustment are polar, they are mutually necessary. Spontaneity is 
the seizing-on and glowing and growing with what is interesting and nourishing 
in the environment. Unfortunately, the 'adjustment' of much psychotherapy, the 
'conformity to the 'reality principle', is the swallowing of a stereotype. (pHG 
p.277) 
In this tension between creativity and adjustment in the self-same event, we have the 
phenomenological resolution of the subject/object split: one lives through the coming of 
being to awareness. So, therefore, in their untiring stress on the primacy of immediacy, in 
the way in which they structure their book to engage at first hand with the person himself 
and prescribe how he must act in order to be touched by what is real, in their taking a 
stand that challenged the immensely successful Cartesian view of the world, in their 
simple equation of health with immediacy of perception, the founders of Gestalt therapy 
were phenomenological in their orientation. 
Section Three: A Critique of Gestalt Therapy 
I argue that whereas the founders were basically phenomenological in their approach, 
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they did not follow through on this position. I am not retracting what I said earlier and I 
must now deal with the problem of their not living up to the promise implicit in that 
approach. 
General Points 
Basically, they were not equipped for such a task. In order to follow through and develop 
their insight they would have needed to be familiar with four concepts basic to 
phenomenological ontology: intentionality, transcendence, anonymity and 
intersubjectivity. These notions derive from reflection upon our embodied subjectivity 
and are developed by Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception (1979). These are 
not separate acts: they are separate only in the sense that we can think about them as 
distinct aspects of the one act. I shall, in the course of this study, considerably elaborate 
upon each of them (Ch.9). Here in this chapter we shall have to be content with very 
summary and incomplete statements just sufficient to make sense of what I say. 
My argument here has three steps. 
1. I explain what I see as three basic flaws in their approach 
2.1 then take what appears to me as a pivotal analysis, which they make of sexual touch. 
This is their best effort at dealing with intersubjectivity. 
3.I make a general comment upon this analysis and then demonstrate how their 
treatment of it would have been transformed by the application of the four concepts of 
which I spoke earlier. Since each of these four notions is implied in each the others I 
realise that my choosing to discuss the analysis separately under each of the headings is 
somewhat contrived. 
The Basic Flaws 
Three factors illustrate and, indeed, undergird the inadequacy of the foundations they 
have laid: 
a) Their point of departure assumes a dualism. I have already stated this earlier in this 
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Chapter: this is a basic phenomenological flaw. 
b) They do not see therapy in terms of perception (cfH.P.ch.2 Sect.Four). I refer the 
reader to my discussion of this under the title: Gestalt Therapy as Perception. 
Perception is access to the advent of being. This is not clear in PHG. It means also 
that they will be limited in their access to phenomenology in elaborating the concepts 
of their therapy. 
c) At the centre of the whole work is a constraining and reductionist paradigm of 
human experience; this is the organism/environment paradigm. The Constraining and 
Reductionist Paradigm 
The alimentary model of contact is not original to Perls, although he uses it extensively in 
Ego Hunger and Aggression, a book he wrote in collaboration with his wife Laura and 
published in 1947 (Clarkson and Mackewn 1996 p.54-55). The model was used by 
Dewey previously (192011991) 57 whose profound influence stamps the whole work 
(Stoehr, 1994). This is the general paradigm for all forms of contact from eating to 
loving. In his Gestalt Reconsidered model, Wheeler (1998A) trenchantly criticises this 
model: 'what is left out is nothing less than the whole relational context' (Wheeler, 
loc.cit. p.53). There is always an exchange - the organism takes from the environment, 
maintains individuality, rejects toxicity, absorbs nourishment and, as a result, grows. 
The exchange becomes a synonym for contact. This, in turn is used to express the whole 
relationship between 'the organism and the environment' (pHG pp.273,275 etc); contact 
extends to 'appetite and rejection' (pHG p.276); when they want an example of this they 
'envisage an animal freely roaming' in 'creative adjustment to the environment' (pHG 
p.277); 'good contact' removes the problem concerning the relations of 'mind' and 
'body' or 'self and 'external world' (pHG p.303); 'when these processes require for 
57This is very reminiscent of John Dewey's style in his Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920/1991) when he 
is lecturing on the revolution in the notion of experience. He works from 'a psychology based upon 
biology' and his notion is linear and scientifically based. 'Wherever there is life there is activity. In order 
that life may persist, this activity has to be both continuous and adapted to the environment This adaptive 
adjustment, moreover, is not wholly passive; is not a matter of the moulding of the organism by the 
environment.. .. '(loco cit p128). 
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completion new material from the environment - and this is the case in tum with every 
organic process - .. we have to do with contact.'(PHG p.324); contact has to do with 'the 
wisdom of the organism about its needs' (PHG p.324); 'By contacting we mean food-
getting, eating, etc. (PHG pA27). They seem to be seeing contact as contiguity - one body 
surface pressing against another body surface - and the field isforgotten. The reductionist 
element in this model is that it subsumes under the same category a shark eating herrings 
and a man saying goodbye to his dying father. I suggest that this reductionism (so 
apparent in the works of John Dewey) accounts for the sense of superficiality which some 
people experience as they read this book and which was remarked upon by Wolfgang 
Kohler (Stoehr, loc.cit. p.l00).s8 
The Inadequate Analysis of Sexual Touch 
Towards the end of the book under the heading Creative Adjustment II: Final Contact 
and Post-Contact, the authors analyse sexual touch. The constraining influence of the 
paradigm stands out: 
'Love aims at proximity, that is, the closest contact possible while the other 
persists undestroyed. The contact of love occurs in seeing, speech, presence, etc. 
But the archetypal moment of contact is sexual embracing. . ..... This archetypal 
contact shows also the creativity of the self At the height of awareness, the 
experience is novel, unique, and original. But when, at the orgasm, the boundary 
is 'broken' and the self diminishes, one has the sense of a conservative instinctual 
gratification of one's own familiar body. (pHG pp.476-7) 
A General Comment 
We notice here that the sexual embrace in this description is lacking intersubjectivity. 
The emphasis is almost entirely upon the individual experience of the subject. They speak 
of the experience oflove being 'in seeing, feeling, presence etc.,' 'the creativity of the 
58Kohler had the IDS. of the book two days before they wanted a decision from him about it His damning 
comment on this application of Gestalttheorie was: ' rather hannless but almost cheap'. He also wanted 
'Gestalt' removed from the title. (Stoehr.loc cit p.IO I) 
158 
self being evident. Is the 'diminution of self intended to be the experience of 
intersubjectivity? If so, then what do we call that huge increase in self-esteem, that peace 
of knowing one's place, that all-pervasive sense of connectedness that heightens one's 
experience of uniqueness, which marked for instance the relationship between Brian 
Keenan and John McCarthy as set down in An Evil Cradling?(Keenan, 1993, p.91 et 
passim). 
Intersubjectivity is lacking in their analysis - as, indeed it is, in the eight-step experiment 
I mentioned earlier (pHG pp.336-7) - because the concepts of intentionality, 
transcendence, and anonymity are not available to them in their analysis. 
Section Four: The Application of the Four Concepts to their Analysis of Sexual 
Touch 
Intentionality 
We can develop this notion of intentionality and see it as the way in which the world is 
already present to us before we move, and draws USS9 ' .•.. from the outset the grasping 
movement is magically at its completion' (phP p.l04; F120). 'Intentionality means that 
consciousness precedes and surrounds the boundaries of personal identity' (Brooke, R 
p.43). For instance, someone returning home after a hard day may have his actual home-
coming present to him even before he places his key in the door. This presence becomes 
his self-image, his body-sense, his pace, and so on. Intentionality is not a contingent but a 
constituting element of our perception which enables the whole of my past to be present 
to me as mine in every 'now' perception (PhP.p.418; F478, cf p.204;F236). Omit this 
notion and it becomes impossible to analyse phenomenologically the gaze between loving 
people. There is no sense of profundity in the authors' analysis either here or elsewhere. 
Is this it, then? No mention of what the parties are bringing to the embrace. There is no 
sense of its being a conjunction of worlds. 
5~S is a veIY ancient notion and profoundly informs the theology of St Augustine in his thinking about 
the way God is present 'Amor meus, pondus meum' 'My love pulls me' (-like a magnet); 'Deus meus, non 
omnino essem nisi esses in me ' (Conf.libJ cap.m. 'My God, were you not in me, I would not be at all. ' 
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Is it unfair, I wonder, to speculate on a correlation between Goodmans' unhappy 
relational life and the thinness of his treatment of sexual touch? With neither of his wives 
did he have a love-bound sexual relationship. Each of them tolerates his persistent and 
frequent 'cruising' in search of homosexual sex. Stoehr says of this: 'He (Goodman) was 
clear about the sequence of his obsession: first he took the risk, made the pass, had the 
sex and then sometimes felt the lust. If he was lucky he might also make a friend' (1994, 
p.206). At the same time he was a very devoted and loving father to his daughter Susan 
who got polio (loc.cit. p.227tl) and his son Matthew who was killed in an accident in the 
White Mountains in 1967 (loc. cit. p.288). 
It cannot be said of Fritz Perls that he was so devoted to his children, at least after they 
had passed from babyhood; nor was he so devoted to his wife, Laura. After 27 years 
together he drifted away and took up with Marty From who was half his age (Clarkson P. 
and Mackewn 1., 1996, pp.11,22,23). When he was 63 years of age he met Marty From. 
He became her therapist, lover and companion for many years. 
Transcendence 
We need to discuss this concept briefly before applying it. This is one of the concepts, 
which seems excluded by Goodman's deficient analysis of experience at the start of his 
theoretical formulation. 
Gestalt Therapy seminally contains this idea but never explicitly discusses it. This notion 
of transcendence as applied to human being derives from Heidegger (192711973, p.62 et 
passim). (De Waelhens, A (1946) cap. II and XIII). I shall later on in this study (cfCh.l0 
p.2S9tl) deal much more deeply with this rich notion. Suffice for now to allow De 
Waelhens to speak. 
Unlike things, (Dasein's) existence is always injeopardy (mis enjeu) -) He is 
fundamentally a pawer-to-be (pouvoir-etre). He is ever more than he is and his 
'more-being' depends on him. Of necessity man is possessed of the liberty to 
surpass himself This necessary liberty is not a (contingent) property of Dasein 
but belongs to his very existence (mais j'etre meme de son existence), this is 
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what Heidegger calls his transcendence. (De Waelhens op cit.p.26.mt). 
'More-being' means a transformation of the situation and this is one ofthe ways in which 
Merleau-Ponty uses the tenn (PhP p.169;F197). 
By transcendent here I mean our capacity to transform any situation into a 'higher' 
situation60 precisely because that 'higher situation' is a/ready present as possibility of the 
field and draws us ever forward. Lovers transform one another and their situation is 
transformed. 'The body's role is to ensure this metamorphosis' (PhP. p.164;F192). 
Now let us apply this concept of transcendence to sexual touch. In PHG's analysis of 
sexual embrace, the point of departure is also the terminus ad quem which is the 
biological welfare of the organism. The 'archetypal act of love' really goes nowhere. The 
high-point is marked as the orgasm in which there is a diminution of self; there is no 
indication of the hope or perpetuation in children or of projection for a future together or 
of the myriad exchanges that go on between people who love one another or of the 
transforming aura that comes upon the whole field with people who love much. There is 
no mention, let alone analysis, of reciprocity and its transforming power (cf PhP.p.357; 
F41O). Their omission of the concept of transcendence is a regrettable because the whole 
enterprise of therapy is an exercise of transcendence .. The closest they get to mentioning 
it is in a footnote (pHGp.476) on 'Compassion'. 'In the practice of compassion, it is not 
some interest of the "f' but the integration of the "Thou" that is in motion. ' 
The statement on compassion similarly lacks depth. It is also unclear. 
Anonymity 
We have already noted the importance of this in any analysis of experience when we 
discussed Goodman's formulation. We notice all through PHG a great emphasis on 
60 Here, in using the word 'higher' I am alluding to Madison, G.B. (1981, p.13) where he dares to give 
what he calls 'the essence ofMerleau-Ponty's thought' and quotes from La Structure du Comportment 
(1942) where the philosopher speaks of 'the soul'. 
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subjectivity. There is no hint of that limitless opaqueness which we are to ourselves and 
which is the very atmosphere within which we experience our lives. Who can undo a 
mistaken judgement when reversing in the car? Who can make himself hungry when he is 
not? Who can make himself sleep? Certainly, we can invite these conditions like the 
Greeks invited U!~ods to appear in their rites, but we cannot bring them about. This 
opaqueness is the otherness, which I am to myself in my bodily experience. In this 
opaqueness reside the possibilities of my existence which is given to me not as an 'I am' 
as an 'I can' (PhP p.l37; F160). Without it, subjectivity has no interiority, no depth. And 
intersubjectivity is inconceivable.61 Significantly, Merleau-Ponty, opens his chapter on 
intersubjectivity with a section on this opaqueness, which begins: 
'I am thrown into a nature ... My voluntary and rational life, therefore, knows that 
it merges into another power which stands in the way of its completion ... 
..... the lived is thus never entirely comprehensible ..... .in short I am never quite at 
one with myself. Such is the lot of a being who is born; that is, who once and for 
all has been given to himself as something to be understood.' (phP.p.346-347; 
F398tl) 
Again and again Merleau-Ponty returns to this anonymity and opaqueness which, again, 
is not a contingent but a constitutive element of our being (cfPhP.p.354; F406). 
Is there, perhaps, an allusion to this anonymity in PHG when they say that 'at the orgasm, 
the boundary is 'broken' and the self diminishes. '? But that is as far as it goes. There is 
no development or discussion of this noematic or objective aspect of our being in the 
whole of the book. 
My argument here is reinforced by Wheeler, (1991198). He criticises the boxed-in 
subjectivity that he finds in Gestalt therapy theory, which ministers to a dead-end 
individualism (Ch.4, Pt.2.). He resolves this by shifting the focus from figure to ground 
and relates the persons involved in the event with one another through the shared ground. 
61Madison, G.B. (1981, p.39) makes this anonymity, which adheres to our embodiment, the key point in his 
discussion of intersubjectivity. 'The secret of the presence of the other resides, therefore, in the perception 
that I have of my own body. ' My own body is by no means transparent to me. For instance, digestion. 
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Wheeler, by changing the focus from figure to ground actually moves from the subjective 
element in the event to the objective or, better still, to the anonymous element in the 
event. This way he breaks out of the boxed-in subjectivity in which the focus is entirely 
on the individual. He humanises the ground. He creates the area of intersubj ectivity. That 
Wheeler's criticism of the individually-based model in which the self was figure has a 
basis in history.62 is shown by (in) famous 'Gestalt Prayer' set down by Fritz Perls at 
the end of his introduction to Gestalt Therapy Verbatim (1971) and wildly popular in 
that decade : 
The Gestalt 'Prayer': 
'To be able to do this (take sides in the race between fascism and humanism) there is only 
one way through: to become real, to learn to take a stand, to develop one's centre, to 
understand the basis of existentialism: a rose is a rose, I am what I am, and at this 
moment I cannot possibly be different from what I am. That is what this book is about. I 
give you the Gestalt prayer, maybe as a direction. The prayer in Gestalt Therapy is: 
I do my thing; you do your thing. 
I am not in this world to live up to your expectations 
And you are not in this world to live up to mine. 
You are you and I am L 
And if by chance we find each other, it's beautiful. 
If not, it can't be helped. ' 
This is the apotheosis of the isolated individual facing the world on his own and needing 
no one. 
I ntersubjectivity 
The application of intersubjectivity to the analysis of sexual touch will be covered in the 
62Wheeler ,G. (2000). This is a work devoted. to an examination of what he calls the 'paradigm of 
individualism' and the practical possibility of shifting this and substituting a more socially inclusive way 
of thinking. 
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section below devoted to the Gestalt therapy view of human being. (cfH.P.pp 136; 
158ff;278;Appendix A.XIl) 
Section 5: A Formulation of the View of Human Being Implied in Gestalt therapy 
Every enterprise however big or however small is informed by a particular view of the 
world. Giorgi calls this 'an approach' and he names it as' the fundamental viewpoint 
towards man and the world that the scientist brings, or adopts with respect to his work as 
a scientist, whether this viewpoint is made explicit or remains implicit'. (1970, p.126 in 
Brooke p.29).63 I propose now to formulate just such a view in advance. This 
formulation is necessarily very abstract and summary. It is important to bear in mind that 
in the following formulation 'world' comprises, not just the material ambience, but the 
massive network of intersubjective and other relationships that we carry with those who 
now people our world - human and animal, and with those who have gone before us into 
death. 
Gestalt therapy presupposes that health is to be found in the awakening of a person to a 
fuller experience and awareness of his/her being-in-the-world as an incarnate subjectivity 
in close contact with other incarnate subjectivities. This experience is a bodily event in 
which the subject experiences himselflherself not as a system of externally related organs 
and limbs, however wonderful that may be, but as coherent and dynamic unity - a Gestalt-
in which each part ontologically implies all the other parts, the totality, and the world. A 
person belongs in the world as her heart belongs in her body. The same cohesive 
dynamic that holds my limbs and organs together in one body binds me to people and to 
the world unity. The subject becomes increasingly aware of how his body intentionally 
carries the profile of his world in his ability to move (motility). It is only in movement 
towards the world that the capacities of the embodied subject find their realisation. 
63It was his awareness of the profound but little articulated difference between the world that infonned the 
empirical sciences and that which infonned everyday living that moved Husser! to write his monumental 
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology(l970)(c:fHammond Howard and Keat 
1991, p.5). 
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Neither the body nor the world makes any meaning as an isolated entity. They each make 
meaning only if they are in a posture a/transcendence towards one another. This means 
that my embodied subjectivity takes up and transforms the world and the world takes up 
and transforms my embodied subjectivity; they each belong with the other. An 
amputated limb is an obscenity, in that it is a reality out of place. The capacities of the 
body find their realisation only in that intentional movement that signifies the way the 
world is present to me and I to the world. Gestalt therapy recognises the presence in the 
person of bodily schemata and acquired worlds; these determine to a large extent what I 
become aware of and how awareness grows in me. Such worlds and schemata, while they 
are the sources of richness and happiness for the person, can also carry psychopathology. 
The foundation upon which these schemata and acquired worlds are built is that initial 
experience of belonging in the world, which the Existentialists call 'thrownness' .(cf 
H.P.pp.XI;XIII;XIX;XXVII;54;165;296;). This is developed by Merleau-Ponty as 
'primordial contact'. This primordial contact informs and founds all subsequent acts of 
perception because it is my being-in-the-world. This is the level of operation proper to 
Gestalt therapy, although it does operate throughout all the other levels also. This means 
that Gestalt therapy operates through the client's coming to be or showing himself 
/herself precisely asfrom themselves and not in terms imposed by the therapist. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have endeavoured to view Gestalt therapy in its beginnings and asked if 
it is the kind of thing that can benefit from the application to it of the philosophy of 
Merleau-Ponty. My conclusion is positive. The founders of the therapy belonged to that 
group who were long awaiting the advent of phenomenology - especially in the form in 
which Merleau-Ponty articulated it. It would require a whole new study to explore why 
for so long this huge support for Gestalt t1J.erapy has been neglected. 
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Chapter 7 - The Lived Body in Therapy Practice and Theory 
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Intentional Presence 
This Chapter shows two contrasting sides of Gestalt Therapy. 
In Section One, we see that aspect of Gestalt therapy that directly addresses the body. I 
do this by narrating the work of Gestalt therapy in the tradition represented by Laura 
Perls and continuing down to our time. 
In Section Two, we see the contrast - where the lived body seems to go into eclipse. 
There is a lot of evidence around to support my view that the body has been 'forgotten'. 
One indication was the recently published collection of seven papers which leading 
Gestalt writers and trainers produced as a result of nine days of lectures, demonstrations, 
supervisions and experimental work. It is published under the title Contact and 
Relationship in a Field Perspective (2001). There is hardly a mention of 'the body' in any 
of the papers and where there is mention (p.30), it is 'en passant'. Another indication is 
the use of the phrase 'body work', which is widely used amongst Gestalt therapists as if it 
was an added extra to the practice of Gestalt. Thirdly, I know it to be still standard 
practice in some institutes that trainees wishing to take the Diploma examination must 
submit a twenty-minute tape and a transcript as matter for examination. There is never 
any question of their needing to demonstrate their skills in dealing with the lived body in 
therapy practice. What happens in all the training institutes that I am acquainted with is 
that a specialist in 'body work', like Ruella Frank, Susan Gregory or James Kepner, is 
invited to give a workshop or a series of workshops and the students are expected to 
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integrate this into their practice. Finally, I notice that amongst the essentials for Gestalt 
therapy mentioned by Resnick and Yontefthere is no mention of 'body work'. 
Section One: The Body Directly Addressed 
In this Chapter I wish to demonstrate how work with the living body in the therapy has 
been there from the start and is still an integral part of authentic Gestalt therapy. 
It is my intention to show: that work with the lived body is part of Gestalt therapy; that 
this has suffered some eclipse and that it is, as a matter of fact, being operated by leading 
therapists. 
Gestalt Therapy 
One of the reasons why I do not entirely agree with Gordon Wheeler when he says that 
Perls' view of 'the body' was of the isolated individual body, is that array of eighteen 
'experiments' which is acknowledged as Fritz Perl's own special contribution to this 
classic text. I have found that these experiments return me to my body; and the more I 
return to my body the more I appreciate the Gestalt of myself, how every bit of me is 
intimately connected with every other bit of me; and as that happens to me then I may 
begin to experience myself in the world in a very integrated way, so that I am reminded 
of my belonging and my otherness. The resistance of the ground, the sheer weight of my 
body, the sense of movement in my limbs; the resistance I sense in myself to the 
contrived nature of these exercises; these become my world in which I belong 'as the 
heart belongs in my body' (phP p.203;F235). Once a person has educated himlherselfto 
experience themselves as a totality, that is, to be present and at home in their own body, 
then it is only by doing violence to oneself in some way that one can prevent the 
constellation 'self-others-world' (phP p.57;F69) from being the basis of all ones 
perception. The violence I speak about can be a scientific method which I am deeply 
invested in, and which I cannot afford to let go of in my personal life. It can also be a 
split in myself that I am wedded to for different reasons. While I do think that Perls' 
experiments are very individualistic in focus and give very little reach on 
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intersubjectivity, the dynamic in them is intersubjective. If they are practised as part of a 
group, for instance, they serve to open members to relationship with the others. 
Elsa Grindler with Fritz and Laura Perls 
It was part of the genius of Fritz Perls that he was sufficiently open to learn from others, 
to acknowledge some of his own limitations and to overcome crippling adversity. It can 
help us to appreciate the nature and thrust of Gestalt therapy as a body-centred therapy if 
we look very briefly at the likely genesis of these exercises. I am taking a good deal of 
what I say in this short survey from a remarkable article by Susan Gregory (2001) about a 
remarkable and heroic woman called Elsa Grindler (1885-1961). Gregory calls her a 
'Lost Gestalt Ancestor'. She lived in Berlin and had a long career (1917-1960) as a 
teacher, educating people from all walks of life to take possession of their bodies. She 
taught people breathing, walking, standing, postures and perceiving. 'For real standing', 
she said, 'we must feel how we give our weight pound-for-pound onto the earth' . 
Grindler was a conscientious and meticulous teacher; she kept detailed records of all her 
work and pupils; the whole lot perished in 1945 when her house went up in flames. She 
was the kind of woman who was able to live in defiance of the Nazis for so many years. 
In that fire in 1945 not only were her records lost but a group of Jews whom she was 
sheltering in her cellar had to flee; they were all murdered. 
Perls came powerfully but indirectly under the healing influence of Grindler. It came 
from three directions: Laura, his wife, Reich his therapist and Charlotte Selver his 
teacher. Laura Perls was a pupil of Grindler, but only for a short time because Laura, 
Fritz and Renate their daughter, had to flee Berlin in 1934 for fear of the Nazis. Then 
they found they could not stay in Holland because they were denied work permits 
(Clarkson and Mackewn, 1996, p.13-14), and decided to go to South Africa. There Laura 
and Fritz collaborated in the writing of Ego, Hunger and Aggression (1947) a forerunner 
to Gestalt Therapy (1951). Laura wrote two complete chapters in that first book and her 
mark is on the whole text; Grindler's influence is obvious, even to 'the achievement of 
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concentration', the title over part of the book: 'Concentration Therapy' 'its aim is to 
regain the "feel of ourselves" .... to awaken the organism to a fuller life' (1947, p.220). 
This is very similar to Grindler's: 
'The aim of my work is ..... the achievement of concentration' . 
It was Laura who first changed her way of doing therapy while they were in South 
Africa: she sat in front of the person, for face to face dialogue. 
Just about the same time that Laura was learning from Grindler, Fritz was advised by 
Karen Homey to go into analysis with Wilhelm Reich. The Reich historian, David 
Boadella, says that it was only after Reich's second marriage to the influential Elsa 
Lundberg that he developed his ideas on body armouring. This was the second influence 
upon Perls in the style of Grindler. The third happened when the family left Capetown 
for New York in 1947. There, Perls was endeavouring to start a practice and applied for 
lessons in 'body work' to Charlotte Selver, a former student of Grindler. That same year 
in a lecture at the William Alanson Institute in New York, he included "a study of the 
approach of the Grindler School" amongst a list of three areas of study for anyone 
engaging in work with human personality. 
It is important to note that this influence upon Laura and Fritz PerIs went on over a period 
of eighteen years before the actual publication of Gestalt Therapy. It was not just for 
'body work' in the sense of something complementary to the 'real' work of 
psychotherapy - although there is some evidence from negotiations between PerIs and 
Charlotte Selver that he saw it somewhat like that. All this time he was with Laura and 
her approach was certainly not that of 'Gestalt antiBody work'. She saw attention to the 
body as an integral part of any therapeutic process: 'It's not use of the body .... The point 
is to be a body' (perIs, L. 1992, p.210). 
It seems to me that this integrated approach' " where breathing, movement and 
awareness-training form an essential part of the dialogue between therapist and client, is 
an essential characteristic of Gestalt therapy. 
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Present Day - Frank, Gregory and Kepner 
The tradition of the body as integral in therapy is basic to Gestalt therapy from the start 
and is evident today in the work and writings of people like Ruella Frank, Susan Gregory 
and James Kepner. One of Frank's main teachers was Laura Perls who was for Frank not 
only an encourager, but a model. It was under her influence that Ruella entered training 
as a Gestalt therapist in the early 1980' s. Her particular focus is on 'developmental 
psychotherapy' and offers what seems to me a very acceptable model for Gestalt therapy. 
I prefer to think of her model as demonstrating the body as carrying the whole history of 
the person. Here is an abbreviated example of her work with a client. 
Ruella Frank with KanIa: 
When the processes of ditTerentation do not emerge flexibly, an awareness of the 
primary supports that are basic to maturation recedes more and more into the 
background, often irretrievably. To observe Kanla's structure is to notice her 
diminished essential supports for contacting the parts of her body that are blotted 
out from her awareness, manifest in a weakness of structural support. The 
weakness reflects visible difficulty in the emergence of movement patterns. 
Imitating or 'trying on' Kanla's patterns while reading these passages is a direct 
route to entering Kanla's world, and to feeling empathy and compassion. (Frank, 
R 2001, pp.53-62) 
Frank then goes on to describe clearly and beautifully her process with Kanla and how 
that woman became increasingly aware of her body. Her experiment with Kanla was to 
invite her to sit on a large red physio-ball about 95 ems, in diameter. This served to 
exaggerate the lack of support for herself in KanIa's postures. Then follows 'The 
Therapy' through three pages. At the start of this she tells us one of the secrets of her 
powerful work with clients. 
I resonate with Kanla's bodily expression, and feel the edge of a quickly 
developing exhaustion. I lengthen my spine and inhale deeply. Having considered 
my own experience, I ask Kanla to attend to her body. We have worked together 
171 
now for almost two years and KanIa is now accustomed to these kinds of 
experiments. 
Reflection 
Her close observation of her client reminds us ofPerls advice to therapists quoted earlier: 
'All you have to work with is in front of you' (Perls, F. 1976.p.76); then he details the 
things he would expect a therapist to notice. What strikes me about her account and what 
has been confirmed for me by some of my supervisees who have worked with her, is the 
sense of alignment between her and the client. Her gaze is not a scrutiny, it is a thinking, 
full-bodied presence, that elicits a sense of acceptance and strength in the client. To 
recall Merleau-Ponty: Ruella Frank's gaze 
' .... is that perceptual genius underlying the thinking subject which can give to 
things the precise reply that they are awaiting in order to exist. (PhP. p.261; F302) 
It is through consciousness (awareness) that our world has meaning 'consciousness is this 
power ..... of giving a form to the stuff of experience' (phP p. 121; F 141). Those areas of 
our body that are 'blotted out' no longer have meaning for us; they are unavailable to us 
so that my presence to myself may feel thus, empty, insubstantial. I recall a client of 
mine who told me after a walking experiment that she had no sense of feeling in her body 
from her waist down. This woman feels out of touch with herself and others, she had to 
leave her teaching post because she could not support herself in the face of her pupils or 
colleagues. 
To return to KanIa's therapy, notice how Frank constantly checks what is going on in 
herself with what she is observing in KanIa, she feels the exhaustion in herself and then 
turns to Kanla. Here is Frank's summing up: 
KanIa's withdrawn posture served to sustain her primary relationships in an 
earlier environment, and provided a semblance of protection from a world that 
was habitually critical and shaming. In the present it left her out of touch with 
both herself and others. An integration of developmental movement patterns into 
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therapy provided the incremental and necessary underlying supports to move 
KanIa from her routine patterns to a more differentiated experience of self. (Ioc 
cit. p.65) 
James Kepner and the Phenomenon of 'Splitting' 
In the same tradition as Ruella Frank are the writings of James Kepner. He too is an 
established Gestalt therapy trainer and I had the pleasure of making a five-day workshop 
with him in Chester about five years ago. In a Forward to Kepner's Body Process (1987), 
Joseph Zinker, another Gestalt therapist and a stalwart carrier of the holistic tradition in 
Gestalt therapy, says what summarises the approach in Kepner's work: 
What do I do as a Gestalt therapist, when sitting with someone? What do I take 
in? What model do I construct inside me to manage a meaningful intervention,. I 
see, for one thing, a man sitting before me, leaning forward, talking passionately, 
his chest turned inward. I see this dark-eyed, delicately formed man trying to 
make sense of his experience as best he can ...... . 
(And he continues to describe what he observes) 
..... But the moment I respond to his words alone, I don't see him as 
clearly. My vision of him is filtered by his concept of himself or diagnostic 
pondering about him. It is as if both of us become two little black boxes attached 
to a voice apparatus. One's eyes become glazed with insight. I join the client's 
linguistic perspective, landing myself in the tracks, getting hitched in like a horse 
to the wagon of his perceptions. In the meantime what happens to his chest? 
What happens to his mother and father 'standing' behind him? What happens to 
us in the room? How can we manage all that without becoming scattered or 
confused? (loc. cit. Pp. XlI-XlII) 
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Kepner begins his book with an exercise to help the reader become aware of how split off 
from his body he may be. 
Just as you are sitting, without intentionally altering your body posture or 
position, begin to attend to your body experience (p.6). 
He takes time to discuss what he means by 'self and he views' self not as a thing, a 
static structure but as a fluid process. In this view it would be accurate to say that the 
'self is nothing else but the system of contact functions. ' The self and contact functions 
are one and the same to the Gestalt view' (p.IO-II) (italics mine). (cfPhP. p.320;F270). 
Kepner focuses on the phenomenon of splitting; this is to make' .... The body itself an 
"It" .... and relegate the "f' or identified self to the mind; so, our body in a sense becomes 
the "disowned self' , (p14). Here we have very well illustrated why Gestalt therapy 
cannot find its foundation in any dualist philosophy such as Cartesianism, either in its 
empiricist or idealist form. A dualist philosophy when embodied becomes a 
psychopathology. I am here (my mind); my body is there (a thing). 
A great deal of Kepner's book (1987) is taken up with the phenomenon of splitting. Part 
II deals with Body Phenomenon and the Cycle of Experience. There he deals with 
sensation, perception, movement, action, contact and withdrawal - all in relation to body 
process. Kepner is careful to distinguish the kind of 'bodywork' proper to Gestalt therapy 
from what he calls Reichian bodywork. In a table of comparisons of concepts from the 
two approaches the 'mechanical' approach of Reich based on 'desire' theory is contrasted 
with that of Gestalt therapy which is holistic. For instance in the Reichian approach 
'resistance' is 'physically manifest as tension'. 'A defence to be broken down so that the 
"true" impulse can be expressed'. In Gestalt therapy, on the other hand, 'resistance' 
is an expression of the self (i.e. an ego function) to be made aware and active 
rather than static and passive; then expressed so that full choice can be made (loc. 
cit. p.211). 
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Reich's goal in his body work was to break through the resistant character of the patient 
so that he (the patient) could accept the interpretation of the analyst. 
Kepner points out that Perls saw expression and withholding as an attempt by the patient 
to meet his needs in the given environment. Whereas, Reich was primarily interested in 
some kind of cathartic break-through, mainly concerning the inner life of the patient. 
Perls' concern was the realization of the' sense of self of the patient (p.2l4). In the final 
pages of his book (1987), Kepner acknowledged that Gestalt therapy remains somewhat 
ambivalent about fully implementing the body process theory of their therapy (p.2l5). 
Healing the Split 
It is a point of agreement amongst psychotherapists that one of the most difficult 
problems confronting us is how to be effective in helping adult survivors of sexual abuse 
in childhood. In the Appendix I shall be devoting a special chapter to the nature of this 
kind of trauma. In his book Healing Tasks (1995), Kepner describes brilliantly an 
approach he uses with people who are split as a consequence of their having been 
sexually abused as children. His approach is to reconnect the person with their bodies/the 
environment. He calls this 'grounding' and he does this by means of a graduated series 
of exercises, which form part of the healing dialogue with the therapist in which the client 
finds courage to explore her style of living. The whole thrust of the therapy is to build 
the person's self-support by self-aware reconnection with her body - 'the vehicle ofCher) 
being-in-the-world' (phP p.82; F97). The therapist acts as a kind of 'pontifex', a bridge-
builder. In her relationship with the therapist and in her increased self-support, which 
comes of body-awareness, the client learns to tolerate, and then to embrace the denied 
feeling, the buried experience. This process which operates standard Gestalt theory in 
regard to contact, movement, completion and change, is radicated in the phenomenology 
of human situatedness. 
I could proceed to describe similar body-awareness work for several other Gestalt 
therapists, Mackewn, Rubenfeld and Wheeler come to mind. Were I to do that, you 
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would find it far less concentrated than in the case of Kepner and Frank, as I have 
described them. The extensive and powerful exercises in Wheeler's book, Beyond 
Individualism, are not so much focused on evoking actual body-awareness or movement 
as upon finding the sources of environmental shame and support, as they arise for one in 
recollection. For many adults, it has to be said, movement can be shaming; so, fantasy 
work of the kind described by Wheeler can be considered as a powerful form of lived 
body involvement. Mackewn (1997) devotes two chapters to exploring the integration of 
fantasy (imagination and dreams) and 'working with embodiment, energy and resistance' 
(pp. 129 to 169). 
Ilana Rubenfeld is an example of someone who, though not professedly a 'Gestalt 
therapist', includes the three essentials of Dialogue, Phenomenology and Field Theory in 
her therapy sessions and these consist of lived-body work. Significantly she was invited 
to contribute an article on her 'Rubenfeld Synergy Method' to a collection, Gestalt 
Therapy, Perspective and Applications (1992). She was personally encouraged by Fritz 
Perls to experiment with the integration of Gestalt therapy and the Alexander Technique. 
They even collaborated in joint sessions with groups when they met at the Esalen 
Institute in Big Sur, California in the mid '60's. 
Neither Kepner nor Frank nor Perls nor Goodman anywhere clearly discuss dualism in 
therapy or bring forward a solution to it. I have already discussed Goodman's statement 
and solution which I find neither clear or satisfactory. 
Section Two: The Body Eclipsed 
The 'Lived Body' Forgotten 
In the first part of the Chapter we saw how, from the beginning there was in Gestalt 
therapy a marked emphasis upon the involvement of the whole person in the therapy. We 
noted the anomaly of people speaking about the 'role of the body in therapy' as if there 
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could be any psychotherapy without involving the whole person. We noted also how the 
earlier practical holistic approach has endured. 
There is something of an irony in the fact that the same has not happened in regard to the 
articulation of Gestalt therapy theory. The body does not feature explicitly all that much 
in the theory writers who sometimes seem to me to have forgotten the body. The body 
they have 'forgotten' is the 'lived body'. This is a scary thing to say and I am reminded of 
Robine's fear (1999, p.63): ' .. . fa peur quej'evoquais tout a !'heure ... ).64 By 'lived 
body' I mean the body which knows exactly where its parts are without looking for them; 
the body as a master-piece of mechanical engineering, yet at the same time is informed 
by manifold intentions, which I realize only through my body's material; the body which 
carries the projects of other worlds, like playing the organ or driving a car, and 
incorporates these specific projects into the over-arching 'personal project of the body as 
being-in-the-world' (Langer, M. 1989 p.4); the body as incarnate intentionality; the body 
as an expressive space: it is an altogether different experience to live by oneself like some 
Cathusian monk than it is to share one's house with another person: the meaning of the 
space entirely changes with the presence of another. That is the experience of the 'lived 
body'. 
Three Gestalt Therapy Theorists 
In the remainder of this Chapter, I choose three representative and acknowledged Gestalt 
therapy theory writers, Peter Philippson, Gary Yontef and Gordon Wheeler. I summarize 
a piece of their work and then take it forward with the application of the philosophy of 
Merleau-Ponty. Finally, I take a remarkable essay by Y ontef: Gestalt Therapy: A 
Dialogic Method (1993, p.202) and bring it forward in summary form; I point out how 
this exemplary piece of Gestalt theory manifests a flaw in basic analysis. 
64 'the fear which seized me immediately .....• 
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Peter Philippson: Three Boundaires of Self-Formation 
- A Chapter in Contact and Relationship in a Field Perspection (200 1) 
In this chapter Philippson is interested to talk about the self and its boundaries. 
He is concerned not to tie our concept of the self to either thingness or process. 
Self can be both, he says. His discourse is 'about three boundaries which in themselves 
and in the relationships between them make up our experience of self.' (p.24) 
The flrst is 'some kind of interaction which involves both sides'. And he gives what he 
calls a 'beautiful example' of this from chaos theory. He envisages the organism as eating 
drinking, defecating and having sex; this distinguishes it from a non-living thing. 
The boundary process here is experience, and the organs of that experience are the skin, 
the nerves of the skin, proprioceptors, and our sensory and motor organs. So that is where 
experience comes from. The important thing to notice from this model is that 'this is not 
in any sense my experience' (p.26). It is anonymous. 
The second is the 'self/other boundary or ego boundary'. Out of the complexity of the 
flrst boundary there 'somehow' develops a sense of, "This is my experience, this is me, 
this is other": a sense of one-ness develops. 'Here it is possible to talk about 'my 
experience'. The interaction at this boundary is contact not experience.' At this second 
boundary, choice is developing. I'm already choosing what aspect of otherness I'm 
creating self in relation to. This approach makes for a fluid self, very useful in 
psychotherapy. 
The third is 'the personality boundary.' This means identifying with certain aspects 
of my personality and alienating others; 'so I say: "I am a generous person" and I 
would alienate my meanness'(p.28). This is the area of choice regarding life-
choices, commitments, values and culture. It is from this area that we get a sense of 
the stabilization of self. Philippson sees a continual feedback loop between the 
boundaries at all three levels; the ego boundary and the personality boundary have 
continual feedback on the 'physical boundary' which is 'the most basic; the 
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precursor. ... sensing the field' (p.30). With this feedback the ego boundary 
transforms the physical boundary. 
He sees the physical boundary as correlating with the Id - as it is spoken about in PHG. 
'The Id appears as passive, scattered and irrational; its contents are hallucinatory and the 
body looms large.' This is 'the moment before any kind of figure gets formed' (p.30). 
This definition of the Id fits well with the idea of the Id as being pre-self, as Id being the 
ebb and flow of the field - it's to do with field rather than me. It's the crucible out of 
which self-experience comes, with little bits of self and small figures' (p.31). 
His paper finishes with a very instructive clinical application of these concepts. 
There are great merits in this delineation of the 'boundaries of the self -as is shown in his 
application to practice as the openness of the therapist to the client and the totally non-
partisan attitude of the therapist, which allows the client to choose and grow. At the same 
time it affords a good example of the lack that I find in Gestalt therapy theory. 
My Critique of Philipps on's Chapter 
Philippson begins from that view of the self which is set down in the opening chapter of 
PHG: 
"Experience occurs at the boundary between the organism and it's environment, 
primarily the skin surface and the other organs of sensory and motor response .... 
we speak of the organism contacting the environment, but it is the contact that is 
the simplest and the first reality." (pHG p.273) 
Then he ingeniously develops this structure into a theory of the self 
Straightaway we are faced with the flaw in Gestalt therapy theory structure: the 
analysis is not radical enough; - I have elsewhere explained this (cf 
H.P.Introduction, p.7 and Chapter 6:Foundations). At a psychological level his 
analysis seems fine to me. I agree with many of the points he makes - that the self is 
179 
not a thing but may be at times regarded as a thing, that there is an element of 
anonymity about experience, that there are stages of development in the individual 
self, that field perspective is essential in the appreciation of' Self. At the same time 
we are faced with this hiatus in the basic analysis which misses out on the 
givenness of the body. 
An Application of Radical Analysis 
I would like now to take forward what Philippson says by demonstrating what a 
radical analysis of the experienced self would look like. From my point of view, I 
would want any account ojthe self to straightaway identify it with the lived body. 
When I reflect upon my own self 
I have a glimpse of an anonymous flux, a comprehensive project in which there 
are so far no 'states of consciousness', nor, a fortiori characteristics of any 
sort ..... (phP.p.434;F496) 
In this flux I find my body immediately becomes figure and everything else in relation to 
that: it is my weight upon the chair, the lighted room about me, the feel of my fingers 
upon the keyboard, the way in which those fingers find their way so quickly round the 
keyboard - without any interposition of thinking - is my experience of self. 
I do not know what contact with the world can be like apart from the experience of my 
body. Experience is our contact with the world. This contact cannot be a contact of cause 
and effect~ otherwise the lived body becomes a determined thing in the world, and we can 
find ourselves at a loss to explain both the way in which the body is alive to itself, and the 
way in which everything else in the world takes its position and its status from its 
relationship to my body. Although I may not be all the time aware of it, I know without 
having to prove it that my body is the ever-present subject of all experiences. My body is 
what makes experience possible. 
180 
As I read Philippson about 'the self in all its phases, I find I am left with a series of 
discontinuous but rather ingenious notions rather than with an idea of the self that is 
expressive of my experience of myself. I have to go back to the actual experience of my 
body in motion to bring all the predicates together into a conceivable reality. 
If someone speaks (as Goodman does) of experience as arising from nerve-endings and 
sensory organs interacting with the environment, I find it so easy to regress to my earlier 
education and revert to that dualism of body and consciousness, of matter and spirit of 
subject and object, of person and environment which marks the familiar tradition of my 
education and which I have come to recognise as the bane of psychotherapists. When I 
think of experience, I think of my wife's four-year-old grandson who, for the first time, 
experiences the sea and the beach at West Kirby. Clearly, he is not self-aware in his 
screaming and delight at the sand and the sea. But he must be aware at some level, 
otherwise he could not bring all those disparate excitements together in himself and 
behave as one who delights in existence. Even before he has enough concepts to engage 
in elaborate world-interpretation there is this on-going exchange in which every cell of 
his body is in tune with the surrounding environment and is banking up experience for 
use in future perceptions. He finds in his body a ' power towards the world' which pre-
dates understanding. I see this power as 'something incommunicable and incapable of 
being an object for an outside consciousness, it is power, not a thing known' (PhP.p138; 
F161). This four-year-old 'delves into the thickness of the world by perceptual 
experience' (phP p.204; F236). This all 'takes place in the world, not in a consciousness' 
(PhP p.IS7; FI83). He does not seem at all confused - as he would be if he were not 
experiencing a delightful unity about it all. Where does this unity come from? 
I suggest it arises from the unity which he experiences in his own body. It is not just the 
nerves under his skin which react to the stimulation of the 'feel' ofa thing; his whole self 
is in unity with the whole of the object and his ability to perceive a thing is a correlate of 
the way in which all his senses unify in his perception. If I look to the world itself: 
'There is nothing in the appearance of the landscape, an object, or a body whereby it is 
predestined to look "gay" or "sad", "lively" or "dreary", "elegant" or "course'" 
(phP.p.23-24; F32). I do not have to infer these predicates. They arise out of the dialogue 
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with the environment. This dialogue is essentially a way in which my body belongs in the 
field, that is, the world and is at home there. The thing is given to me as a possible 
modality of my existence. And that modality is realized in my body. 
I live my Self in an atmosphere of givenness: the air, the rain, the animals and the people 
surround me and give themselves to me in a great inundation of perception. I would go so 
far as to say that, to live in a body is to experience 'being-given-to' and to respond by 
giving back what was given in the first place. My perceptions all invite me to do, to live 
a new way, to go out from myself It is not just a thought in my mind. This invitation is 
experienced by me in my body. The thoughts in my mind are nothing if not sustained by 
the feelings, sensations, the imaginations and the movements they engender in my body. 
The knowledge I have of myself - as such - of me as an identified 'I' is nothing if not 
rooted in the earth. In order to be happy I need to experience this belonging. This is not a 
thought, it is an embodied and lived existence - that is to say 'a standing out' from all the 
rest. 
Anyone acquainted with Philippson's work will see that my approach and his are quite 
different. Without the centrality of the lived body we can have my body and the 
environment forming an impressive system, but we would then have a nexus of objective 
correlations. It is my view that when we place the lived body at the centre of our 
reflections it is possible to build up a nexus of 'lived through correspondences' between 
the world and myself, so that the unity of the world is a correlate of the unity of my own 
body. '(PhP.p.204;F286). 
As I read Philippson I see his account represents the 'self-system' which we 
experience at different levels, without almost any reference to the body. It seems to 
me that unless the lived body features as the central vehicle of experience at all 
levels, it becomes very difficult to account for experience at any level. 
A question for each one of us arises out of his chapter: Do I actually experience my life 
as arising out of the interaction of skin, nerves and sense organs with the environment? I 
know I can infer from observing myself that something like this is going on, but is that 
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my experience? Is this the way Philippson actually experiences himself? Rather does it 
look to me like an inferred idea of how experience occurs. His account omits so much of 
that wealth of bodily feelings, sensations, impressions and connections, which thicken 
and liven what we call 'experience'. How otherwise can we account for the distinctive 
form of cultural objects or of people's faces? Are we going to account for the magic 
power of these by an appeal to transference and the projection of memory? 
Gary Y onter: Relational Gestalt Therapy 
- What it is, and what it is not - Why the Adjective 'Relational '? 
A further Chapter from Robine,J-M.(Ed.)( 2001 pp79-94) 
Yontefis concerned to emphasize the relational nature of Gestalt therapy. His questions 
draw attention to the the tautology: 'Relational' / Gestalt therapy. He openly uses the word 
'perception' saying it is of its nature relational. It is interesting that he is identifying 
therapy as a perceptual activity. Similarly, he identifies Phenomenology as a relational 
activity. Perception is not only relational but always perspectival. This means that 
everyone sees reality differently and reality is co-constructed. All perception is 
interpreted. I imbue everthing with my humanity. No self-awareness totally coincides 
with my Self. 
Field Theory 
He selects some Gestalt principles: All the forces in the field are interdependent. There is 
no environment without an observer. We are not in a field; our very substance is of the 
field. This mode of speech caused a degree of misunderstanding amongst the audience. 
'Of the field', he agrees, is a departure from Lewin's description of the field. There is no 
explicit treatment of the lived body either as the locus of the field, or the medium of 
relationship. 
Gordon Wheeler: 'Towards a Gestalt Developmental Model'(l998B) 
The problem he is addressing is this: When working with children and adolescents 
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therapists find it useful - even essential, to have a model of human development in mind. 
The models most frequently available and most influential at present are those developed 
by Eric Erikson, Piaget, Kohlberg and Kohut. The difficulty is that all of these depend on 
conceptualising the self as an entity in its own right over against the environment. He 
draws attention to the fact that this model is typical of the way in which 'we are always 
navigating with some implicit map, however deeply buried or unspoken are the 
assumptions'(Wheeler, G.1998B p.116). It carries the assumption long-cherished in 
Western culture that the "self' or the essential individuality of a person, already exists in 
a real way prior to (and apart from) relationships and development in a relational field. 
He instances how this model of the isolated individual does not hold up when, as Daniel 
Stem did, we look at the actual way in which infants develop (1985). Wheeler puts a 
very serious question: 
... how can we take up a different view of self and development, if the one we 
have now, and the very language we express it in, are enclosed in deeply- held 
assumptions about human nature that are (in part) out of our awareness and very 
firmly embedded in our culture. (p.116) 
He finds the beginning of an answer in Goodman's writing in Part 2 ofPHG (1951) in his 
opening chapter on The Structure of Growth: 'Adapting Goodman, we do better to 
picture self-process not in the hidden centre of the person, but "at the boundary If between 
me and my environment, actively poised to resolve the world I think of as "outer" and 
"inner" into some workable, liveable whole'(p117). (Italics in text.) But this takes time, 
he argues, because it involves unlearning a habitual mode of thinking. Inner and 'outer' 
make no sense except 'as it relates to, and is informed by, the other'. This yields a more 
promising view of the child/adolescent/adult. They are seen as intimately belonging in the 
environment - it is no longer just 'the environment of the child's self but 'the dynamic 
material, which is actually being integrated'. 'In this model political and social 
considerations become something more than background: they are integrated into the 
self-structure of the developing subjective person'. (p.118) 
Wheeler is critical of the view ofPerls on development in that it proceeds by identified 
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stages in a linear way, stage by stage. According to Peris, 'We simply "get over" our 
infantile needs, as we become firmly individuated and non-dependent adults.' This 
contrasts with the more modem Gestalt model developed by Mark McConville in which a 
new, far more complex, matrix of relationships develops. Wheeler claims (p.119) that 
amongst the cohort of competing models, the Gestalt model alone offers one that 
sufficiently addresses the context of the relationship and therefore does justice to the 
whole field. 
In the last part of the article he applies the Gestalt developmental model to four areas: 
1. Intersubjectivity and Intimacy: Meaning-making - the process of integration of self 
and environment - is accomplished in exercising skills that can be learned only in 
intersubjective experiences. He gives the example of a father carrying on a conversation 
with a very young child in which he (the father) also speaks/or and to the child. 
2. Support and Shame: The whole field model moves away from the position in which 
the goal is maximum autonomy achieved by a great deal of self-support. ' .... in a field 
model we view support not just as an environmental transaction, nor as a sign of 
immaturity or dependency, but as a field condition, a dynamic aspect of a field 
living. '(loc. cit. p. 121 ) 
3. Gender and Identity: Gender differences are part ofthe process from the outset. The 
threat of shaming is the instrument whereby gender stereotypes are enforced and 
introjected. Identity - 'who I am in-myself and in-the-world, a kind of boundary 
experience or bridging concept which has always tended to nudge the individualist 
models in a social field direction, is likewise a deeply gendered notion' (p.122). In the 
Gestalt model identity emerges only from interaction with the field; in fact, it is the 
boundary with the field. 
4. Voice and Narrative: In the Gestalt model the mature Self can be conceived as one 
who has come to achieve and articulate 'that coherent, connected point of view ' (p.122). 
This moves the concept of Self away from the older model where it was more associated 
with self-assertion and robust self-expression. Such a developed view of 'self-
development' is far more complete and brings more satisfaction than the individualist 
one. 
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The achievement of full voice is utterly dependent on a developmentalfield of 
other voices - i.e. other selves who can first lead and then engage in a kind of 
intersubjective dialogue which is essential to evoke and support self-development' 
(p.123). 
Wheeler goes on to say that essential to this Gestalt model is the future-orientation 
of Gestalt therapy. It embraces the idea of sequences: 'first this and then that'. That 
enables a person to voice his concerns in a timely way. It is this built-in future 
orientation of Gestalt therapy that so well accommodates the notion of human life 
as story. 'That is why we can say, in Gestalt, that the human being is a "story-
telling animal" '(Wheeler, 1998B, p.123). We do not compose our own stories: 
Rather we find and create our story in the telling of it to another person 
and that act is the same as the creative construction of the self (ibid.). 
The phrases 'good gestalt', 'good form' used by the Gestalttheorie psychologists apply to 
'a narrative self'; story and story-maker form a Gestalt. Wheeler, in opposing the notion 
of the 'solid' self, is developing a theme familiar in Gestalt therapy writing from the very 
beginning (pHG p.281)6s. James Kepner warned, in his Body Process (1987), against 
reifying the self (loc. cit. p. 10, p.14) 'Gestalt Therapy views the self not as a thing ... but 
as a fluid process' 
A Reflection on Article 
A theory of the Self must always be a theory of perception and a theory of being, because 
it is from our experience of perception and of our existence that the theory of self arises. 
The Self - if we take this in the sense of my illuminated identity does not coincide with 
65paul Goodman (1911 - 1972) is generally regarded as a co-founder of Gestalt therapy with Fritz PerIs. I 
have spoken more fully about him in the Chapter 6 where I contextualize my study and discuss the value 
and deficit of his philosophical contribution. (cfH.P.ch.6.p.152ft) 
That Wheeler is drawing on Lewin we know from his references and other places. In both his (1991/98) 
Gestalt Reconsidered and his (2000) Beyond Individualism he draws heavily on Lewin. 
186 
my body. There are areas of my lived body that are not accessible to me - my digestion, 
for instance. The body is the locus of the Self 
This is not the body of the Institute of physiology in Gower Street or the body of the 
pornographic literature on the top shelf in Smiths - it is what Merleau-Ponty calls 'the 
phenomenal body' or 'lived body'. Of that we have already spoken and we shall say a lot 
more later on. (cfpp. XV;XXIll;XXXV;2;6;11;59;62.109). A final point is this: An 
important reason, as I see it, why the 'thing' self is unacceptable as a concept in Gestalt 
therapy theory is that such a concept is at the basis of psychopathology itself If I, as a 
psychotherapist, am working from a position where I see the client and experience myself 
as necessarily split - my body and myself - then I will be implicitly promoting the very 
split which under-writes psychopathology - as the word schizophrenia indicates. 
'Towards a Gestalt Developmental Model' - Brought Forward 
As we shall see in detail in the Chapter, The Body Situated, Wheeler is profoundly 
in agreement with Merleau-Ponty when he places the integrity and growth of a 
person as a function of their union with others 'in the field'. This is also the theme 
of his book Beyond Individualism. 
What I hear Wheeler calling for, in his article, is a reform of perception - the healing of 
perception - at a profound level - a turning away from the Cartesian mode in which our 
most immediate experience 'is subordinated to the knowledge we have of it through the 
medium of ideas' (phP p.199; F231). In this Cartesian mode there is widespread 
discounting of the need we experience for the close support of others: for instance where 
a child who is fearful of school is told to 'grow up' and 'stand on his own two feet'. His 
fears are dismissed: he is dismissed. 'Look, you have nothing to be afraid of; the teacher 
is nice and all the other children are also new'. Merieau-Ponty calls this 'mutilating 
experience from below, treating it immediately as knowledge and forgetting its existential 
content' (phP.p.53;F65). A culture delivered over to an individualist ethic - as described 
by Wheeler (2000) - will discourage people from a holistic view of their experience - the 
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ideal being the self-made man going it alone, like Clint Eastwood. Sensation becomes 
detached from knowledge and knowledge becomes detached from the lived body. 
This involves taking for granted and passing over in silence the decisive moment in 
perception: the upsurge ofa true and exact world (PhP.p.53;F65). 
This upsurge is the experience of the lived body; and this raises an important question for 
Wheeler and for all Gestalt therapy theorists: Where is 'the field? Is this a construct of 
thinking? A way of viewing the world? Professor Heath(2000) is raising a valid point 
when he accuses Roberts (1999): 
His article is an attempt to turn a belief - in 'the field' -into a fact .... By 
asserting the existence of the field and of its universal influence in the 
construction of all human experience (Heath, 2000 p. 13). 
I do not agree with Heath's conclusion - yet his point is valid. So, if 'the field' is a 
reality, we need to be able to locate it; if 'the field' is such an ubiquitous influence upon 
us we need to be able to experience it. Where then is the locus of 'the field'? 'The field' 
is the lived body. Each of us carries and experiences the 'upsurge of that true and exact 
world' in us. In my body is present the aggregate of all those influences, experiences and 
possibilities that comprise the field. It is all so much there that it constitutes our biggest 
problem. Wheeler does not locate the field explicitly in the lived body. Merleau-Ponty 
sees the locus of 'the field' as a point of departure. 
'The problem of the world, and to begin with that of one's own body, consists in 
the fact that it is all there.' (PhP.p.198;F23) 
I wish now to elaborate upon my saying above that 'the field is the lived body'; what is 
not present in some way or other for me does not belong in my field. I do not see how 
else the field can be real, ifnot in terms of the lived body. 
When I open the door of my office to a client and she walks in I sometimes get sense 
'Not good to-day!'. Then there is 'something' about the way she looks at me or does not 
look at me that confirms that 'first impression'. Similarly when I approach a friend's 
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house and as I do so, I am suffused by a sense of peace. 66 It is a commonly used 
technique in Gestalt therapy with people who are trapped in a 'victim' state to suggest 
that they adopt the body stance appropriate to their experienced condition and intensify it 
in their bodily posture; then recognising what they are doing they can adopt a different 
posture and contrast the feelings in each situation. Frequently they may find that, as they 
allow themselves to take on the 'victim' posture, they experience a current of archaic 
thoughts and feelings moving through them. The opposite posture may bring with it a 
feeling of freshness and newness and guilt and a tendency to hide. Our bodily postures 
and movements seem to trail our history. It is the woman's history I am sensing. 
What we gather from these examples is that our vision, our sense of touch, our sensation 
of movement 'is already inhabited by a meaning which gives it a function in the 
spectacle of the world and in our existence' (phP.p.52;F64). My living body is full of 
sensations and this sensation-filled body constitutes 'the whole field'. Sensations are 
never just 'qualities' they transcend themselves and bring in their train realms of 
meaning. The world in which we define sensations in terms of electrical impulses and 
explain them (away) as physiological changes, is the same world as isolates the 
individual from the community and makes of neediness a source of shame. This is the 
world of' dead' qualities, 'a world of darkness', so eloquently described by van den Berg 
(1980) in his article about Gustave Theodor Fechner. 
The whole field is first and foremost present in my body, 'that heavy mass' 
(phP.p.52;F64) supported by gravity, endowed with these designer-made senses, exactly 
fashioned for 'world conditions'. Every least sensation involves a reference to the body. 
And that least sensation 'is that vital communication with the world which makes it 
present as a familiar setting of our life .... .It is to it that the perceived object and the 
perceiving subject owe their thickness. (ibid.pp.52-53). 
66 Although not nwnbered amongst the phenomenologists, Martin Buber alludes to this kind of 'model 
perception' in his own works. This is the point of A. Hodes's essay, The Asylum (1972, p.ll)). 
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Yontef: Gestalt Therapy: A Dialogic Method 
I shall now set down an extended account of Y ontef s theory of Gestalt therapy. I 
have two main reasons for doing this. Firstly, it offers an extended account of 
Gestalt therapy theory within which the lived body is present but eclipsed. This 
theory actually works. It is clear and sufficient unto itself Yet, because it derives 
from an analysis of experience that omits the givenness of bodily experience, it can 
too easily become a knowledge that is detached from the embodied subject. 
Secondly, I give so much space to this expose in order to supplement my all too 
brief and inadequate and personal account of Gestalt therapy in the Appendix (cf 
H.P. Appendix B). I shall, a few times, interrupt this account to apply the 
philosophy ofMerleau-Ponty; and then at the end, I shall add an extended 
comment. 
Originally circulated as an unpublished work, in 1983 Yontefs paper was 
published in German. It was first published in English in 1993. 
Yontefbegins with the statement that 'The theory of Gestalt therapy is a theory about 
what makes good psychotherapy. It integrates ideas, observations, and techniques from 
diverse sources .... ' (p.203). He requires a complete system of psychotherapy explicitly 
or implicitly, to include: 
1. A theory of consciousness, including a viewpoint on what kind of 
Awareness or insight is being sought and a methodology for reaching 
that goal; 
2. An attitude or prescription about the therapeutic relationship between 
therapist and patient; 
3. A scientific theory. 
He then proceeds to define Gestalt therapy. Three principles define Gestalt 
therapy: 
One : Gestalt therapy is phenomenological; this founds the technology of 
awareness. 
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Two : 'Gestalt therapy is wholly based on dialogic existentialism, i.e., the I-Thou 
67 contact/withdrawal process. This is the basis of our relationship theory.' 
Three: Gestalt therapy's conceptual foundation or world view is Gestalt, i.e., 
based on holism and field theory. This is the scientific theory that sources 
our understanding of key concepts such as 'now', 'process', 'polarity'. 
From the very beginning Dialogue has been stressed in Gestalt therapy theory, even 
though the language was then different and less precise than it is now. He envisages 
dialogue as essentially two or more people talking and being open to one another in 
such a way that there is a possibility of what Buber calls the 'I-Thou relationship' 
developing between them (Buber 1923/1996). 
The Characteristics of Dialogue 
Awareness: this is a form of experiencing: when continued it leads to insight, that is 
to an immediate grasp of the obvious unity of disparate elements in the field. 
Here, 1 want to take forward what Y ontef says about Awareness. 
1 deem it a mistake to view awareness as a 'state-in-itself, (something in the 
thinking). Sometimes Yontef speaks of it in such a way as would lend itself to such 
a view: 
'The awareness that cares is the awareness that forms a clear Gestalt, with a 
figure organized and energized by the person's dominant need at each 
moment' (1993 p.182) or 
...... the awareness that is sought in psychotherapy aims for insight as 
defined by Gestalt psychology; ... a patterning of the perceptual field in 
such a way that significant relations are apparent' (loc. cit p.247). 
67 In a foreword to the 1993 edition of this article Y ontef says that he has changed his tenninology since 
writing this piece: 
'Thus the terms "I-Thou attitude" and "I-Thou relationship" in this paper are the same as the tenns 
"dialogic attitude" and "dialogic relationship" 1 refer to in later papers. 1 have elected in this summary to 
retain the tenninology of the original paper'. 
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Is he viewing awareness as a 'state of mind'? Or as a modality of existence for a 
person; i.e. a realisation of his perceptual region? As a modality of the person it is a 
condition of the body-subject, the epiphany or manifestation of that person at some 
particular level of being. The 'awareness' itself takes up the limits of that person 
and brings them on to transcend/surpass themselves - as, for instance, when a 
therapist invites a client to dance with him (in special context of the therapy, of 
course). 
If, instead of bogging down in a view of awareness as a state of mind, we take it 
instead as a modality of that person's existence, then it is only through the 
intervention of inhibitory agencies that the awareness will not take the client 
forward to new worlds of possibility. Yontefhimselfinchoately acknowledges this 
when he says' Awareness is accompanied by owning'. This power that is 
awareness occurs frequently in the Phenomenology. 
'Awareness is transcendence through and through, not transcendence 
undergone ..... it is the actual effecting of vision ...... ' (PhP p.376; F431) 
In other words awareness is existence that thrusts towards inexhaustible 
possibilities. 
Yontef continues: Three things to notice about complete Awareness: It must figure 
the dominant present need in the field; it is concerned with reality of the situation 
and comprises a component of appropriation or ownership/ responsibility; this is 
always here-and-now and open to change. Awareness can override habit and enable 
the person to regulate herself by choice. 'Phenomenology is the method Gestalt 
therapy utilises to learn about the Awareness process. Our goal is to learn enough 
so that Awareness can develop as needed for Organismic Self-Regulation' (Yontef, 
1993, p.205) 
Notice how more expansive is our view if we take awareness as 'life process of the lived 
body'. Then awareness becomes my gaze, which is at once creative and receptive, which 
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discerns, or is able to discern, what is coming from the subject, what is coming from the 
world, which amazingly becomes 
' .... The gaze which is that perceptual genius underlying the thinking subject 
which can give to things the precise reply they are awaiting in order to exist 
before us. ' (phP p.264; F305) 
Whereas a parallel between Merleau-Ponty's and Yontef's view of awareness may not be 
justified by the texts presented here, such a parallel can be justified, I think, if we extend 
the range of our enquiry. 68 They may be parallel, but they are also different. 
We have met Yontefs description of phenomenology previously. 'Phenomenology is a 
search for understanding based on what is obvious or revealed by the situation' ... (ibid). 
(cfH.P.pp.89-91). It works by entering the situation experientially and allowing sensory 
Awareness to discover what is obvious/given. Phenomenological exploration opens the 
way to a clear and distinct description of what IS, as distinct from what can be speculated 
about, imagined, or hoped for. Y ontef calls the phenomenology of Gestalt therapy 
'experimental phenomenology' and derives it, in part, from Gestalt psychology. 
The ContactlWithdrawal Process 
In Gestalt therapy, dialogue is articulated in the contact process. This process has 
four moments: connecting, separating, moving and awareness. This process is the 
'organ of meeting' of the boundary individual/environment which constitutes the 
existence of the person. A person can lose himself in the environment or isolate 
himself from it. The regulation of these polarities is the work of awareness. In 
regard to the contacting process itself, Yontefquotes PHG and Lynn Jacobs: 
The contacting process is " the work that results in assimilation and 
growth"; it "is the forming of a figure of interest against a ground or 
68 In this connection consult the following references in 
Phenomen%gy:pp.121;130;140;215;219;279;291;292;376;434. 
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context of the organism/environment field." (from Perls et al.,1951,pp230-
231) 
Jacob notes: "Two essential characteristics of contact are implied by this 
definition. First, contact leads inevitably to living and growing. Second, 
contact involves behaviour that establishes a relationship with the figure of 
interest, one must move either towards or away from this figure. " (from 
Jacobs, 1978, p.28) in (Yontef, 1993, p.208). 
In growthful contact people connect/separate/connect while maintaining their 
separate identities. Movement is necessary in order that a person may manifest 
different aspects of herself Y ontef makes the point forcefully that because a human 
existence is relational, the isolated person cannot be said to 'stand out or exist - i.e. 
be a defined person and feel alive'(p.208). The polarity of isolation is confluence 
which is an absence of differentiation between self and other. The person who has 
abandoned himself in confluence will long for aloneness, just as the isolate will 
long for confluence. 
1-Thou: The Existential Base 
Gestalt therapy says Y ontef is a therapy of existence as contrasting with a therapy 
that stresses 'essence'. A therapy of essence such as classical psychoanalysis, 
searches out the unchangeable drives in the person and de-emphasises personal 
choice. Gestalt therapy focuses on the present, on what is going on now in this 
therapy hour and allows the person to experience his freedom of choice. The stress 
in Gestalt therapy upon self-determination and freedom, does not reach to analysing 
that freedom. Merleau-Ponty points out how freedom is lost by avoiding the 
situation 1 am actually faced with; the challenge is to take hold of my situation and 
transform it. I transform it by actually integrating it into the lived experience that 
goes on every day. Through my talk, my walk, my breathing, my teaching, 1 join 
myself and any situation with the world. 'I can miss my freedom, only if 1 try to 
by-pass my natural and social situation, by refusing to take it up, in the first place, 
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instead of assuming it in order to join up with the natural and human world'. 
} 69 (phP.p.456;F520 . 
Y ontef continues: The second way in which Gestalt therapy is existential has to do 
nwith the relationship between therapist and patient. This is a defining 
characteristic of Gestalt therapy. It is called variously, 'dialogic Existentialism' '1-
Thou Dialogue', and finds its eloquent articulation in the life and writings of Martin 
Buber. The I-Thou is a special kind of meeting of which phenomenological analysis 
and the heightening of awareness are but the servants. In such a meeting the parties 
experience themselves as personally addressed and 'reached' by their 'Thou'. 
Each finds herself respected and affirmed in his/her uniqueness. It is the polar 
opposite of using a person as a means to an end. (e.g. as a source of income). That 
would be to reduce a person to an 'IT'. The demand upon the therapist is to move in 
the direction of the possibility of 'I-Thou' with the client. 
This is a most important statement by Y ontef. He here defines the healing 
component in Gestalt therapy; and he has support in this not only of the seven 
names whom he thanks on p.l ofthe unpublished edition of this paper 70 but of the 
wider Gestalt therapy community. This view is endorsed in every current manual of 
69 An example of such situation avoidance is, perhaps, offered to us in the reception given to Merleau-
Ponty's PhenomenoLogie de La Perception in Britain. Although published in 1945 it was not published in 
English translation until 1962; then it was two more years before it was reviewed in the leading 
Philosophical Quarterly. The reviewer half-dismisses the book as 'mainly derivative'; (but, of course the 
translation was 'eminently worthwhile'); what Merleau-Ponty says is 'not new'; the demerits of the book 
outweigh the merits. The eminent reviewer savages the last part of the book (the source of my quotation 
above) calling it 'grandiose' and 'rhetorical'. Then comes the 'coup de grace': 'Only someone absolutely 
blinded by prejudice that anything European is more interesting than anything English could seriously 
believe that much value should be attached to these final ramblings' (loc. cit. p.375). The reviewer was 
Mary Warnock (1964). 
70 'I want to express my appreciation to: Jeffrey Hutter, PhD.: Lynne Jacobs, PhD.; John Long, PhD.; 
Robert Martin, DSW.; Robert Resnick, PhD.; Lolita Sapriel, MSW.; and James Simkin. PhD. for their aid 
in the preparation of this paper.' He omits this in the 1993 publication of his paper. 
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Gestalt therapy that I have seen. From this principle flows the ethical approach of 
the Gestalt therapist which Y ontef elaborates upon later in the paper. This approach 
demands total respect for the feelings, convictions, world-view of the client; 
adaptation of language to facilitate dialogue and non-exploitation of the client at 
any level. The reader will notice how it squares exactly with what I said in my 
Introductory Chapter: the healing is in the authenticity of the Between. 
The dialogic attitude of Gestalt therapy is incompatible with any approach which 
has interpretation as its main technology. I here must emphasise 'main'. Of 
course, I have already said that 'interpretation and diagnosis are intrinsic to what we 
do'(HP p.148). But the therapeutic component in Gestalt therapy is the authenticity 
of the relationship. At the same time the mainly interpretative approach, as in 
psychoanalysis, says Y ontef, must objectify the patient as an It, and implies a 
psychic determinism, which works through transference and makes genuine 
dialogue impossible. 
Similarly, is it incompatible with any therapist - even a Gestalt therapist - who 
thinks he knows for sure what is best for the patient. 
A Gestalt Therapist who uses his own charisma or Gestalt techniques for 
rapid change in the patient that is not grounded in dialogue and in the 
patient's Awareness and self-support, is another example of vertical 
treatment and feeds the ego of the therapist more than the competence of 
the patient. (loc.cit. p.212) 
Here is a confirmation of our analysis of phenomenology, which pointed the way to a 
method of investigation congenial to Gestalt therapy. (cfHP. ch.4) 
Shouldistic Regulation 
Gestalt therapy with its emphasis upon the existence of the person and its 
technology of awareness, summoning the person to live through the I-Thou 
orientation, will enable the patient to deal, not only with his presenting problems, 
but to experience growth in all areas of his life. One of the great antagonists to 
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growth is inherited attitudes which may tend to shrink and cripple the spontaneity 
and effectiveness of that person in his everyday life. Such alienating attitudes and 
values are called in Gestalt therapy terminology 'introjects', and 
phenomenologically, they manifest as 'shoulds' in the person's vocabulary. Yontef 
contrasts a life driven by inherited 'shoulds' with one that proceeds organically 
from the person in response to genuine needs and chosen beliefs. Such a person is 
appropriating his life by Organismic Self-Regulation.' Shouldistic regulation 
inevitably splits the person: he is tom between that part of him which knows what 
he most needs just now, and that part of him that is caught up in loyalty to his 
'introjects,71. If the therapist moves to become an agent of change for the client or 
rescue him from his slavery to introjects, then he only increases the split by 
promoting one side of it, and upstages the client in doing his own work. 
Y ontef is careful to point out that the person conceptualized as separate from the 
field is not the person as envisaged in Gestalt therapy. In Gestalt therapy the person 
is sustained by and 'of the field,72, which means that his being is essentially 
relational and has meaning only in relation to the environment. (this includes other 
people, of course). 'An organism only exists in a context' (Yontef, loc.cit. p215). 
What Yontef is saying here - the person is sustained by and 'of the field' - is 
brought forward in a different way by Merleau-Ponty in the Preface to his 
Phenomenology of Perception: 
The world is not what I think but what I live through. I am open to the 
world, I have no doubt I am in communication with it, but I do not possess 
it; it is inexhaustible. 'There is a world' or rather, 'there is the world'; I can 
71 The compelling, almost magical powers of the introject have to be experienced to be believed. A woman 
whose mother never showed her any love but who regularly abused her emotionally during the course of 
her childhood and youth will still at the age of forty-eight hope for the love she never received and still, 
with trepidation, dutifully visit her every Sunday. 
72 'Of the field' - this phrase does not occur in the paper I am reviewing. I am taking it from a paper which 
Yontef read at a meeting of Gestalt therapy International Network in 2001: Relational Gestalt Therapy. His 
use of this expression triggered many questions (Robine, J-M, (Ed) 2001). 
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never completely account for this ever-reiterated assertion in my life. (PhP 
xvii; Fxx) 
Therapy Without a Change Agent 
This becomes possible only if the therapist through his phenomenological focusing 
(laying aside his prejudices) can allow space in which the patient can feel heard, 
and therefore respected and free - and if the atmosphere is such between therapist 
and patient that they can address one another horizontally as human beings, then the 
therapist has stepped down from his place as 'change agent'. Here again we see 
how possible it would be to take forward Yontefs notion of the 'change-agent-
therapist'. IfI think I know better than my client what is 'good for her', then I am in 
that way of thinking lapsing back into a dualism. I am saying: 'my mode of being 
is superior to your mode of being' . This is easier to live out as a 'mental' attitude; 
if we see the 'shared awareness' as a meeting of body-subjects each contributing to 
the 'between', it becomes more difficult to adopt the non-horizontal stance. 
The use of experiments, such as suggesting to a client that he imagine that he is 
little boy whose mother asks him for a hug - is not designed to change the patient 
but to enhance awareness. 'The focus in Gestalt therapy is on what needs to be 
explored rather than on what needs to be changed.' (loc.cit.p16) 
A good relationship is worked at by both parties with and for Awareness 
and that is the heart of the process in Gestalt Therapy . 
... . Acknowledgement ofIS in the sense of Awareness and in the sense of a 
real meeting, is the therapy - it is the natural process of living and 
learning. (loc.cit.p.220) 
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The Dialogic Relationship 
These he lists as 1. Inclusion, 2.Presence, 3.Commitment to Dialogue, 4.Non-
Exploitation 
1. Inclusion: This is a term taken from Buber (1968)73. It indicates that the 
therapist endeavours to live at the other pole of the relationship looking at 
himself and the world through the eyes of the patient. He is not looking upon 
the patient as 'a case', a 'disturbed person who needs my help' but himself 
enters the world of the patient and honours that world. The honouring of the 
patient's world is possible through a phenomenological approach. This means 
that I prescind from all my prejudices, beliefs and assumptions about the 
patient. (As much as possible, anyway.) That way there is no question of 
judging the patient positively or negatively. This creates an allowing attitude. 
Let us take this forward a little. It is possible to glimpse here what a difference 
it can make to the facilitation of the relationship if the therapist lives in an 
atmosphere of' givenness' and therefore of gratitude. Just as the person's body-
awareness is rooted in and heightened by a basic attitude of 'being-given' to-
himself (phP p.360; F413), so he sees the client as a 'gift' to be respected and 
cherished. It is a misconception to view givenness as a contingent element of 
our being, like having skills in music; Merleau-Ponty sees it as constituent of 
our very being. 
731bis is Yontefs reference to Buber's address on Education in Heidelberg in 1925. The reference I find is 
different: (Buber 1968 p.124ft). 
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2. Presence: Honesty and authenticity mark Gestalt therapy. The Gestalt therapist 
does not wear a 'professional face' or try to be anything that he is not. So, ifhe 
is scared or puzzled or angry he does not pretend otherwise. This does not mean 
that he vents anger upon the patient or behaves sexually. This would be to abuse 
and exploit the patient. It does mean that he is genuinely present with the 
patient and does not hide behind a fayade. It also means that he is not there just 
to administer warm acceptance, but will, as occasion requires, give the patient 
what he may not want - accurate feedback. At the same time he is educated 
and knowledgeable and able to guide the work and confirms the patient in his 
strengths. 
3. Commitment to Dialogue: 'A commitment to dialogue not only means each 
expresses his inner self to the other and is also receptive to the other's self-
expression, but it specifically means allowing the outcome to be determined by 
the Between and not controlled by either individual' (loc.cit. p.223). This means 
accepting the limits and giving up control of the process. The more one tries to 
bring about the I-Thou moment the less likely it is to happen. 'It is given, not 
made by me or my patient.' "Allowing contact." This takes two and must 
happen by an act of grace that goes beyond making contact' (loc.cit. p.224). 
4. Non-Exploitation: Under this heading Yontef expands upon the ethical 
implications for Gestalt therapy of the Dialogic approach, as he defines it. He 
discusses four forms of exploitation; 
(A) A person is treated as a means to an end. (B) There is an inequality of 
language- the therapist talks down to the patient. (C) The therapist does not 
do his job fully. (0) The therapist fails to abide by the limits of the situation 
- for instance, by the inappropriate use of humour, so that the patient feels 
shamed. 
I shall conclude my summary here, not because I consider the remainder of 
Y ontef' s paper unimportant but because what is said in there is implicitly contained 
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in the earlier part where he states the operative principles of Gestalt therapy. 
Furthermore, my comments on this paper which aim to take forward what he has 
said will mainly feature the earlier part of the paper. 
My Comments on Y onter s Essay 
I would consider the whole of my study to be a kind of commentary upon this 
profound and thoughtful work by Y ontef What I propose to do here is to take some 
points and show how what he has proposed here can be further illuminated by the 
application of the insights of Merleau-Ponty. 
Meeting with the Client - Observation is not Perception 
When a client presents herself to me I may take time to note things about her: I can 
notice what she is wearing, the way she moves, how she looks at me or does not 
look at me; I can take note of her voice, her skin colour, how she sits and whether 
or not she takes charge of her environment. I can list and note those things and 
draw inferences from them and, maybe, even think that this is being 
phenomenological and opening the way to the dialogic relationship. And maybe it 
is, by the way, laying the ground preparation for such an encounter. Yet, when I 
reflect upon this note-taking, is it all that different from that of the scientist who 
translates the body into terms of chemical and electrical structures? And as I reflect 
further I am confronted by a perception of that woman which is 'anterior to such 
observations' and without which the whole edifice of my observations and 
inferences would amount to nothing. 
It is simply a question of recognising that the body, as a chemical structure 
or an agglomeration of tissues, is formed, by a process of impoverishment, 
from a primordial phenomenon of the body-for-us, the body of human 
experience or the perceived body ..... (phP.p.351;F404) 
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My body is ahead of me all the time and I do not completely coincide with it. By 
this I mean that because it is of its very nature relational, the arc of its intentionality 
is a/ready engaged with that woman before I have even opened the door to her. 'My 
body is a movement towards the world and the world is my body's point of 
support' (ibid). This movement is 'given' to me with my existence and goes out 
unless I choose to interrupt it. This movement is the response of my being to the 
presence of the woman. This is not a 'thinking about' but a movement towards the 
realisation of a possibility, a mode of being. This is 'my gaze at grips with a visible 
world.' As we look at one another our worlds meet;' that expressive instrument 
called a face can carry an existence as my own existence is carried in my body, that 
knowledge-acquiring apparatus' (PhP. p. 3 51 ;F404). 
The Phenomenal Body 
My body and that of woman who visits me are not co-ordinated by a series of 
functional relationships which can be listed and pondered upon. She is present to 
me as an incomplete individual through the agency of my body as a possible mode 
of my being-in-the-world. My awareness is suffused with sensations of her 
presence in an atmosphere of opaqueness. The body that my body responds to, 
cannot be that of the institute of physiology, because such a body is incapable of 
being inhabited by a consciousness~ such a body must be for me an object only, an 
IT. That would not be a foundation for Gestalt therapy. The living body of Gestalt 
therapy is what we call 'the phenomenal body'. 
Will the Healing Presence not Happen anyway? 
Before we look a bit closer at the meaning of that intentionality, let us ask ourselves 
the question: If my body is ahead of me and goes out to 'the other' unless I 
interrupt that movement, then what is so special about the therapeutic relationship? 
What Yontef, after Buber, calls the 'I-Thou relationship' seems to me to be the 
given direction in every meeting between people. But, as Buber warns, such a 
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relationship carries risk (Buber 1923/1996 p.S1). Therapy is a safe place in which 
to enter into such closeness. Children, unless they have been hurt or introjected 
with some contrary teaching, will automatically move to a relationship of closeness 
of intimacy with you. 
Intentional Presence 
Let us explore a little further that internal relation, which exists between my body 
and that of another. If I reflect upon the relation I experience between my body and 
my awareness, I see they belong with one another as music belongs in my hearing, 
or my heart in my body. Although I can think of them as distinct they are not so and 
I know it so in my experience. I know for sure that I can behave, and have 
behaved, as if they were separate objects and that such behaviour always leads to 
pain of some kind. So, it can happen that for the sake of seeming funny, I can make 
a hurtful remark to my wife. That is where I move from sensation, through to 
action, without allowing the mobilization of my feelings and a fuller bodily 
response, which would be a more human response. When I reflect upon the relation 
that exists between my body and the body of another, belonging and denial of 
belonging both seem similarly possible. I certainly can behave as if they did not 
matter to me, as ifthere was no relation. But I have to do violence to myself to 
behave that way; my body moves in reply to their speech, my eyes follow their 
movements, so my senses are alert awaiting recognition; their presence has already 
transformed my world: it is as if I already 'know' them ever before I move to 
enquire about them. 
No sooner has my gaze fallen upon a living body in process of acting than 
the objects surrounding it immediately take on a fresh layer of 
significance: they are no longer what I myself could make of them, they 
are what this other pattern of behaviour is about to make of them. Round 
about the perceived body a vortex forms, towards which my world is 
drawn and so to speak, sucked in.(phP.p.353; F405) 
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How can it happen that I 'know' the person before I meet them? Or is this an 
illusion? Perhaps we get some explanation of this in what happens with a very 
young baby as Merleau-Ponty mentions. 
If for fun I take one of its fingers between my teeth and pretend to chew it, 
the baby of fifteen months will open its mouth. And yet he has scarcely 
seen his face in a mirror and his teeth are not like mine. It is that his mouth 
and his teeth, as he feels them inside him, are straightaway for him 
designed for chewing, and my jaw such as he sees it from the outside is 
straightaway for him designed for the same intention. (PhP.p.352;F404)mt. 
It must be that the baby perceives the intention in his own body; he perceives my 
body with his body and my intention in his own body. He does not have to go 
through any process of thinking or preparation for this kind of perception. His body 
does it for him. This is the way our bodies are towards one another. In a similar 
way my body does it for me when I go to open the door to a client. This is the pre-
personal perception which our bodies are amazingly engaged in all the time. And it 
is upon this that all subsequent knowledge builds. The skills of the therapist so 
painfully learned, build upon this perception. All his training is directed to allow 
this meeting to happen because this is the beginning of a perception that heals. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has given a sketch of the actual practice of body-based Gestalt therapy. It 
also shows, in contrast, how the lived body has become somewhat forgotten in the 
theoretical articulations of Gestalt therapy. This chapter also affords a context for an 
extended statement of Gestalt therapy theory from the writer whom I consider to be an 
outstanding theoretician: Gary Y ontef I take forward his statement in a application of 
Merleau-Ponty's philosphy. 
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Arthur Roberts 
Gary Yonter, who has written and taught extensively about Field Perspective, says that in 
his experience, it is one of the most difficult areas of theory for students to understand 
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(1993 p.286). This will not surprise anyone who is well acquainted with the subject: 
students find it so difficult because Field perspective presents them with a view of the 
world that is very different from that which has informed their education, during all the 
years of their schooling. For almost every one of us, the unity of the world, the possibility 
and solidity of knowledge, was represented in the solidity, reliability, simplicity and 
continuity of our knowledge of things, nicely separate, each one in its own place over, 
opposite against us, out there. We relied on our ability to describe each thing as a 
'network of general properties'; and for a deeper and even more reliable knowledge of 
things we could always fall back on Science. We got used to knowing things by 
themselves with no complications. Field perspective changes all that; just as Merleau-
Ponty's philosophy 'of ambiguity' changes all that. Field perspective invites us to a world 
in which 'a wooden wheel placed on the ground is not for sight the same thing as wheel 
bearing a load. '(PhP.p.52;F64). And that same wheel carries about with it the history of 
its fashioning and of the designer whose thought it articulates. The light of a candle is no 
longer just a chemical interaction resulting in light, but for a child who has been burned, 
it becomes a repulsive thing; things are viewed 'as concentrating in themselves a whole 
scene ..... or segment oflife' (PhP. ibid.). A person is no longer just an individual living 
her own life, but is carrying the influences of her family and neighbourhood. The two 
boys who killed the toddler Jamie Bolger are no longer just two youngsters given over to 
their own private evil; their neighbours, their relatives, their teachers, the journalists, all 
of us, in fact, have a part in what happened. In the field perspective, everything is 
connected with everything else, not by the bond of 'efficient causality' but because we 
belong in the same world and we belong with one another. ' .... field theory invites the 
Gestalt practitioner into non-linear thinking ... .It honours the specific nature of situations 
and people ... .It is relativistic and nondichotomous ..... It underlines present-centredness 
and the uniqueness of moments .... Above all the field is organized (meaning arises out 
of the constellation of energies, vectors, or influences in the field as they act together),. 
(Parlett, 1997, p. 19) 
'Field Theory' or 'Field Perspective' is one ofthe three supporting pillars of Gestalt 
therapy theory according to Yontef(1993) and Resnick, (1995). Since it was first 
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launched (rather ambiguously) by PHG in 1951 it has been the main growth area for 
theory. In this chapter it is my aim to embody this rich concept and demonstrate how the 
advances in thinking about it can serve to unify Gestalt therapy theory around its central 
concern; the lived body. I shall first of all describe and explain Field Theory. Then I 
shall show how this theory is best understood if we come to it phenomenologically. This 
is in contrast to an approach used by most writers of deriving it from the pioneering 
researches of Kurt Lewin. I shall use this to contrast the phenomenological methodology 
of Gestalt therapy with the 'scientific' approach. I shall then review the way in which 
some outstanding Gestalt therapy writers deal with Field Theory and endeavour to take 
forward their insights by the application ofMerleau-Ponty's philosophy. 
Section One: Field Perspective Described 
Yontef, a leading theoretician of Gestalt therapy, includes Field Theory as one of the 
three essentials in order that an approach in psychotherapy can legitimately call itself 
Gestalt therapy (1983/93 p.203). Field perspective is important in Gestalt Therapy 
because it enables the practitioner to work in a clinical way that is appropriate to Gestalt 
therapy, which is by being open to the totalfield ofthe person in a very focused way. 
This means, as Robine (1999, p.65) and Wheeler (2000, p.29f) eloquently tell us, that the 
therapist is no longer an individual 'relating' to an isolated individual; but each of us sees 
himself as embedded in a world of relationships and our meeting becomes a meeting of 
communities. We can ask "Where is this community"? The community is present in my 
lived body - more-or-Iess according to the love that binds me to people. In practice, this 
means that it is no longer a source of shame to have needs, or to carry injuries; it is no 
longer a shameful thing to show one's weakness and ask for support and receive it. By 
means of Field Perspective a therapist sees herself differently - no longer an enthroned 
'professional' having to put up a front of knowledge and strength - 'I'm OK but you're 
not OK - yet!'; he/she embraces the totality of their humanity. I recall how helpful it was 
to a supervisee of mine, who was extremely embarrassed as she played one of her taped 
sessions on the cassette player, when I told her just how embarrassing it is still for me, 
after all these years, to play tapes of my sessions. 
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There follows now a brief explanation of Field Theory in Gestalt therapy: I am taking the 
indented passages from Malcolm Parlett (1991, p.90). 
• The essence offield theory is ..... a holistic perspective towards the person (this) 
extends to include environment, the social world, organisations, and culture ..... 
• As a general outlook, a way of talking about and making sense of human 
experience, field theory attempts to capture the interrelated flow of unfolding 
human reality, impregnated as it is with our personal meanings and 
significance ..... 
• A method and a whole way of thinking which relates to the intimate 
interconnectedness between events and the settings or situations in which these 
events take place (ibid.p.70). 
Those three formulations above can readily be seen as abstract representations of the 
phenomenological gaze, a global experience of the other which is at the heart of Gestalt 
Therapy. In much of the writing of Gestalt therapy theory, field perspective is portrayed 
mainly as a theory: as a way of thinking about the situation with the client. This thinking 
is what makes it so difficult, as Yontef remarks 'perhaps the most difficult aspect of 
Gestalt therapy to discuss' (YontefG. 1993, p.286). It is not hard to appreciate the 
importance ofField Perspective for the practice of Gestalt therapy. It is essential to allow 
the total person to emerge. 
And then Parlett proceeds to explain at length Five Principles ofField Theory: 
(i) The Principle of Organisation: Everything is interconnected and meaning 
derives from the total situation. 
In practice this can mean not using handy rules of thumb to find the meaning of clients' 
behaviour. So, if a client arrives late, I cannot conclude that he does not want to come to 
therapy - the meaning belongs in the whole situation. 
(ii) The Principle of Contemporaneity: It is the constellation of influences in the 
present field, which explains present behaviour. 
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In practice this can mean that if a client is behaving with me as if I was his father, then 
the explanation of this is to be found in what is going on in the room now (this includes 
me as therapist). This principle calls into question the way a therapist can stand back 
from a transference as if it had nothing to do with him. Here we have the invoking of 
temporality; not only is the NOW present, but the NOW is carrying the past and 
promising a future. 
(iii) The Principle of Singularity: Each situation and field is unique. Generalisations 
are, therefore, suspect. 
It demands that the therapist respect the specialness of each client and stops him (the 
therapist) jumping to conclusions about what is best for the client. The uniqueness of a 
situation properly belongs in the uniqueness of bodily experience; feelings, sensation, 
posture, breathing and so forth. 
(iv) The Principle of Changing Process: This refers to the field undergoing 
continuous change. This states the enormous complexity of the field. 
In such a view absolutes are out. Labels that can be stuck on a client and follow her 
everywhere are contrary to this principle. In predict and expect a client to behave in a 
particular way then I am introducing a potent factor into the field and may even induce 
the expected behaviour. 
(v) The Principle of Possible Relevance; no part of the total field can be excluded 
in advance as inherently irrelevant however mundane, ubiquitous, or apparently 
tangential it may appear to be. 
Note here 'possible' relevance: it does not mean that everything is equal in relevance, but 
that it is not possible to decide before-hand - which is a common practice. (For instance, 
you may know from another place that a client has been sexually abused. This may not 
be the most relevant factor in the meeting with the client - you do not know until the 
meeting happens). What is ruled out by this principle is specification in advance. The 
field is other and therefore inexhaustibly complex. 
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This principle asks great openness of the therapist. A client presents, for instance, with an 
inability to form lasting relationships, and 'happens' to have a slight lisp. This may seem 
to have nothing to do with the presenting 'problem'. Field theory would ask the therapist 
to be open to every possibility. 
It may seem from reading the above that the benefit ofField Perspective is simply in 
having many high and noble thoughts and imaginations. Field perspective is essentially a 
bodily experience in that it is a challenge to pass from what 1 am to what 1 aim to be; and 
this is accomplished by movement. 
Field perspective can be seen as the implementation in psychotherapy of my 'being-in-
the-world'. This means that 'I am given to myself merely as a certain hold upon the 
world' (PhP. p.354;F354). 
Section Two: The Problem of the Importation of Field Theory from Science 
The difficulty here is the way in which Gestalt therapy writers seem to bypass 
phenomenology as the source ofField Perspective thinking, and look instead to the exact 
sciences. There is a question immediately about the derivation of this 'theory'. My point 
is this: Unless field perspective arises out of the lived experience of the therapist then it 
must be classed as knowledge and becomes a category of subsumption. That way it 
constitutes only a way of thinking in Gestalt therapy. The literature of Gestalt therapy 
theory generally represents field perspective as deriving from the work of Kurt Lewin. 
To my mind, it would be better for the cohesiveness of Gestalt therapy theory if it was 
taken as an aspect of our perception, which has emerged through phenomenological 
reduction. 
In this search for the validation ofField Theory in the writings of Kurt Lewin we have an 
i1ustration of the consequences of a founding philosophy that lacks radical connection to 
the lived body. It is only when we enter what Merleau-Ponty calls the phenomenal field, 
where my body is the pivot of the world and unites in itself the "subjective" and the 
"other", that we seek within our own immediate experience the validation of our world 
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view. When people think (consciously or unconsciously) in terms of a determined world 
(PhP p.208; F241), then they quite naturally look to the findings of science to validate 
and elaborate their world view. 
Reviewing the Attribution 
Let us briefly review this attribution to Kurt Lewin by Gestalt therapy theorists. 
Mackewn (1997, p.14) widens the attribution but stresses the importance to Gestalt 
therapy of its emergence amongst the Berlin psychologists. Yontef(1993 p.240) anchors 
Field Theory firmly in the work of Kurt Lewin~ Wheeler (1991198; 2000) finds its origins 
in the thinking of Paul Goodman; but he also attributes the theory to Lewin. Parlett also, 
whom I quoted above and who has written most lucidly about Field Theory, finds its 
source in the genius of Kurt Lewin who pioneered the study of social groupings of field 
theory. 
Under the influence of powerful writers like Yontef, Field Theory has more and more 
come to be seen as the key element in Gestalt therapy. Some texts do not formally treat of 
it at all~ eg Polster and Polster (1973)~ Zinker, J. (1978) and Korb Gorrel and Riet (1989). 
Zinker makes up for his omission in a later book (1998)- and extends himself to a lengthy 
explanation of field theory - attributing its origin to Kurt Lewin. 
I am not calling into question its pivotal position in Gestalt therapy theory. Without Field 
Theory, Gestalt therapy could be at a loss to establish a basis for its holism. The question 
is about the derivation ofField Theory. 
Lewinian Field Theory Yields a World View Uncongenial to Gestalt therapy 
There is abundant evidence that Lewin was and remained all his life74 a dedicated natural 
74Speigelberg (1972, p.80) says that Lewin is frequently mentioned as a leading American 
phenomenologist; but this was mainly pre-Husserlean phenomenology, such as he would have learned from 
Carl Stumpf his director and supervisor - who had also been a teacher of Husserl. 
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scientist (Marrow, 1969, pp.188ff, de Rivera, 1976, p.3). He carried the assumptions of a 
scientist of that time. This means that he worked with the assumption of a determined 
world ruled by causality. In such a world perception is reduced to 'an inspection of the 
mind' (Mallin, 1979, pI71). Causality implies predictability: 'The practical tasks of 
mental hygiene and education demand conceptual tools which permit prediction' 
(Lewin, 1940/1951, pI.). Such expectation compromises the methodology proper to 
Gestalt therapy theory. It is not possible to separate a method from the world view that it 
begets; just as it is not possible to separate a theology from the view of ultimate reality 
that inspires it; or the laws of a state from the envisaged 'common good' that informs 
laws. 
The methodology from which Lewin's theory arose was one of scientific observation and 
the verification of hypotheses with the goal of telling us about the 'thing-in-itseIr. We 
have an example of this methodology in the work of Tamara Dembo, a student of 
Lewin's, who was guided by him in constructing her work on anger of which I shall 
speak more fully further on in this chapter. The observer is not involved in the 
experiment. 
F or Lewin Thinking is the high-point of contact with the world. The real world is the 
world of Science. It seems to me that Lewin, like his colleague Koflka - working in the 
culture of that time where Science was thought of as the only gate to real knowledge 
(Kohler, 1930, p.26) - thought of a 'return to things' in totally different terms to that 
presented in Gestalt therapy.7' Just as Kohler does in his Gestalt Psychology (1930) so 
does Kotl'ka in his Principles of Gestalt Psychology (1935) - they both make it the task of 
Psychology to refine its methods, learn from the established sciences and 'catch up'. 
They are locked into a Cartesian paradigm of perception, which sees in thinking and 
reflection the high-point of contact with the world. (Van den Berg 1980, p.23-24) 
7' An example of this is the opening words of ch. 1 of his Gestalt Psychology. 'There seems to be a single 
starting point for psychology, exactly as for all the other sciences: the world as I find it, naively and 
uncritically'. In fact, as you read on, you see it was a vety formed and structured world he was speaking 
about. His starting point was not radically phenomenological. 
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So, for Koflka in Ch 1 of the Principles: (he is sketching out the emergence and 
development of the scientific outlook) thinking is what perception is all about: 
And man slowly discovered the errors in his original world. He learned to distrust 
what things told him, and gradually he forgot the language of the birds and stones. 
Instead he developed a new activity called THINKING. (Kofika 1935, p.7) 
(emphasis his). 
The methodology of Lewin is to deal with events or things in the world. This is 
abundantly clear on every page of his Field Theory in Social Science (1952), - I give an 
excerpt below - this is the source most commonly cited by Gestalt therapy writers. 
According to Heelan (1988, p.157), whose work lays the foundations for a philosophy of 
Science based on the primacy of perception, there was one general assumption 
underlying the naturalistic approach of classical scientists: that the human being is a 
product of the earth like anything else and is subject in all her/his movements and 
experiences to the same laws as govern every other 'natural' thing. It is the world of 
Galileo, Descartes, Newton and Maxwell - a world of causality, which presupposes 
extension - "partes extra partes". In such a view of human being, there is no room for 
ambiguity, for what we call embodied subjectivity, which implies both a belonging in the 
world and a transcendence of that world. Scientific method cannot work within a 
philosophy of ambiguity, which treats a person as belonging in the world just a much as 
anything else, yet transforming and creating the world; where the unity of the body is not 
a notional unity, but inhabits the body through an intention 'that is not a thought .... But 
takes for granted all the latent knowledge of itself that my body possess' (PhP p.233; 
F269). A philosophy of ambiguity such as that ofMerleau-Ponty,76 admirably suits 
76Une Philosophie de !'Ambiguite is the title given by A. De Waelhens to his commentaIy on 
Phenomeno!ogie de /a Perception which Merleau-Ponty published in 1951. De Waelhens had previously 
used this as the title to his forward to the second edition of La Structure du Comportment. The opening 
words in the Avant-Propos of de Waelhens 1951 work is a humble apology to M. Ferdinand Alquie who 
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Gestalt therapy which is concerned with perception/intersubjectivity. Perception cannot 
be called 'an event in the world' like a shooting star and yet, it has a profound 
commonality with the stars. But if! treat it as just another event then I miss out on its 
depth and meaning and set up again the subject/object dualism within which Gestalt 
therapy becomes impossible. 
I wish now to demonstrate the approach of Lewin so that we can appreciate how his goal 
and methodolgy are inappropriate to Gestalt therapy. 
Lewin's Approach Illustrated 
I have some hesitations about going into such detail about Lewin's method; especially as 
Parlett (1997) specifically states that we do not have to follow him in this 
numerical/algebraic ideas to appreciate his fundamental insight. At the same time I am 
aware that Yontefclaims 'a scientific theory'(1993,p.203) as one of the essentials for a 
viable psychotherapy; I also recall that in my own Gestalt therapy training we were 
inducted into his exacting procedure. Furthermore, the point I made earlier stands: unless 
Field Theory comes out of my own experience then it is difficult to integrate it with the 
other theoretical structures of Gestalt therapy. 
Lewin is quite straightforward in his statements about method: 
"Formalisation will have to be achieved if psychology is to become an 
acceptable science, and psychology can and must take definite steps in that 
direction now. As psychologists, we are interested in finding new knowledge 
about, and deeper insight into, psychological processes. Theory, 
mathematisation and formalisation are tools for this purpose"(Lewin 1952, 
p.Sl). 
A few pages further on under the heading The Basic Assumptions and the Main 
had first used the title in an article in the review Fontaine. Merleau-Ponty himself did not much like that 
label upon his philosophy. Obviously, others, very enthusiastic about his work, thought otllerwise. 
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Derivation he uses the work of his pupil Zeigarnik who provided a first experimental test 
of the theory that 'the effect of intention was equivalent to the creation of an inner 
personal tension' to illustrate what he means by 'formalisation'. 
(AI) Assumption 1: The intention to reach a certain goal G (to carry out a 
certain action leading to G) corresponds to a tension (t) in a certain system (Sg) 
within the person so that (Sg) > o. This assumption co-ordinates a dynamic 
construct (system in tension) with the observable syndrome popularly called 
"intention". (loc. cit. p.9) 
And so Lewin proceeds through A2, A3, A3a and then Dl. 
I see such procedures as enormously valuable for proving in a formalised and 
mathematical way that, for instance, there is a greater tendency to recall spontaneously 
unfinished tasks than finished tasks. This clearly belongs to a different realm of discourse 
than that of Gestalt therapy whose realm of discourse is that of phenomenology which is 
'the study of the advent of being to consciousness instead of presuming its possibility as 
given in advance.' (PhP p.61: F74) 
Lewin's Goal is also different he aims for predictability and clarity of concept. In Gestalt 
therapy theory the goal is always the phenomenology of awareness which is another way 
of speaking about the hermeneutic circle (Richardson, W.J. 1963, p.41_42)77. The basic 
assumption of Gestalt therapy is the givenness of the lived body; everything else trails 
behind that. 
The clash of the two realms of discourse emerges starkly if we consider an example. 
Suppose a Gestalt therapist is asked to intervene in a dysfunctional family. He 
approaches to assess the stricken family using the Field Theoretical Construct 
77 The presupposition in Gestalt therapy theory is that the hwnan being begins from a comprehension of 
Being. Otherwise they would not stress immediacy as they do. 'This comprehension is presupposed in that 
vague, pre-conceptual, self-evident seizure of being which Heidegger holds to be indisputable'. This is 
Merleau-Ponty's 'givenoess'. The hermeneutic circle moves from the vague to the precise (Richardson 
W.J. 1963). 
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"Tension"(loc. cit. p.9) as the instrument of investigation. He cannot but then assume the 
presupposition built into this instrument: that we best know a thing when we objectivize 
it. This, of itself, weights the process and outcome because the very inherent structure of 
understanding is 'that it always projects a context of meaning or involvement ahead of 
itself (Dillon, M. 1997. p.179). He sees himself as apart from that family - this will in 
tum, affect the members of the family and affect their behaviour in his presence. In the 
Lewinian approach - as is apparent in the experiments ofDembo(1976) - he must omit 
from his experience of the family a whole world of phenomena which do not come under 
the construct but which phenomenologically register with him in his body. 
Bodily space may be given to me in an intention to take hold without being given 
in an intention to knOw. (PhP p104; F121) 
It is universally accepted amongst Gestalt therapists that whereas speech is very 
important it is certainly not the only factor in the interactive field. There is gesture, 
movement, breathing, looking, feeling, the voice itself allows a huge range in tone, 
modulation and speech - all of which are of a piece with the look on the face, the eyes, 
the angle of the head and so on. Every part of the field is of possible relevance. 
'To start with the assumption some part of the field is unimportant (violating 
phenomenological principles) may exclude access to that here-and-now residue 
of past experience that is available e.g. in body language or hidden assumptions. 
To be purely verbal and try to be 'here-and-now' would miss too much to be 
effective. (Yontef, 197911993 p.193) 
I take the point made by Parlett (1997) that Lewin's ideas can inform practice not 
research; however, such 'tagging' will not promote a cohesive body of theory. 
The Lewin Approach Does not Deliver the Total Field 
Field theory - as formulated by Parlett, for instance - makes the point that the whole 
world is, ultimately, the field of all fields. This is the approach required if one is to take 
the phenomenon seriously as our only access to reality, it is the approach of a 
phenomenological ontology. Otherwise we enter an infinite regress in endeavouring to 
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ground the reality of our enquiry. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty makes this presence of the 
world the guarantor of the reality of my perception and sanity: 
" ... because from the very start I am in communication with one being, and one 
only, a vast individual from which my own experiences are taken, and which 
persists on the horizon of my life as the distant roar of a great city provides the 
background to everything we do in it". (pbP p.328; F378) 
We need to take this just one step further, before we move on; the world is present to me 
in my body. My body is not just a collection of processes, 'defined once and for all', it is 
incorrect to say 'my body is in a place or space', since my body itself makes a place to be 
what it is, like a woman's smile gladdens the world. Where my body is the whole world is 
present. 'The problem of the world, and to begin with that of my body, consists in the 
fact that it is all there (PhP p.198; F 121). 
Essential to the Lewin approach is a pre-conceived construct. This is bound to prejudice 
the outcome because it is too narrow and accommodates only certain elements in the 
field. What is really happening is that I am telling my body how it must respond - which 
may be fine in scientific investigations but unsuited to the phenomenal field which is the 
realm of Gestatt" therapy. Here 'it is the body which points out, and which speaks' (phP 
p.197; F230). 
We see a variation on the same difficulty in that Lewin's limited approach is concerned 
with theoretical constructions about the phenomena. 'Phenomenology is concerned with 
the study of the structure and the variations of structure, of the consciousness to which 
any thing, event, or person appears.' (Giorgi, 1975, p.83). Lewin imposes structure, 
phenomenology allows structures to emerge. 
Support from Frankel's Study 
My misgivings about the wisdom of importing Lewin into Gestalt therapy theory is 
supported by the findings of Cynthia Frankel's interesting study: A Theoretical and 
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Empirical Dialogue between the Lewinian and Phenomenological Approaches to 
Psychological Research (1979). 
Frankel's study takes further the dialogue between the Gestalt and phenomenological 
approaches. She first of all summarises the Lewinian and phenomenological approaches 
to psychological investigation. Then she takes two empirical studies on anger: one by T. 
Dembo, one of Lewin's pupils (1925 - 1928) and the other by E. Mann of Duquesne 
University (1969), a phenomenologist. She compares and contrasts them. 
She points out how they begin differently: Dembo 'defines the situation in advance' - she 
designs the investigation so as to arouse anger in the participants. Mann brackets her 
everyday knowledge of what anger is, so that she will not pre-define either pole of the 
phenomenon. Mann does not engage with the actual anger of the subject but 
'presupposes that individuals have reflective access to their experience'; so she works 
with the recollected anger of the subjects. Dembo sees herself as 'an objective scientist' 
'unaffected by the struggle that ensues between her and them (the subjects)'. Dembo also 
takes it for granted that she 'grasps the real situation' and 'fails to reflect on how she, 
who is extremely involved in the situation, is constituting her own psychological field 
which comprises, after all,' "her access to her subjects'" experiences' (Frankel 1979 
p.94). Mann, on the other hand' seeks to sustain intimacy with her subjects by adhering 
to their described experiences and continually reflecting upon her own participation in the 
process. Whereas for Mann, the duration of the experience of anger was left to the 
experience of the subject, for Dembo it was confined to the temporal limits of the 
experiment. This meant that the anger of the investigation was removed from the life-
context and that the most important other present was never 'angry-back'. In contrast to 
this, Mann's methodology ensured that the whole of the person's life was present in the 
narration of their anger; and the important other in their experience of anger could be 
recollected as being angry. We see here clearly in Dembo's work the limitation of the 
field - which excludes the total life of the subject. This is also true of her relationship 
with her subjects: it is limited to the experimenter-subject area. Mann is investigating the 
lived world of the subject; Dembo is focussed on an isolated event. 
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Section Three: Some Gestalt Therapy Theory Writers 
The Consequences of Importing Field Theory 
To demonstrate the consequences I shall take three outstanding Gestalt therapy writers 
and draw on their works: G. Yontef; G. Wheeler; A. Roberts. These are all leading 
theoreticians with many publications to their names. In this section I shall confine myself 
to one relatively short but highly significant work by Wheeler, an article in the British 
Gestalt Journal. His other works require more attention than I can give them here. It is 
my conclusion that Lewinian Field Theory has been imported into Gestalt therapy theory 
without facing up to the difficulties which it brings along with it. 
Y ontef and Field Theory 
Yontef sees Field Theory as a useful tool and as many other things too: an excellent aid in 
the essential work of unearthing assumptions: 
Not examining Peds' individualistic, confrontative and drama oriented theoretical 
stances of the 1960s, had an extremely harmful effect on the development of 
Gestalt therapy. A field analysis would look at the total context of the work, 
especially the interpersonal relations.(Yontef, 1993, p .. 287) 
Furthermore Field theory provides 'guidance and orientation'; it is a 'vital part of Gestalt 
therapy theory'. It could 'help resolve many issues in psychology' which a Newtonian 
approach cannot resolve; field theory language avoids the dilemmas created by dualistic 
thinking; it surmounts the objections which people raise against the inclusion of 'physical 
energy as a necessary aspect to a holistic theory', as a throw-back to Freudian drive 
theory. The theory of self in Gestalt - which avoids reifying the self by seeing the self as 
dialogic process - can only be understood in the context of field theory. So, Field Theory 
is very 'useful'. 
On the other hand he makes Field Theory the central element of Gestalt therapy theory. 
Although he speaks of it as 'a theory' he sees it as embracing every other theoretical 
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element in Gestalt. Yontef aequiperates holism and field theory. ( 1993, pp. 77,86,90,181 
et passim). He makes it a cornerstone of the edifice of Gestalt theory and says that 
Gestalt, long before other therapies, accepted that the truth of any event or person is to be 
pursued in the relationships of that the person/event (loc.cit.). He links field theory with 
dialogue (1989/9, p.131-132) which he lists as the first essential mark of' genuine' 
Gestalt therapy. 
It does not appear to me that Yontef appreciates the confusion and limitation that 
accompanies the importation ofField Theory from the work of Lewin. Although he does 
say , In the light of all this I believe it behoves us all to show some caution about 
introjecting theories from physics.' (1984/1993, p.365). The 'all this' is the 'rapid 
change' and conflicts within physics as an area of study. In this essay he has an excellent 
discussion of the relation of Gestalt therapy to the empirical sciences, yet he does not 
seem to me to appreciate the difficulty adverted to by Merleau-Ponty (Ph.P.p.396; 
F454f8 associated with the transfer of evidence from one realm of discourse to another. 
Whereas Yontefappreciates the necessity ofa dynamic view of the world (which avoids 
the consequences of the 'determined world view'), his concept of phenomenology does 
not allow him to see where else such a view can be derived from, if not from Lewin. In 
this regard it is significant, I think that he makes field theory and phenomenology two of 
the three principles definitive of Gestalt therapy theory. 
A Counter Argument 
Someone may urge, as Strasser does, that Merleau-Ponty himself in his Phenomenology 
of Perception draws extensively on empirical work - for instance on the work of 
78 The context here is Merleau-Ponty's discussion of evidence; historical evidence moves not from an idea 
but from 'something'. In order to move from one realm of thought to another I can do so only by taking for 
granted a whole world of thought as 'self evident'. 'Once launched and committed to a certain set of 
thoughts, Euclidean space for example .... I discover evident truths; but these are not unchallengeable' 
(pbP loc. cit SUpl3). The difficulty for Gestalt thernpy theory is that the 'self evident' truths of Lewin's 
world, are unsupportive of therapy. 
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Goldstein (cf Strasser, E. 1963 p.291). The famous case of Schneider's wound is one 
such instance. 
This objection is met by noting the way in which he makes use of the anomalous 
behaviour of this man with an eye injury. He treats of this in the chapter on the 
'Spatiality of One's Own Body and Motility' (PhP p.98;FI14). He uses it to show that the 
anomalies cannot be understood either in terms of causal explanation and attributed to a 
breakdown in visual ability or in terms of a breakdown in 'symbolic function' because 
my body is provided with a 'praktognosia' - 'it has its world or understands its world, 
without having to make use of my 'symbolic' or 'objectifying function'(phP p.140-
141;F164). So, Merleau-Ponty concludes we must look instead for explanation in terms 
of bodily intentionality and the way in which our body is not 'in' space but lives space. 
So, far from importing a scientific theory into his analysis, Merleau-Ponty makes use of 
the observations of the scientist to confirm his own analysis. 
Wheeler: How Field Theory Meets a Problem in Development 
In this section I wish to return to the article of Gordon Wheeler's, which I used in 
Chapter 7 Section Two: The Body Eclipsed. We recall how Wheeler, using the notion of 
Field from Lewin and joining it up with the seminal notion ofField in PHG, brings 
forward a concept of Self favourable to a developmental model in therapy. 
I intend to show how this can be further understood and developed by the application of 
the philosophy ofMerleau-Ponty. 
Recall the article headed: Towards a Gestalt Development Model (1998B). 
Recall also the problem Wheeler is addressing: the reification of the person - to see a 
person as a thing; as an object, as a 'resource'. This is part of the 'natural attitude' and is 
quite taken for granted throughout our society; e.g. travellers are 'customers'; people who 
work are 'human resources'; managers count 'human units'. The difficulty is that if we 
regard people as 'objects' we go on to treat them as such. It is destructive of the whole 
project of Gestalt therapy to treat a person as an object. 
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Wheeler proposes in this article a different and dynamic view of self - which, as he points 
out, he draws from what has been part of Gestalt psychotherapy theory from the start. 
Quoting Paul Goodman 79 - he relocates self-process at the boundary between me and the 
thing - rather than having it hidden in the centre of the person. 
In Wheeler's concept the selfis no longer a res, it is a process - so the selfis discernable 
only in terms of the world. In this view person and world merge. 
Wheeler is in fact re-instating the original Goodman vision while at the same time 
looking over his shoulder to the assumptions of a psychology based on a determined 
world view. He knows that such views will not work in Gestalt therapy. 
Taking Wheeler's Notions Forward 
By this model of the SELF, which has the powerful advantage of connecting the person 
closely to the world/environment, Wheeler facilitates the dialogical approach so 
characteristic of Gestalt therapy. In such a model the subject is perceived as a carrier of 
meaning - able to answer questions and commanding the respect of the therapist in every 
area of their encounter. Here there is no question of perception being viewed as 'contents 
being presented to an ego' - a model which in no way promotes dialogue. 
By introducing the time dimension, which adheres to our body as its natural element, we 
can take forward his notion of self as process. Let us first see the SELF as the lived 
body; always changing, always in dialogue with the environment. The lived body is the 
foundation of any notion of personal identity - just as it is the foundation for any other 
specification such as 'I am sad' or 'I am a mathematician' or 'I have suffered a terrible 
loss'. This SELF articulates itself through my choices, through my thinking, through 
awareness of the ever-changing landscape of its feelings, sensations and movements. This 
79paul Goodman (1911 - 1972) is generally regarded as a co-founder of Gestalt therapy with Fritz Perls. I 
have spoken more fully about him in Chapter 6 of this study, Foundations of Gestalt Therapy. That 
Wheeler is drawing on Lewin we know from another place. In both his (1991198) Gestalt Reconsidered and 
his (2000) Beyond Individualism he invokes Lewin. 
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SELF is aware - painfully sometimes, of the passage of natural time both as opportunity 
and threat, and it knows how, through the pulse of its existence, it can transcend the 
'instants oftime' (PhP p.397;F399). Such transcendence opens up the possibility of a 
'totally new future to me in which I shall be able to reflect upon the element of opacity in 
my present' (loc.cit). Such reflection brings with it a realization of my place in the world 
and in the scheme of things. The threat of damage is part of my SELF in that 'I shall 
never manage to seize the present through which 1 live with apodictic certainty and since 
the lived-in is never entirely comprehensible, what 1 understand never quite tallies with 
my living experience' (PhP p.347;F399). As such a SELF 1 have to come to terms with 
the fact that I am never quite at home with myself 
Wheeler is tentative in coming forward with his resolution - expecting resistance from his 
readers. There would not be that resistance if his suggestion was a natural follow-through 
from modes of thought already established. This indicates, perhaps, that field theory is 
not arrived at as emergingfrom the lived experience of the therapists but is adhered to in 
an abstract way as 'belonging' to the traditional teaching of Gestalt therapy. 
Primacy in Perception? 
1 wish to look more closely at an interesting remark by Wheeler. 
'The most crucial feature of this picture is one that is often left out ... the fact that 
the field of self-experience is not for the most part a field of objects at all. Rather 
it is a world of people .... '(loc.cit. p.117) 
I think Wheeler is saying that the intentionality, the thrust in our perceptual, motor, 
cognitive/linguistic regions is towards intersubjectivity; and that is in accord with what 
Field perspective is about. On the other hand our mode of existence - being in-the-world 
makes no distinction between people and things. We can reach people only in things and 
things only in terms of people. 
As we shall see in my chapter on The Body Situated, my very existence is sustained and 
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made meaningful by my relationship with things and their existence is s80ustained in their 
relationship with me. We lean against one another; mutual support. The relationship is 
reciprocal but not symetrical. The things that surround me, that graciously disclose 
themselves to me, the furniture of this room, the ticking clock, the patio door, need me in 
order to be a world; and I need them to live my world. 'A world' is born of this between; 
this 'world' is not present exclusively in either polarity, in me or in those things, but in 
the between. I respectfully suggest that to accord a primacy to the perception of persons, 
the way Wheeler does, runs the risk ofre-instating dualism. We need to be on our guard 
against is lapsing back into two kinds of being - the being of my relationship with things 
and the being of my relationship with people. Just as it is only in terms of the world of 
things that I know myself, so it is only in terms of that same world that I know you, a 
person. I see you walking in the same street, responding to the cold, I hear you speaking, 
I perceive you hurrying. My body picks up on your body, just as the body of a baby 
responds to movements of your hands and mouth in pretence of biting his toes, without 
the infant having any previous knowledge of such behaviour (phP p.352;F404). 
I would agree with Wheeler if he means that when we reflect we can see that everything 
about us is ordered to intersubjective relations. At this level we can have competition 
between things and people in our perception. But at that level of perception, where the 
world is the horizon of our perception, the other person is, literally, inconceivable apart 
from the world which we both share. 
'The thing is inseparable from the person perceiving it and can never be actually 
in itseifbecause its articulations are those of our very existence, and because it 
stands at the other end of our gaze or at the terminus of a sensory exploration 
which invests it with humanity'. (ph.P.p.320;F370). 
80 It is worth noting that this between is intentionality, the noematic / noetic structure, the objective-
subjective and the subjective-objective (cfCh.2;p.30). There is an ineluctable tension between these aspects 
of one and the same event 
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What is the Whole-Field-Self 
I have already addressed the question of the locus of the whole-field-self.(cfHP. 
pp2; 183; 187;290) The third point I wish to address is the ontological status of what 
Wheeler calls the 'whole-field-self. 
Although the body is central to Gestalt therapy in practice, it has been very difficult to 
marry this centrality with theory. Field perspective in Gestalt therapy theory amounts to 
nothing more than the way our embodied subjectivity is present in the world. This is as 
apparent as one would expect it to be in the writings of Y ontef, Parlett, and Roberts or 
Wheeler. Nor is it the viewpoint of Lewin, as we have seen. 
Gestalt therapy - Theory standstill 
Gestalt therapy theory has difficulties with development (Wheeler, 1992/98, p.v-xxi) .. 
This is due to the fact that whereas Gestalt therapy professes to be phenomenological it 
inherits an undeveloped form of phenomenology, which is of little help for theory 
elaboration. And furthermore, although it moves at the phenomenological level, Gestalt 
therapy theory does not in its undergirding philosophy accord a clear ontological status to 
the phenomenon as our only access to reality. Lastly, we have seen how its most basic 
position omits the lived body; nobbled in this way by its beginnings, the writers struggle 
to integrate the various aspects of the therapy into a coherent schema. Attempts at such a 
schema, under the umbrella ofField Theory, were powerfully promoted by Yontef and 
others in the late 1970's and during the 1980's. All of them referred back to Kurt Lewin. 
He was a brilliant researcher, the founder of social psychology, a Gestalt psychologist 
from the original Berlin Institute and a close colleague of the famous triumvirate 
Wertheimer, Koflka and Kohler. Field theory has since become a platform from which 
development in Gestalt therapy is launched. 
Arthur Roberts 
It is from this launching pad that Arthur Roberts speaks. Almost as a lone voice he 
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addresses the fundamental problem in his article The Field Talks Back (1999). 
Roberts tells us that his article derives from his strong sense that 'Gestalt theory has, 
stalled' (loc.cit. p.37). He says that the season of the Constructivists applying their 
insights to Gestalt theory has had its day. What has happened to transform all the 
excitement of the early days 'into a kind of intellectual standstill'? The mistake has been, 
he says' to neglect the order, which is inherent in thefield.'(p.33.emphasis in text.). The 
problem is that he sees no clear way out of the difficulties that attend anyone for whom 
the only world is the-world-as-I-understand-it. (This is precisely the world of Kurt Lewin 
and the Gestalt psychologists). 
Roberts appeals to a field that is 'not socially constructed' that 'existed prior to our 
thinking and talking about it'. He finds intimations of this in language, narrative, ethics 
and poetry. I notice that he works from the base of Heidegger's famous dictum that 
'language is the house of being' which gives rise to what Dillon calls 'post-hermeneutic 
scepticism' - 'that there is no access to either Being or beings that is not mediated by 
language' (Dillon, 1997, p.178). The philosophy that he finds in Gestalt therapy is simply 
unequal to that challenge. The problem that Roberts faces is that language has replaced 
the world as the theme of philosophical discourse. He discerns a 'disconnection from the 
source on which language relies and to which language always refers: our felt experience' 
(Roberts, A. loc.cit.p.37). Because he is not schooled in phenomenology, he is unable to 
develop this insight by the vocabulary of 'primordial contact' or Merleau-Ponty's 
distinction between 'originating and creative expression 'and 'secondary or 
institutionalized language' (phP.p.197;F229) (Dillon, 1997, p.182fl). Roberts notices 
that 'experience itself seems to be intimately connected to that which is not experienced', 
this makes it 'the field-phenomenon par excellence'. But this is where Gestalt theory 
grinds to a halt. He does not have available to him those profound concepts of 
anonymity, intentionality and transcendence so developed by Merleau-Ponty. Gestalt 
theory has ground to a halt because it has, in some respects, wandered into a realm of 
discourse that is foreign to it. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have treated the most pivotal concept in Gestalt therapy theory: Field 
perspective. It is pivotal because it at once distinguishes Gestalt therapy as a truly holistic 
approach in therapy and defines the realm of discourse proper to Gestalt therapy. The 
twofold source from which the Gestalt theorists draw this notion is the writings of Paul 
Goodman in Gestalt Therapy and the work of Kurt Lewin the founder of Social 
Psychology. Goodman, under the strong influence of Dewey and James omits 
phenomenology almost entirely from his explanations of this theory; furthermore his 
explanations are confused and although profuse, are not convincing. Lewin is, on the 
other hand, very clear and convincing but not phenomenological; and his theory brings in 
its train an approach that is inimical to the Gestalt therapy view ofthe world. The effect 
of this is to close down for Gestalt theorists the very opening they need in order to 
develop and more deeply endow their theory. 
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Introduction 
This is the Chapter where I make good my claim in Chapter 4 that it would benefit the 
theoretical structures of Gestalt therapy to root its field theory in phenomenology rather 
than in the theories of Kurt Lewin. (cfHP. Ch.8 Field Perspective). 
In this chapter I intend to outline a point de depart for Gestalt therapy. To do that is to 
found Gestalt therapy ontologically. By 'ontologically found' I mean to elaborate a view 
of the world which makes sense of our experience and of the enterprise we embark upon 
in therapy, in terms of Being. If it is to be a point de depart it must, in some manner, 
contain its terminus ad quem - just as a pen before it writes at all must be 'suited for 
writing'. It must be an integrating philosophy, which holds together all the disparate 
facets of Gestalt therapy in a cohesive system. 
The point de depart for Gestalt therapy, which I outline in this Chapter, is different from 
that which we find in 'Gestalt Therapy': there it is reductionist in two ways: (i) the 
human being is reduced to being a series of experiences: 'You and your environment are 
not independent entities but together you constitute a functioning, mutually influencing 
total system ... Your sense of the unitary functioning of you andyour environment is 
contact' (PHG p.275). (ii) the theory is constructed upon the analogy between the human 
being in the world and 'the organism in the environment'. This is reductionist in that it 
omits the more basic human experience that '[ am given to myself'. It would probably 
more correct to say 'One is given to oneself,' since the'!, can be seen as a cultural 
construction. 
The point de depart that I deal with in this Chapter is called Situatedness, which 
describes the ontological status of everything in our world and constitutes a situation of 
ontological dependency between things. So, the 'body situated' is another way of 
describing my being-in-the-world. Situatedness is the 'givenness' present in every event 
in my life. It is the impersonal at the heart of every act of perception. 
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Perception is always in the mode of the impersonal 'one' .... Rather than being a 
genuine history, perception ratifies and renews in us a 'pre-history' 
(PhP.p.240;F277). 
This pre-history is the foundation of situatedness. It is that silent moment preceding 'the 
upsurge ofa true and exact world' (PhP.p.43;F65). 
'1 am given, that is, I find myself already situated and involved in a physical and 
social world - 1 am given to myself, which means that this situation is never 
hidden from me .... (PhP.p.360;F413). Italics in text. 
This is the root of my situatedness and it is the starting-point of Gestalt therapy as centred 
in the lived body. I shall begin by describing a therapist and client together, then we shall 
see that this admits of a fourfold view. The cohesive element in the situation is the bodies 
of the people involved. We shall then see how by using the concepts of intentionality, 
anonymity, transcendence and intersubjectivity we can gain a richer view of the 
possibilities of Gestalt therapy theory. 
Section One: Presence and Situation 
A client presents saying he is depressed to the point of wanting to kill himself. He has 
been referred by his doctor, who feels the patient might be helped by counselling. 
At first glance this looks like a simple situation - a meeting of two people. Here I am in 
my familiar surroundings, sitting in my usual place, with the symbols of my life on the 
bookshelves each side of the gas fire. The man tells me who has referred him to me, and 
he uses the word 'recommend', rather than 'referred', so this introduces another person 
into the meeting. There he is, a man in his early 50's, somewhat over-weight, breathing 
heavily as he moves and sits down in the chair. He sighs with relief as if he has got there 
after a lot of effort. 
I am aware of myself through wordless dialogue with my body which is me, and yet, in 
some sense, not-me. I experience in myself the pull of the earth upon me, which we call 
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gravity. I know what I know and am aware of the limitations of my knowledge. I am 
aware of being supported by the tea I have had and which feels warm inside me~ I also 
know that this man is the last person before lunch; my presence to-day is a little 
shadowed by that letter which I received this morning; brings me bad news of my friend 
Michael who has been in hospital for a time. Here I am, present to myself and to my 
client, yet this presence to myself is only partly luminous, because whatever I know of 
myself is already shot through with the inexhaustible opaqueness of the world. I know 
myself only in terms of things that are not me, and I am aware of not completely 
coinciding with myself 
To say it abstractly, that special unique incommunicable experience which I alone can 
have and which I call my subjectivity is accessible only in relation to 
objectivity/otherness and that otherness cannot be known except it can be enlightened by 
subjectivity (Mallin, 1979, p.18fl). Whereas I know myself a lot - with the insight of 
psychology - that knowledge is always of what was, and even then it was my biased view 
of what was! We have then a foursome: subjectivity facing otherness and otherness in 
turn facing SUbjectivity. And each of these implies the other. This drama of the forces of 
existence, this coincidence of past, present and future is realised and present in my living 
body. 
The Situational Dialectic 
But that is not all - there is my client. Can we meet? He sees himself in terms of me as I 
begin to see myself in terms of him. This is intentionality, we 'lean' towards one another. 
He can protect himself from me in a myriad of ways. The danger to him is that I shall 
view him as an interesting case - objectify him; and his only defence in tum will be to do 
the same to me (PhP.p.361;F414). The problem is that we have here two worlds reaching 
to become one. So that the same situational dialectic is operating between us as is 
between each of us and the world. This is what we mean when we say that to be a human 
being is to be situated - my being is to be involved with countless others. We are by no 
means just spectators of the world as the Idealists would have it, but involved. And the 
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experience of the world' ... .is lived from a certain point of view: the body's. It is this 
point of view which makes possible. "both the finiteness of my perception and its 
opening out upon the complete world as a horizon of every perception."(PhP,p.304;F350 
in Hammond, Howarth and Keat 1991, p.188). 
Situatedness - Ie 'point de depart ': Explained 
To be a human being is to be in a situation. From the very first moments of my dawning 
awareness' ... a world forms itself around me and begins to exist for me' (PhP.p.ix;Fiii). 
This is my primordial contact with the world. It precedes all knowledge; it is of this that 
all subsequent knowledge speaks, 
and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and 
derived sign-language, as is Geography in relation to the countryside in which 
we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is (PhP.p.ix;Fiii). 
I am here using the word 'situation' in that special sense which Mallin (1979, pp 8-9 et 
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passim) gives to it. He sees the concept of 'situation' as the basic building block of 
Merleau-Ponty's metaphysics. This is ontological situated ness so that 'situations 
interrelate to form a unified world' (loc. cit. p.1 0). It is because I am situated that I can 
wake up during the night in a strange room and recover myself from the sight of my 
clothes on the chair. My subjectivity is in jeopardy and is restored to me in my commerce 
with otherness, which in tum must carry a 'subjective' side. (Otherwise it could not be 
otherness). I only know who I am if the world about me tells me. It 'tells' me who I am 
by being 'not-me', that is by resisting me. It is only in the magic world of cartoons that 
DIY jobs can be accomplished without stubborn resistance from the world! And this 
resistance is not of my making. It at once proclaims my belonging and my alien condition 
81 Mallin ( loco cit.p.lO) excludes the sense in which Sartre uses the tenn 'situation' in his collection of 
essays under that title. For Sartre it designates 'external circumstances'. Mallin attributes its origin in 
Merleau-Ponty to the influence of Hegal's use of the concept Begriff. 
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in this world of things. Situatedness is entirely inescapable, immediate and totally 
universal; I open my eyes and I am surrounded by things and people; I open my ears and 
I hear all manner of sounds; I reach out my hands and I feel the surfaces of things; I smell 
and taste the world about me with my nose and mouth. I find myself surrounded on all 
sides by circumstances/events/people who challenge and resist me and evoke my 
potentiality for struggle. Every one of my senses immediately involves all the others so 
that a defect in any sense registers in my whole perception of the situation.82 And this 
intimate and enduring connection with things and the world through my body constitutes 
my existence. This overall condition of affairs is ontolOgical situatedness. 
Here I am not considering situation as a collection of brute facts which have to be dealt 
with, as for instance the situation of a political party after a bad election result; or the 
situation of being stranded at Crewe on a snowy winter's night. In those instances 
situation is no longer being considered as the unavoidable human condition but as an 
unfortunate contingency. Situation here is what I am born into and what departs from me, 
presumably, in death. I am not using 'situation' in the sense accorded to it by Robine, J-
M. (2001, p.95). There it refers to a definite field or dyad of therapist and client. 
Every experience of human being is of being-in-the-world. 'My body is the vehicle of 
being-in-the-world' (PhP.p.82;F97) (my emphasis). So, in this view then, my being 
which is not distinct from my body that is essentially relational, essentially dialogic, 
essentially ambiguous and essentially spatial. I am an embodied subjectivity. We can say 
that our on-going being is given us from the world - just as the world's being is conferred 
on it by us. Just as the moon without the sun is blackness to our vision, so a person 
without the 'gaze' of her surrounding world is darkness and non-being. Here now, as I sit 
writing, my world is constituted by the press of the chair under me, the screen to my left, 
the music of Classic FM coming like a gentle zephyr from the landing, the brightness of 
82Sclmeider's wound was in his eye and this it was that gave rise to all his other complicated problems 
(PhP. p. 113;F13 1). 
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the morning, the project of this work and those countless other relationships which 
comprise my life. 
'Through and Through compounded of Relationships' 
When I modify all those adjectives above, naming our human being as relational, 
dialogic, ambiguous, spatial, and embodied with the word 'essentially' I mean to indicate 
that the tiniest movement of my body is already informed by these structures and finds 
meaning only in reference to the situatedness of the whole person. So, when I gesture my 
client towards the waiting chair there takes place in me a total re-configuration of my 
world and this is articulated in the corresponding adjustment in the sinews and cells of 
my body. That person enters my world and my whole being lives out the intention of 
signalling him to sit in the chair. 
I am given to myself merely as a certain hold upon the world; (prise sur Ie 
monde); now, it is precisely my body which perceives the body of another, and 
discovers in that other body a miraculous prolongation of my own intentions, a 
familiar way of dealing with the world. Henceforth, as the parts of my body 
comprise a system (forment ensemble un system), so my body and the other's are 
one whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon, and the anonymous 
existence of which my body is the ever-renewed trace henceforth inhabits both 
bodies simultaneously (phP.p.354;F406). 
The relationship between us is 'anonymous' because neither of us can be said to own it or 
cause it; neither does it consist in my feeling or his thought or my intention, it is given to 
us by the situation; it informs those millions of imperceptible movements between us - of 
our eyes, tongues, breathing and so on - so that our bodies are 'singing the world' In a 
duet (PhP.p.lS7;F21S). 
This is the kind of being we have: that we are: ' through and through compounded of 
relationships with the world. '(phP.p.xiii;Fvii) (loc.cit.xiii). If a man turns his head to 
look at a woman riding by on a bicycle, there takes place a total re-configuration of his 
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world. That woman on her bicycle moves him as his intention, aware or unaware, to turn 
his head and look after her. He would not tum his head if she was not present to him. 
This is intentional presence. In his turning to look after her we have the specification of 
the general reference to the world that constitutes his body and is indelibly written into 
every part of it. This reference to the world is given him and belongs with that' otherness' 
or opaqueness which marks every event in our lives. Merleau-Ponty expresses this when 
he says that: 'The world is wholly inside and I am wholly outside myself' 
(PhP.p.407;F467). It is the way in which the world is present to me so that I am 
summoned to action. This is the marriage of my body with the world. This built-in 
intentionality informs the stuff of our experience, guarantees the cohesion and continuity 
of our existence and allows our least subjective act to have meaning. This abiding 
reference to the world is seen in the mysterious operations of our reflexes and of our 
sense functions: 
In fact, the reflexes themselves are never blind processes: they adjust themselves 
to a 'direction' of the situation, and express our orientation towards a behavioural 
setting ... they (the reflexes) trace out from a distance the structure of the object, 
without waiting for its point by point stimulation. It is this global presence of the 
situation which gives meaning to the partial stimuli and causes them to acquire 
importance, value or existence for the organism (phP.p.79;F94). 
In Merleau-Ponty's view, perception is not a response to stimuli coming from the 
'outside', but a way in which a person is present in the world and takes up and transforms 
that world in his process of becoming. This is co-creative dialogue and it constitutes the 
being of the person. 
The reflex does not arise from objective stimuli, but moves back towards them, 
and invests them with a meaning which they do not possess taken singly as 
psychological agents, but only when taken as a situation. (PhP.p79;F94). 
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Section Two: Situated ness as 'Field Theory' 
The Field is the Lived body 
Even in this brief account of situatedness we can begin to see how it inevitably involves 
every principle contained in the field theory of Lewin imported into Gestalt and described 
by me in the preceding chapter. 
We begin with the living body. All the parts are interconnected, co-ordinated and create 
'space'. My body generates its own internal coherence, the perceptual meaning, the 
configuration of parts within the Gestalt contexture is intrinsic to the body through the 
'sensuous content' (Dillon, 1997, p.Sl). 
This is what Merleau-Ponty calls the principle of 'autochtonous organisation'(PhP. 
p.441;FS03) (cfDillon, 1997, p.196). This is the characteristic of the Gestalt. And the 
beauty of this principle is that it resolves the opposition between the immanentl 
subjective and the transcendent/objective. It does this because the Gestalt embraces both. 
The living body is not just all one pulsating mass of subjectivity. The opaque, 
inaccessible, inexhaustible world, is also me. 'I am given to myself and that gift is not 
just of an individual isolated mass of flesh and bones, it pulls in its train a world of 
inexhaustible abundance. And that inexhaustible abundance only becomes 'world' 
through its correlation with an embodied subjectivity. This autochtonous organisation 
extends beyond my body into the world that I move through. My body is present there' as 
the heart is in an organism' (PhP.p.203;F235). That client sitting in the chair in my 
office belongs in my world and I in his. Neutral presence is impossible: our bodies form 
one system with the world (ibid). I can, of course, back away from this and kill off our 
burgeoning relationship by the death of a thousand words. Otherwise, 1 am vulnerable to 
him. He can hurt me. Jacobs requires the therapist to 'step forth out of his protected 
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professional superiority into the elementary situation between one who asks and the one 
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who is asked'(Jacobs, L.1989, p.44). 
'The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth ... '(Ezechiel ch18 v2). 
When we bring together the Gestalt principle of autochtonous organisation (Dillon, 1997, 
p.81) and our situatedness (and they are really only aspects of one and the same 
phenomenon) then we can see that the unity which I have with my body is extended to 
include the whole history of my body and therefore of the influences and 'acquired 
worlds' (PhP.p.130;F151) which constitute me as I am to-day. All this manifests itself in 
my body. We carry not only the scars and trophies of our own struggles but those of our 
parents and of our parents' parents as well. This has impressed me most powerfully when 
I participated as a 'representative' in the family constellations of Bert Hellinger (1998). 
He uses this technique successfully with people whose families were traumatised by 
involvement in the events of the Nazi concentration camps. In Hellinger's 'constellations' 
the bodies of the 'representatives' - without their knowing anything of the history of the 
family member they represent - amazingly portray the symptoms of the family member. 
It is as if the suffering of that (perhaps dead) member has to be acknowledged before the 
present family members can be at peace. The metaphysics ofMerleau-Ponty open before 
us a scheme of things in which we are far more intimately connected with one another 
than is comfortable to imagine. 
Temporality - The Present Field 
The rich heritage from Wilhelm Reich (1997-1957) shows itself in the Gestalt therapist's 
belief that the person's body carries their history (cfH.P. Ch. 7). Like so much else in 
Gestalt therapy that is so powerful in the treatment of clients, this belief goes unexplained 
83Here Jacobs (citing Friedlander) is alluding to Buber's I and Thou (1923/96). It is interesting to note that 
whereas Gestalt therapists take their field theory from Lewin, the scientist, they look to Buber the poet and 
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in the literature. In order to explain it as part offield theory we need to recall what we 
said about my subjectivity being dependent on otherness and how this otherness itself 
possesses a subjective side as well as its objective side. I can know myself only in terms 
of what is 'not-me'. So, in order to know my past I need to make an object of my body. 
My body has knowledge that is not accessible to my thinking; for instance my body 
knows how to digest food; this knowledge and a whole lot else has banked up in me over 
the years. These are 'acquired worlds' (PhP.p.130;FlSl) possessing my history. 
Memory is not merely a thinking process trying to re-construct what happened in the 
past; it is also my body alerting to the past in the present and re-creating in me the 
postures, feelings, and sensations that then constituted my 'present'. 
The part played by the body in memory is comprehensible only if memory is, not 
only the constituting consciousness of the past, but an effort to re-open time on 
the basis of the implication contained in the present .... (PhP.p.181;F211). 
So, this is the ontological and epistemological constitution of the situated Gestalt. 
It is in the exploration of this fourfold relationship that we find a richer, more coherent 
and more suggestive explanation of field theory. Let us shine this light on the principles 
as enunciated by Parlett (1991). 
In connection with temporality, we recall the Principle of Contemporaneity: 'It is the 
constellation of influences in the present field which explains present behaviour' 
(loc.cit.p36). The 'field perspective' is my body perspective. My body carries the field, 
the whole field. Where else can it be realised if not here in this pulsating mass of flesh 
that is me? We can take this forward somewhat: Suppose a woman presents herself for 
therapy in my office. The field now changes. Our present behaviour explains, indicates, 
represents, embodies the constellation of the field. Here is the mystery of time: I can 
never quite catch it. It is the present when I say: 'stay with what you have just said' and 
go silent, and we allow ourselves to become aware of our being aware. And then it can 
mystic for their theory on dialogue while neglecting entirely to explore phenomenology that makes up the 
everyday stuff of their work. 
238 
be that she sees how her life is not yet her own but shadowed and haunted by an internal 
monologue, which bullies her and denigrates everything she does, every appearance she 
makes. The room is now peopled by her and me and her father and mother and her 
daughter and grandparents and teacher colleagues and neighbours and many, many 
others. And I am with her at this procession of people all caught up and entangled in 
their own lives. Then she decides, at my suggestion, that it may be time for her to address 
this persecutor that is her constant and uninvited companion. Her eagerness to do this 
marks a change. 
This is the way the past is present in the NOW not as past but as NOW. Such is the 
richness of the present moment. The principle is the abstract statement of what is 
happening now in our bodies. It emerges from situatedness that the influences are present 
not just by themselves naked, but clothed in their histories. We can take it further and say 
that the world is summoned to witness our meeting. 
My Body Carries the Time of My Life 
Because they all participate in the figure/horizon structure every thing in my world leans 
against and is supported by every other thing~ and the same is true of the time of my life: 
Each moment oftime calls all the others to witness .... each present permanently 
underpins a point of time which calls for recognition from .all others, so that the 
object is seen at all times as it is seen from all directions and by the same means, 
namely the structure imposed by a horizon (PhP. p.69~F83). 
The Scholastics recognised how time was founded in the body: they used to call it Ens 
ratiollis cumfundamento ill re - 'a being of the mind with a foundation in the thing' - the 
res or thing here is the body. What is it I notice when I reflect on how time registers with 
me? It registers in my body, by a series of movements in response to my reference to the 
world. No body awareness, no time. So, when I am under anaesthetic, or sound asleep I 
have no awareness of the passing of time. My awareness of time is the counting of my 
process: 
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... time comes into being from our relationship to the world and has no existence 
apart from that relation. Further, since subjectivity is the act of transcendence 
towards a world, which thereby comes into being as world, we can say that we 
ourselves are time. (Langer, M. 1989.p.124) 
It is possible for us to think and talk about the age of the stars and 'history' of the 
universe; and this talk makes sense because there is a hidden subject counting the years. 
Let me explain this. When I say: This house was built in 1939, the house was built 63 
years ago. How do I make sense of this? What I say becomes meaningful only when it 
means something to me as embodied. I know how a day feels, how a month feels, I know 
the feeling of a year. Then there is the feeling of sixty years - it is all in relation to my 
age, to my experience. I know this immediately - without any process of reasoning or 
comparison. Of course, I can deepen my appreciation of its meaning by imagination and 
by building up comparisons. So, when I say 'there is a hidden subject counting the 
years', I am simply referring to what we do automatically with our thinking to make time 
meaningful- I'm referring to my own body-time. The stars take not only their age and 
history from my body, but also their bearings from the location of my body. 
We ourselves are one continuous question, a perpetual enterprise of taking our 
bearings on the constellations of the world, and of taking the bearings of things in 
our dimensions (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, F.p.1D2, from Mallin, 1979, p.69) 
Time is the unfolding of my process. Wherever I am, that process is dependent upon all 
that has gone before and must in some way still carry it. To be here NOW I have got to 
have come from a WAS; and, because I am embodied, I bring that 'was' to 'now' which 
is pregnant with a possibility and is, even as I speak, becoming itself a WAS in giving 
birth to a 'possibility'. The constant here is me who am all the time being re-constituted 
in identity by the a world which is at once resisting me, because it is other, and yet whose 
structures are the very structures of my body (PhP.p.205;F237). With this world I am in 
such intimate communion that it is not always clear where one ends and the other begins 
(PhP.p.212;F245). I sit in the garden and listen to the birds. Where is the bird song? 
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We can see this more clearly, perhaps, if we think of it in physical terms of identity and 
belonging. I know who I am because of the world's resistance to me and this is also a 
disclosure of my belonging. If I stand beside you and lean against you, your body resists 
me but also stops me falling over, so that I can stand on my own feet and know that I am 
not you, but am supported by you. But I could not be supported by you without your 
resisting me. Furthermore, you can only resist me if we share the same world. So I belong 
in your world and you in mine. We belong with one another. So, your resisting me is also 
your supporting me and validates my belonging. And you, in turn, are supported by 
others, and they in tum by others still, to that ultimate support and guarantor of all our 
identities, which is that great individual - the world 
.... from the very start I am in communication with one being, and one only, a vast 
individual from which my experiences are taken, and which persists on the 
horizon of my life as the distant roar of a great city provides the background to 
everything we do (PhP.p.328;F378). 
Just as we have the paradox in spatial terms of your resistance being that also which 
makes me belong, so we have the paradox oftime being 'that which holds events 
together by distancing them from one another.' (PhP.p.422;F483) (cfMallin, 1979, p.9) 
There can be no interconnectedness without time. Y ontef correctly defines a relationship 
as 'a contact continued over time'. My body carries the whole of my history because it is 
present with me - or rather I am present NOW through my body (PhP.p.85;F71). 
Yesterday and the day before are not lost; they are still with me but I am not thinking 
about them. Unless something very significant and incomplete happened in those days I 
will not spend my time re-living them. The basis ofMerleau-Ponty's theory of what 
Freud called 'repression' (phP.p.83;F98), is given in his theory of time. We shall see later 
how, in this, we have the point of departure for a new view of trauma and the resulting 
psychopathology. 
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Section Three: The Phenomenal Field 
The Realm Proper to Gestalt Therapy 
Situatedness allows us to establish the metaphysical framework within which Gestalt 
therapy theory can develop and unfold. It is called being-in-the-world. We have seen how 
congenial it is to Gestalt therapy theory: how it implies a powerful field theory and 
extends this theory to embrace time also in all its dimensions; it dispenses with the idea 
of the detached observer. It opens up a new view ofa world which is no longer just a 
spectacle presenting itself to a surveying subject nor just a construct emanating from a 
transcendental subjectivity, but a correlate of our bodily structures, an on-going co-
creation. The actuality corresponding to this view Merleau-Ponty calls 'the Phenomenal 
Field'. 
The importance of this for Gestalt therapy theory is that it defines the realm or universe 
of discourse within which the therapist moves and theorises. It is instructive to note that 
he treats of this in the 4th and final chapter of the Introduction to the Phenomenology of 
Perception, which is headed: Traditional Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena. As the 
heading indicates, a great deal of the chapter is devoted to clearing a way for the analysis, 
which is to follow in Part I: 'The Body'. This comprises six chapters which all place the 
body at the centre of perception. His clearing process in Ch 4 sets out to show how any 
experience, which is separated from the body, descends into the meaningless. So he sees 
sensation as 'that intentional tissue which the effort to know will try to take apart' 
(p.53;F65); 'psychic states' must not be separated from the living body so that 'the 
empirical selves become objects and subjectivity ... an impartial spectator' (p.56;F69). 
'The impression' is not to be confused with 'the phenomenon' which is the Gestalt 
possessed of meaning, structure, spontaneous arrangement of parts (p.58;F70, 71). 
'Consciousness' must 'cease(s) to be a particular region of being, a certain collection of 
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"mental" contents', ' but is the power which 'derealizes itself. .. in giving form to the stuff 
of experience. (PhP. p 121;F 141) 
The Prejudice of the Determined World 
Everyone of the above 'prejudices' arises and thrives under 'the presupposition that 
things are, in themselves completely and unambiguously determined' (Dillon, 1997, p.62) 
This is called 'the prejudice ofthe objective world' (phP.p.5S;F71) (cfH.P. 
p.77,SO;12S;139,iv;xxix, et passim). This is generally a pictorial world lending itself to 
measurement (Heelan, 1988, pp.157-S). It would seem to be the world-view still very 
generally accepted in our Western European culture as is shown by the fact that only 
'facts' that have been 'scientifically proven' (i.e. measured) are granted the status of 
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genuine knowledge in our news media. That the determined world view affects the 
Gestalt therapy community is apparent not so much in their literature or declared teaching 
but in the structures, regulations and priorities that obtain in some of the Gestalt therapy 
training institutes. The acceptance of this view is shown by an emphasis upon what 
'appears' by constant references to what is 'laid down', by looking back over one's 
shoulder to seek approval; in other words this view damps down the co-creative element 
and has recourse to authority as the source of knowledge. The determined world is the 
world of classical science of which I spoke earlier; but it is not the world of Gestalt 
therapy theory nor of phenomenology. To have a body is to have a world and the world 
of the body is the phenomenal field. 
It is because it is a pre-objective view that being-in-the-world can be 
distinguished from every third person process, from every modality of the res 
extensa, as from every cogitatio, from every first person form of knowledge -
and that it can effect the union of the 'psychic' and the physiological' 
(PhP.p.SO;F95). 
841 am thinking here of a recent report on traffic congestion. Everyone who uses the roads knows about the 
congestion; but it attains the status of 'true' knowledge only as a result of the survey. 
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The Phenomenal Field is the lived world in two senses - Firstly, it cannot be assumed for 
a task, like a white coat in a hospital, but is a way of life in Merleau-Ponty's sense - a 
lived experience ever drawing upon that reservoir of belonging which is primordial 
contact. It is this contact which helps a person to live in truth and makes the hermeneutic 
circle meaningful. Now let us explore this a bit further. 
This Realm of Discourse Gathers in the Therapist 
When I say that the approach of situatedness opens the way to a 'new' 'kind of world and 
we call this 'the phenomenal world', I do not intend this in any idealised sense. I mean 
that when a Gestalt therapist meditates upon this situatedness and enters the phenomenal 
world in her attitudes and practice as I have described it, she finds herself having to 
review the way she lives. It is not possible, as I have demonstrated elsewhere (Kennedy, 
1998) to be a 'part-time' Gestalt therapist. To be a Gestalt therapist is to be committed to 
certain attitudes and values. Truth, respect, love and the valuing of human life will tend to 
become priorities in the life of the therapist. The reason for this is simple: If a person 
goes the way of situatedness, and takes the phenomenal world seriously, then she may 
soon find two convictions growing as she exercises her skills and knowledge with 
stricken people. One is enonnous and grateful wonder in the face of the world~ and, 
secondly, an ever-growing sense of belonging; that is to say, that she belongs with people 
and that they 'belong' with her. The philosophy ofMerleau-Ponty becomes meaningless 
ifit is separated from life-positions. He himselflived his philosophy. This we know from 
a glance through the essays which he published in Les Temps Moderns: I refer in 
particular to his essay The War Has Taken Place in which he raised the highly sensitive 
issue (at that time, June 1945) of anti-Semitism and collaboration with the occupying 
German forces. We allowed the abomination to happen, he says, because we told 
ourselves lies and refused to see what was in front of our faces (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 
pp.142-3). Phenomenology challenges our life-style. 
By exploring the phenomenal field we place ourselves in a favourable epistemological 
position for bringing forward our enquiry. This concept gives us entrance to the 
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'members box' in that we no longer have to concern ourselves with questions arising out 
of the 'prejudice of the objective world' and which could distract us in our study. That 
metaphor, however, limps badly in that we shall never understand or savour this rich 
notion by looking at it from a distance: what Merleau-Ponty said in the Preface to his 
Phenomenology is more than ever true here: 'We shall find in ourselves and nowhere else 
the unity and true meaning of phenomenology '. (phP.p.viii;Fii) italics mine. 
The Phenomenal Field is the World ofthe Lived Body 
We see that it is primarily a world of the body, which is where all phenomenology - in the 
sense of 'the advent of being to awareness, instead of presuming its possibility as given in 
advance' (PhP.p.61;F74) - begins and ends. There is no way I can 'study' the field unless 
I am 'of it'; nor know of it, unless it takes place in my body. 
The phenomenal field as the lived body arises out of our study of situatedness, which is 
the mainstay ofMerleau-Ponty's ontology (Mallin, 1979, Ch.I). It prepares us to explore 
further those four key structures of the phenomenal field: intentionality, anonymity, 
transcendence and intersubjectivity. 
I shall first briefly describe Merleau-Ponty's view of what constitutes the phenomenal 
field then I shall relate this to its place in Gestalt therapy literature. I shall choose 
particularly 'health' and 'openness'. I shall give three contrasting examples from the 
literature, ofthe way patients/clients may be perceived. I shall then add a long comment 
on the foregoing. 
The unreflected-upon world, which we live through, is called by Merteau-Ponty the 
'Phenomenal Field' (cfH.P. ppXXV;XXIX;XXXI;21O;241ff;287;301;et passim). This is 
different from the world of thought, of objective measurement, of geometrized 
conceptions of things, of reflection and of classical 'Science'. The phenomenal field sees 
the world and its objects as our home, the 'familiar setting of our life' (PhP.p.53;F65). In 
the phenomenal field we notice and are affected by the jumble of interconnections that 
exist between things and ourselves and one another. In the phenomenal field a certain 
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institutional building is no longer just a construction of stones and other materials where 
so many people work and live and wear white coats and come and go in cars. It is alive 
with memories and charged moods and terrifying states, so that my client takes a long 
detour to avoid passing it. The phenomenal field is alive with meanings and memories. It 
is the hollow within my time where my heart's desires jostle and elbow each other for 
preferential place. It is where: 
Vision is already inhabited by a meaning (sens) which gives it a function in the 
spectacle of the world and in our existence . 
... .. (where) the problem is to understand these strange relationships which are 
woven between parts of the landscape, or between it and me as incarnate subject, 
and through which an object perceived can concentrate in itself a whole scene or 
become the imago of a whole segment oflife ....... 
(where) sense experience ...... invests the quality with vital value, grasping it first 
in its meaning for us, for that heavy mass which is our body, whence it comes 
about that it always involves a reference to the body. (PhP p.S2; F64) 
Elsewhere (PhP p.72; F86) He speaks about those 'intentional threads' which intimately 
bind the body to the surrounding world 'and finally reveal to us the perceiving subject as 
the perceived world.' It is important to note that these 'intentional threads' are not just 
cogitationes but felt movements of the body. The meaning of that movement is not at all 
explained by description in terms of chemistry and electricity but is to be found in the 
mode of presence of the world to the body of the subject and the subject's presence to the 
world. (PhP p.3SI;F403-4) 
The Phenomenal Field Implicit in Gestalt Therapy Theory 
I wish to emphasize that when I draw attention to unasked questions or lines of enquiry 
unexplored, I am in no sense criticising the authors or their works. I am drawing 
attention to two things. (1) That they are writing their theory for an operation which can 
take place only in the phenomenal field not in the objective world of clinical science. 
Implicitly, they are affirming the holistic nature of Gestalt therapy. (2) A text book is a 
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basic learning book and not a philosophy of Gestalt therapy. To put this another way: we 
can envisage perception in three stages. There is the basic state where I am being 
impacted/noticing my client, but not noticing that 1 am being impacted. Secondly, there 
is the stage when I reflect on this experience and theorise about it - this is the stage that 
produces the text book. Thirdly, there is the stage of reflecting on the reflection and this 
is the beginning of philosophy. 
The core of philosophy .... Lies in the perpetual beginning of reflection at the 
point where an individuals life begins to reflect upon itself (PhP p. 82~F75). 
When Gestaltists speak of their therapy as being 'holistic', when they promote 'body-
work' as essential in the process of healing, when they speak about 'integration' they are 
affirming that Gestalt therapy operates in the phenomenal field (Mackewn, 1997, pp 2-7 
et passim). Mackewn emphasises this by an explanatory footnote to the title of her 
excellent Ch.22. 
A ttending to body structure, body experience and body process. 
Note: The title of this section suggests a duality, which is alien to the holistic 
essence of Gestalt, because Gestaltists are always endeavouring to work with whole 
persons, body, mind and soul. In this section I am merely making body process and 
energy flow, figural for the moment (p .162 ). 
She repeatedly emphasises that body movements and exercises are used in order to 
involve the whole person and bring into awareness feelings and attitudes carried by the 
person and awaiting articulation through the body. She is not concerned to explore in 
depth the theory undergirding her practical approach. What constitutes the nature of this 
'carrying' by the body, the implications of this carrying for the subject's relationship with 
all the rest of the world, the residence of 'meaning' in the body; these are questions not 
entered into by Mackewn. (I would not expect that such questions even belong in a 
textbook for trainees). 
Her approach is implicitly phenomenological because action/movement is the only way 
any state of ours can appear, that is, come into awareness - which is, you will well recall 
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by now, Merleau-Ponty's definition of Phenomenology. She is seeing the living body of 
the person intimately bound to the environment by these 'intentional threads' and 
therefore, she is, without using the terminology, speaking of the phenomenal field. 
Furthermore, nowhere in her book does she make an attempt to explain what is happening 
in terms of cause and effect, as if the body was a machine and could be 'explained' in that 
way. Similarly, when Gestalt therapy theorists emphasize that the organismic functioning 
of our bodies is always in the direction of our health (Korb, Gorrell and Van de Riet, 
1989, pp.llff, p44ft), they are speaking of the phenomenal field. They make the 
important point that, at the therapeutic level the person is not acting simply from the level 
of thought: 
'When the organism regulates itself in harmony with its nature - and this is not 
easily done - the individual behaves spontaneously and naturally. There is no 
effort of planning or doing' (Korb et al 1998, p.ll). 
The authors make no attempt to explain what they mean by 'nature' or whether and to 
what degree a person can act without the intervention of learned programmes. Nor do 
they attempt to tell us how it is possible for a person to 'just be'. (Phenomenologically it 
is apparent that my existence is given to me not as an 'I am ' but as an 'I can' - just look 
at the structure of your body - and you are your body!) (phP p.l37; F1S9) 
For Yontefthe phenomenal field is the domain of that special relationship which informs 
the therapy and within which the therapist respects, facilitates, allows and even loves the 
client: 
In Gestalt therapy these tasks (sorting out problems, reviewing decisions, 
etc.) are all embedded in the I-Thou relation and are used to continue the 
exploring by the therapist/patient dyad of each other. (Yontef, 1993, p.190) 
For him this is well-nigh sacred ground in which there is no pay-off whatever for the 
therapist, but in which the client is always empowered: 
The Gestalt therapist indicates by his behaviour and words that he cares, 
understands and willlisten ....... Giving subtle approval cues would be a form of 
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conditioning that reinforces the patient's struggle to impress the therapist rather 
than express himself. (loc.cit.p.194) 
The practical wisdom here is manifest and compassionate. Yet Y ontef does not seek to 
identify the ways in which this special domain of interaction is structured and registered 
in the body of the patient and therapist. 
Lastly, I see the main thesis in Wheeler (2000) - that Gestalt therapy must abandon its 
confluence with the cult of individualism and become far more' field' oriented - as 
directed by the insights of Paul Goodman and Kurt Lewin - as an appeal to Gestalt 
therapy to operate far more in the phenomenal field. 
The Openness of the Phenomenal Field 
I return now to describe Merleau-Ponty's view of what he calls the Phenomenal field. 
Another characteristic of the phenomenal field is its openness or generosity. This means 
that the thrust of energy in our bodies is towards giving, receiving and belonging in the 
world. The human person longs with a fierce longing to go out from herself and thereby 
find herself. We shall see later that, like time, it is the existential condition of subjectivity 
that it opens itself to the Other. As for instance, when I have good news, I rush to the 
phone to share it. People wear special clothes and jewellery to celebrate their uniqueness. 
Such openness is our very existence and therefore our surroundings glow with the aura of 
the particular attitude we are striking vis-a.-vis our life setting, which is all the time 
beckoning us to go out from ourselves . 
. . .. the living present is tom between a past which it takes up and a future which it 
projects. It is thus of the essence of the thing and of the world to present 
themselves as 'open', to send us always beyond their determinate manifestations, 
to promise us always' something else to see' (PhP. p.333~F384). 
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This openness to the other and transcendence of ourselves is in response to the unending 
flow of invitations from the world, experienced by us as sensations in our contact 
functions or orifices. This is what Merleau-Ponty means when he says: 
The body is the vehicle of being in the world ....... for if it is true that I am 
conscious of my body via the world, that it is the unperceived term in the centre of 
the world towards which all objects turn their face, it is true for the same reason 
that my body is the pivot of the world: (PhP.p.82;F97) 
In the Phenomenal field there is no such thing as 'pure sensation'. That concept belongs 
in the 'objective' view of the world, proper to the exact sciences. In the phenomenal field 
our sensation is already informed by meaning. It is the global presence of the situation 
that gives a meaning to the partial stimuli and causes them to acquire importance, value 
or existence for the organism (PhP.p.79;F94). 
Our presence in the world is not confined within the skin of our bodies; our presence 
hangs about us like the aroma ofa woman's perfume wherever we go, and it impregnates 
the objects close at hand through which we articulate our motility. So, a blind man's stick 
ceases to be just a stick for him and becomes an extension of his presence; similarly we 
are in our clothes so that we have a sense of how they (our clothes) speak about us; in the 
rucksack I carry on my back so that I know how to move without hitting the other rail 
travellers with it; in the piano so that its wires embody the tensions of my heart. Such 
experiences are not the result of thought processes yielding a notional unity, but of an 
embodied subjectivity living out primordially intended connections. Merleau-Ponty sees 
this quest of contact/integration at work at all levels of human existence. For instance in 
the context of speaking about sensation he sees the fact that we have two eyes but only 
see one object as a manifestation of the intentional existence of our phenomenal body. 
It is not the epistemological subject who brings about the synthesis, (two images 
becoming one) but the body, when it escapes from dispersion, pulls itself together 
and tends by all means in its power towards one single goal of its activity. 
We withdraw this synthesis from the objective body only to transfer it to the 
phenomenal body, the body, that is, in so far as it projects a certain 'setting' round 
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itself, in so far as its 'parts' are dynamically acquainted with each other, and its 
receptors are so arranged as to make possible through their synergy the perception 
of the object. What is meant by saying that this intentionality is not a thought, is 
that it does not come into being through the transparency of any consciousness, but 
takes for granted all the latent knowledge of itself that my body possesses. 
(PhP .232-234;F269) 
The Language of Phenomenal Field in Therapy 
Perception that is healing takes place in the phenomenal field. This is what constitutes 
truly human perception. In Gestalt therapy training, there is very great emphasis upon 
what is called 'the phenomenology of the client'; this expression means that it is very 
important for the therapist to actually notice the client - all the details about him or her 
and to allow himself to be affected by what he notices. This is not a sequence of two 
actions; first notice; then 'be affected'. It is one act of perception in which the therapist is 
engrossed. The follow through is for this to affect his language during the session. Much 
of the language of psychology, being tom from its own vital roots in experience 
'perpetuates our modem alienation (Brooke, R 1993, p.41).85 
It is because Gestalt therapy is very aware of this that the use of poetry, metaphor and 
image is so much encouraged in the training of therapists. Mackewn encourages 
therapists to evoke metaphors describing the processes of their clients: ' ... their 
relationship with the environment; or of the cycle of contact and withdrawal; or their 
styles of moderating contact in their relationship with others and to various field 
conditions; their styles of supporting themselves and so on.' (1997, p.l 03) The metaphor 
and the simile, the language of poetry, heavy with memories, feelings, unspoken desires, 
is the language of the phenomenal field. 
8SHere Brook gives as an example the Freudian tenn 'complex' as replacing talk of a 'god' in describing 
the patient's difficulty. 
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Daniel Stem (1985, pp162fl) makes the point that while language acquisition brings with 
it a whole new dimension of shareable interpersonal experience, it also drives a wedge 
between the experience as it is lived and as it is verbally represented. In regard to therapy 
he says that it is one of the major tasks of the therapist to help the patient find 'a narrative 
point of origin in his/her own story and the imaging of this in a metaphor. (loc.cit. 
p.262).86 As this kind of dialogue takes place in the phenomenal field the client feels 
seen, heard and effectual and therefore no longer alone. Such nurturing of the embodied 
presence of the client is polar opposite to regarding the client from a distance or through a 
87 
window. Every other way of perceiving a person can be done safely only in reference to 
the phenomenal field. So, some directors of Gestalt therapy groups make a point of 
suggesting that the members not mention their professional status as they introduce 
themselves to the other group members. The phenomenal field is not only the domain of 
therapy, but it is also the domain of trauma. I make this point in Appendix A of this 
study. Just as it is at this level that we are healed so it is at this level that our world is 
subverted and our identity can be taken away from us. 
The Effort to Know Takes Apart the Phenomenal Field 
When two people meet, the possibilities of action can be manifold. Everything I do - or 
even think - in the presence of a client - is, technically, an intervention; because 
everything I do modifies the field. If I am watching myself and 'tip-toeing through the 
tulips' then that too is an intervention and may dissipate the field. Such a spectrum of 
variation is to be expected because of the chaotic complexity of the phenomenal field. 88 
Although they may be in broad agreement about theory, no two Gestalt therapists will 
operate in the same way, even with the same client. On the other hand I must, as a 
86Stem is not profossedly a Gestalt therapist yet he works phenomenologically, in a field perspective, and. 
as he abundantly demonstrates, in a nurturing dialogue with his patients; wherefore, in my view (and that of 
Yontef) his work belongs as a model in this study. 
87 Romanyshyn, (1994) devotes a whole book to this theme of bodily detachment. 
88Here I am using 'chaotic' in a mathematical sense as in Davies,P. (1995 pp52-56) 
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therapist, maintain my thinking while allowing myself to be drawn into the situation. Yet 
my thinking must not be such that I objectivize the other so that he becomes to me a thing 
(PhP.p361;F414). The experience of being regarded as an object will sometimes be 
described by the subject as a feeling of annihilation or suffocation so that he experiences 
difficulty breathing. A person who is so looked upon is being taken out of his human 
world, which is his proper element and plunged into an alien environment. Unless the 
impersonal regard, which may be necessary at times - in some medical procedures for 
instance - is accompanied by a compassionate human gaze then the maintenance of 
identity becomes increasingly problematic. Consider, for instance, the way in which a 
student is being invited to view a patient in the following excerpt: The context is 
'Physical Treatment' for schizophrenia). 
Although improvement with phenothiazine drugs usually commences during the 
flrst 7-14 days of treatment, it may be delayed as long as flve or six weeks. It is not 
possible to predict which cases will respond promptly and there is a proportion of 
patients who fail to improve with phenothiazine drugs but who make excellent 
response when these are combined with electro-convulsive treatment. Patients in a 
catatonic stupor will often be slow to respond to phenothiazines and those in 
catatonic excitement may bring themselves to a dangerous point of exhaustion 
unless their symptoms are brought under rapid control with a few convulsions. 
(Mayer-Cross, Slater and Roth, 1972, p.330)89 
As I read this immense and prestigious volume I have a sense that the patient is being 
taken away from his lived world, and labelled as a 'case'. He has got to have things 
'done' to him, so that he can once again join the assembly of the 'normals' such as you 
and me and the authors. Even in Kaplan and Sadock (1991) the preferred method of 
treatment all through the book is to act upon the patient (literally 'the suffering one') 
from a safe distance rather than build a bridge of relationship with him and gather about 
him in reassurance that he is one of us, our brother, indeed. The approach in these texts 
89 In the more recent text, Kaplan and Sadock (1991) there is more space given to discussing the benefits of 
psychotherapy but the approach is basically the same: 'The human brain is the common denominator for all 
schools of thought regarding human behaviour' (loc. cit. p.87). 
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heavily stresses the subject/object dichotomy. This is always the mark of departure from 
the phenomenal field. It automatically relegates the' object' to the status of thing, ranks 
him with the other things in the world, and explains him in terms, not of what makes him 
a person, but in terms of that efficient causality which is the relationship and coherence of 
the things of the world. Such an object is not another subjectivity like me, but belongs to 
a different order of being and therefore beyond the range of my personal engagement. 
Such an 'objective' posture vis-a-vis the 'sick' person is not confined to the world of 
psychiatry, it occurs also with predictable inevitability, in all organizations - even in 
religious orders. Yes, and in psychotherapy training also. It may even be encouraged in 
the name of professional ethics and good practice. 
Suber and the I-IT world 
The question of making people into 'things' or 'objects' in Gestalt therapy requires that 
we mention Martin Buber. I shall deal with his place in Gestalt therapy theory more fully 
when I come to discuss Intersubjectivity. Martin Buber occupies the place of the 
philosopher of dialogue in Gestalt therapy theory. His I-Thou relationship as set down in 
his book, I and Thou (1923/1996), is the headline or model for the healing relationship 
between therapist and client. This is where a person is treated as an end in himself~ 
'where the person says 'Thou' nothing is present to him except this one being, but it 
implicates the whole world' (loc.cit. p.49). This moment of meeting sounds pretty 
intense, and it is. So, one cannot maintain it for always. So we relieve it by talking about 
the weather or some triviality or by using the person in some way. That is the I-it 
relationship. 
But this is the exalted melancholy of our fate that every 'Thou in our world must 
become an IT .... As soon as the relationship has been worked out, or has been 
permeated with a means, the THOU becomes an object among objects' (loc.cit. 
p.3l). 
Yontefwould say that any contact with a client, which is not dialogue, is I-it contact 
(Yontef, 1993, p.4D). Therefore, for the therapist to have an 'aim' or 'goal' for the client 
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- even with the best intention, is a departure from dialogue as it has come to be 
understood in Gestalt therapy. His terminology is of consequence here. Whereas he 
reserves the term 'I-Thou' for the peak moment of coming together he applies 'dialogic' 
to the on-going quality of the relationship between therapist and client (Yontef, 1993 
p.34). The difference between such an on-going relationship and everyday contact is that 
it is always open to the I-Thou meeting. It excludes, as much as possible, I-It or the 
relationship of use. 
As an Existentialist theme, the objectivization of the person, the reduction of a person to a 
thing to be manipulated for someone's use and benefit, was explored very profoundly by 
Nicolai Berdyaev (1874-1948), Russian philosopher and mystic. He spoke with that 
special knowledge of the subject that comes to those who live what they teach (cf 
Kennedy 1994). 
Section Four: Ontological Situatedness and Dialogue 
The World of Light and the World of Darkness 
This is at once the basis for and the articulation of that explicit anthropological stance 
which I spoke of earlier (cfR.P. p.22). Therefrom arises that dialogue which Yontef 
90 
marks as one of the three specific essentials in Gestalt Therapy and which is rooted in 
91 
our ontological situatedness. This means that I find myself already in a world that is 
familiar to me in the sense that it is of the same stuff as I am. 
I find in the phenomena 'a basic layer of experience, a whole already pregnant 
with an irreducible meaning .... The features, the layout of a landscape or a word 
90r count 93 references (1993) 
91 'Merleau-Ponty's philosophy may be characterized as a philosophy of situation.' So begins S.B.Mallin's 
monumental work (1979). This is really no different from A.De Waelhen's marking Merleau-Ponty's work 
as Une Philosophie de l'Ambiguite (1951) 
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in spontaneous accord with the intentions of the moment as with earlier 
experience,92 (PhP.p.21-2;F29-30). 
This is the 'setting' of the phenomenal field within which all therapeutic 
dialogue/movement takes place. It speaks of the condition in which every human being 
spends every moment of his/her life. It marks my very existence as such. In that 
phenomenal field there live in me the very structures of the world which are 'designed' to 
engage with the structures of my body. Lighting engages vision; smells engage my power 
of smell and so on. But where is the light? Is it in the eye or outside the eye? Where is the 
smell? Such is the measure of the intimacy of our contact with the world. And every 
one of my senses immediately involves all the others as the Gestalt emerges. Every 
experience of human being is of being-situated, an experience of the phenomenal field. 
This is Fechner's world oflight in contrast to the world of darkness which he saw as the 
Cartesian world of Science, a silent and dark world where things live in isolation and the 
'intentional threads' no longer count for anything (van den Berg J., 1980, p,22). 
Living in the phenomenal world I open my eyes and I am surrounded by things and 
people which beckon me; I open my ears and I hear all manner of sounds inviting me to 
participate; I reach out my hands and I feel the surfaces of things - I touch them and they 
touch me; I smell and taste the world about me with my nose and mouth. I find myself 
surrounded on all sides by circumstances/events/people who challenge and resist me and 
93 
evoke my potentiality for action -only because they have the same structures as me .. 
This dialogue tells me every moment who I am and that I belong. 94 
92 'What I discover and recognise through the cogito (primordial contact) ...... is the deep-seated 
momentum of transcendence which is my very being, and the simultaneous contact with my own being and 
with the world's being' (phP.p.377;F432). 
93'No sooner has my gaze fallen upon a living body in process of acting than the objects surrounding it 
immediately take on a fresh layer of significance ..... round about the perceived body a vortex forms, towards 
which my world is drawn. .... (PhP.p.353;F406) 
94'Without the world I would not know, without I, there is no world humanly conceived' Yontef (1993, 
p.251) 
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'My first perception, along with the horizons which surrounded it, is an ever 
present event, an unforgettable tradition; even as a thinking subject, I still am 
that first perception, the continuation of that same life inaugurated by it' 
(PhP.p.407;F466) 
I engage with the world because my being is given to me 'once and for all as something 
to be understood' (PhP.p.347;F399) that is, as something which has meaning - which only 
the world can give me. Such is the broader meaning of 'dialogue'. These summarised 
reflections come about through the hermeneutical circle of my interrogation of the 
phenomena, a continual, never ceasing conversio ad phantamata - ('return to the 
95 
phenomena'). (Sum.Theol, la.86a.1) Psychopathology is an interruption to this 
dialogue of return. 
Shared Phenomenology 
Yontefdescribes dialogue as 'shared phenomenology' (loc.cit.p.279). In this sense it is 
essentially a reciprocated movement of persons towards each other precisely as persons 
and is the bedrock of Gestalt psychotherapy. Yonteffor the most part sees 'dialogue' in 
the clinical sense of patient and therapist. The broader horizon of dialogue, which is of 
movement that generates the phenomenal world, is taken up by others, notably Perls and 
Kepner. They do not analyse it as I have done above, because their interest is mainly 
clinical. Perls and his colleagues do not use the phrase 'phenomenal field' but devote the 
whole of Book I of Gestalt Therapy to exercises designed to put the reader participators 
in touch with the actual. They illustrate how inability to experience, a loss of feeling for 
the world 'within' us or 'outside' of us impairs our awareness, stores up trouble for us, 
and sabotages our contact with others. Kepner's two great books Body Process (1987) 
and Healing Tasks (1995) are, as their titles imply, discourses on our dialogue with the 
95summa Theol, la.q.86.al. This is a key text for Rahner (1968) in his Spirit in the World, which is an 
attempt to confront Thomism with the problems of modem philosophy. 
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world through our bodies. He succinctly states the thrust of Gestalt therapy in terms of 
movement. 
The founders of Gestalt therapy (perls et al. 1951) have emphasised that the self 
is not a fixed given so much as it is created through contacting .96 That is, I do 
not have a negative self-image; rather, I experience myself negatively through 
something I do - e.g. by criticising myself for behaving in ways inconsistent with 
my values, or by creating visual images of myself that are unpleasant. Similarly, I 
do not "have" a self-image as powerful so much as I experience my power 
through my behaviour and action, that is, by experiencing that power of my 
feelings and my impact on the world. (Kepner 1987, p.145) 
This is phenomenological description - an interpretation, in the best sense - of basic 
experience. I think it calls for more amplification. Here Kepner is assuming an ontology 
of situated embodied subjectivity undergirding Gestalt therapy. He is assuming a 
particular kind of being-in-the-world. He is assuming what Mallin calls 'the foundation 
building block' ofMerleau-Ponty's ontology: situatedness (Mallin, 1979, Ch.l). 
Kepner's view of being-in-the-world is at odds with the 'natural attitude,97 or the 
'common-sense view' and requires from each Gestalt therapist the confirmation of his 
own experience. Such confirmation cannot come from inference or from reading about it 
in a book; it has to be of the same order as a person has for her sight -by actually seeing. 98 
'We shall find in ourselves and nowhere else the true meaning of phenomenology. ' 
(ph.P.p.viii; Fii). This is that immediacy in which a person knows his own body and 
96 More accurately, perhaps, 'the-self-in-the-world' is created.(cfPhP.p.79;F95» 
97 Merleau-Ponty speaks of this as 'the prejudice of the determinate world' - this is the presupposition that 
independently of my perception the world I see is actua1ly there. In other words the subjective element of 
perception is excluded. Giorgi (1982) warns: 'Whatever presents itself to consciousness should be taken 
precisely with the meaning with which it presents itself and one should refrain from affirming that it is what 
it presents itself to be. '(In Brook loco cit p.33) cfDillon (1997) p62; Heelan (1988) p9. 
98 
Merleau-Ponty labours this point in his chapter Cogito .. If we know what we know only by means of a 
tertium quid then I don't really contact the world at all and miss out on the very essence of perception.(cf. 
PhP p376; F431) 
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knows also that this is the only way a human being can be. This principle of immediacy is 
to Gestalt therapy what the' cogito' is to the Cartesian system. When we speak of 
ourselves as working in the phenomenal field we mean that we work at that level at which 
we experience ourselves as essentially embodied, essentially relational, essentially 
dialogic, essentially ambiguous, essentially spatial. This is the level of operation proper 
to Gestalt therapy 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have endeavoured to reinstate the lived body at the centre of Gestalt 
therapy as it is at the centre of the philosophy ofMerleau-Ponty. I have shown how this is 
part of the logic of situatedness. This most basic concept which implies the intimate 
interconnectedness of all beings in our world, is implicit in the stated theories of Gestalt 
therapy. Along with this comes the other notion of the phenomenal field. This is the 
world of the lived body and also the realm of discourse of Gestalt therapy. It remains for 
us now to look more closely at the world of the lived body and the precise aspects of it, 
which are most relevant to Gestalt therapy. 
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Section One: The Gestalt of the Lived Body 
Introducing the Four Concepts: Intentionality, Anonymity, Transcendence and 
Intersubjectivity 
The point of this chapter is to demonstrate how each of the four concepts above help us to 
found the intimacy between the world and the person's body. This is a follow-on in the 
logic of situatedness which gives rise to the phenomenal field. I have explained earlier 
how situatedness leads to the phenomenal field. In this Introduction I want to delineate 
the view of being-in-the-world which informs each of the above concepts. We must keep 
in mind that although the Gestalt therapy literature does not speak of 'being-in-the-world' 
or 'the lived body', it implies the concepts and gets close with 'field perspective'. 
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Ultimate Point of Reference: The Lived Body 
It is important as we enter upon this chapter that we remind ourselves how the 'lived 
body' is the root that gives life and meaning to those four concepts: 
Intentionality, Anonymity, Transcendence and Intersubjectivity 
Let me introduce someone to you: 
A young woman in her thirties comes to me for therapy because she has had a 
'breakdown' in work. She is chronically tired, dispirited, cannot get up in the mornings, 
has no motivation for going out or dressing-up and will sometimes pass the whole day in 
pyjamas and dressing gown. She lives with her parents, is symbiotically attached to her 
mother and cordially abominates her father. She has a son in his late teens who looks 
mainly to his grandmother and regards my client as a financial resource and taxi. Fifteen 
years ago at a New Year's party, my client was raped and has never recovered herself 
from that trauma. None of her family knows about the rape. She was also sexually 
abused as a child; none of her family knows about the abuse. She has lost all sense of 
being a woman, feels unattractive, rejects men and would like to die - except that she is 
afraid of dying. 
We could put reductionist abstract terms on her condition and call it a Depression, 
probably Major and Clinical, with elements of secondary Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 
and that can be helpful in its way. These are terms that generalize upon observed 
modalities of being, ways in which we can conceptualize her narrated experience. 
The reality upon which the validity of any of these terms is founded is the lived body of 
this young woman. Those terms refer to some idealised subject shorn of background. So 
there is no reference to the pain of sleepless nights, the vague continued fear of invasion, 
the nausea at mealtime. 'The objective world of things in themselves' (Mallin 1979, p.45) 
is the horizon against which such a 'case' is figure. 
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It is the same with Intentionality, Anonymity, Transcendence and Intersubjectivity; 
whatever meaning these terms have is rooted in the lived body of that young woman. She 
is the "peak" or "wave" of Being; Heidegger's 'clearing', the "Da" of"Dasein". These 
terms have no meaning or worth apart from the lived bodies of people. They afford us 
ways of speaking about what we experience in our bodies. In reality - in the body of that 
young woman they are not distinct; so it is of questionable value for me to say that 
because her intentionality has broken down, she no longer desires a man and is lacking 
energy. The image of Humpty-Dumpty is closer to the reality: something awful has 
happened to her and she has been injured. She no longer experiences herself as a totality; 
co-operation and communication between the areas of her bodily being has broken down. 
She is frantically trying to put herself together again and cannot. Her sense of 
substantiality has drained away, she feels hollow and empty; we could call this 'a 
breakdown in her experience of anonymity' but it is also a failure of transcendence and 
also of inter subjectivity. Again, as always, we come back to the point that all our 
concepts are rooted in the lived body. In fact, I can have no idea whatever of what is 
going on for her - and she would immediately and certainly be aware of my ignorance -
unless I can meet within the scope of my personal experience, things similar to what she 
experiences. Again we come back to it: my ability to meet her is rooted in my body. 
I choose these four concepts because each of them is operative, that is to say, each carries 
a particular way in which the unity of the person with the environment (that includes 
persons, of course) may be seen and experienced in the movements of the body. Each of 
them is specifically articulated in the body of the subject and none of them can be 
understood without reference to the other three. With unity as the core of Gestalt therapy 
theory, it is entirely essential that it is underwritten by a non-dualistic philosophy; 
otherwise, there is no adequate theoretical support for the therapy. The separation of 
subject and object, of person and environment, of body and soul, of mind and sense-
function, yields us a world in which the person is divided against herself This in itself 
promotes emotional and 'mental' disorders in people, as I have said in the previous 
chapter. The subject/object, mindlbody split is a world view in contradiction not only 
with Gestalt therapy theory but with the very way a person experiences himselflherself in 
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health. (cfH.P.pp.19;30-34). 'Avoiding dichotomous thinking is central to our theory and 
method of work' (Parlett,M. 2000, p.17). A dualistic world-view promotes and validates 
a person's withdrawal from her embodiment. This we call 'fragmentation' and it is the 
definition of ill-health in Gestalt therapy. Reporting on this fragmentation the person will 
say things like: 'I can't enjoy anything, I have lost all interest in things'. 'I'm here, but 
I'm not here. It is as ifI'm in a glass cube and nothing reaches me and I can't reach 
anyone'; 'It is like my heart is dead so that I feel nothing at all'. 'If my Mum died I would 
not cry.' This is an example of fragmentation, of a person divorced from her body. A man 
may experience himself as so vile and repulsive that he will not venture to leave his flat 
for months on end. Such a person is profoundly at odds with himself When we look at 
this phenomenon more closely we see that the split is essentially experienced as a bodily 
phenomenon: 'I feel soiled and repulsive'; 'my stomach chums with anger and my chest 
area is all dead'. Because the sense function has shut up shop, the person experiences 
herself as isolated, cut off from the world. Our senses remain the only gate to our 
meaning-making intelligence. 'And intelligence seizes on that unity which has as its 
correlate the unity of my body' (De Waelhens, 1951, p.178)mt. Any belief or philosophy, 
which normalises the split, will tend to promote it. 
The Open Upon the Phenomenal Field 
The domain of operation of these concepts is the phenomenal field. This is that realm in 
which the person and the world are experienced as joined up in a closeness that is not a 
contingency but a constitutive element of their being. It is that realm of experience, which 
undergirds and informs all scientific endeavour. In the phenomenal field my body finds 
its place. It becomes 
... the unperceived term in the centre of the world towards which all objects turn 
their face, ... for the same reason, my body is the pivot of the world. (phP.p.82; 
F97) 
Our embodiment not only creates space but this spatial dimension is meaningless and 
inconceivable without time. The enduring nature of my bodily presence is the basis of a 
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union with the world. Without time, which is really body-process, my senses could not 
function - no movement. Change by very definition takes time. 99 The changes of space, 
time and movement are the basis upon which all cognition is founded. 
The world no longer conceived as a collection of determinate objects, but as the 
horizon latent in all our experience and itself ever-present and anterior to every 
determining thought. (phP p.92; F108) 
We shall see how intentionality, anonymity, transcendence and intersubjectivity all 
express ways in which the world and the subject are intimately involved with one 
another. 'Being' in Merleau-Ponty's view 'runs through them' (where 'them' is the lived 
body and the world). They flow into one another; the world and the subject belong in the 
same system; the other becomes a prolongation of myself His body and my body are 
tuned-in to one another. Gestalt therapy rightly places the body at the centre of all 
therapy. I suggest that it is only with the use of such concepts that Gestalt therapy can 
integrate the sort of radical and exciting thinking which we see coming more to the fore 
in such writers as Wheeler (2000) and Parlett (2000) 
Section Two: Intentionality - the Enactment of Situated ness 
This means that my perception at all levels - even preconceptual- is always world-
directed. 'Consciousness is always consciousness of something' (Brooke, R. 1993, p.42.) 
In Gestalt terms, perception is always figure against horizon; and the horizon of horizons 
is the world. The concept of intentionality is not much more than adumbrated in the 
classic text Gestalt Therapy. In the chapter on Self, Ego, Id, and Personality, under the 
sub-heading: Self is the System of Present contacts and the Agent of Growth the authors 
say this: 
., .. .in any biological or socio-psychological investigation the concrete subject 
matter is always an organism/environment field. There is no function of any 
99 We can admire the scholastics' succinct definition of change. Numerus molus secundum prius et 
posterius. (The counting of change with regard to before and after). (Joannes de Fonte; 13-14 Century). 
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animal that is definable except as a function of the field. (PHG.p.426) 
What this means is that nothing and no one stands by itself separate from the 
environment. So, things are understood in terms of their relationship to other things or to 
me. If I speak of a client, I do so under some aspect of his relationship to me or to the 
world. He is generous, forgetful, loving and so on. And just as I cannot know another 
except in terms of her environment, so neither can I know myself except in terms of my 
environment. 
Intentionality is my hold upon the world. That is the way I manifest myself not just to 
others but to myself. In Merleau-Ponty's view it is just not possible to know myself as 
such. In fact I don't even perceive my own unity - 'it is invoked rather than experienced' 
(PhP.p.406; F465). At the core of my being is bodily motility, which he calls 'basic 
intentionality'. My awareness is always awareness of me-in-the-world, that is of my 
movement towards the world 'I am given to myself as a certain hold upon the world' (phP 
p.354; F406) (Italics mine). This hold is an embodied experience and manifests itself in 
my least movement: my walk is my dialogue with the world; my breathing is, indeed, that 
hold upon my life. 
This intimacy of our belonging has not been neglected by modem Gestalt writers. Gordon 
Wheeler in his work Beyond Individualism is concerned to show how a willingness to 
acknowledge others, to count on them for support, to believe them when they say they 
want to be with us, can deal effectively with crippling issues of shame. He does not 
explore just how, in terms of our existence, we belong with one another and in the world. 
He assumes the primacy of intersubjectivity as the foundation of perception. I think it is 
fair to say that the literature of Gestalt therapy theory is all about our connectedness with 
the world and how to promote that connectedness and the obstacles to it. What is lacking 
is any discussion in depth of the phenomenology of that belonging. 
Intentionality is itself knowledge. Investigating the character of human consciousness, 
'Husserl conceived of consciousness (knowledge) as intentionality - as orientation to that 
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which is not consciousness itself' (Luijpen, 1972, p.33-34 and 101). The reader will recall 
how I said earlier, that if one accepts this as a defmition of perception one also accepts 
the impossibility of the critical question - are we in touch with the real? (cfR.P. 
pp.37;51;56;59;75;132,et passim). His definition is congenial to Gestalt therapy if we 
hold fast to the facticity of our lived world. That is to say, it is all there and I did not bring 
it about! There is, however, a dispute amongst philosophers about intentionality in 
Russeri's reduction. 
This has importance for us in regard to the present study; I refer the reader to my Chapter 
4: A Phenomenology for Gestalt therapy. 
Intentionality as Appropriation 
Intentionality is not a bridge between environment and subject: it is a structure of 
consciousness, presupposed in phenomenology. This structure means that I 'lean 
towards' the environment in every second of my life. It is a particular aspect of 
situatedness; the world around me draws me and is drawn to me; this is the dialogue 
which makes the stuff of my life, and, when it is interrupted, I become unhappy and ill. 
So, here we have intentionality as the mutual dynamic presence of the world and myself 
By extension we can see that it is also the way in which I appropriate the environment as 
my own. The track I leave behind me in the world is one of appropriation . 
. . . with my first perception there was launched an insatiable being who 
appropriates everything he meets, to whom nothing can be purely and simply 
given because he has inherited his share of the world, and hence carries within 
him the project of all possible being, because it has been once and for all 
imprinted in his field of experience (phP p.358; F411). 
Important to note is this: Intentionality is not something I do. It is done for me. If the toast 
is burning I cannot stop myself from smelling it; I cannot stop my eyes from seeing, my 
ears from hearing, my body from experiencing the presence of others. I cannot make 
myself sexually desire someone, or feel love for them. This relationship with the world is 
there, whether I like it or not and can operate against all my expectations. So it can 
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happen that a woman who underwent an abortion without much thought when she was in 
her late teens is shocked and surprised in her mid-thirties by the magnitude of the sadness 
she feels for her lost baby (Kirton 1998). 
Our intentionality is the ontological dynamic in the way we heal ourselves and also in the 
strange ways of psychosomatic illness. The speech therapist and attendant consultant at a 
cleft palate clinic were astonished some time ago when a child who, according to all the 
previous assessments and observations, should not be able to speak turned up for the 
clinic chatting away to his Mum and young sister. When they examined him with video 
fluoroscopy they saw that against all expectations, a layer of tissue had grown across the 
gap; this enabled the child to speak. On the other hand when the urge to express is either 
lacking or thwarted, illness can result. Joyce McDougal, a psychoanalyst, has made a 
very interesting study of this correlation and gives many examples of it (McDougal 
1.1991). 
In the appropriation associated with intentionality we have the philosophical context for 
Yontefs analysis of awareness (1993). He points out (Corollary Two p.Z05) 'that 
awareness is accompanied by "owning". It is this owning, he says, which actually brings 
about change in the person's life. If a man comes for therapy and cannot move from the 
position of blaming the hospital for his wife's death, his parents for his own fecklessness, 
his children for his drinking, his teachers for his poor achievement, then no progress is 
possible. Similarly, with couples who come for therapy, the condition for the possibility 
of any progress is that each begins to own their own part in bringing about the misery 
they are now in. And such owning comes of awareness. 
Intentionality and Self-Awareness 
An interesting question is this: Why do people need psychotherapy to become aware? 
Perhaps they could get it from reading a book or from a software programme on the PC? 
Perhaps so. In the context of this discussion, however, there is the twofold fact of the 
vastness and formidable nature of the field that is the person's life. As a client, the world 
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that faces me is entirely beyond me, terrifying and inexhaustible and I am summoned to 
choose what I shall allow myself to become aware of This summoning is my 
intentionality. Things beckon me to become involved; 'in order to perceive things we 
need to live them' (PhP.p.325; F376). And this holds as much for the ghosts that haunt 
me as for the flowers in my garden. I 'become' what I allow myself to be aware of 
(PhP. p.197;F230). What I am called upon to become aware of is at once a correlative of 
my knowing body and yet a rejecting of that body (phP.p.325;F376).lOO When I say 'a 
correlative of my body', I mean that the person/environment before me are not primarily 
given me as something that I plunge myself into and get lost there, or as a kind of 
problem of disparate elements, which I must synthesize, like I would solve a crossword 
puzzle. My experience is that I am dynamically drawn towards the person/environment 
without any blueprint of what I am going to find, yet carrying in me an openness to the 
other as the response of my being to the situation. At the same time that I am 'given' a 
person/environment possessed of an infinitude of possible aspects - shape, colour, size, 
sounds, smells, feel, new, familiar, connected and so on, my body seizes upon only those 
aspects which are helpful in the situation. I do not constitute the person/environment in 
the sense of actively synthesizing the elements, making inter-relationships between the 
separate parts, relating them to different sensory organs. 
We have expressed this by saying that I perceive with my body .... My gaze ..... 
understands the logic of lighting. Expressed in more general terms, there is a 
logic of the world to which my body in its entirety conforms, and through which 
things of intersensory significance become possible for us (phP.p.326;F376). 
When I speak of a 'rejecting 'Of that body' I mean that in order to perceive, my body must 
be transcendent towards itself That is to say, in the very act of perception my body must, 
in a sense, abandon itself for the constitution of the object. If, for instance I do not 
transcend my sight or sense of smell, then I never get to perceive the scented flower with 
its perfume and beauty - I am not holding on to the appearance (Mallin,1979, pI53) but 
100 Self-conscious awareness means I am aware of myself being aware. This implies a stepping-back from 
myself; this distancing happens in every event of self-consciousness. 
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moving straight on to the thing. 
Awareness can be a very painful process. My decision will be determined to a large 
extent by what seems to me to promote my values - particularly my own welfare. If, in 
the context of therapy, I come to value truthfulness with my therapist and he has created 
an ambience of safety around our dialogue, then I can risk entering those areas of me that 
have become 'no-go' zones, and I become aware ofa wider range of events in my 
situation. There is here a paradox: to permit myself to become aware, is an event which I 
alone can allow, it is as personal as eating; yet I cannot give it to myself but must accept 
it as the gift from another in whose presence I no longer feel alone. Awareness, like 
everything else about us, ends up being intersubjectivity. 
Brooke says of intentionality that it is 'the ontological "there" of world-opening which 
makes it possible for a thing to "be" and consciousness to be appropriated as 
"someone's'" (Brooke, 1993, p.42-43). 
Let me re-state in a different way these reflections on intentionality/awareness. 
When a person permits himself to become aware of some event - for instance that he has 
a growing alcohol problem, or the terror that haunts him around closeness to a woman-
this means that he allows his body (himself) to-touch-and-be-touched-by an event. He 
enters the whole cycle of perception - what Gestalt therapists call the 'cycle of 
awareness' - and, over time, his world re-constellates itself The act of appropriation is 
precisely the union or 'communion' (PhP.p.212; F245) of the person with the world; a 
replay of that moment of primordial contact which sustains and informs every subsequent 
act of perception. The transformation happens because of the realisation of that person's 
capacity for being. 
The person becomes more real. From being someone who hardly dared to speak because 
of terror, he feels free to explore a whole world of relationships. The job of the therapist 
in all this is to support, protect, promote and validate the work with the client. The 
therapist is one 'who addresses the longings of my heart, and who knows also the 
darkness of my heart - with a knowing that is also a loving' (Dunne 1985, p.130) 
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When Yontef describes awareness as 'a form of experiencing '(1993, p.183) he makes 
sense if he intends by this a reflective awareness, a consciousness of the intention present 
and operative in an act of perception. When further on (loc.cit. p.184) he makes the point 
that the element of appropriation in awareness is the transforming element, so far as 
therapy is concerned, he states a very important insight. He does not explain this 
important insight in any depth, as I have above. 
Intentionality Makes Present 
We can develop this notion of intentionality and see it as the way in which the world is 
already present to us before we move; it draws us. 'Intentionality means that 
consciousness precedes and surrounds the boundaries of personal identity' (Brooke, 1993 
p.43). For instance, I notice that as I set out to cycle a long distance, the journey is 
present to me precisely as my project before I have completed it. 'The end is in the 
beginning' as Heidegger says. This presence modifies my self-image, my body-sense, my 
pace, and so on. It is quite different from the sense I have of myself if I am merely going 
to the local news agents to collect the Radio Times. I am not here talking about the 
process of planning which makes the journey present to me in a different way. Planning 
establishes 'a collection of objective correlations' (unjaisceau de correlations objectives) 
whereas intentionality, which is primarily a bodily experience, establishes 'a collection of 
lived-through correspondences' (un ensemble de correspondances vefUes).' 
(ph.P.p.204;F236).(cfH.P.Appendix A, I) 
Let me explain this nexus of objective correlations. Suppose I look around my office. I 
have my chair here - just to the left of the patio door, so that I can easily open it and 
allow fresh air through my office; also the client can more easily see me because I am not 
silhouetted against a window. The client's chair is so placed that she can look past me to 
the background of my garden. Here is a nexus of objective relations. It is all very clear, 
cohesive and reasonable. Philippson's paper Three Boundaries of Self-Formation in 
Robine (Ed) (2001) is in this style.(cfH.P.p182;288). On the other hand if! say: 'Even 
before I actually opened the door to her I felt a pressure in my chest; then there was 
something in the way she came through the door, I sensed her not looking at me, a sense 
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of strain in her voice, and the pace of her entering my therapy room, the overall sense of 
stress in my own body that warned me; be careful today, make sure you have the Marantz 
recorder switched-on. This is an example of 'lived through correspondences'. Ken 
Evans's (2000) article is in this style. 
Lived through correspondence as a process belongs to the phenomenal field. It is the 
basis of phenomenology; Merleau-Ponty sees it as Ie point de depart for philosophy, 
which ' lies in the perpetual beginning of reflection at the point where an individual life 
begins to reflect on itself «(PhP. p.62;F75). (1 have added the emphasis).'Begins' is very 
important here. Intentionality makes present and can be distinguished from what is made 
present. I pointed this out in my criticism of Kohler's and Yontefs notion of 'naive and 
unspoilt experience'. Perception has the trick of hiding itself in the thing perceived. (cf 
H.P. p.85) 
Intentionality and Gestalt Therapy Practice 
In Gestalt therapy an understanding of intentionality illuminates some of the basic 
concepts. The body is a unity and its primary dynamic is to maintain that integrity. 
Therefore, as I pointed out earlier, we say in Gestalt therapy theory that the basic 
movement of the organism will always be in the direction of health. This is explained and 
explored by Kepner (1987, p.65-66; 212ft), withholding is coming from a need to adapt 
to a dangerous situation. This is true even of people who harm themselves. It will seem to 
them at the time, that this is the best way to maintain that integrity. This is really a 
statement of intentionality. 
Similarly with regard to what is called the Paradoxical Nature of Change. This principle 
states: change occurs when one becomes what he is, not when he tries to become what he 
is not (Beisser, A.R 1970, p.77) italics in text. In other words the more a person tries to 
be what he is not, the more will he stay stuck in what he is. This applies also to the way a 
therapist works with a client. Ifhe acts as a 'change agent' he may be hindering rather 
than helping the client (Yontef 1993, pp. 216ft). 
'When a therapist "leads" or "heals" a patient, the therapist is actually pushing or 
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pressuring the patient to be different, and the more the patient is aimed towards a 
goal, the more he or she will stay fundamentally the same' (Yontef, loc cit p.27). 
So a therapist will not set goals for the client saying 'You should be like so', or express 
disappointment or disapproval of him for not making more 'progress'. By doing so he 
may be interfering with that primordial intentionality which belongs to the client as a 
struggling human being, and which, in the first place, brought the client to therapy. 
For an intention to be effective it must be a specification, an articulation in the body of 
the client that is deriving from this primordial intentionality - that personal experience of 
his body's belonging in the world. 
If the therapist imposes his own goals on the client, then he (the therapist) may be making 
grandiose assumptions about his comprehension of the world of the client. This is to 
disrespect the ultimate opaqueness, the otherness and mystery that belong with every 
subjectivity as our common inheritance. In that way the therapist is withdrawing himself 
from that posture of equality and respect in which intersubjectivity can flourish. 
It is the same in regard to the common Gestalt practice of not opposing or breaking the 
resistance of the client. (Kepner, J. 1987, ch.S). If the therapist believes in the process and 
has faith in the client, he can afford to wait, and to wait, with the client. IOI He can also 
simply go along with the resistance of the client and invite him to say: 'I am not angry, I 
am not angry, 1 am not angry. (Each time inviting him to put more power into his 
protestation). This may bring into the awareness of the client just how much he is 
inhibiting his anger. He must, of course, be careful not to set up a client to 'fail' in an 
experiment. 
Section 3: Anonymity - An Aspect of Intentionality 
This title refers to the fact that when 1 reflect upon my experience 1 find that, to a large 
extent, it 'happens to me' (pbP p.240; F277). The element of anonymity which belongs 
101 I am reminded here of that beautiful and very moving testament to her therapist by Sarah Ferguson: A 
Guard Within (1976) 
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in every experience, is by-passed by Goodman when he defines experiences as a 
"function of the boundary' (PHG, p.273). We have seen earlier in regard to intentionality 
how there is an opaqueness about it. This confirms my saying earlier that whenever we 
come to analyse any situation, we find it has four sides to it: 
subject/objective/subjectivity/otherness. Subjectivity and otherness indicate what I have 
called the inexhaustibility and opaqueness that we find in ourselves and the world about 
us. When I say in that first sentence, 'to a large extent', I am leaving room for the ever-
present subjective element. This may seem to challenge the existentialist principle of self-
determination, but it does not. The passivity here indicates no diminution in responsibility 
for myself, but the necessities which press upon me as a being-in-the world. In 
existentialist terms it is part of my 'throwness', which is contained in Merleau-Ponty's 
expression: 'I am given to myself' (PhP.p.360;F 413). Mallin elaborates upon this idea: 
'the core of the idea of throwness is that there is meaning in the world before I initiate it, 
but at the same time this meaning discloses my "connaturality", that is to say that the 
nature of myself is the same as the nature of the world' (1979 pA2). This is related to the 
primordial experience of belonging. 
" am given to myself 
It is only in my being given to myself that I am given a world. With this comes my 
movement towards the world or my 'intentionality'. This movement which is 
intentionality, is,/or the most part experienced anonymously. I open my eyes and the 
world is just there: 'The problem of the world and to begin with that of one's own body 
consists in the fact that it is all there' (PhP.p.198: F230). This is Roquetin's problem in 
Sartre's novel Nausea. For him it is a nauseating experience: any touch of reality utterly 
disgusts him. One evening he enjoyed himself: 'After that, the next day I felt as disgusted 
as if! had awoken in a bed full of vomit ..... .1 need to clean myselfup with abstract 
thoughts as transparent as water.' (1965,p.85). He cannot help himself; objects insist on 
touching him. He is really trying to wash away that presence of the world, which is 
intentionality. Intentionality is an abstraction - a general way of speaking about the 
pulsating, live event that is my life. Of course, I do not experience intentionality as such; 
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to do so would be to experience myself as such and that is not a possibility; so, it is best if 
we say I invoke my intentionality and I experience myself in the world. And the 
background to this, is the circum ambient opaqueness. As I ride along by the moorland on 
a sunny day in May I smell the perfume of the gorse. As I reflect on that I notice two 
things: (i) I cannot not smell it: it is given to me and is of a piece with my belonging in 
the world. It belongs to a world which was there before me and upon which I come as I 
move about. (ii) It does not come about on account of my creative activity. Of course, it 
would not be what it is without the structure that is my sense faculty; yet part of my 
perception of it, is its otherness from me. The gorse perfume takes me over, enters into 
my body, and affects me not only in my smelling-capacity but suffuses my whole 
existence, like a magic spell, and haunts my world. It is part of me and I am part of it so 
that I feel it belongs to my existence, as if it had been long here waiting for me to arrive. 
In the actual experience there is nothing more manifest than that I am both active and 
passive at the same time. I am aware of allowing myself to enjoy, savour, feel, enter into 
the experience; yet I know full-well that I am being-done-to . 
.... ifI wanted to render precisely the perceptual experience, I ought to say that 
one perceives in me, and not that I perceive. Every sensation carries within it the 
germ of a dream or depersonalisation such as we experience in that quasi stupor 
to which we are reduced when we really try to live at the level of sensation .... .I 
am no more aware of being the true subject of my sensation than of my birth and 
death (PhP.p.215;F249) 
'Given' but not 'Compelling' 
To a limited extent I can close down on this experience - by deflecting myself from it by 
focusing my thought on the experience: 'This would be a wonderful experience to analyse 
and set down in my thesis, concentrating on effort.' Or I can turn to some other sight or 
smell - but only with some effort. I notice, that whereas I am gathered up into the 
experience of the gorse perfume and feel very much alive and energised by it, the 
experience is only relatively compelling; if I start thinking about it, then the intensity of 
the experience diminishes and may even vanish altogether. 
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Sense experience is that vital communication with the world, which makes it 
present as a familiar setting of our life. It is to it that the perceived object and the 
perceiving subject owe their thickness. It is the intentional tissue which the effort 
to know will try to take apart. (PhP.p.52-52; F65) 
Anonymity, Contingency and Appropriation 
Anonymity is the 'object side' of the experience, which permits my subject side to be 
manifest. It is important in therapy that both sides are acknowledged. Now, 1 wish to 
return briefly to what I said earlier (Ch 5 pl0l) about speech in Gestalt therapy. 
It is a common practice in Gestalt therapy to invite the client to own her experience by 
changing the language in which she speaks of this. For instance, instead of saying: 'One 
naturally feels bad at wanting to leave someone whom one loves so much' (in Clarkson, 
1989, p.86) the client will be invited to say something like: 'I feel bad about leaving John 
whom I love so much'. The impact on the client of such a change in language can be 
dramatic. It may bring about the expression of unspoken feeling and emotion. There are 
several therapeutic reasons behind this change of language and they leave intact the 
anonymity of perception stressed above by Merleau-Ponty. Let me very briefly 
summarise these reasons here. 
1. By owning his feelings, desires, ambitions etc., the client becomes more aware of them 
and is, therefore, in a position to change his life if he so wishes. It is important, at the 
same time, that the client learn to accept his feelings as 'given'. 
2. By accepting these movements as his own he reappropriates his sense of urgency 
which his trauma will have taken away from him (Stem, D. 1985, Pp.76-81). A 
traumatised person may thereafter go in great fear of the opaque, the anonymous element 
in all emerging situations. This may be articulated in a fear of the night, which calls into 
question our anchorage in the world: 
'The distress felt .... In the night is caused by the fact that it brings home to us our 
contingency, the uncaused and tireless impulse which drives us to seek an 
anchorage and to surmount ourselves in things, without any guarantee that we 
shall always find them (phP p.283; F328). 
3. Using the impersonal form of the verb can be a way in which the client de-realises/ de-
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personalises himself and distances himself from his life. Clients will say how they can 
yearn to 'fade far away dissolve and quite forget' as if the responsibility of being oneself 
is too much. Gestalt therapy travels in a different direction - which can make it an 
inappropriate therapy for people of some fundamentalist religious beliefs. 
As Clarkson points out (loc. cit supra) there is a strong correlation between the way a 
person speaks about himself and the way he experiences himself A mode of speech can 
limit the scope of the experience. (Stem D.1985, p.176) 
A difficulty, in Gestalt therapy, is that the exploration of the subjective field - the actual 
feelings and sensations of the subject - has, traditionally, been paramount, and the opacity 
and anonymity of the objective side is forgotten. For instance, there has been a tendency 
in Gestalt therapy to prize displays of emotion; to emphasize how important self-support 
is as against community support (perls 1976, p.103). It is out of this 'do-it-yourself 
attitude that Wheeler's indictment of individualism emerged (Wheeler, G. 2000). The 
opaque is alluded to when Yontef speaks of relationship:' .... Relationship develops when 
two people each separate ... contact each other, recognising and allowing the differences 
between them' (1993, p.189). It will be pointed out, I'm sure, how the objective side, in 
so far as it enters awareness, becomes the subjective side - the feeling of helplessness, of 
awe, of frustration - the objective side as such cannot be encompassed in awareness. I 
reply that the union of subjective and objective is the experience of reality; when I say 
that the opacity is forgotten I refer to the cult of the clear figure as the important goal in 
Gestalt therapy: 
'The awareness that cures is the awareness that forms a clear Gestalt with a figure 
organised and energised by the person's dominant need at each moment' (Yontef 1993, 
p.182). This is a logical consequence ofYontefs position on the unconscious which I 
have dealt with earlier - he does not go along with the idea of the unconscious as a system 
or acquired world - although this would be more in line with the Gestalt approach to the 
centrality of the body, that mysterious repository of my total past. It was his past that 
enabled Schneider to act from the acquired world of the barrack square soldier when his 
more spontaneous acts were disabled. This work of Goldstein with Schneider shows that 
277 
I I . h' 102 at all leve s peop e operate Wlt In systems. 
Anonymity: Re-instating the Unconscious 
One of the difficulties which Y ontef faces in 'doing away' with the unconscious is that he 
thereby deprives consciousness of that whereby it defines itself as consciousness-of-such-
and-such. In every act of self-awareness there is also present a negation ' I am this but not 
that.' Just as I know where I am by the resistance of this ground, this wall, and this tree to 
my body so my self-definition leans on what I am not. So, if there is no hinterland of the 
unconscious but simply a movement of figure/ ground then I have abandoned the field 
and collapsed my perception to 'an inspection of the mind'. (Mallin 1979, p.17l). In fact, 
my sense faculties tell me of a much larger world, with acquired worlds of behaviour, 
which, while not being figure, still comprise my world. In this regard Mallin remarks: 
'Consciousness can only comprehend itself in the otherness that it continually delimits 
articulates or makes present.' (1979 p.99). Otherwise, subjectivity itself drifts into 
superficiality - as I exemplify in my analysis of intersubjectivity and compassion in 
PHG. (Ch.6). I do not think that Yontefin any way wishes to dismiss the common 
experience we have of placing actions that derive from we-know-not-where (cf van den 
Berg, 1980). The dynamic causality that the Freudians place in the 'unconscious' is now 
seen by Gestalt therapists as an incomplete Gestalt from the past, residing in the lived 
body. 
The focus on the subjective side is behind the Gestalt therapy reputation for producing 
'I-people' - that is for affecting people in such a way that their subjectivity is to the fore 
in their lives. And there is some justification in this. I refer the reader to my Chapter 6 on 
Foundations where I set down what has become known as 'the Gestalt Prayer' (cfp.163). 
Wheeler further documents this in his Beyond Individualism (Chs I-IV) 
102 Merleau-Ponty cites the case of Schneider, a former soldier, whose brain injury made it impossible for 
him to point to his body parts; but if he was asked to salute he could go through it and all the attendant 
circumstances also. (phP.p.116;F128-9) 
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What then, can be the value of focusing on the anonymous element in perception? 
Anonymity and Gestalt Therapy Theory 
Merleau-Ponty never tires of saying in different ways that our being-in-the-world is not at 
our own disposal. When he says 'I was thrown into the world' (PhP.p.360;F413) he does 
not take this in any sense as a misfortune, a dreadful act of carelessness on the part of a 
cruel fate - as Wheeler takes it (2000 p.31) - but as the event which conferred my 
freedom upon me: 'to be unable to reduce myself to anything that 1 experience, to 
maintain in relation to any factual situation a faculty of withdrawal , (PhP.p.360;F413). 
The central phenomenon at the root of both my subjectivity and my 
transcendence towards others consists in my being given to myself. I am given, 
that is, 1 find myself already situated and involved in a physical and social world 
- I am given to myself, which means that this situation is never hidden from me, 
it is never round about me as an alien necessity, and 1 am never in effect 
enclosed in it like an object in a box. (phP.p.360;F413) (Italics in text.) 
It seems to me that MerIeau-Ponty is describing above the ideal or 'normal' situation. 
Being-in-the-worId can become an agony for individuals; being 'given to myself is 
beautiful and congenial so long as the person wants it so. The contrary is well described 
in that masterly piece of Existentialist writing by Kierkegaard Sickness unto Death 
(184911983). 1 have already referred to Sartre (1965) who has brilliantly depicted the 
misery of Roque tin the man who could not reconcile himself to the human condition. In 
Appendix A, where I shall write about sexual violation, I shall attempt to explain the 
phenomenology of trauma, which I see as the total loss of the given world by the 
traumatised person. 
Whereas in the question of completing the incomplete, Gestalt therapy has a great deal to 
offer, in the actual meaning of the process of dying it has much less to offer. 'Anonymity' 
and 'being given' are concepts that call for further work in this area. An example of such 
work is that by Evans (2000) in which he describes how he and his wife Marie shared the 
experience leading up to her death. 
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Anonymity and Escape from Experience 
Splitting is a common term in Gestalt therapy for the process whereby a person loses 
touch more or less with their body or parts of their body. The case of a detective engaged 
in the investigation of a child abduction being himself later charged with paedophile 
pornography offences, is an example of splitting. 
Such a loss is possible because of our mysterious capacity for splitting ourselves. Y ontef 
defines this as 'Parts of self-experience that together constitute a whole are kept apart in 
awareness without influencing each other. The person is aware of both parts but never at 
the same time.' (1993, p.462). This can happen to a person who has witnessed the sudden 
death of a loved one. She may set his place at the table and make ready for him to return 
home while at the same time she knows he is never, ever, coming home again. Such a 
woman is facing the opaqueness of the world. The world is not only opaque, it is 
inexhaustible and it is there. Such is the inundation of experience that floods us that at 
times, we fear for our lives. We are endowed with the ability to block off from us this 
overwhelming flood and retire to a quieter place in ourselves. But this very capacity to 
control the inundation of experience, can become the source of our splitting ourselves to 
the extent that I can stand back from myself and see myself as an object in the world. Our 
ability to 'disown' ourselves resides in the partiality of our perception and our 
indeterminacy. Because of my motility I can always 'leave the scene' - by turning my 
eyes away, but adopting a particular bodily posture, by actually walking out. There is 
such an abundance of perspectives available to me, I do not have to 'tum' or gaze at any 
particular one of them. This is how we can refuse our world, i.e. not attend to the totality 
of the phenomenon that presents itself. For instance, a man at a conference with sexual 
designs on a colleague that may destroy both their lives, can choose to tum away from the 
total field and 'forget' about his wife and children. Another example is a person suffering 
from anorexia nervosa. 103 Such a one may look in the mirror and actually see themselves 
103 Merleau-Ponty has a very interesting reflection on this condition: PhP.p.164;F 
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fat and bulky, whereas her friends may be worried at her emaciation. The split is between 
herself and her body. The person she sees when she looks in the mirror is a person 
stricken with the fears and self-rejection. Smaller splits in ourselves are everyday 
occurrences; accidents, forgetfulness, irrational outbreaks of rage with other car drivers. 
My right hand does not know what my left hand is doing: because, whereas I cannot 
merge with the world so that I become a thing, I can withdraw even from myself, even 
from my body. Such withdrawal means that I cut back on what I actually see, hear, smell 
or feel. I no longer know what is going on in my situation. Merleau-Ponty will attribute 
some of these symptoms to a disturbance in the present experience of their spatiality (phP 
p.282-3; F327). Our lived body makes our space. 
In fact, the experience of Roque tin can become the experience of any of us in a specific 
way of bodily retroflection (Kepner 1987, p.14ft), because there is never any thought of 
feeling that is not underwritten by bodily modification. Splitting is always manifested in 
some way in the person's body (PhP.p.431;F493). This 'splitting' has, from the start been 
a familiar theme of discourse' in Gestalt therapy (pHG.1973; Y ontef, 1993, p.287). 
Kepner treats of it at length in his book Healing Tasks, (1995). I have described his 
approach earlier (cfH.P.Ch.7, p.171ft) and how it is totally concerned with reconnecting 
the abused people with their bodies. 
Anonymity and Body Memory 
The neglect in Gestalt therapy writing of what Mallin calls 'the objective side' of 
phenomena and the focus instead on the subjective and personal awareness tends to bias 
Gestalt therapy as particularly favouring the 'worried well' and unsuitable for really 
profoundly disturbed people. Harris, O. (1992) in her essay Gestalt Work with Psychotics, 
favours an approach 'that humours the body-mind, brain-mind (divide) .... A philosophy 
of cause and effect. She makes the assumption that Gestalt therapy is not entirely suited 
to work with 'psychotics'. In fact we shall see that Gestalt therapy, with the body as its 
central focus is extremely well-suited to such work. My body, as well as being identified 
with me (my subject side), also surpasses me in its subjectivity. I have so many functions 
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in my body that I know very little if anything at all about. Whereas my body can, to some 
extent, become an object to me it can never become 'completely constituted (as an object) 
because it is that by which there are objects (for me) (PhP.p.92;F108); in other words, in 
order to see or feel something as being not-me, I must feel it in my body; but that cannot 
happen unless I am experiencing my body at that time. Yet I do not coincide with my 
body. I carry the physiognomy of my parents and grandparents whom I may never even 
have met. I can be aware of myself breathing, but how it actually happens I do not 
know. Mysteriously, my body carries not only my past experience but the past 
experiences of people connected with me. It also portends my future. How precisely it 
carries so much history is a subject of much discussion (Rossi, E.L.1993) but, that it does 
so, is established by the researches of Reich and his pupil Lowen. More recently 'body 
memory' has become a growing area of study in psychology. 
Opaqueness at the Centre of Subjectivity 
To summarise the present section we can say that Gestalt therapy theory needs to take 
account of the opaqueness at the centre of our subjectivity. This contains an indication for 
an approach to disturbed people that moves away from treating them as if their illness 
was rooted in some subjective disorder; as ifit was a simple matter of raising a person's 
awareness so that they can take steps to deal with their problems. Things are not that 
simple. Weare not at our own disposal, and that holds for everyday experience just as it 
holds for someone who is caught-up in the trauma of war or childhood sexual abuse. 
There needs to be a place in the theory of Gestalt therapy for the utterly mysterious and 
opaque dimension to human existence. 
I am thrown into a nature and that nature appears not only as outside me, in 
objects devoid of history, but it is also discernible at the centre of subjectivity 
(ph.P.p346;F398). 
Section Four: Transcendence: The Future in the Present 
The third concept neglected in Gestalt therapy theory and yet which opens a gateway to a 
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whole hinterland of exploration into intimacy is transcendence. 
It seems to me that this is one of the richest and most relevant concepts for Gestalt 
therapy. Transcendence is at once that inviting 'openness' of the world and the 'thrust' 
that informs our every movement. It is the future-in-the-present that draws us on, the 
mystery, which constitutes us as a question to ourselves. 
It is thus of the essence of the thing and of the world to present themselves as 
'open', to send us beyond their determinate manifestations, to promise us always 
'something else to see'. This is what is sometimes expressed by saying that the 
thing and the world are mysterious. (PhP.p.333; F384) 
As Merleau-Ponty uses the term, transcendence belongs to the very structure of our 
existence. It is not something I have but what I am. It is the phenomenon, the situation, 
the experience, even consciousness viewed as transformation. (phP.p.121; F141) 
This Midas-like power of transformation is inseparable from my bodily presence and my 
gaze. 
Existence is indeterminate in itself, by reason of its fundamental structure, and in 
so far as it is the very process whereby the hitherto meaningless takes on· 
meaning, whereby what had merely a sexual significance assumes a more 
general one, chance is transformed into reason; in so far as it is the act of taking 
up a de/acto situation. 
We shall give the name transcendence to this act in which existence takes up, of 
its own account, and transforms such a situation. (PhP.p.169; F197) 
The relevance of transcendence is this: that it is at once a description of our being and it 
is ever-present and observable in our lived experience. It describes the phenomenal field. 
Transcendence and Gestalt Therapy 
Goodman originally intended Gestalt Therapy to supply a framework or philosophy to 
support the new approach in therapy. His book could never be this because its view of the 
human was basically reductionist. I have elsewhere (in the chapter 'Foundations') 
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attributed this reductionist bias in Gestalt therapy theory to the powerful influence of 
John Dewey (1859 - 1952) whose ambition it was to explain the phenomenon of 
perception in biological terms and therefore in terms of cause and effect 
(Dewey, 192011991, p.124ff). Goodman openly professed to be influenced by Dewey 
and his influence is confirmed by the researches of Stoehr (1994, p.120-1). Dewey's 
work does not embrace philosophical concepts that accommodate an understanding of the 
phenomenal field and the enterprise of Gestalt therapy. Goodman and his colleagues talk 
a great deal about growth and change, yet do not explain how psychotherapy is a 
worthwhile enterprise wholly in line with the existential structures of the human person: 
how it is that they can say that the body is always moving in the direction of health; how 
can it be so transformative to be in the presence of a person who accepts one precisely as 
one is. Gestalt Therapy embraces the notion of transcendence implicitly (in the emphasis 
on experiments, for instance) but never explicitly discusses it. So it is not surprising if 
Gestalt therapy theory is stuck, as Roberts asserts (1999, p,37). 
It is not an exaggeration to say that I think the notion of transcendence is to the enterprise 
of Gestalt therapy what breathing is to an organism. Transcendence in Gestalt therapy 
theory can be said to have three functions. 
Firstly it marks off the specialness of the human being whose existence is given as an 'I 
can'. 
Secondly, it makes sense of the 'optimism' about rectitude of 'organismic self-
regulation' which is an important concept in Gestalt therapy theory. (Y ontef 1993, 
pp.212-6). 
Thirdly, it brings us to a position of being able to appreciate of the pivotal function of 
language in therapy. (cfH.P. Ch.5) 
It will be apparent how this notion is seminally present throughout Gestalt Therapy: the 
whole enterprise of therapy is an exercise of transcendence. (Speaking thus is to speak 
rather loosely about what is constitutive of our existence - yet, my inaccurate speech 
here, may serve to illustrate what ontological grounding means.). My point is that the 
authors do not explore this notion and therefore remain impeded in their discourse. 
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Transcendence - an Existential Concept 
The notion of transcendence as applied to human being derives from Heidegger. It is 
superabundantly referenced in Richardson, W.J. (1963). It is also dealt with at great 
length in De Waelhens, A. (1946) cap. II and XIII. Transcendence is that which marks 
off human being from the being of anything else in the whole world. Dasein is in no way 
an 'existent' in the manner ofa table or a stone. 
If then we take a human being as essentially situated - in the sense I explained earlier -
then we see that the capacity to become more i.e. to transform, belongs to the person-in-
the-situation. The isolated person, a kind ofLeibnitzean monad, is inconceivable to 
Heidegger and this is also the declared position of the authors of Gestalt Therapy (p.274). 
So, it is not illegitimate for us to extend this definition to that given by Merleau-Ponty 
and cited earlier: 
We shall give the name 'transcendence' to this act in which existence takes up, 
to its own account, and transforms such a situation. (phP. p.l69;F197» 
'Transcendent' here means our capacity to transform any situation into a more 
meaningful situation precisely because that 'more meaningful' is already present as 
possibility of the field and draws us ever forward. Lovers transform one another and their 
situation is transformed. A rather banal example of transcendence is a student at a lecture. 
The teacher says something the student does not understand so he chooses to ask the 
teacher a question and understands the answer. Now, he has transformed the first 
situation into a different and 'more meaningful' situation. This he could not have done 
unless the answer to his question had already been present to him as an absence shown in 
his question and he had turned himself in the direction of his more-being. 
Creative Response - The Body Transcendent 
What I wish to do here is to point the way to a more profound understanding of just one 
area of a particularly important schema relating to the application of the Gestalt approach 
to everyday living. This schema is featured in an article by Malcolm Parlett (2000) 
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which, though constituting a significant development in the application of field 
perspective, begs a framework within which the fertile ideas put forth in his writing can 
be elaborated upon. 
The general context in which he writes is problems arising for people from the 
phenomenon of globalization - where the possibility of communication between people 
has enormously increased, where abundance for all is a real possibility and yet where our 
society is driven with destructive greed, inequality and injustice. Parlett delineates five 
areas or abilities of creative adjustment, which, if woken-up and applied by the 
individuals, would humanise our society. His idea is that by recognising and naming 
these five areas, people can be empowered to a more healthy response in various and 
changing circumstances. Whereas Merleau-Ponty has nothing to teach Gestalt therapists 
about the 'how' of psychotherapy what he has on offer is a more profound understanding 
of the theory supporting actual practice. Here it is his view of the body as 'the pivot of 
the world', through its transcendent power transforming and transfiguring situations. I 
take the first 'dimension' of Parlett's schema, which he calls 'Responding' and I apply 
Merleau-Ponty's insight to this and see where it takes us. A similar elaboration could be 
made around the notion of what 'creative adjustment' means (phG Book Two Chs 12 & 
13). 
'Creative' - Explained and Illustrated 
Our beginning place is to agree that response is unavoidable in any situation. Our 
presence is itself a response - even if that is a closing down or leaving the scene. What is 
it to 'respond'? Is it not to give meaning - and to allow that meaning to become operative 
in me? Merleau-Ponty views the body as the primary meaning-giving response in any 
situation. As he sees it, my lived body is the cue for the constellation of any situation. 
How I walk, how I hold myself, how I look at people, how I breathe and so on. My body 
creates a 'certain structural co-ordination of experience, a certain modulation of 
existence. ' 
... a pattern of my bodily behaviour endows the objects around me with a certain 
significance both for me and for others. (PhP.p.193; F225) 
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This is my body's transcendence that is to say, opening itself to a new pattern of 
behaviour in the very act of appropriating the disparate elements of the situation and 
applying them to a project. Phenomenologically the body is characterised by its ability 
(indeed its inability not to) to endow with meaning the hitherto meaningless. Merleau-
Ponty predicates this power, of existence itself (PhP.p.169; FI97); but we must 
remember that the body's existence is its transcendence. This means, of course, that this 
power of transformation 'runs through' every least part and cell of the body - even my 
eyebrows are 'informed' by this power of transformation. Let us consider some 
examples of this. 
When my friend shows me into the room I am to occupy during my stay, I quickly take in 
how the various things there, the position of the desk and window and the light suit me. 
My body pulls together all the separate elements of the room and illumines them with 
meaning in terms a/my body. We see the same transformation dramatically in the way a 
leader like Ghandi pulled together the energies of the people of a whole sub-continent. 
People described this frail figure as 'emanating peace'. Of course, Ghandi was also a 
remarkable thinker; but it was his body that people wanted to be close to. I have seen the 
same phenomenon - less dramatically but still remarkable - when I was in the common 
room with a group of male celibate clergy when a woman entered the room. A new 
energy seemed to possess the priests. They were galvanized into helping with the 
particular project, which she was promoting. Here is that characteristic of the human 
body' to take up and transform, to its own account such a situation. '(phP.p.169; FI97). 
Her body (her entering the room, the look on her face, the way of her gaze, the movement 
of her limbs and so on,) creates a space; each of their bodies responds in congenial 
fashion. Here is the co-creation of a new reality through love and desire (PhP. p .154; 
F180). It is also an example of embodied subjects thrown open to the world through the 
transcendence of their bodies. 
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'Response' - Creative Adjustment 
For people who view the world objectively, who do not think and live in terms of the 
phenomenal field, these examples will bristle with difficulties. Not so for poets, artists, 
lovers and mystics, I guess. 104 But let us return to the common room with the woman and 
the celibate priests. 
Transcendence will always take things much further than you expected. That is the 
creative or co-creative element in us. Who could have anticipated that the arrival of this 
'magic' woman would elicit such an energetic response from a low-level energy group of 
burnt-out 'patres'? Merleau-Ponty warns us that it is possible to psychologize such an 
event and so miss out on its meaning, like reducing a ballet to the 'brilliance' of the 
choreography. The wonder in such an event is the creativity of the exchange or 
'adjustment' that takes place. It is not just the priests who are enchanted by the woman 
but the woman is enchanted by the priests so that the magic is shared around. 
Response acknowledged allows a space in which the dance can happen and . .in the dance 
the subject and his (her) world are no longer in opposition, no longer stand out one 
against the background of the other .... '(PhP. p.287; F333 ft.nt.4). 
We can see the promise that lies for development of progressive Gestalt therapy thinking, 
such as that of Malcolm Parlett when it draws upon the resources ofMerleau-Ponty's 
thinking. 
Holistic Response 
Here we speak of the phenomenal field where the 'intentional threads linking (the body) 
to its surrounding', 'finally reveal to us the perceiving subject as the perceived world' 
(PhP. p.72; F86). In the phenomenal field there is a continuous traffic of exchange 
between subject and world. In Gestalt therapy literature this is called 'contact'; I would 
104 Heidegger in his later works referred to the 'knowledge' of the mystics: 'The breath of all growing 
things which rest along the pathway bestows the world In what remains unsaid in their speech is, as 
Eckhart, the old master ofletters and life says - God, only God.' (in Dunne, 1985, p.13). 
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go further and call it dialectical contact or even dialogue - if we wish to nuance the 
intimacy of the union. Just as the meaning of a word is not contained in its sound, but 
trails its context, the history it has for the hearers, as well as the face and style of the 
speaker, so neither is the response of the body contained by its dimensions or 
physiological data. It makes no sense to speak here in terms of cause and effect. Such 
explanation will tend to diminish and lose the heart of the matter, which is the 
transcendent power of the body. 
The meaning of the gesture is not contained in it (the body) like some physical 
or physiological phenomenon. The meaning of the word is not contained in the 
word as sound. But the human body is defined in terms of its property of 
appropriating in an indefinite series of discontinuous acts; significant cores 
which transcend its natural powers (PhP. p.193; F226). 
The body here responding is not the body as studied in medicine. It is the body that 
understands 
... a logic of the world to which my body in its entirety conforms, and through 
which things of intersensory significance become possible for us .... 
. .. to have a body is to possess a universal setting, a schema of all types of 
perceptual unfolding and of all those intersensory correspondences that lie 
beyond the segment of the world, which we are actually perceiving 
(phP.p.326;F377). 
Response - makes a New Space 
We have stated the immensity of the field to which I have access through my body as the 
pivot of the world. And just as the worlds of others illumine my field, so does my world -
my body - illumine theirs. Specifically, the gesture informed by a word or sound pervades 
the situation and imbues it with an aroma, which affects everyone present. I think of that 
story in the Gospel of St John (12.3) where the woman empties a whole jar of perfume 
over the feet of Jesus and everyone is affected by it. Of course, unless response is 
responded to, no dialogue will ensue. We call it 'creative response' because it opens up a 
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new space. 
Here we see before us a whole hinterland inviting further exploration of the question of 
human space - What is the relation of dimensional space to the 'space' within which the 
psychotherapist and client meet? In what way do we carry our own 'space' around with 
us? What of the space in which the very depressed or anorectic person dwells? 
Romanyshyn (1994) says it is more correct to say that the body is a situation rather than 
that it is in a situation. He illustrates this beautifully: 
A smile on the face of a woman I love is inseparable from my face, which I 
present to her. Her smile has nothing to do with her insides. It has to do with my 
face, with our relationship. Moreover, her smile gathers a space around us in a 
specific felt bodily way. Her smile does not exist in a space that contains us. 
Rather her smile forms and shapes a space for us. It creates and radiates its space. 
(1994 ft.nt.3 p.236) 
In one of his most recent papers (2001) Y ontef, without any invocation of 
'transcendence' makes the same point. 
We are not in afield; our very substance is oj afield (p.82). 
I have already drawn attention to the stir that this expression aroused in his audience. 
Section Five: Intersubjectivity - The Goal of Transcendence 
One of the most significant developments in Gestalt therapy during the past thirty years 
has been the move of focus away from the individual acting alone, to the person as part of 
a field. This I have spoken about earlier in the context of Gordon Wheeler's and Malcolm 
Parlett's work. As I pointed out, each of these writers is prophetically addressing the 
modem situation of Gestalt therapy and they each are profound and insightful in their 
analysis. Although I am coming from a different point de depart. I am travelling in the 
same direction. This study aims not to challenge the validity of their analysis but to 
supplement that analysis; to root what they say in a solid philosophical foundation and 
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enable the 'reform' and development which they, each in his own way, proclaims, to 
become operative in the everyday practice of Gestalt therapy. I see this as happening 
mainly through the re-instatement of the human body as the locus of the Field, as that by 
which, in which and through which we 'Respond', 'Interrelate', 'Self-Recognise' and 
'Experiment' and 'Embody' (parlett, 2000, p.20fi). 
The Craving for Intersubjective Closeness 
The logic of situatedness applies to the human body just as it does to everything. To think 
of the human being isolated, alone by himself cut off from the world of people and 
things, is to imagine unreality. Intentionally every cell in our bodies craves the closeness 
of other people like ourselves - in place of which we may substitute at times, other 
creatures like cats or dogs or projects such as academic distinction or business success. 
The closeness that we crave is not like that between the sea and the house in Sheila 
Cassidy's extraordinary poem: 
Good neighbours 
not that we spoke much. 
We met in silences, 
respectful, keeping our distance 
but looking our thoughts across the fence of sand. 
(in Cassidy 1989, p.8) 
Such 'respectable' closeness is really distance and isolation. 
From its very inception in the 1940's Gestalt therapy proclaimed and operated upon 
the principle that our union with the environment is very close and intimate. 
You and your environment are not independent entities but together you 
constitute a functioning, mutually influencing total system ..... .your sense of the 
unitary inter functioning of you and your environment is contact 
(pHG.p.l04). Emphasis in text. 
When we say 'boundary' we think ofa ' boundary between'; but the contact-
boundary, where the experience occurs, does not separate the organism and its 
environment (pHG p.275). 
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Such a formulation leaves out that which enables us to go out from ourselves - our 
transcendence. This primary insight has never got past its stuck place. We have seen how 
through lack of a philosophy articulate in such matters; the theoretical elaboration of this 
primary insight ran into very great difficulties. However, when one reads the record of 
the actual practice of Gestalt therapy, we see how unity and closeness between people 
was central to it. In fact, it was the implementation of this insight - sometimes bazaar, 
sometimes genuinely caring and loving, sometimes plainly exploitative - that brought the 
therapy into disrepute even in the lifetime of Perls himself 
The difficulty with Gestalt therapy is that is does not adequately explain itself It is full 
of unspoken questions. One such question is this: What is it to be in the presence of 
another person? 
The Difficulty about Intersubjectivity 
How can I be with another person and see and experience her as a person like me? 
Because our being is given to us primarily as an '/ can', the 'natural' thing is to see the 
other as part of the world and therefore as 'something-at-hand-for-use'. So, a man may 
view a woman or a woman a man as a possible sexual partner, without knowing anything 
whatsoever about that person. In our culture it is assumed to be in order to depersonalize 
people: so, people who work for a company are referred to as 'human resources', people 
who use services become 'consumers', politicians regard people as 'voters'. The 
tendency is to incorporate 'the other' as part of our on-going project. And such 
depersonalization seems to me in line with a particular way of perceiving the world I do 
not agree with Wheeler that our primary orientation is interpersonal - our primary 
orientation is towards the anonymous world - 'psyche is the lived world' (Brooke, 1993, 
p.89) and fantasy or imagination is simply the on-going presence of the world around us. 
'If we want to understand man's existence we must listen to the language of 
objects.'(Van den Berg. 1972, p.40) 
Phenomenologically, it seems to me that the analysis in Gestalt Therapy does not support 
us in opposing such depersonalisation, because it insufficiently supports embodied 
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subjectivity. Depersonalisation happens when I dismiss or disregard or miss the 
subjective interiority of the other. A supporting philosophy must explain the dialectic 
within which a person can manifest his interiority to me and I to him without shame. 
Without this reciprocity it seems impossible for any of us to see another as an 'alter ego'. 
There is more than a grain of truth in the saying that 'the eyes are the windows of the 
soul'. It was not just for fear of recognition that their captors insisted that Brian Keenan 
and John McCarthy wear a blind fold: they could not meet the gaze of those two men. It 
is difficult to look into the eyes of another without sensing their humanity, that is, their 
embodied subjectivity. Interiority does not disclose itself as such. We can get some idea 
of the difficulty in this from the exercise which Merleau-Ponty describes (PhP.p.448; 
F511). If I touch my left hand with my right hand, I cannot perceive my left hand qua 
touching my right hand, that is, in so far as it is a subjectivity perceiving my right hand 
(phP.p.92; FI08). Subjectivity as the presence of self to self does not happen with regard 
to 'another' self, if self is simply 'the function of contacting the actual transient present. ' 
(pHGp.42S) 
Self, which is interiority, is not a phenomenon and therefore as such is imperceptible. 
These and other difficulties multiply so long as we envisage the self, either as a thing or 
as sealed-up interiority. Basic to the elaboration of any satisfactory understanding of 
intersubjectivity is a satisfactory understanding of the self. 
The Deficient Notion of the Self in Gestalt Therapy 
In the section on the Self, the authors 'consider the self as the function of contacting the 
actual transient present.' (pHG p.425). Self is process; but the self does not come to 
awareness but only the intentionality of the self - that is, the thing that the person is 
contacting. And 'the self is not to be thought of as a fixed institution; it exists wherever 
there is, in fact, a boundary interaction. To paraphrase Aristotle, "When the thumb is 
pinched, the self is the painful thumb". (pHG p. 427) lOS 
IOSThe dictum of Aristotle which he is paraphrasing used be a very familiar one in Thomistic Scholastic 
circles and was repeated in the Latin translation of Aristotle from the Arabic as: Actiones sunt compositi 
'Actions belong to the whole person. ' 
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Why do they not say: 'The self is the boundary interaction'? Not an entity in itself, the 
self is a being-toward-the-environment; in other words it cannot be known except in the 
environment. - just as the light of the sun cannot be seen except when it strikes objects. 
They explain further on: 
'Self, the system of contacts, always integrates perceptive proprioceptive 
functions, motor muscular functions, and organic needs .... To put this another 
way .. .it is the sensory organ that perceives, it is the muscle that moves, it is the 
vegetative organ that suffers an excess or deficit; but it is the organism-as-a-
whole in contact with the environment that is aware, manipulates, feels (PHG 
p.428). 
I find this a very fair statement ofMerleau-Ponty's view in the chapter on the Thing and 
the Natural World that, 'I perceive with my body ... '. Although they do not speak from 
within the phenomenal field, 1 do not think they are here envisaging stimulus proceeding 
from the environment via the sensory organ to the Self where it is all integrated. 
Otherwise, the movement is from the outside in and we are back to subject/object and the 
Cartesian discourse. However, three things 1 am missing in their account of the Self: 
firstly, any mention of subjectivity as interiority: This is precisely what distinguishes self 
from thing. Interiority in touch with itself over time is subjectivity. In the absence of this 
you can read over the quotes above and substitute 'ingenious electronic device' for 'self 
and the statements still make sense. 
The second thing I am missing, and I have dealt with this previously, is any reflection on 
my awareness that 1 am given to myself. This comprises the whole objective or opaque 
side of myself - the Ground against which 1 'stand out' (existere - ex stare). 
Merleau-Ponty calls this 
The central phenomenon at the root of both my subjectivity and my 
transcendence towards others ..... (phP.p.360; F413) 
The third element 1 find lacking in this description of the self is bound up with the two 
already mentioned: 1 am not only present to myself and aware that I am given to myself, 
but that these two find their realisation in my body. . This is the only way I know myself 
or can be manifest as a phenomenon and because it is bodily, such a presence is of its 
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very nature ambiguous - no event expresses the whole of me but every event expresses a 
part of me so that over time I manifest myself more and more. 
I know myself only in my inherence in time and in the world, that is, I know 
myself only in ambiguity (PhP.p.345). 
It can justly be said that in this section - and, indeed, throughout the thesis - I do not 
sufficiently distinguish between Self, awareness, boundary, interiority, embodiment. 
While we need to make those distinctions for the sake of description thses terms are all 
abstractions and are realized only in the lived body where they are indistinguishable. I do 
not see how such elaborations belong in the present context. 
'The Secret of the Presence of the Other ..... ' 
There is a very difficult philosophical problem about the meeting of embodied 
subjectivities where they each meet the other precisely as such. We have not entered this 
problem which is discussed in great detail in Madison (1981, p37ft). Merleau-Ponty's 
resolution is of great importance to us. He resolved this problem by his finding what he 
calls 'the third genus of being' (phP p.350; FF402): the lived body. 
It is through my body that I understand people, just as it is through my body that I 
know things (PhP.p186; F216). 
Madison puts it this way: 
The secret of the presence of the other resides therefore in the perception that I 
have of my own body ....... It is the lived body as circular structure which, by 
accomplishing the synthesis of the in itselfand the/or itself, makes it be that my 
field of bodily experience intertwines with that of the other (1981, p.39)ltalics 
mine. 
Let me explain this rather compact thinking of Madison. As we grow up we learn what 
various objects are 'for'. We see someone using a hammer, or a saw or a knife. My 
learning happens in the ways I'm told: this is a hammer and you hold it so and you do 
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such and such and it is useful for. . . .. Talk. will not teach us anything unless our body 
takes hold of it and goes through its motions. The second way makes this easier: we see 
and hear and stand beside someone using a hammer; he may even 'give me a chance' 
using it. Now my body dances with the hammer; just as a very small baby makes 
movements with its mouth if you pretend to chew its fingers. This is the circular 
structure of my body - I reach out and 'become' the thing in my world. We do this 
around all cultural objects. 
The very first of all cultural objects and the one by which all the rest exist, is the 
body of the other person as the vehicle ofa form of behaviour (PhP p.348; F401). 
Just as I have 'the positing of objects through that of my body' (phP p.350; F402) - my 
hand, my muscles, the angle at which I work with the hammer 
(and vice-versa) - so also my body 'gives me the other as the completion of the system 
"self-other-world'" (phP p.352; F404). 
In his Phenomenology oj Perception Merleau-Ponty has not, I regret to say, fully 
developed this insight (Madison 1981, p 37). I would like to be able to say that we have 
in Merleau-Ponty's early work a complete philosophy of inter subjectivity designer-made 
for Gestalt therapy. Not so. In that part of the Phenomenology where we might expect to 
find such a development (Ch IV of Part II) he is very taken up with how subjectivities 
can co-exist. Madison (loc. cit p.38) makes the point that in his solution of this problem 
he is implicitly criticising his revered teacher Edmund Husserl. 106 Another consideration 
is this: one cannot discourse about intimacy with another person without disclosing a lot 
about oneself 
Though incomplete in the Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty's thought is profound and 
fertile. He devotes the fourth chapter of Part II The Perceived World under the heading 
l~ereas Husserl seems to have thought that consciousness or interiority was sufficient to constitute the 
world, Merleau-Ponty held that only through the body can the world be constituted. Husserl ends his 
Cartesian Meditations with a quote from St Augustine: noli foras ire. in te redi. in interiore homine habitat 
veritas. Merleau-Ponty rejects this at the very start of the Phenomenology: 'Truth does not 'inhabit' only 
'the inner man', ... there is no inner man'(PhP.p.xi;Fv.ft.note) 
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'The Other and the Human World' to a discussion of inter subjectivity. He sees this as an 
extension of the perception of the world. And it is in that context that it has a great deal to 
offer to Gestalt therapy theorists. In Gestalt therapy practice there is little focus on the 
perception of the natural world yet this is the basis of all intersubjectivity. At the head of 
Part II he makes the point strongly that how you think about your body is how you will 
perceive the world: 'The Theory of the Body is already a theory of perception' (PhP 
p.203;F235). His approach is to show how the Now is interwoven (entrelacement) with 
the past. My present personal acts build upon sedimented past acts. Other subjectivities 
emerge from a cultural world that everywhere bears their marks. The same reciprocity 
that binds us to the world of things binds us to one another. In summary it is through the 
reciprocity of their bodies that subjectivities can recognise each other as such. 
Unfortunately he has not left us in the Phenomenology an explanation of what Martin 
Buber calls the 'I-Thou relationship'. However, there is a great deal more development in 
his later works. 
A very evocative and interesting question arises:Does Merleau-Ponty's incompleteness 
on intersubjectivity arise from the very nature of his approach in Phenomenology or did it 
just happen that he did not develop the theme? I have no definite view on that and I see it 
an invitation for a further study. 
Section Six: The Between - A Healing Perception 
In order to develop Merleau-Ponty's thought for the foundation of Gestalt therapy we 
need to come from the same viewpoint as he did: Merleau-Ponty sees the meeting of 
embodied subjectivities in terms of the intimate interconnectedness of being-in-the-
world. Just as my thrownness means that I find myself belonging in the world so, 
through my body I find the presence of the other's body is given to me. It is not a 
question of my recognising the other by a process of analogy nor by a process of 
inference that the other is human like me. We are both present within the same world, 
through our sense functions we contact the otherness of that world. Each of us is 
contacting that world in our own special way yet sharing in a general way: by smell, 
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sight, hearing, feeling and so on. This means that what I smell, see, hear and so on, must 
be extended through that other person's smelling, seeing, hearing and so on. We all 
know how, in surprise or apprehension we can tum to someone and say did you hear that? 
Did you see that? If they say 'Yes', our response is totally different than if they say 'No'. 
We find that confirmation or doubt alters the whole configuration of our world, and the 
other's field is a prolongation of mine. As he says' Yes' it is as if my intention/experience 
is continued in him and he sees my world from his special point of view. How do I know 
that he sees what I see, hears what I hear and so on? By his voice, his demeanour, his 
look, his gestures, his movements, by his lived body response. My body knows this - I 
don't pick up 'the data' and tum it into a series of inferences, I just know. And, if! think 
he is deceiving me, I can know that only by comparison with what I would be like if he 
was not deceiving me . 
.... It is precisely my body that perceives the body of another, and discovers in 
that other body a miraculous prolongation of my own intentions, a familiar way of 
dealing with the world (pbP p.354; F406). 
Just as my eyes, ears, smell, touch become the logos, the utterance of a world that can be 
perceived that way, so now, all my perspectives become intermeshed with the 
perspectives of the other and become the logos of 'Being'. 
'Just as my different perspectives on a thing are interwoven by being all 
specification of this general object situation, the global perspective that I am (that 
definitively characterises my reality and individuality) is interwoven with that of 
every other, all being specification of general Being-in-the-world' (Mallin, 1979, 
p.49). 
Here we have a clue to why it is so important, so transfonnative, to share with the other, 
why we find that the therapeutic component in therapy is not so much my display of great 
learning nor my acuity of interpretation, nor my impressive qualifications, but the quality 
of the way in which we are able to share our perceived worlds. The other, in the way he 
looks, talks, listens, responds gives me back my world as validated because he represents 
a different perspective on the world of my experience. This is not just' an exchange of 
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views' but a bodily experience, like I said above. 'A body-subject is actually presented 
and given to me essentially as another perspective or organization of the world itself 
(Mallin., ibid). Such validation is important even around our football team - and indeed 
inspires this whole vast enterprise of football competitions; it becomes something else 
when it has to do with deep fears, terrors, griefs and losses of hope and meaning, which is 
the area of psychotherapy. This is the 'healing perception', the experience of 'the 
Between'. 
The Anonymous in the Between 
And so I find myself caught up in a system of reflection - not withdrawal reflection, but 
mirroring reflection in which I recognise myself because I am recognised. I think of what 
Wright (1991, p.13) says about the child finding its identity in the eyes of the mother - so 
that the mother delivers his meaning to the child by finding her joy in him and the child 
deliverers her meaning to his mother by finding himself in her eyes. l07Yet for Merleau-
Ponty there is always something anonymous about the meeting and it is always a meeting 
of lived bodies. 
I am given to myself merely as a certain hold upon the world; now, it is precisely 
my body which perceives the body of another, and discovers in that other body a 
miraculous prolongation of my own intentions, a familiar way of dealing with 
the world. Henceforth, as the parts of my body together comprise a system, 
(jorment ensemble un systeme). so my body and the other's are one whole, two 
sides of one and the same phenomenon., and the anonymous existence of which 
my body is the ever- renewed trace henceforth inhabits both bodies 
simultaneously. (PhP.p.354; F406) 
The Between - Involves the Whole of Me 
This is the same immediacy that I have with things. The thrust of transcendence is 
107 As the title of his book indicates, Vision and Separation, the whole subject of seeing and being seen is 
treated at length over several chapters in this remarkable work. 
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towards the essence of the thing. The essence of the other person is his embodied 
subjectivity and the opaqueness into which that subjectivity withdraws. We can apply 
here to the relationship with the other the analysis he gives of our relationship with the 
things of the world. 
It is not just my eyes that see and my ears that hear and my nose that smells and my 
hands that sense texture, '1 perceive with my body' (PhP.p.326;F376) 
When 1 perceive a pebble, I am not expressly conscious of knowing it only 
through my eyes, of enjoying only certain perspective aspects of it, and yet an 
analysis in these terms, ifI undertake it, does not surprise me. (phP.p.326;F376) 
The whole of me is brought to bear on the perceptual object. I am given manifold aspects 
and each is responded to by a 'creative adjustment' on my part, so that I begin to live the 
thing; - 'In order to perceive things we need to live them' (phP.p.325;F376). When we 
look at it in detail, we see that a great cascade of data is poured over us in even the 
simplest perception. 108 
The thing is not all of a piece, for though the perspective aspects, and the ever-
changing flow of appearances, are not explicitly posited, all are at least ready to 
be perceived and given in a non-positing consciousness, to precisely the extent 
necessary for me to be able to escape from them into the thing.(phP.p.326;F376) 
The Between is Inexhaustible 
This flood of data is not posited in awareness but only such details of the thing - size, 
colour, shade, texture as I require to have, so that 1 can abandon them and gain access to 
the thing - the person. Merleau-Ponty makes it clear, that whereas our perception is all 
about reaching the thing, 
losnus is a recurring theme in the work of Karl Rahner: 'the (human) subject is fundamentally and by its 
very nature pure openness for absolutely everything, for being as such. ' (Foundations 1984, p.20) He sees 
transcendence as 'the experience of being known' ( op.cit. pS8). He is writing as a theologian about the 
love of God. 
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, the ipseity is, of course, never reached: each aspect of the thing which falls to 
our perception is still only an invitation to perceive beyond it, still only a 
momentary halt in the perceptual process (PhP.p.233; F269). 
Transcendence, which is the thrust of my existence, draws me on by the promise of more 
to be seen while the transcendence of the thing means that it always escapes from me into 
its 'aseity' - 'its unchallengeable presence and the perpetual absence into which it 
withdraws.' (ibid.), So that, 'What makes the 'reality' of the thing is therefore, precisely 
what snatches it from my grasp. '(ibid) 
So it is, that although we may live a whole lifetime with a person - what we know of 
them is nothing compared to what we do not know of them. 
The Between: A Basis for Ethics 
It is possible to see in this philosophy of the person the foundation for the ethical practice, 
which informs Gestalt therapy to-day. Especially am I thinking of that culture of respect 
for the client, which marks the modem practice of Gestalt therapy. We never take the 
person for granted, we never presume that we know better than the client how she should 
live her life. And, however ill a person may be, they never cease to merit our best caring. 
A Review of the Section on Intersubjectivity 
Everything about us, right from the beginning of our lives calls for relationship with 
another person. Intentionality, anonymity, transcendence all serve intersubjectivity. Even 
so, Merleau-Ponty's treatment of inter subjectivity in the 'Phenomenology' is incomplete, 
but it is beyond the scope of this study to follow the development of his thought into his 
later works. Intersubjectivity is of special interest to Gestalt writers. From the start the 
thing that distinguished Gestalt therapy has been its placing the core therapeutic element 
in the relationship between therapist and client. However, the theory supporting Gestalt 
therapy has been inadequate and has not facilitated a more profound development of the 
understanding of this primary insight. The concept of subjectivity in Gestalt therapy 
theory is weak and inadequate and divorced from 'body': the concept is missing three 
301 
essential elements: interiority, givenness, and corporeity. 
To some extent we can draw on what Merleau-Ponty has taught about these concepts to 
elaborate a notion of intersubjectivity which founds Gestalt therapy practice. 
Conclusion 
Gestalt therapy already carries the promise of a new and more complete way of viewing 
the world. To develop this new way a method, a more structured and creative way of 
discussing perception must be taken on. There is evidence to show that the task is too 
much for the old terminology. Therefore, I bring in the four concepts: Intentionality, 
Anonymity, Transcendence and Intersubjectivity. These concepts enable us to move with 
ease and develop with elegance the discourse in that realm proper to Gestalt therapy 
called the 'phenomenal field'. This is characterised by openness to the totality of 
perception. 
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Section One: Learnings in Regard to Training 
I would recommend a re-direction or re-focus of the Core Curriculum around the lived 
body. It seems to me, perfectly feasible to have that curriculum follow the lines sketched 
out by Merleau-Ponty in his Phenomenology of Perception, where the Body features as 
the core of every chapter. I find the attitude 'Gestalt-and-bodywork' is quite established 
and will not easily give way to a Gestalt therapy more centrally and professedly based in 
the lived body. Long-term, trainers may learn to think: primarily in terms of the lived 
body, and secondarily in terms of 'a curriculum to be taught'. Thinking in terms of the 
lived body means, for instance, when teaching the 'Field' - to follow some of the 
exercises in Wheeler's Beyond Individualism; teaching 'Interruptions to Contact' means 
allowing the trainees to experience repeatedly and reflect upon repeatedly, that 
experience of those interruptions in their own bodies. This is part of the application of the 
hermeneutic circle to themselves. Whereas there may be great deal of experimental work 
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as part of the training, there needs to be an emphasis on reflection upon this and trainees 
require instruction in how to reflect upon an event. This is best done in small groups with 
each one articulating how the experiment was for him/her in an atmosphere of acceptance 
and encouragement, totally devoid of competition. 
As I have pointed out in my text there is a considerable amount of writing in Gestalt 
therapy at present, which is forgetful of the body as the realization of the person. 
Trainers - Models of Gestalt Approach 
In training it is necessary for trainers to model body-centred Gestalt therapy for trainees. 
This has to do with the personal interest they take in each trainee; the way in which they 
continually check-out with them how each is in regard to the personality of the trainer, 
how valued they feel, how really listened-to and understood they feel. This process of 
personal involvement with each trainee has very little to do with the multiplication of 
'feed-back sheets', the 'grading' of tutors or the assessment of performance targets 
achieved. These things are all excursions into the 'objective' world and do not belong as 
part of training in Gestalt therapy. Training in Gestalt therapy has got to be trust-based. If 
a candidate is not trust-worthy then he should not be in training. If this personal 
engagement is there from the start, and if it is maintained as an integral part of training, 
then the 'discovery' of trainees unsuited to the Gestalt therapy way and their retirement 
from the courses will happen much sooner and with less bitterness. These trainees will 
themselves be embodied and will grow in sensitivity for damaging or disintegrating 
elements within the training group. 
An Example of a Body-Based Trainer 
I would like to sketch out how a particular trainer whom I know very well goes about 
personalizing his Gestalt approach for his students/trainees. 
Before he delivers a training course he is careful to learn beforehand the names of the 
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participants. He personalises the packets of notes he prepares for each of them. He greets 
each personally before the workshop and then the first exercise will be a 'check- in' 
where he invites them to engage with the polarities of their attendance ('I want to be here 
.. '. '1 don't want to be here .. .') and to say what could get in the way of their learning this 
day. So there is no defensiveness, no gratuitous assumption that all the trainees are 
equally pleased to be where they are. This procedure in establishing a personal 
connection with each student is his Gestalt therapy way offacilitating learning. He also 
implicitly challenges them in regard to preconceptions they may be bringing as to what 
learning is about. Of course all this consumes a lump of the time assigned for the 
workshop, and this will come quite obliquely to anyone who thinks that learning is 
mainly introjection, the unreflective swallowing of' stuff', dealt out by the learned 
professor; in other words, this approach challenges the 'mug and jug' approach. 
This is not the usual approach in academic circles; and, indeed, teachers who endeavour 
to personalize their teaching can meet with much opposition 109. I am not saying that this 
is the way it should be or that this approach is better than another. The point I am making 
is to highlight the contrasting philosophies of learning which obtain in the institute of 
Gestalt therapy training and the university faculties. 
Gestalt Therapy Training in the Universities 
The most far reaching development that has occurred in Gestalt therapy in the UK during 
the past ten years has been the development of close links between Gestalt institutes of 
training and some of the universities. This, for many reasons, is a most welcome 
development in that it benefits the universities, who will now embrace Gestalt therapy 
influence and values, as part of their ethos; and it benefits the institutes in that they have 
the benefit of university resources and expertise in a whole variety of ways. It is also a 
greater inducement to the students to specialize in Gestalt therapy with the prospect of an 
I09Recently, a teacher from a British University was invited to the Sorbonne to deliver a series of specialist 
lectures to a postgraduate audience. He attempted be more personal with them. Many got up and left. 
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award with degree status, which may open the way to a career in psychotherapy. This is 
all taking place in the context of a general tightening up of regulations controlling the 
registration of psychotherapists and the practice of psychotherapy (Bradley 2001, pAtI). 
One of the problems that calls for study is the difficulty of aligning the prerequisites for 
training in Gestalt therapy with the prerequisites for the study of similar realms of 
discourse in other faculties of the university, clinical psychology for instance. It is not 
clear to me that when we call Gestalt therapy a 'human science' we mean exactly the 
same thing as we mean when we call psychology or sociology a human science. As I said 
earlier in this study, in order to be accepted as a trainee in any of the institutes, one has 
already to accept a whole cohort of values and beliefs. For instance one has to accept that 
he/she is entering upon a course of training which requires belief in the human being as 
present in the world in a way totally different from the presence of anything else in the 
world; in other words the scientific method of induction is out of bounds for this student 
as a methodology appropriate to his realm of discourse. (Of course, he can use it in 
related spheres - just as Merleau-Ponty did when learning from the researches of 
Goldstein in his Frankfurt institute). For instance again, it is fundamental to the Gestalt 
therapy method that, in order to deal appropriately with a human being in anything but 
the most casual way, I must first establish the basis of a relationship with that person; that 
way mutual respect will enable our dialogue to be real. 
It could benefit everyone to know more about the ethos that binds Gestalt therapy trainers 
and trainees from diverse institutes even from different countries and continents into a 
loose but identifiable community than those bind university staff and students into a 
community. What values do they share? 1 10 What common basic beliefs motivate their 
work? What I would like to see is a shared research project in which a small number of 
researchers, agreeing upon a set of values and beliefs which made it possible for them to 
undergo the very exacting Gestalt therapy training, explore in a systematic and agreed 
110 
In all my years of training and working in Gestalt institutes I have never once come upon any incident of 
theft - although I know there was opportunity for it. This exemplifies the vlaue of mutual respect. 
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way, the values and beliefs implicit in the teaching and modus operandi of the institutes 
of training. Abundant and stimulating material for such a project can be found in the 
work of Hadot (2001 A and 2001B) and also of his colleague, Voelke,A-J.(1993). 
Section Two: Areas of Further Study 
Spirituality 
There is great interest amongst Gestalt therapists in spirituality. This was brought home 
to me some years back when I published an article in the British Gestalt Journal (1994) 
on the philosopher and mystic Nicolas Berdyaev whose attitudes and teachings seemed to 
me to have a lot to say to Gestalt therapists. To my surprise and joy, I was awarded the 
1994 Ed Nevis Journal Prize. This prize is 'organized in honour of Ed Nevis's important 
service to the Gestalt Institute of Cleveland, (and) designed to highlight worthy 
contributions for the entire community of Gestalt practitioners.' Then four years later, 
when I published a study of Gestalt therapy principles facing a 'limit situation', - a study 
of the spirituality ofEtty Hillesum, trainee therapist and diarist who perished in 
Auschwitz in 1943, I received a remarkable number of phone calls and letters from 
Gestalt therapists in the UK, validating what I had said in the article and asking for more. 
I see the study of spirituality as basically a study of the phenomenology of perception. 
Whereas Gestalt therapy is not to be confused with a cognitive-behavioural approach 
which deals professedly with the level of the cogitatio or the thinking level of the person, 
Gestalt therapy likes people to think even while they engage at the more profound level of 
the pre-reflective. So, it is quite in order for Gestalt therapy student to approach 
spirituality from the point of view of the phenomenology of perception. There are, of 
course, other ways too - but in this chapter I am dealing with possible studies which 
would be a continuation and development of this present study. If such students would be 
willing to parallel the development of our understanding of perception with the growth 
and development of Gestalt therapy, I see the possibility of a whole flight of very 
interesting studies. I think, for instance, of the relationship between Edith Stein and 
307 
HusserI with whom she was on intimate terms for many years as a young and promising 
student. I think: of the possibility of studying the Rules for Discernment in the Exercises 
of St Ignatius - which contain a lot of 16th Century "Gestalt therapy" material (Robert, 
S.,1997). There is an abundance of resources readily available. 
When I say that such studies would require an acceptance of the parallel growth of 
phenomenology and Gestalt therapy, I am thinking of the strong current of which I am 
aware, amongst some Gestalt students to unanchor themselves from the past, to disown 
the traditions out of which those very questions which we now wrestle with have been 
handed down to us. The past, our ancestors, our teachers from former times are present in 
our bodies and operative in our lives. 
A promising area of further study could be the phenomenology of the Family 
Constellation work of Bert Hellinger. In his work Hellinger continually stresses how it is 
totally based upon what the body perceives (1998, p.254).1l1 Hellinger himself was for 
several years a practising Gestalt therapist and then, building upon his 'family systemic' 
work in Africa, he engaged in his acclaimed constellation work. Having had a lot of 
experience with this work over several years, I am convinced that it is a development of 
Gestalt therapy incorporating the dynamics of the ontological situatedness. 
There is vast amount of work waiting to be done on the later works ofMerleau-Ponty and 
their relevance to the practice of Gestalt therapy. I was very aware of this all the time 
during my study. A pointer in this direction is Part ill of Professor Dillon's book (1997). 
The Concept and Place of Truth in Gestalt Therapy Theory 
I have already touched on this elsewhere and explained my far-too-cursory treatment of 
the question. It is intimately related to what some of us call the Gestalt Community; I 
111 Hellinger puts it even more clearly in his unpublished manuscript (1992). Working with family 
constellations (given to workshop participants): Instructions to Representatives: 'Centre yourselves, collect 
yourselves, forget your own problems, your intentions, your goals. Just notice the feelings and sensations 
which arise as you re-mold ... trust your body reactions ... .' (loc.citp.2). 
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have remarked how easily trust develops between members as they meet together for 
conferences and the like. This would not be possible without an assumption that the 
members were 'living in truth': transparency is one of the things that draws people to 
Gestalt therapy in the first place. Like the air and the pull of the earth, we take truth for 
granted in our work and meetings, yet people constantly declare its impossibility, as I 
have demonstrated. 
Any study of truth will once more involve an engagement with the question of 
perception. I see there are three main aspects of this question which we could further 
study with considerable profit: the epistemological approach, the existential issue and 
truth in relation to authenticity. 
Epistemological Approach 
What do we mean when we talk about 'truth'? There are as many different kinds of truth 
as there are kinds of evidence. Propositional truth is different from situational truth. The 
evidence of a propositional truth is not the same as the evidence of a situational truth and 
not the same as the evidence of a body truth. Basically, the foundation of all our talk 
about truth is to be found in 'those very aspects of our lived experience that cannot be 
sublimated by cognitive experience' (Mallin 1979, p.201). The core of this 'lived 
experience' 'lies in that perpetual beginning of reflection at the point where an individual 
life begins to reflect on itself.. .. '(phP.p.62). In contrast to those who place 'truth' in a 
world of ideas, Merleau-Ponty in his Phenomenology sets himself to describe that 
perception of the world which founds for all time our idea of truth (PhP.p.xi;Fv). In other 
words, all truth derives from that primary experience in which the very act of perception 
is its own evidence. Even though he changes this thinking somewhat about truth from the 
time of the Phenomenology to that of the Visible and Invisible (Dupond,P. 2001, p.62) 
Merleau-Ponty always maintained that the basis of truth is body experience. (cfMerleau-
Ponty, 1968, p.3fl). A thorough investigation of this could yield us ideas about truth 
congenial to Gestalt therapy, in place of the present confusion that I have touched on in 
my study. 
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Truth as an Existential Issue 
This approach is summed up in that saying of Nicolas Berdyaev: 
I have always thought ... that truth serves no one and nothing; 
we must serve truth. (1944 p.14) 
This theme is taken up by the eminent Jesuit scholar Michael J. Buckley (1978), as also 
in his monumental work on atheism (1987, p.197 et passim). His detailed analysis, (1978, 
pp.647fl) of the work of the six moments in the claim of truth upon us, could serve as a 
model of the application of the phenomenological method in this important and difficult 
area for Gestalt therapists. The difficulty of entering this area and speaking of the 'claim 
of truth upon us' is that it seems to be going right against the accepted Gestalt therapy 
position which abhors any kind of dogmatism. But this is very much in line with the 
existential phenomenological analysis ofHeidegger (1927/1973): Conscience and the 
Call of Care (p .319). Dogmatism happens as soon as I forget that 
I do not coincide with my life, which is forever fleeing from itself, in spite of 
which there are inner perceptions. For the same reason I am open to both 
illusion and truth about myself: that is, there are acts in which I collect myself 
together in order to surpass myself (PhP.p.383;F439) 
Truth and non-truth are inseparable; in every perception of myself there is deviation of 
some kind, sometimes great, sometimes little. Yet it is only by the presence of truth that I 
can even begin to recognise 'deviation'. 
Joseph C. Zinker (1998, pp.244ff) takes up the theme ofiIIusion and lies and their effect 
upon intersubjectivity, in his book on couples' therapy. His approach is pragmatic rather 
than philosophical, as one would expect. He devotes more space to this subject than any 
other Gestalt therapy writer I know about. 
There is also Stephen Schoen's remarkable Presence of Mind (1994,pp.14, 15) where he 
implicitly treats of the status of truth in psychotherapy but avoids the difficult question of 
the morality of truth-telling. The amount of material available for any student wishing to 
do a special study in this area of existential truth is truly immense. An interesting possible 
approach for a non-professional philosopher would be to study the question through the 
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life of some philosopher who was obsessed with the subject. For instance Heidegger -
especially with the guidance of William J. Richardson's Heidegger - Through 
Phenomenology to Thought (1963); Kierkegaard was another like that, or Berdyaev, 
obsessed about the importance of living the truth. And then to relate this to 'truth' as it is 
enshrined in our codes of practice and understood amongst us. 
Truth in Relation to Authenticity 
This is the question of the struggle between 'good faith' and 'bad faith' that plays itself 
out in the depths of the human heart. I am in 'good faith' when I am authentic, I am in 
'bad faith' when I am unauthentic. In order to fall into 'bad faith' I must first of all tell 
myself a lie. The locus classicus for this is, of course, J.P. Sartre's Being and Nothingness 
Part I ch.2 
There are even men (e.g., caretakers, overseers, gaolers), whose social reality is 
uniquely that of the No, who will live and die having forever been a No upon 
the earth. Others, so as to make the No a part of their very subjectivity, establish 
their human personality as a perpetual negation. This is the meaning, and 
function, of what Scheler calls' the man of resentment' - in reality the No. 
(Sartre, IP.194311956, p.87) 
Such a direction can undergo a whole series of variations. One such is for it to tum back 
on the person himself so that he arrives at the point where he denies the truth to himself 
On the one hand he knows the truth on the other hand he denies it. This is different from 
plain lying. There you have the deceived and the deceiver, two consciousness. Here there 
is single consciousness, which is in denial to itself One can see what a promising area for 
investigation by a psychotherapist this would be. 
Lack of authenticity is a recurring difficulty in psychotherapy not just for clients but for 
the psychotherapists themselves. Sometimes it affects just individuals and that is hurtful 
enough to psychotherapy as an enterprise. But it can also affect institutes of training and 
then the consequences can be very damaging indeed. In this connection we can take to 
heart the warning of that very great Canadian philosopher, Bernard Lonergan. Lonergan 
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has something very important to say to Gestalt therapists so I shall quote him in extenso 
below. He is writing in the context of explaining the functions of meaning; how meaning 
is derived from the community, and communities are of different kinds fostering different 
values. 
This process for the schoolteacher is education, for the sociologist it is socialisation, for 
the cultural anthropologist it is acculturation, but for the individual in the process it is his 
coming to be a man/woman, existing as a person in the fuller sense of the name. 
Such existing may be authentic or unauthentic and this may occur in two different 
ways ........... . 
'As Kierkegaard asked whether he was a Christian, so divers men can ask 
themselves whether or not they are genuine Catholics or Protestants, Muslims or 
Buddhists, Platonists or Aristotelians, Kantians or Hegelians, artists or scientists, 
and so forth. Now they may answer that they are, and their answers may be 
correct. But they can also answer affirmatively and still be mistaken. In that case 
there will exist a series of points in which they are what the ideals of the tradition 
demand, but there will be another series in which there is a greater or lesser 
divergence. These points of divergence are overlooked from a selective 
inattention, or from a failure to understand, or from an undetected rationalization. 
What I am is one thing, what a genuine Christian or Buddhist is, is another, and I 
am unaware of the difference. My unawareness is unexpressed. I have no 
language to express what I am, so I use the language of the tradition I 
unauthentically appropriate, and thereby I devalue, distort, water-down, corrupt 
that language. 
Such devaluation, distortion, corruption may occur only in scattered individuals. 
But it may occur on a more massive scale, and then the words are repeated, but 
the meaning is gone. The chair was still the chair of Moses, but it was occupied 
by the Scribes and Pharisees. The theology was still scholastic, but the 
scholasticism was decadent. The religious order still read out the rules, but one 
wonders whether the home fires were still burning. The sacred name of science 
may still be invoked but, as Edmund Husserl has argued, all significant scientific 
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ideals can vanish to be replaced by the conventions of a clique. So the 
unauthenticity of individuals becomes the unauthenticity of a tradition. Then, in 
the measure a subject takes the tradition, as it exists, for his standard, in that 
measure he can do no more than authentically realize unauthenticity' (Lonergan 
1975, p.80). 
finis 
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Introduction 
Defining the Enquiry 
Despite the discouragement of knowing something of the immense complexity of this 
subject I have decided to go ahead and include A Phenomenology of Sexual Violation. 
Firstly I entitle it a phenomenology. It is just one analysis of one aspect of this complex 
phenomenon. It is important to say this, as there are many other phenomenologies that 
could be written about it. One could write a phenomenology of the violence in a person-
a man's violence being quite different from a woman's and each person's being different 
from everyone else's. One could write a phenomenology of deviant sex or perversion-
'The Erotic Form of Hatred' after the style of Robert Stoller's amazing work (1986). 
One could write a phenomenology of criminal violence using the enormous flood of 
works such as Gordon Bum's "Somebody 's Husband, Somebody's Son" (1985) or Brian 
Master's Killingfor Company (1986). There are many possible phenomenologies of 
sexual violence. 
I am intending to take just one aspect of this phenomenon and, in the memory of my 
clinical experience, and in the light of what I have written in previous chapters meditate 
on its structures. The aspect I choose is this: What is it about sexual violation that causes 
such cataclysmic difficulties for people - men and woman - who suffer such a violation? 
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I am not proposing to discuss whether what I say is what people call 'physical' and 
'emotional' violence upon children - can there be one without the other? The violence is 
upon the person. I am not entering a debate about the difference between adult and 
childhood sexual abuse. I am not arguing that sexual violation in all cases results in 
traumatic subversion of the person's life. I am not entering the question of consensual or 
half-consensual sexual violence - no more than I am envisaging sado-masochistic 
practices. Nor am I entering the minefield of people who say they have been sexually 
violated, but whose world has not been subverted by the event; nor of those who 'don't 
know' if they were sexually violated but whose world is subverted. These are all 
important questions - perhaps far more important than the one I am asking: What 
happens that is so destructive? 
In this Appendix A I intend to illustrate my contention that the radical phenomenology of 
Merleau-Ponty affords the Gestalt psychotherapist with an infrastructure which opens up 
the profound dimensions of hislher work. I propose to look at the phenomenon of sexual 
intrusion which underlies mental illness just as much to-day as it did in Freud's time1l2 
and ask a question about it. There is an abundant literature available on this subject. What 
is not available is a literature, which interrogates the phenomenon itself In this chapter I 
set out to answer the question: Wherein resides the destructive element in the act of 
sexual intrusion which devastates so many people? My guess is that much of what I say 
applies also to 'physical' violence and 'emotional' violence that is not genital. I stay with 
the sexual violence so that I do not have to modify and qualify my statements too much. 
There is no such thing, of course, as simple 'physical' or 'emotional' or 'sexual' violence. 
They all overlap. 
112'ln his earliest accounts before 1897, Freud regarded the neurotic mind as one which has been subverted 
from the outside, by other people' (MitcheU1988, p.42). 
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Cultural Opaqueness Indicates the Domain of our Enquiry 
It is significant for our enquiry to remark the general blindness, which obtains amongst 
sections of the population in Great Britain, in the Republic of Ireland and in the USA to 
the nature of sexual violation. II3 The significance resides in the fact that the defect of 
perception, which prevents people taking sexual intrusion seriously, is the very defect of 
perception that Merleau-Ponty so robustly opposes in his philosophy. This opaqueness1l4 
is to be attributed, I think, to a cultural habit of stepping back and looking at things, as we 
say, objectively.w The 'idea' of sexual intrusion does not advertise its lived meaning. 
This is lived out in the tormented bodies of those who have suffered violation. The lived 
meaning operates 'in the domain of the phenomenal and does not run through the 
objective world' (phP.p.l06; F123)1l6, so that my thoughts about an event displace the 
reality of that event, so far as I am concerned. Full perception requires of us that we go 
beyond 'the idea of the objective world '(phP p.S8; F71), and leave ourselves open to that 
Jl3For Great Britain cf The Waterhouse Report (1999); for the Irish Republic - in Dec. 1994 the Irish 
Government was brought down by the disclosure of attempts to pervert the course of justice on behalf of a 
pedophile priest cf. Irish Times 02.12.1994. The blindness of the USA bishops is amply documented by 
Rigali in Theological Studies March 1994, 55.1,pp.124-139, cfLivezey (1987); Miller A. 
(1983;1988;1991); Sanford (1992); de Mause (1991). For a history of child abuse up to the 19th Century 
with abundant references cf de-Mause (ed) 1991. 
1l4About the Waterhouse Report (1999): It details how, over a period of 25 years, scores of the most 
vulnerable young people in society, placed for safety in residential homes in North Wales, were 
outrageously abused in their persons by the very people appointed to care for them The full report of the 
enquiry is set out in half-a-million words, took four years to compile and cost £13.5 million. Hundreds of 
people knew or suspected the abuse, but took no action 
II ~omanyshyn (1994) chronicles the growth in disengagement from the world and the subversion of lived 
perception in his riveting and apocalyptic work. 
II~erleau-Ponty. The context here is body spatiality and the explanation of how a patient can readily 
scratch a place on his body but not point to it 
All references in this Appendix to Phenomenology of Perception will be made as in the body of the text. 
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most difficult of all experiences: ' .. to know precisely what we see' (PhP.p.58;F71). 
Professor Martin Dillon (1997) explains well how we can miss what is right under our 
noses, when he says: 
... .it is evident that the result of coupling the experience error1l7 with the 
prejudice of determinate being is a transformation of perception into thought 
about things. A reversal has taken place: the concept, itself founded on the 
percept, becomes the model and measure of the percept ............. The authentic 
experience of perception has been obscured, and perceptual reality has been 
displaced by an idea of reality (p.62). 
In this Appendix, I make little explicit reference to Gestalt therapy theory and practice. I 
have done that sufficiently in the previous chapters to enable the reader to make the 
applications for him/herself To engage in such explicit applications - detailing what 
Gestalt theorists say, and drawing attention to the strengths and weaknesses of such 
theories would excessively increase the length of this chapter of my study. Merleau-Ponty 
has nothing to teach Gestalt therapists about the detail of psychotherapeutic intervention. 
They are, in that field, accomplished experts. What they can learn is a deeper 
understanding of the theory, which supports their interventions, skills and strategies. 
Section One: Psychopathology as a World Complete In Itself 
A Summary of the argument in this Appendix 
Briefly my argument is as follows: Sexual intrusion is the violation ofa person's body 
and, therefore, of the total person in every area of their being. Because it masquerades as 
love its violence destroys a person's openness to love. It assaults a person in that area of 
her/his being where they are most vulnerable, because the sexual area is precisely that 
area of our being where a thing or person begins to exist for us through desire or Jove 
117 'What we know to be in things we immediatley take as being in our experience ofthem.'(phP.p.5;Fll) 
Here it is the thing conceived under the ideal of absolute detennination. 
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(PhP.p.154; FlSO). That dialogue with the world, which at once tells a person who she is, 
that she belongs and that she is beautiful, is subverted. Her world is taken away from her 
and in its place she has the world of the violator in a mutuality of ugliness. 
I wish now to state the same thing in another way. 
We are here concerned with the way dialogue with the world, that never-ending exchange 
between each of us, and his environment, is connected with a person's welfare. (When we 
speak in this way we must bear in mind that the perceiver is, in a way, also the 
perceived.) We have seen elsewhere that the environment tells us who we are, whether or 
not we belong and whether or not we are valued for ourselves. The experience of being 
valued for oneself is to feel beautiful. 
Following Merleau-Ponty I shall demonstrate that it is possible to regard a 
psychopathological condition as a way of life making complete sense in itself; such a 
condition can persist once it has the status of 'an acquired world'. An acquired world is 
sustained by the persistence of that primordial contact with the world, which is the basis 
of all subsequent experience. Thereafter our world is elaborated by our introjection of the 
cultural learnings, parental attitudes and the like. All this happens through the living 
body. Our most powerful learning happens through our intersubjective relations where 
the other becomes an extension of ourselves. The logic of situation leaves a person open 
to having the acquired world of another which subverts the 'givens' of primordial contact 
and in which the person loses contact with herself and finds her world contaminated by 
another; so, instead of a world of beauty and belonging we have a world of alienation and 
ugliness. 
The Protean Idea - Psychopathology as a System 
Merleau-Ponty in the course of his Phenomenology speaks a good deal about 
psychopathology and psychoanalysis. He shows great respect for the work of Freud and 
makes generous use of his psychoanalytic descriptions; yet he does this, as usual, by 
incorporating it into his own view of being-in-the-world and giving it his own particular 
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slant. In Freud's view, psychopathology was the consequence of 'leakage' or carry-over 
from the repressed unconscious into the functional world of that person; so, a girl 
traumatised in the oral phase of sexual development becomes fixated in that phase and 
becomes unwilling/unable to speak, as a sign of her refusal to participate in communal 
life. This hidden trauma is activated by her mother's prohibition on her seeing her 
boyfriend (phP.p.I60;FI87). Merleau-Ponty's take on this is to see it not primarily as a 
sexual problem but as an interruption of the dialogue between the girl and her world. 
Sexuality, he sees as very important but not to be confused with genitality - 'not the mere 
effect of processes having their seat in the genital organs', but rather 'a general power, 
which the psychosomatic subject enjoys, of taking root in different settings, of 
establishing himself through different experiences, of gaining structures of conduct' 
(PhP.p.I58; FI8S). It is not my intention to pursue Merleau-Ponty's interpretations of her 
various symptoms but rather am I interested in his general comments on the situation. 
The sick girl, he says, is not miming in her body a drama played out in her 
consciousness ... neither is she making a 'gesture'; she has 'lost her voice as one loses a 
memory -like 'looking past a friend I do not wish to see' (phP. p.I62;F189-190) . 
.. ifl lose my power of speech, Peter no longer exists for me as an interlocutor, 
sought or rejected; what col/apses is the whole field of possibilities. I cut myself 
off even from that mode of communication and significance which silence 
provides (ibid.italics mine). 
Because my existence is given to me not as an 'I am' but as an 'I can' (phP.p.137;F160), 
the collapse of whole fields of possibilities means the collapse of the person's world-
because my world is literally a world of possibilities. This is a bodily collapse because, 
'my body is a movement towards the world' and if the possibility is removed then there is 
nowhere to move to. And yet the girl carries on living. Truly, she does not eat and she 
does not talk, but she is aware of her parents' worry, her senses are still structures open to 
the world - because when her mother gives permission for her to see her boyfriend again, 
she recovers. 
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In these views we have an example of what W.J.Richardson (1979, p.2) calls Merleau-
Ponty's 'protean idea' that psychopathology was not just an illness but a whole way of 
life with its own systems and balances and compensations, its paths of articulation and an 
instantaneous intercommunication between all the sectors of it. That is why he will say 
that the girl's loss is analogous to the loss of a limb by an insect which then passes over 
into a whole new mode of 'life-without-a-Ieg'. It is also why he will say that people who 
suffer disablement become unhappy only in the light of comparison with their former life 
before disablement, or in comparison with others who are not disabled. Illness forms a 
whole system of its own, a complete life. It would approximate to what he elsewhere 
calls 'an acquired' world. It is not uncommon in people who suffer the loss of a beloved 
one through accident or alleged medical negligence, to consume the rest of their lives in 
recrimination and bereavement. It becomes for them a complete way of life, which finds 
articulation in the decor of their homes, their dress, their interests their conversation and, 
indeed, in every area of their lives, so that twenty years later they continue their rituals of 
remembrance and still rant about the hospital. 
Psychopathology as an Acquired World 
Each of us inhabits several what we can call 'acquired worlds' (PhP. p .13 O;F 151). This 
way our lives run smoothly. If I know how to play the organ and have an interest in that 
practice, then that confers on me an acquired world. We can say that we move about in a 
whole series of acquired worlds. We inhabit this world - or it inhabits us - and it 
constitutes a realm which 'sustains round about it a system of meanings whose 
reciprocities, relationships and involvement's do not require to be made explicit in order 
to be exploited' (phP.p.129;F150). 
Merleau-Ponty cites the example of living in a house so that we can find our way round it 
and know all the time where things are without thinking about it. He points out 
furthermore, how in such a situation, 'each gesture, each perception is immediately 
located in relation to a great number of possible co-ordinates'(loc.cit.). What he does not 
point out, but what is relevant to our concern is that such 'acquired worlds' can become 
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confused and uncertain. If, for instance, a person lives some days of the week in a house 
where the bathroom is to the right of his bedroom and at weekends in a house where it is 
to the left, then he can find himself not knowing what way to turn if he rises during the 
night. Similarly, with the organist, if his stem instructor is sitting in the pews then it can 
be difficult for him to live with ease in his acquired world of organ playing. Our happy 
life is fragile and can be totally subverted by an act of sexual intrusion. 
Another important characteristic of these acquired worlds is this: they are not primary in 
the person's experience. The condition for the possibility of their acquisition is the 
person's living already in a more basic world: the organist must have the use of at least 
some of his senses, and feel minimally at home in and in contact with the world. Our 
awareness plays an essential part in the acquisition of and exploitation of these acquired 
worlds. Indeed these worlds are not acquired at all unless I live in them and exploit them. 
'What is acquired is truly acquired, only if it is taken up again in a fresh momentum of 
thought .. .' (phP.p.I30; FISI). Such a fresh momentum derives from our spontaneity, it is 
our elan vital or transcendence and without this our acquired worlds wither. 
We can appreciate from what I have already said that our life is layered. These layers are 
not separate and never isolated from one another - except perhaps in gross 
psychopathology - and all are resident and lived through in our bodies. It is important to 
remember that these layers of living are not only in contact with one another, but each, 
through all the others, is bringing the world to us. So close is this contact that it is not 
clear where my body ends and the world begins. This closeness is expressed dramatically 
by Merleau-Ponty when he says: 'The world is wholly inside and I am wholly outside 
myself (phP p.407; F467). When I am listening to Classic FM where is the music? When 
the sun's rays warm me- where is the warmth? At twenty seven thousand feet up, the 
temperature can be minus 50 degrees despite the sun's rays. So, to state it crudely, the 
traffic is two-way. 'My senses are taking from the environment but are giving back to it 
also - only what it received in the first place.' (PhP.p.44I;FS03) (We have already 
covered much of this ground in discussing situatedness). 
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The importance of establishing that psychopathology is a world complete-in-itself is this: 
we move the centre of gravity of psychopathology away from 'something wrong with his 
brain' or 'very neglected by his parent's or 'a personality disorder' to encompass the 
world of the person. By 'the world of the person' I mean that unifying presence, that 
'permanent being within which I make all corrections to my knowledge, a world which in 
its unity remains unaffected by those corrections, and the self-evidence of which attracts 
my activity towards the truth through appearance and error' (PhP.p.327-8;F378). So that 
psychopathology is 'an acquired world' superimposed upon this permanent unifying 
presence of the world 
which is the horizon of all horizons, the style of all styles, which guarantees for 
my experiences a given, not a willed unity underlying all the disruption of my 
personal and historical life (phP.p.330;F381). 
Herein lies the hope of recovery, that bedrock of reality under-girding the bizarre 
experiences of the person. When we try, as we do, to help a client 'ground' himself we 
are endeavouring to help him get in touch with 'this permanent unifying presence' . 
Section Two: The Embrace of the World 
The Fourfold Message of Primordial Contact 
An important question for us is this: If I am in 'dialogue with the world, what is it saying 
to me? If I feel the warmth of the sun then it can be saying a whole variety of different 
things to me - depending upon the layer of my living experience that I am addressing. 
The sun's warmth may say to me 'Such a lovely day for a swim.' or it may say; 'Snatch 
the day while you can, to-morrow it may be raining'. Or it may say: 'It is good to be 
alive.' All these are 'thetic' utterances, they have the form of imperatives; - they derive 
from my cognition, which is always the sublimation or refining to definition of my 
unreflective experience. 
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If we go further and ask What is the message that I receive in that area of my lived 
experience which is non-thetic or preconceptual; that layer of me which 'knows' but 
whose knowledge is not available to my cognition (PhP.p.1D4;F120). My body knows 
how to heal itself from the shock of a fall and the abrasions I received when I hit the road, 
but this knowledge is not available to my cognition. My eye 'knows' how to protect itself 
from a fly without that knowledge being available to me to describe. In order to answer 
the question above we must (i) explain primordial contact - how it is a bonding with the 
world. (ii) how this primordial contact does not cease but endures in us as a bodily 
experience which (iii) underlies the experience of'thrownness' and which can be seen 
as the marriage of my body with the world and (iv) engenders belonging because we are 
'connaturals' . 
A Bonding with the World 
Primordial contact describes the most immediate and unbiased contact, which I have with 
the world, and this contact is founded in my body, in fact my body is that contact (Mallin, 
1979, p.58). I have already detailed Merleau-Ponty's use of this expression (cfH.P.pp54-
55). The concept is pivotal for Merleau-Ponty. Mallin remarks that 'Merleau-Ponty often 
says that his entire phenomenology is meant to be a reduction to the lived and pre-
objective realm where primordial contact is disclosed'. (1979, p.53). Merleau-Ponty's 
problem was epistemological - how to avoid the Idealist solution: they made of 
experience a total construct. Such a view would make the body irrelevant as the vehicle 
of perception. In order to find a way forward he has to show that we are, in fact, in 
immediate contact with the world. Primordial contact does just that. 1 18(phP p.254; F294) 
We can even go so far as to think of primordial contact as our being named by the world 
as well as our naming a world. 
This is the level or field in which we 'return to the things themselves' - which is: 
llSThis is an advance on Husserl's 'return to the things in themselves'. Merleau-Ponty is very slow to 
criticize Husserl.. He always considered himselfhis most loyal disciple (Geraets, 1971, p.135). 
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... to return to a world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge 
always speaks, and in relation to which every schematization is an abstract and 
derivative sign language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in which 
we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is (phP.ix; Fiii). 
A Contact that Endures 
This primordial contact informs every act of perception: 
.... the phenomenon of the world, that is, its birth for us in that field into 
which each perception sets us back, where we are as yet still alone, where other 
people will appear only at a later stage, in which knowledge and particularly 
science have not so far ironed out and levelled down the individual perspective 
(PhP.p.256; F256) (italics mine). 
Primordial contact lasts for always because it is constitutive of my every act of 
perception. As its name signifies, it is an event marking each person's life in which that 
person - entirely without any previous thematic formation - 'finds' herself in a world i~ 
which she belong, because her existential structures are also the structures of the world. 
This timeless 'moment' is the phenomenon of the world where the subject is opaque to 
himself and, in this 'given and pre-personal existence' (Mallin, 1979 p.47), he grounds all 
his most personal acts. In his chapter on Temporality, Merleau-Ponty discusses the 
persistence of the past in the present: 
.... each present reasserts the presence of the whole past which it supplants, and 
anticipates that of all that is to come, and that, by definition, the present is not 
shut up within itself but transcends itself towards a future and a past (PhP.p.420-
425;F481). 
It is important to my argument that I demonstrate the way the past is in the present so I 
shall approach it now in a slightly different way. Phenomenologically it has got to be so. 
lt is a matter of plain observation that each moment of our experience is building on the 
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previous moment and brings it into the present. I know where I am now only because of 
where I was previously. If I do not know where I was previously then I have forgotten my 
history; which means I am that much out of touch with my self, that is, with my history 
which is body. (Where else can history be stored except in my body which was the active 
participant?) Unless my present comes out of my past then I must be here by magic. So, 
my history must have had a beginning, some 'moment' when this identity that is me 
began to become. Unless my present emerges from my past and my future from my 
present, my experience of the passage of time is total illusion. 
When Merleau-Ponty says that 'My history must be a continuation of a pre-history and 
must utilize the latter's acquired results' (PhP.p.2S4; F294), the pre-history he is referring 
to is that term of pre personal life before my cognition began to 'sublimate' my body-
perception - to separate things and give them names - and during which my living body 
was laying down sedimented habits of being-in-the world. Thus, in every act of 
perception we move back to that original level where the body and 'the world' bonded 
and that bond became the level of all levels. (I use inverted commas because, of course, 
there is no 'world' apart from my situatedness). 
In order to appreciate the depth of the injury, which can be inflicted upon a person when 
the assault is upon the beginning 'place' of his perception we need to look closely at the 
connection between primordial contact and all subsequent perception. 
Engenders Belonging 
'Thrownness' is an Existentialist term used by Heidegger to indicate the inescapable 
facticity ofDasein. (Heidegger 1927/1973, p.173-4 ; cfMacquarriel973, p.149). It can be 
taken in a negative way - as it was for Roquetin who found his 'there being' intolerable or 
in a positive way as does Merleau-Ponty with his concept of primordial contact. For our 
purposes the two terms are almost the same. 'Thrownness' emphasises the diversity, 
individuality and the i"eversibility of our human situation. 'Primordial contact' 
emphasises that first momentous entry or emergence of a potentiality for relating. 
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Thrownness is a very rich and profound notion. which meets the philosophical problem of 
how we can have any relationship with the world at all. The central meaning of the 
concept is that, at the moment of my advent, the world gathers about me like people 
gather around a new-born baby in wonder and welcome and say, 'Welcome! You are one 
of us!' Mallin puts it more formal philosophical terms: 
The core idea of thrownness is that there is meaning in the world before I initiate 
it, but at the same time this meaning discloses my 'connaturality' that is to say 
that the nature of myself is the same as the nature of the world (Mallin, 
S.B.1979, p.42). 
The message of primordial contact is this: ' You belong. ' 
It is out of this that our sense of belonging in the world that all subsequent perception 
becomes possible. This belonging which founds all our knowledge and everything else 
about us operates through a lived and pre-personal awareness (as distinct from a reflected 
upon awareness). Through my body I am caught up in a project that is ~lto er beyond 
me, about which I am not consulted but which ' looks after my best int~ . 
amazmgway. 
It must be that my first perception and my first purchase upon the world gives 
itself to me as the execution of a most ancient pact concluded between X - and 
the world in general (phP p.254; F293-4) (Mallin,S.B.1979 p.42). 
Unless we are in some way the same, we cannot share or live together. The Scholastics 
used to say of God that He is 'totaliter aliter' - ' altogether other' - the polarity of 
' connaturality' and therefore utterly inaccessible to us. More down-to-earth we can say 
that if! don' t speak the language, if! am culturally and ethnically distant and different, 
then feeling at home in a foreign country can be a problem. Intersubjectivity depends on 
reciprocity. To be able to share is to be able to belong. 
It is useful at this point to recall the exercise we did earlier in the study, in answer to the 
question: How do you know who you are? Then we saw how on waking in a strange 
room in a strange house, familiar things like my clothes and alarm clock announced to me 
who I am and what I am about. The message from the environment is: 'You belong' . 
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Reviewing the Argument 
Because we are embodied we bond with the world. This bonding happens before any act 
of perception and establishes the basis from subsequent acquired worlds. This permeates 
all the other regions of that person so that he is in a special and contained way oflife. 
Except in extreme instances, there still remains in the person a sense - much eclipsed at 
times- of a unifying and validating presence called 'the world'. This is the source of that 
basic orientation and foundational thrust of my being right from the first moment of 
existence and constitutes a dialogue with the world. Dialogue takes place at different 
levels, depending on the level of the structures engaged - motility, sensuality, cognition, 
sexuality and so on, - all permeated by this critical 'contact', supremely intimate and 
foundational for all further acts of perception. Our sense of belonging and personal 
identity in the world derives from this primordial experience. 
However, I am still not in a position to demonstrate the subversion of all this, a 
subversion in an act of sexual intrusion. Before entering on that part of my argument I 
must demonstrate how -
a) This happens through what Merleau-Ponty calls 'natural absolutes' - perceptual 
postures; 
b) through primordial contact which persists as the' operational intentionality' of the 
body 
c) through the existential character of shame as a body experience. 
The Natural Absolutes 
Natural absolutes are not cognitional categories but very general perceptual postures. It is 
these that are directly undermined by sexual intrusion, so that although the victim will 
still maintain her life-functions and the use of her perceptual regions, as did the girl 
prohibited from seeing her boyfriend, she has lost the pillars of her scheme of things and 
her 'world' has collapsed. It is not possible to give examples of these 'natural absolutes' 
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without using thematized expressions. Daniel Stern refers to 'This global subjective 
world of emerging organization (which) is and remains the fundamental domain of 
human subjectivity ......... the ultimate reservoir that can be dipped into for all creative 
experience' (Stern, 1985, p.67). 
Because I contend that not only is our capacity for personal identity established in what I 
have earlier called 'the kiss of the world' but also that the primary wound of sexual 
intrusion happens at the level of primordial contact which informs the between- I need to 
elucidate the meaning in Merleau-Ponty of this cardinal notion of natural absolutes. 119 
They are given in Tacit Cogito 
We are trying to establish a moment in which the 'foundations of all subsequent acts of 
perception are laid down. Logically there can be no knowledge without absolutes or 
anchorage points' (Mallin, loc.cit. p.57); but these must be general and non-specific-
otherwise our perception comes to a halt - our situatedness ceases. Because of 
situatedness, everything is bonded with everything else so that the absolute knowledge of 
any-thing means the absolute knowledge of every-thing. However, in order that 
perception be possible we require the constancy of these non-specific absolutes. These 
absolutes come with primordial contact - Merleau-Ponty calls them 'natural' absolutes120 
-which become the basis of all lived-out and objective certainties. 
We can envisage them as possible postures of the body - a kind of operational 
intentionality that underpins every subsequent act. It is the way in which my solidarity 
with the world is asserted in my every perception: they are 
that system of anonymous 'functions' which draws every particular focus into a 
general project. And this blind adherence to the world, this prejudice in favour of 
being, does not confine itself to the starting point of my life. It is this, which 
ll'i am confining my investigation here to Phenomenology of Perception (1945/1967) 
120 An example of such absolutes would be orientation, sensation, motility, cognition, and transcendence. 
These are listed in a different way by Merleau-Ponty in that passage in La Structure du Comportment 
(1942/1990 p.227) which Madison (1981, p.13) speaks of as 'the essence of Merleau-Ponty's thought'. 
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confers meaning on every subsequent perception of space, it starts up again each 
moment (PhP.p.254;F294 mt). 
These constitute the 'natural self and are realised in my body. These absolutes which are 
the very structures that constitute us as beings, say such things to us as 'There is 
something and not nothing'. Expressions such as 'mass' or 'gravity' are too specific to 
qualify as a 'natural absolutes'. Such are taken as implicit in 'motility' or 'sociality' or 
'cognition' - which mark existential regions (Mallin 1979, p.41), and delineate the 
boundaries of my possible relatedness. When my being bends back upon itself and I am 
present with myself as myself - this is called the 'tacit cogito '. There can, of course, be 
no reflection in this act, which yields me the most intimate experience I can have of 
myself This antecedes all categorical experience and is the simultaneous contact of my 
being and the being of the world - these are not separate, otherwise I am making myself 
into an intellect and I am left with the intractable problem of bridging the gap between 
myself and the brute world. 
Section Three: The Level of Insult 
Shaming as a Constant 
Sexual intrusion always trails immense shame. Sexual intrusion is a general word for the 
exercise of power in a sexual way upon an unwilling person. It describes a continuum of 
actions ranging from an unwelcome lustful look to the act of rape at knife point. I am not 
saying that a person is always and inevitably traumatized by every sexually intrusive act. 
Nor am I saying that trauma is solely associated with sexually intrusive acts. Shame 
seems to be a constant in all traumatizing sexually intrusive acts (Kepner 1995, p.36). It 
is not uncommon to find that shame is re-visited upon the victim during the enquiry for 
legal prosecution. This is retraumatization and it can seem even more terrible than the 
original event. This tells us something about the ontological status of the violent event: it 
remains as an acquired world in the body of the person and then is 'triggered' by words, 
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images, insinuations, looks and whatever. This shows how it has embedded itself in the 
perceptual areas of the person, which are so easily disturbed. 121 
A key to the phenomenology of sexual intrusion is the paralysing legacy of shame, which 
universally clings to the victims (Kepner 1995, p.37 et passim). Like the wound of 
Tristan, which would not heal without a long and arduous visit to the holy land of Ireland 
and the kiss of beautiful Isolde, shame makes an alien of a person in his own land and 
places an agonised and unattainable yearning in his heart. Shame is experienced as a 
shrinkage of one's being, an imminent threat of annihilation, a disfiguring of one's 
beauty, and an enduring reduction to the status of a slave (phP.p.167;F194). It becomes 
the style of her/his being-in-the-world (PhP. p.85;FlOI). 
'The specific past, which (her) body is, can be re-captured and taken up by an 
individual only because that life has never transcended it, ... its present is still 
that past (loc.cit.). 
This past may be lived through in her walk, in the angle of her head, in the way she 
glances, in the way she looks away, in the manner of her sitting or not sitting but perching 
herself on the edge of the chair. It is not that she intends by these movements 
to manifest her soul, but shame is such an overwhelming emotion that once established in 
a person it drives every other feeling into hiding, like the playful dolphins ofKaikaura 
Bay are driven to hide away when the predatory orchas come visiting. 
Feelings of shame are resident in the body and can even be evoked when a person holds 
themselves in a particular posture. Similarly, I have found that feelings of compelling 
shame can be diminished by the person moving himself in unaccustomed ways and 
allowing himself to become aware of such body movements. It seems as if these 
regressive states are incompatible with postures and breathing that do not support them. 
Only an injury at this level can account for the magnitude of the upset in the violated 
121 It is also not uncommon to find that a profoundly disturbed person interviewed by a professional person, 
who is impersonal with him, will respond by becoming psychotic. 
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person's life and the powerful yet anonymous anxieties that torment him - a torment 
amazingly inaccessible to the subject's rational convictions 
Subverting the Embrace of the World 
So far we have seen how the magnitude of the injury done to a person in an act of sexual 
violation is not manifest at the objective level of perception. It occurs at that level of the 
person where a world comes into being for him - the phenomenal level. By this I mean 
the person as an embodied subjectivity, the focal point of a field of intersubjective 
relationships. This contrasts with the objective knowledge of a person like the knowledge 
we get from reading about him in a newspaper. At the phenomenal level, people are far 
more 'joined up' than generally appears. The ferocious bonding within families testifies 
to this. Just as an acquired world can establish itself in a person's body and insures that 
he lives according to the introjects of a particular culture, so a condition of 
psychopathology can 'possess' a person and for him this can be the 'normal' world. This 
condition is supported, like any other acquired world, by the event that we call 
'primordial contact'. This makes acquired worlds possible- as it makes language possible 
and lays down 'natural absolutes'. Primordial contact persists all through a person's life 
and underwrites all subsequent acts of perception. Unless it is subverted, this most 
primitive of contacts with the world, orientates the person to experience herself as 
belonging and beautiful. The subversion of primordial contact and the displacement of 
the natural absolutes can never be complete, but can happen through invasion by another, 
precisely in that domain of lived experience where they co-create worlds - the sexual 
area. 
When two people meet and affect one another sexually, so that they are drawn towards 
one another then they co-create a beautiful new way of being for themselves. I say 
'beautiful' because it promises happiness. In the event of sexual violation there is co-
created a mutuality of ugliness. Sometimes a victim feels guilt and added shame because 
'a part of me sort of enjoyed it'. 
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I have now to demonstrate how sexual intrusion can collapse my world - it swops a 
world, in which my personhood was constituted and sustained, for one in which I become 
a thing (PhP.p.361;F414). 
Section Four: The Structure of Violation 
My Ambiguity Constitutes My Vulnerability 
It is the very openness of my being that makes me so vulnerable. 
In the gaze of another I enter that new world and inhabit it (phP.p.264;F305; 
cfp.414,F361). For Merleau-Ponty this is a process of transcendence (Langer 1989 p.xvi). 
My project is to appropriate the whole world:' ... an insatiable being who appropriates 
everything that he meets'(phP.p.358;F411). In the context of sexuality, ambiguity is my 
vulnerability. I am structured for openness, not only to the beautiful and the abundant, but 
also to the ugly and the mean. I am given to myself and so much of me comes as a 
modality of a general existence which 'runs through me without my being the cause of it' 
(phP.p.216;F250). To be given a body is to be given an undetermined world. This means 
that my life can be turned in various directions. I did not ask to be born or even 
conceived. My being is given to me and, once given, there is nothing I can do to stop it. It 
showers down on me like a tropical rainstorm. As I said above - it comes to me stuffed 
with gifts in all the regions of my being and endowed with a generosity that defies 
comprehension (Mallin, 1979, p.46). My consciousness is rooted in Being (PhP.p.424; 
F485). My senses - these wondrous structures which embody the presence of the world to 
me and proclaim my own presence to myself, are not just privately mine (and yet they are 
in the sense of my vital activity) but immediately connect me with other subjectivities. 
This means that I can become the extension of another's life-world. The very generosity 
of my endowment is also my profound vulnerability. 
The Sexual Body as the Sacrament of Intimacy 
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Just as the act of loving sexual union liberates the parties, and forms an enduring bond 
between them, so the act of sexual intrusion robs the person of her body space and 
mysteriously binds her to the violator. Although not speaking of sexual violation, Sartre, 
to my mind, brilliantly articulates the violation of sexual vulnerability: 
... (his) space is made with my space, there is a regrouping in which 1 take part, 
but which escapes me, a regrouping of all the objects which people my 
universe ... (he) has stolen my world from me ... The appearance of the Other in the 
world corresponds therefore to a fixed sliding of the whole universe, to a 
decentralisation of the world which undermines the centralisation which 1 am 
simultaneously effecting (Sartre, 1992A, p343.cfLanger, 1989, p.1S3). 
Everything about my body calls for communion with the Other - for intimacy 
(PhP.p.212; F24S). This intimacy is chief amongst the many possible projects, which my 
body space opens to me122. This is the project of all projects - as the world is the horizon 
of all horizons. The sacrament of this intimacy is my sexual body 'which projects a 
certain setting around itself (phP.p.232; F269). Neutral presence is impossible: my body 
is in the world as the heart is in an organism and forms a system with the world 
(PhP.p.203; p.354). Therefore in the presence of the invasive Other, 1 co-create a world 
with him and lose my grip on my own world 
'I grasp the Other's look at the very centre of my act as the solidification and 
alienation of my possibilities' (Sartre, loc.cit.). 
The extensive clinical literature on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder confirms this 
analysis. 123 The act of sexual intrusion presents as an act of intimacy, that is as an act in 
I nne primacy of intimacy was the theme of Martin Buber's inaugural lecture at the Hebrew University in 
Jerusalem in 1938. It exposed the error Buber saw in Heidegger's teaching that a person is sufficient unto 
himself in his quest of wholeness (Buber 1968). 
123 Hermann (1998, p33ft) IDaIks overwhelming powerlessness as a constant characteristic of the 
experience of trauma; this is accompanied by a terror and rage so massive that it frequently masks itself as 
psychic numbing and manifests as total passivity. The third most significant symptom is recurring 
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which there is mutual sharing of that bodily interiority that constitutes our personal 
identity. In fact, it becomes an act that is lacking every structure, which could constitute it 
as such. The untruth of this action is at the phenomenal level, which is where the 
'between' comes to being. 124 The reality of sexual intrusion is not to be found in either 
pole (the subject or object) of the event but in the system which envelopes both, which 
we have called the between. The event clings to each of them in different ways because it 
is enshrined in their bodies in different ways. 
A Reciprocity ofImpoverishment and the Eclipse of Beauty 
The end of the movement must also be in its beginning. This means that the violator 
must rob his intention of structures which belong there and which constitute it precisely 
as a human action. Structures by their very definition are 'for another' (Mallin, 1979 
p34). We speak here of bodily intentionality. His eyes, for instance, instead of affrrming 
the other's presence in respect, are caught up in an act of alienation and violence. Instead 
of its being an act of communication between equal and embodied subjectivities in which 
the body attunes itself to the human ambience of the other person, it becomes a movement 
towards the other as object or thing. This involves, for the intruder, a special form of 
violence to himself: a denial of those intentions which anonymously come into play in us 
when we are in the presence of another human being. Such denial is called 
'retroflection', which literally means a 'bending back' upon the subject of those energies, 
which have been denied. Retroflection 125 has its own destructive dynamic in terms of 
that person's self-presence. In order that one person may sexually violate another he must 
first mutilate himself in his human structures: in those non-specific 'absolutes', in his 
involuntary replays of the event Each of these extremely painful conditions is an articulation of the 
transcendence, which is the life of the person, to surpass and survive what has happened and re-find 
himself. 
124 Martin Buber, although not speaking in the context of sexual violation but of simple relational 
authenticity, discourses beautifully on intimacy as constituting humanity. (1996, pp.50 -52) 
1 ~troflection is a technical term used in Gestalt psychotherapy and is extensively treated of in the 
textbooks.(e.g. Mackewn, 1997, pp190 -192) 
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senses, in his emotions, in his cognition, in the transcendent dynamic that is his very 
existence - otherwise the action becomes ontologically impossible. This self-denial 
which is the prerogative of human beings (Rahner, K. 1984, p.28i26 is essentially 
untruthful. It denies 
(that) prepossession of a totality which is there before one knows how and why, 
whose realizations are never what we would have imagined them to be, and which 
nevertheless fulfills a secret expectation within us, since we believe in it tirelessly 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968.p 42;) (cfDillon, 1997, p.21O). 
It is not my purpose to enter into a psychological analysis of the abuser. Such would 
involve a long discussion of' splitting', of disassociated states, of the puzzling fact that 
most violators have themselves been violated. Suffice to say that such a person departs 
from that alignment with the world that is our gift in primordial faith and which founds 
our basic sense of belonging. His world has now changed for always. 127 Henceforward 
he dwells, like Cain, in a homeless wilderness. In order that he objectivize another he 
must first objectivize himself In other words he must become a monster - the grotesque 
caricature of a human person. It is also important that we remind ourselves how each one 
of us carries a violating potential within us: The Milgram experiments (Fromm, 1977, 
pp.80-6), the activities of the Einsatzgruppen in Nazi occupied Poland (Goldhagen, 1996, 
Chp.6), and the recent genocides in Rwanda have demonstrated this. 
Contact Deprived of Reciprocity 
On the part of the victim there may be many emotions and special features articulating 
the nature of the violence upon her person. However, because sexuality is a perceptual 
region endowed with a structure through which the other begins to exist for me in a new 
way and draws me into a shared world - there is no way a person can be sexually violated 
126: that 'he/she can overlook the totality of what he/she is, and especially is. '(p.28) 
127With his usual clarity. depth and elegance, Michael 1. Buckley, SJ. addresses this very question in 
Transcendence, Truth and Faith (1978) 
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without being drawn into that world. 128 It is the trauma of sexual violation that one's 
body is made use of contrary to one's will and without reciprocity. This occasions 
massive feelings of shame-, which again is primarily a whole body phenomenon, which 
includes changes in awareness. 
In the absence of reciprocity there is no alter Ego, since the world of the one then 
takes in completely that of the other, so that one feels disinherited in favour of the 
other ..... Once the other is posited, once the other's gaze fixed upon me, has, by 
inserting me into his field, stripped me of part of my being, it will readily be 
understood that I can recover it only by establishing relations with him, by 
bringing about his clear recognition of me, and that my freedom requires the same 
freedom for others (PhP.p.357;F41O). 
The context of this quotation is the chapter Other Selves and the Human World in the part 
where Merleau-Ponty is discussing the 'co-existence of freedoms and Egos' (Mallin, 
1979, p.284). He is envisaging a couple in a relationship where there is an imbalance of 
love. When he says, 'In the absence of reciprocity there is no alter Ego ... ' he means that 
in so far as there is a lack of response in one, the other party will not find herself 
confirmed in the 'between'. However, in the case he cites there is some reciprocity of 
love, albeit diminished. In the case of sexual intrusion there is, I suggest, reciprocity but it 
is a reciprocity of impoverishment. The' between' which is not distinct from the persons 
involved but is their mode of mutual being, is deprived of every shred of that promise of 
happiness which is the definition of beauty. It is a reciprocity of ugliness. 
The gaze of the violator inserts the victim into his field. In this way the victim is 
despoiled of part of herlhis being - that of her/him which, in the primordial contact is 
experienced as co-creating a beautiful and generous, yet ultimately mysterious world; 
beautiful in that it is replete with potentialities of joy, generous in that it presents itself as 
inexhaustible. This loss transforms the person from: 
128 I am acquainted with people who suffered an incident of sexual 'violation' without any appreciable 
hann coming of it. This gives rise to questions that would require a special study . 
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'an insatiable being who appropriates everything he meets, to whom nothing can 
be purely and simply given because he has inherited his share of the world, and 
hence carries within him the project of all possible being, because it has been once 
and for all imprinted in his field of experience (PhP.p.358;F411). 
into a person tortured with 'what psychiatrists call "dysphoria" which patients find almost 
impossible to describe. It is a state of confusion, agitation, emptiness and utter aloneness. 
In the words of one survivor, "sometimes I feel like a dark bundle of confusion. But 
that's a step forward. At times I don't even know that much". '(Hermann, 1998, p.1 08). 
The clinical profile of the person who has suffered sexual intrusion is that of a person 
living through a whole series of alarming 'creative adjustments' to incalculable 
loss. 129That moment of insult (repeated and re-reinforced over time, perhaps) acquires a 
privileged place amongst all the moments of the victim's life: the ever-renewed 
endeavour to undo that moribund contact becomes a consuming preoccupation 
' .... personal time is arrested' (PhP.p.83;F98). The impossible project of the victim is to 
find again the world she lost in the act of violation upon her. Instead ofliving in a present 
which surrenders to a future and so yields a new present, she is trapped in a past that is 
become a present which will not go away: 
.... Time in its passage does not carry away with it these impossible projects; it 
does not close up on traumatic experience; the subject remains open to the same 
impossible future, if not in his explicit thoughts, at any rate in his actual being. 
One present amongst all presents thus acquires an exceptional value; it displaces 
the others and deprives them of their value as authentic presents ........ personal 
time is arrested (phP. p.83; F98). 
129 Judith Lewis Hennann 1998 (p 121) makes the point that the victims of trauma are characterised by 
three things: 
(I) Involuntary replays of what happened. 
(ii) A sense of overwhelming powerlessness 
iii) Terror and rage - frequently damped down. 
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Loss of Identity 
In order to know who I am I depend upon a continuance of the co-creative dialogue with 
my familiar world coming with me out of my known past and establishing me in my 
present. The shock of a traumatic event interrupts this dialogue; connection depends on 
continuity. If the interruption is radical then there can be no transition, because my body 
cannot find enough in common between before and after to begin to appropriate the new 
situation. All connection with that past, which I carry in my body, then becomes difficult 
- even impossible - and it becomes equally difficult to remain anchored in the world. I no 
longer know who I am or what I am doing here because that primordial moment of 
conjunction has been eclipsed. I lose my sense of being rooted in a world I no longer 
know, and then, as night follows day, I do not know who I am or where I have gone, I 
cannot distinguish the real from the unreal and madness beckons. 
My consciousness of myself is given me not as a separate area of knowledge but as 
utterly inseparable from my intimate contact with the world (Mallin,1979, p.59). It is only 
in terms of the world that I know myself (phP.p.82;F97). Basically I know who I am from 
my body-in-contact-with-the-world. Whatever disrupts my dialogue with the world 
endangers my sense of who I am. 
Ambiguity of Sexual Intimacy 
Sexual contact is essentially an appropriation - that is to say, for each party the body of 
the other becomes part of his/her world. And that exchange when reciprocal is joyous and 
pleasurable. This is a union of embodied subjectives. Existentially each experiences in 
this appropriation, a heightening of uniqueness, an especial affirmation of self-hood, and 
at the same time a flood of sensations powerful and yet anonymous. This is the 
confirmation at the phenomenal level of the tacit cogito, which says, 'You belong'. 
In the act of sexual intrusion the shame that swamps the embodied subjectivity of the 
victim is in total contradiction to our being-in-the-world. Our being is a becoming and 
situated being. Everything about me is, from the very start, relational. In that primary 
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cogito' There is something and not nothing' my thrownness reveals that 'I belong here; 
this is my home. In this atmosphere of connaturality 1 am given to myself as a 'single 
cohesion oflife' (Mallin,1979, p.59). 
, in a single temporality that progressively explicates itself from its birth and 
confirms it in each present' (PhP.p.328;F378). 
The world delivers itself to me as a single individual of constant style and inexhaustible 
generosity. 
from the very start I am in communication with one being, and one only, a vast 
individual from which my own experiences are taken and which persists on the 
horizon of my life as the distant roar of a great city provides the background to 
everything we do in it (phP.p.328; F378). 
Movement towards intimacy is the logic of situatedness. Thereto I am carried by the 
eager transcendence, which is my being. In the face of the beloved I read my name and 
find the anchorage of my being. Because my existence is transcendence I am drawn to 
this world by the very movements in my body (PhP.p.79;F95). Unless I am emotionally 
ill, my behaviour is automatically attuned to the ambient situation either negatively or 
positively. Even ifI make a conscious effort not to be drawn by this gaze my effort not to 
enter that world becomes my way of being. So it is that Merleau-Ponty can say: 
We are literally what other people think of us (p.l06; F123) 
It (sensation) takes place in an atmosphere of generality and gives itself to us 
as anonymous ... I ought to say that one perceives in me ... (p.216~ F249) (cf 
Mallin, 1979, p.47.) 
Even the smallest baby is caught up into the world of the other. 130 
l~nore c. Terr (1999, pp.64ft) documents some instances of children who were sexually abused when 
they were 12-18 months old, re-enacting these events at a later age. 
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My Body is My History 
Our bodies carry our history and make available to us the sedimented experience of our 
past (PhP.p.130;F151). Every event in which we are caught up lays down intentional 
tracks in us, which connect us existentially with that event for the rest of our lives. The 
scar on my leg from a football injury received in 1956 bears witness to this. Primordial 
contact is a singular kind of event. It is an ever-present inscription in every single act of 
perception. This 'preconceptual faith' is not something distinct from my body. It is my 
body. As my body is an event which makes it possible to speak about other events, so my 
body is also the guarantor of my present which emerges from my past, and of my future 
as protended in my present body. This body is the unfolding of my becoming. My 
dialogue with the world is happening to me now just as really as it happened in those first 
moments of my being. 
My body is the pivot of my world (PhP.p.350~F402) not only in regard to orientations 
and distances but also in regard to what we call time. Let us set aside that view of time as 
some thing -like '01' Man River that just' keeps rolling' along' - (as something I simply 
observe) and let us see it instead as me in process of becoming - then it becomes easier to 
appreciate that every event that ever happens to us is carried in the flesh of our bodies 
and, therefore, I can say: my body is my history (PhP.p.85;F101). That way the past can 
magically become the 'here and now'. Every event in my body's history remains in the 
field, which is my body. So it can be as operative now as it was 'once-upon a-time'. 
Every subsequent experience of surprise and joy - every breathtaking advent of parental 
love and generosity becomes possible because of this primary paradigm (Wright, 1991). 
It is a summons to existence - in the original sense of' being outstanding' - being an 
individual with a name. This is the polarity of shame where the dynamic is towards self-
annihilation. The fullness and abundance of what is given us in primordial contact 
persists throughout every instant of our 'lived world' (Dillon, 1997, p87). Sexual 
intrusion is a subversion of all this abundance. 
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Healing - The Re-Appropriation of Body Space 
The movement in therapy, as elaborated upon so well by Kepner (1995) will be towards 
the restoration of what Merleau-Ponty calls 'body image' or body space. (PhP.p.98ff; 
Fl14). This refers to my body as given to me - as a dynamic relationship to a multitude 
of possible realisations (PhP. p.lOO;Fll1). Like receiving my rightful inheritance. This 
body-space has meaning in the phenomenal field and is the foundation for that 'space' 
which we imagine the stars inhabit. Body space is essentially a wondrous potentiality for 
a certain world (PhP.p.106;F123). It is -like the darkness in the cinema -'the zone of not 
being, in front of which precise beings, figures and points can come to light' (PhP.plOl; 
FII7) italics mine. My body becomes the silent third term in all subsequent orientations 
because it is the orientation of all other orientations. Distances, adjustments of vision 
and of the other senses are contingencies attendant upon this sense of my body space. 
This is, in fact, my being-in-the-world (PhP.p.79; F95). Body space, and all our sense 
structures, as Merleau-Ponty has demonstrated, are given us in that first primordial 
contact with the world. 
Our sedimented situations - those acquired worlds (PhP. p.130; F151) which offer 
launching pads for our action, can get in the way between me and my client. Pre-
packaged approaches, rules of thumb, can spoil this dialogue; they belong at the objective 
level and prevent my being with this person at that preconceptuallevel where the injury 
has happened. l3l I am summoned by my client to be present, not so much as a 
professional something-or-other, but as a person with a person. I could step back into the 
objective world of my thinking (Jacobs 1989,. pp.44-45) - and that way by-pass my 
client. 
l3Icf Jung,1935/1963. The Principles of Practical Psychotherapy. This is a remarkable text. It is a lecture 
delivered by Jung to the Zurich Medical Society in 1935 which anticipates the principles of 'immediate 
positive regard' made famous by Carl Rogers. I believe that Jung was so profoundly insightful because of 
his phenomenological approach (cfBrook 1993). 
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I need to have a care for everything that goes on between us. I need to beware of my 
assumptions, mindful that I am in the presence of someone who experiences the world 
quite differently from me. So, I check with my client, for instance, how it is for her to sit 
facing me - a man. We go very slowly. It may take months for her to become aware of 
her perception rather than of the object of her perception (me); to come from that place in 
her where she experiences what it is like to be where she is, sitting opposite a stranger 
and be safe. We are so juxta-posed in order that we may perceive one another which is 
not just a function of the eyes and ears but of all of our bodies. (phP.p 326;F376). And it 
is she who decides where she sits and even where I sit: optimal distance 
(PhP.p.302;F348). She wants to be there. The thrust of our transcendence has brought us 
together. She has come because of her distress, which, like all phenomena, is pregnant 
with its form and is waiting for a context in which it can be resolved (Dillon, 1997, 
p.99). Masked by the shame, her heart yearns to be known and in that being known and 
knowing to be reconciled with the world in her body. 
The Intervention of Psychotherapy 
Gestalt therapy rides upon that primary event of primordial faith because it is in the 
subversion of this primordial faith that the origins of profound psychopathology are to be 
found. And, reciprocally, it is at this level that psychotherapy moves to restore the beauty 
and abundance of this first embrace of the world. 132 The very vulnerability, which 
allowed the client to lose her world in the act of violation, now becomes the vehicle of 
her restoration. 
My client and I, like the parts of one body 'form a system' , a Gestalt, so that what goes 
on for her affects me and what goes on for me affects her. Mutuality is given us. She 
begins to feel she is no longer alone. 
132Mallin (loc.cit. p.S8 ft.nt) remarks that Langan (1966) misses out on the notion of primordial contact in 
in his book. Mallin holds that to omit it is to miss out on the basis of Merleau-Ponty's ontology. 
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We proceed to co-create something. And even as I say this I realize it is not a thing we 
make but a between. 'It is in the relating per se that being is disclosed rather than in 
either of its poles, subjectivity or otherness' (Mallin 1979, p.29). Hopefully she will find 
in her therapist one who addresses the longing of her heart for restoration and at the same 
time knows the darkness of her heart, but with a knowledge that is also loving. Through 
this relationship which she experiences as a bodily event she begins to restore that contact 
with the world which will speak that twofold message: 'You Belong and You are 
Beautiful. ' 
Conclusion 
In this Appendix we have considered an aspect of sexual violation which attracts very 
little attention: what is it in the act that constitutes it as so catastrophic for the victim? 
We considered it in the light of existential phenomenology. We saw how the sexual life 
of a person is that area in which he/she is most vulnerable and this is so because of its 
indeterminacy. Sexual violation compromises the lived body in its basic sense of 
belonging in the world and this is congruent with the findings of the extensive studies on 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Whereas specifically cognitive approaches can be useful 
to resolve the persons ability to function in his/her everyday life, a therapy such as 
Gestalt therapy, whose proper area of operation is precisely the phenomenal field, is 
especially helpful for people who have been subjected to sexual violation. 
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Appendix B 
Brief notes about Merleau-Ponty and Gestalt Therapy 
) 133 hil (i)Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908 - 1961 was a p osopher and psychologist, a 
contemporary and colleague of Jean-Paul Sartre. He served in the war, was taken 
prisoner, released and then joined the Resistance. His first major work, La Structure du 
Comportment, was published in 1942, and translated as The Structure oj Behaviour in 
1963. In this work he steps back from himself, prescinds from his awareness, and , 'using 
the traditional procedures of science, observes animal and human behaviour from the 
point of view of the of the uninvolved spectator. '(Geraets T. 1971, p.38)mt. 
This research convinced him that vital activity is an integrated whole, a Gestalt, whose 
nature is distorted and lost by being broken down into its 'component parts'. He 
demonstrates powerfully the inadequacy of the behaviourist, mechanistic and 
neurophysiological explanations of both animal and human behaviour, which fragment 
the Gestalt. 
This work was preparatory to his next and best known work: Phenomenologie de fa 
Perception, published by Gallimard in 1945. It was translated into English by Colin 
Smith in 1962 as Phenomenology oj Perception and this translation has, since then, gone 
through ten reprints. Thereafter Merleau-Ponty wrote a formidable amount of material, 
much of which has been made readily available by the Northwestern University Press. 
His untimely death :from a heart attack in 1961 in no way halted academic interest in his 
thinking. Priest S. (1998) devotes twenty-nine pages listing 'Secondary Sources' for 
material relating to Merleau-Ponty. 
His philosophic concern was with the inadequate explanations of perception brought 
forward by the Empiricist and Idealist philosophers. Neither of those schools, in his 
view, accounts for the body's role in perception as the articulation of our being-in-the-
133 No adequate biography ofMerleau-Ponty is yet available. For the above account I mostly reference 
Kruks (1981) and Langer (1989). 
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world; the perceiver is not just a thinking head or a passive recipient of stimuli emitted 
by things, but an embodied subjectivity. Dillon, M.(1997 xiii), says that Merleau-Ponty 
is the first western philosopher to offer a viable solution to that age-old problem which 
Binswanger calls 'the Achilles heal of psychotherapy: the disjunction of subject and 
object. Dillon (1995, p.3) also sees such post-modem' thinkers as Jacques Derrida as 
profoundly challenged by the philosophy ofMerleau-Ponty. This mainly, has to do with 
Merleau-Ponty's central demonstration that the only vaIidfoundation for knowledge is 
our bodily inherence in the world. Much of the Phenomenology of Perception is 
refutation of his adversaries; and in this process of demonstrating the inadequacy of the 
explanations of perception brought forward by the Idealists and the Empiricists, he 
explains his own position. He differs with Sartre on the question of the primordial 
orientation of a human being: Sartre said it was alienation, Merleau-Ponty said it was 'to 
be with' (Langer, M. 1989 pp54 and 152). 
Politically he was a devoted Marxist/socialist but finally withdrew his cooperation with 
Sartre on the editorial board of Les Temps Modemes when he took issue over the brutal 
suppression of the Hungarian revolt in 1956. As a psychologist / philosopher he belongs 
within the tradition of Bins wanger, Frankel and Jaspers seeking understanding, rather 
than within that of Freud, Kraft-Ebbing and Piaget who sought explanation in terms of 
efficient causality. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty in his work, is greatly influenced by the 
holism of Kurt Goldstein and the Gestalttheorie_ofthe Berlin School (Wertheimer, 
Kohler, Koflka and Lewin). They see the human being as a living Gestalt where every 
part is in intimate communication with every other part, and where the totality is wholly 
present in every part. Like a soap bubble. It was in his analysis and critique of Hegel 
under the influence of Kojeve whose lectures he attended in 1933, that Merleau-Ponty is 
said to have developed his own conception of dialectical existence (Kruks, 1981, p.24). 
Most of all was he influenced by HusserI whom he regarded, always respectfully, as his 
teacher - even when he disagreed with him. He was also influenced, though to a lesser 
degree, by Heidegger. Both Heidegger and Husserl were Phenomenologists and called for 
a 'return to things' but each meant something quite different by the phrase. For Merleau-
Ponty, 'return to the things' is reciprocity in giving and taking between one's body and 
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the world; a continuous to-and-fro between my senses and the phenomenon to check that 
one is describing not composing. 
He founded his work upon two principles: (i) The ontological primacy the of the 
phenomenon as the foundation of all our contact with reality: the phenomenon is all we 
have of reality. And (ii) The primacy of perception as the epistemological guarantee of 
all knowledge. Because of their primitive immediacy and simplicity, because they emerge 
from reflection upon felt bodily experience these two principles are not amenable to proof 
in a formal way. They are self-evident in the sense that, in order even to call them into 
question we need to presuppose them. 
Two months before his death, Merleau-Ponty gave an interview to Le Monde. There he 
returns to his most penetrating and (for us) most relevant insight:. 
I have always been struck by the fact that ever since he dealt with the body, 
Husserl no longer spoke the same language (as before). One cannot study the 
body as anything else in the world. The body is at the same time (a lafoi) visible 
and seeing (voyant). Here there is no longer duality, but indissoluble unity; it is 
the same body that is seen and sees. This is where I wish to start out from ( in 
Geraets, 1971, p.181)mt. 
One could say that his Phenomenology is one very long reflection upon human being-in-
the-world as embodied subjectivity. 
(ii) Gestalt Psychotherapy 134 is generally attributed to and connected with Fritz Perls 
(1893 -1970) and his wife Laura Perls (1905-1990). Fritz served in the First World War 
as a medical orderly and his experience of a gas attack profoundly influenced his life. His 
134There is an abundance of material available about Fritz Peds and the history of Gestalt Psychotherapy: 
Clarkson P. and Mackewn, 1. (1996); Perls, F .. (1969); (1971); Peds et al.(l973). On Laura Perls cfKogan 
(1991) 
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wife Laura was a gifted intellectual, well acquainted with Gestalttheorie and the 
Existentialism of Kierkegaard and Buber. She was very influential in forming the 
personalist aspect of Gestalt therapy and in maintaining the central focus of Gestalt 
therapy in the lived body. Perls himself qualified as a medical doctor and a 
psychoanalyst. He was not a great thinker and has suffered much criticism for his 
grandiosity as a psychotherapist. 135 His genius was to discern what was missing in 
psychoanalysis and then to gather together with his own insights, the insights and 
experiences of other people and of very diverse traditions. and come up with a powerful 
approach to treating emotionally disturbed people. 
The 'Dark Night' of Gestalt began even before Perls died. 136 Gestalt therapy was being 
taken up by ill-trained people and practiced as a set of 'magic' techniques. 137 Thereafter 
during the 70's it went through a phase where the stress was on dramatic emotional 
discharges and instant charismatic effects. It speedily got itself a 'bad' name. Often it 
became grossly individualistic and anti-intellectual, without respect even for those 
boundaries around sexual contact between therapist and client. Even to-day there are still 
some people in Gestalt therapy practice who claim adherence to what they term is the 
'authentic' tradition of Per Is, Hefl'erline and Goodman and emerge as anarchic, anti-
intellectual and sometimes disrespectful of clients. Whatever the criticisms that have 
been levelled at Fritz Perls it must be admitted that he launched a therapy that was far 
ahead of his time. He influenced many people and his own story In and Out of the 
Garbage Pail (1977) went through ten reprints in eight years. As I shall say in my chapter 
the Foundations of Gestalt Therapy, we can discern some anti-intellectualist bias in PerIs 
and Goodman - another co-founder of the therapy. They were in reaction against that 
135 
Masson, 1. (1992, p.2S2-255) savages him on several accounts. 
136 
Peds own views are abundantly available in Gestalt Therapy Verbatim (1971) and in his In and Out of 
the Garbage Pail (1977). 
137 
This is well documented by Yontef, G. (1991) in a very informative article. He also devotes the first 
hundred pages of his Awareness, Dialogue and Process (1993) to a series of dissertations on the 
vicissitudes and development of Gestalt therapy. Most enlightening. 
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hands-off, stepping-back approach. We need to remember also that the emphasis Gestalt 
therapy placed upon feeling and the articulation of one's state, came as something of a 
shock to a society which had been educated to pack personal calamities into a bag and 
'Smile, Smile, Smile!' .However we may explain it, Gestalt therapy got itself a bad name 
as being against thinking. 
A change came in the 1980' s with such trainers and writers as Y ontef , Delisle, Clarkson, 
Fry, and Parlett. These were people open to learning, wanting to find the rationale 
behind this effective therapy and with an appetite to tackle difficult questions. Whereas 
they appreciated the power of the immediacy of Gestalt therapy, they brought to training 
a new rigor and insisted on standards and on respect as the hallmark of the Gestalt 
psychotherapist. Some of those mentioned above were amongst the founders of the 
Gestalt Psychotherapy and Training Institute which has profoundly influenced the 
development of Gestalt therapy in the UK. This is an umbrella organization comprising 
major accredited training centres throughout the UK. There are also other training 
centres, such as the Sherwood Psychotherapy Training Institute, which prepare their 
students for membership of the United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy precisely as 
Gestalt psychotherapists. The professional training programme is long, arduous and 
demanding. 
I made my training in such an institute in London. It was my personal experience of 
being respected, that moved me to train at the Metanoia Institute in the late '80s and 
take my Diploma examination with the GPTI. The status of Gestalt therapy has been 
hugely assisted by the establishment of the British Gestalt Journal in 1991, which is now 
respected the world over for its excellence as a learned and professional journal. Gestalt 
therapy has many critics, most notably amongst people who know it only from hearsay. It 
is with Gestalt therapy, as it is with phenomenological reduction: there can be no 
secondhand appeal to experience to validate it; this can only be achieved by doing it and, 
having done it, look back at it. 
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Gestalt therapy 'works' from the basic principle that all illness is an interruption of that 
on-going dialogue with the world and with others which constitutes our lives. Because 
perception is essentially a bodily activity, this interruption is always manifest in 'the 
experiential physiognomy' 138 of the person. The therapist and client meet with one 
another and engage as human beings. (Not as doctor with helpless patient, or as 
disembodied spirits). This engagement is marked by that mutual respect of embodied 
subjectivities: the therapist allows the client to emerge - in her own way - so, I don't rush 
to prop her up with cushions or exhort her to 'sit back and relax'! The client finds/feels 
him/herself seen and heard and taken seriously. (perception is essentially a bodily 
activity.) This allows awareness to develop of those areas in the body of the person that 
are 'dead'. This, in tum, opens the door to an awareness of needs and an ability to relate 
to others ever more intimately. Pioneering work on this meeting and growth towards 
intimacy has been done by Hycner and Jacobs (1995). Jacobs herself has become and 
Intersubjective Psychoanalyst, but is not slow to point out how this new direction in 
psychoanalysis has been the practice in Gestalt for several decades. 
Gestalt is a very open therapy in that it accomodates a great range of different styles of 
psychotherapy. Some will emphasize movement or breathing or visualization or narrative 
or experiments or the expression of deeply felt experiences. The therapy is adapted to the 
person not the person to the therapy. Respect for the person is the hallmark of the Gestalt 
practitioner. For a more elaborate discussion of Gestalt therapy cfH.P. Chapter 7 p186ff. 
Gestalt Therapy as a Style 
My concept of Gestalt therapy has emerged from my processing a huge mass of material 
over many years. This volume of material comprises many different sources: my own 
personal experience, experience in training, supervision, therapy (both as client and 
therapist); the mass of written material available; conversation with colleagues, meetings, 
138 
I take this expression from Brooke, R (1993, p33) 
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workshops and conferences. From all this I bring a concept of Gestalt therapy that is in 
part shared with others, in part quite idiosyncratic. I am not in the position that I can say 
definitively, such and such is Gestalt therapy because the therapist is doing this or that. 139 
There is rather a style, which I recognise as Gestalt therapy, just as there is a style that 
distinguishes people in their walk, their approach to life, the way they move, their 
silhouette and their manner of speech. 
End of Notes 
139 I know that Yontef (1993) claims that any thempy that pmctices dialogue, phenomenology and field 
theory is Gestalt therapy (1993, p.203). 
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